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HISTORY

OF THE

WAR.

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A polling booth during the Greek Elections at the end of 1915. All the supporters of M. Venizelos abstained from voting as a protest against the way in which the Elections had been brought about. [Topical.

HISTORY OF THE WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE INTERVENTION OF BULGARIA.

BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE BALKANS—THE IMPORTANCE OF BULGARIA—THE ALLIED NEGOTIATIONS—THEIR FAILURE AND ITS CAUSES—THE MAGNITUDE OF THE GERMAN SCHEMES—THE ALLIES AND GREECE—THE POLICY OF M. VENIZELOS—HIS RESIGNATION—THE LANDING AT SALONIKA—AT WAR WITH BULGARIA.


THE events described in the last volume—the reconquest of Galicia by the reorganised Austrian armies, the expulsion of the Russians from Poland, and the British failures in the Dardanelles-had a profound effect on the politics of the Balkan States. A former chapter (Vol. II., Chap. 25) has described how the Russian successes over Austria, the gradual shifting of the strategic centre of the war from West to East, and the prospect that the Balkan States might join the Allies, led to the beginning of the campaign in Gallipoli. The failure of that campaign—due partly to mistakes in the field, but mainly to our preoccupation with the campaign in France—brings us back to Balkan politics, in which the cause of the Allies was now to suffer the worst defeat that it had yet had in the war. It is necessary for the proper understanding of these misfortunes to gather up some loose ends of diplomatic history.

A phrase of which much was heard in the negotiations that preceded the war was the "localising of the conflict." Sir Edward Grey's position in the negotiations was that we had no interest in the dispute between Austria and Servia, except in so far as it might involve France; our direct interest only began with the menace to France and with Germany's invasion of Belgium in order to be at grips with France more quickly. "It was clear," said M. Sazonoff, to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, in August, 1914, "that Austrian domination of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the dependence of the Netherlands on Germany would be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia a question of life and death." The course of the war was to show that the independence of Servia might mean even more to the British Empire than the independence of the Low Countries. Germany in possession of Holland and Belgium would, so long as we remained superior at sea, be in



Members of a Bulgarian comitadjis.

[Topical.



A hamlet near Strumnitza, which was destroyed by a party of Bulgarian raiders who crossed the frontier in the early days of the war. [Central News.

very little better position to attack this country, whereas she would undoubtedly be more exposed to attacks from us. Belgium, Holland, and Denmark are all, in fact, much more valuable to Germany as neutral screens against our sea-power than as bases of attack against us. We, on the other hand, are more vulnerable to attack in the East; only in Egypt and in India is our command of the sea not a complete protection to us. That fact explains our long rivalry with Russia, our Afghan Wars, and our bolstering up of Turkey against Russia. At the beginning of the war Egypt and India had a triple rampart—first Servia, second neutral Bulgaria, and thirdly neutral Turkey; and it was natural, though not very prescient, to regard Servian

politics as a matter of comparative indifference. But with the entry into the war of Turkey the situation changed, greatly to our detriment. From that moment our interest in the war shifted to the East. The attempt to force the Dardanelles was a recognition of the fact, though perhaps not a wholly conscious one; the chief immediate stimulus to it was a desire to help Russia, and it was believed in the Balkans that had we won through and occupied Constantinople our intention was to hand over its possession to Russia. This belief, whether wellfounded or not, destroyed the political value of the expedition as a means of bringing over the Balkan neutrals to our side. Roumania, Servia, Bulgaria and Greece were united in dislike and jealousy of Turkey, if in nothing

ACCAS PACTALE

TRAING CTE CARRY

The stone monument erected by the Servians as a memorial of the Bulgarian raid into Servian territory. [Central News.

else; but except Servia, who had no interest in the future of the Straits, none had any reason to wish success to an expedition which would put Russia in the position of Turkey at Constantinople, and in possession of the Dardanelles. Roumania in particular, for obvious reasons, greatly preferred Turkey at Constantinople to Russia; and whatever chance there was of her joining us in the war in 1915 disappeared with the beginning of the Dardanelles operations (Vol. II., 250-51).

THE IMPORTANCE OF BULGARIA.

That Turkey's entry into the war was a menace to us in the East was of course understood in this country, A_3 Vol. $IV,^*$

but the danger which people had in mind was that this new war might distract our energies from what was still regarded as our main field of operations in the West. The real danger, however, was very much more serious. Bulgaria, as has already been explained (Vol. II., 249), had a bitter grievance against Servia in her possession of a part of Macedonia inhabited by Bulgars. It was not a Governmental grievance merely, but was shared by the vast majority of the Bulgarian people; nor did it reconcile them to the Treaty of Bukharest, and the loss of what they regarded as their just rights in Macedonia, that their Government had put them completely in the wrong by the treacherous attack on the Servian army. The desire to recover Bulgarian Mace-

nating passion of the whole people, and by comparison with this all other political objects were trifles. When Turkey joined in the war, therefore, there was nothing between Britain as an Eastern Power and Germany but Bulgaria. For against a combined attack by Germany and Bulgaria, it was obvious that Servia could not hold her ground. The opening up of through communication between Germany and the Turkish Empire might, or might not, bring immediate danger to our Empire in the East; but it must inevitably have one very grave strategic consequence. So long as Servia held outand that depended most of all on the staunchness of Bulgaria-a deadlock meant victory for the Allies. But if Servia's resistance

donia was the domi-

was crushed and Bulgaria went over to the enemy, deadlock meant victory for Germany. In the one case, to keep what we had was to defeat Germany's objects in beginning the war; the Central Powers were isolated from the possibility of expansion. In the other case, the policy of isolation had been defeated, and we had not merely to hold our own but to break the Germans in order to achieve anything that could be called a victory.

The keys were thus in the keeping of Bulgaria, and her neutrality (if her adhesion to our cause could not be secured) was a British interest hardly second in importance to our possession of the Straits of Dover. The Central

Powers had already shown their hand, for Austria, to whom had been committed the duty of attacking Russia at the beginning of the war, and who also had an Italian frontier which needed watching, would hardly have led an expedition into Servia* too unless her early overthrow had been a primary object of her policy. The invasion of August was repeated in September, and this second failure was followed by a third attempt in November, and that at a time when Austria was suffering defeat after defeat at the hands of Russia. Austria must have been endeavouring all this time to secure the assistance of Bulgaria, but without success. At the first Christmas of the war, and for a few months afterwards, the Allies had it in their power to make the defeat of the Central Powers' Balkan policy certain. Had Bulgaria been brought over to our cause at this time, it needed nothing more to win the war than to uphold Servia-an easy matter with Bulgaria on our side- and to maintain our position in the West. The British blockade and the mere efflux of time would have done the rest. Germany might,

and probably would, have concentrated against Russia, but her victories in Galicia would have been neutralised in all probability by the adhesion of Greece and Roumania, and they could not have been pressed so far with the risk of an invasion of Transylvania by Roumania.

THE ALLIES' NEGOTIATIONS WITH BULGARIA.

In the meantime, however, we depended entirely on Bulgaria; and there was only one way in which this risk could be avoided and all the gains made secure, namely, by removing the grievance that Bulgaria cherished against Servia. That condition was never grasped until it was too late. Negotiations began with


Bulgaria early, but they were very unwisely left almost entirely in the hands of the Russian Minister at Sofia, who seems to have done little but bring Bulgarian and Servian representatives together and leave them to come to an arrangement a procedure that was quite hopeless (Vol. II., 250). The only authentic account that we have of the early diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the Allies was given in an official statement issued by Russia after Bulgaria had gone to war, and is too controversial in tone to be accepted as a wholly trustworthy guide to what happened. But even in this Russian statement it is evident that its full value was not put on Bulgarian assistance. August, 1914, the Russian Government informed Bulgaria that "a faithful and honest approximation of her policy with the actions of Russia would yield her tangible advantages, while the creation by

trouble in Macedonia and all actions directed against Servia would be considered as an open act of hostility to Russia." This was the language of threats rather than of conciliation. At the same time, the Powers approached Servia in order to discover how far she would be willing to go in order to win the support of Bulgaria. On August 29th, 1914, the Ministers of the Allied Governments handed a Note to the Servian Premier suggesting that if Bulgaria fought on the side of the Allies Servia might agree to make territorial concessions after the war. Servia, who had just beaten off the first Austrian invasion, agreed to the cession of a portion of her territory after the war provided that she were compensated by an extension of her frontiers to the North. It would have been reasonable for Servia, seeing that she was surrendering some of her territory, to ask for military assistance from the Powers. For Servia had no longer any direct interest in Turkish affairs, and if Bulgaria only remained neutral that was as much as she needed. The concession by Servia of

> territory, therefore, on condition that Bulgaria attacked Turkey was quite definitely a concession to Allied interests. Servia asked for assistance it was quite out of the question for any of the Powers to give it her at this stage. There seems, however, some reason for thinking that the Powers encouraged Servia make the incursion into Bosnia (Vol. I. 339), which achieved no military results except that of weakening her strength.

When Turkey entered the war the Powers again submitted proposals—not further defined—as the price of Bulgarian assistance, but as apparently they gave Bulgaria no more than had already been offered, and Turkey had now come into the war and was in a position to attack

her from the rear, the offer can hardly have been very tempting. In January, the Powers considered a fresh scheme, which had been favoured by Russia, and is said by her to have been "based on the following principles:— (1) The transference to Bulgaria for her joining the Allies of the so-called undisputed territory* in Macedonia; (2) compensation to Servia by certain Austrian territories and wide access to the Adriatic." These proposals do not go much beyond those which had already been discussed in the previous September, except in so far as they promise Servia "wide" access to the Adriatic. But vague as these terms were, they would seem not to have been actually offered, the reasons given by Russia being that her victories had made Servia indisposed to concession, and that the Bulgarian Government was at that time unmistakably resolved "not to abandon its



The two "Zones" in Macedonia.

^{*} For the sake of uniformity with the earlier volumes the familiar spelling of Servia has been kept. But the Serbs themselves prefer Serbia, the "land of the Serbs"

^{*} This is the zone in Southern Macedonia which Servia had promised to leave to Bulgaria. The possession of the northern zone was to be referred to the arbitration of the Tsar of Russia. See Map.

attitude of expectancy." On the other hand, in opposition to this opinion of the Russian Government, there is some evidence that in these first three months of the year Bulgaria was more disposed to come in on reasonable terms than at any other time of the war, and it would seem a singularly unfortunate coincidence that just at this time proposals, which might at any rate have served as the basis of discussion, should have been withheld. It certainly looked very black against the Bulgarian Government that it should have allowed irregular bands to raid Macedonia, for there is no doubt that had it been so disposed it could have stopped their incursions. These raids, however, are not conclusive proof that Bulgaria had made up her mind against the Entente and for the Central Powers. They were proof, however, that she was determined to possess herself of Macedonia somehow, and was very willing to prod Servia into giving up territory which Bulgaria thought was rightfully hers. But so long as she got the territory, she did not greatly care from whom. At the beginning of the year it looked as though Austria was beaten, and that she stood a much better chance of getting what she wanted from the Entente Powers. Then, if at no other time, negotiation might have had a good chance of success.

The entry of Italy into the war made it necessary, to reconsider the problems of Balkan policy, and caused further delay in the presentation of the Allied pro-Later, a definite offer was made to Bulgaria that if she took the field against Turkey with all her forces the Powers agreed to the cession of Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line, which was the eastern frontier of Bulgaria under the Treaty of London, and to the cession of Southern Macedonia, including Egri Palanki, Ochrida, and Monastir, provided that the occupation of this district were deferred till the end of the war, and finally promised to give Bulgaria financial assistance. That offer was made on May 29th, but by that time the military conditions had very materially changed. Italy, it is true, had joined the Entente Powers, but the Germans had begun their victories in Galicia, and our prospects of success in Gallipoli had somewhat clouded. Not that Bulgaria was enthusiastic over the expedition, which, indeed, in so far as it promised to make Russia the future mistress of the Straits, was highly distasteful to her, but she was quite prepared to acknowledge the logic of the stricken field, and had early success attended our efforts in Gallipoli she would have hastened to pay court to us. As it was, the argument of success-which is the strongest in the diplomacy of Balkan politics, at any rate--was by the beginning of June with the enemy.

BULGARIA AND THE CENTRAL POWERS.

Meanwhile the diplomatists of Austria and Germany had not been idle. At the beginning of the year it seemed as though they were playing for no higher stakes than Bulgaria's neutrality; until they were themselves in a position to move there was nothing to be gained by asking for more. Indeed, it might have been fatal to the German plans to have it suspected that she wanted more than neutrality. In that case, Servia would have thrown herself on Bulgaria at the first sign of her mobilisation; and unless the Central Powers were in a position to co-operate and hold Servia by an attack from the North, the whole plan might have been wrecked at the outset and Sofia occupied before the mobilisation was complete. It was necessary, therefore, for the Central Powers to move with great


caution and secrecy, and to preserve as long as they could their advantage over the Allied negotiators, namely, that whereas the Allies made participation in the war a condition of their offers, it was enough for the immediate purposes of the Germanic Powers if Bulgaria remained neutral. It is difficult to determine when the plans for joint co-operation between the Central Powers and Bulgaria first took definite shape. The probability is that there were military conversations between their representatives long before Bulgaria was definitely committed to any line of policy. Such plans may well have been in existence at the very beginning of the war, and nothing is more likely than that King Ferdinand was a party to those conversations. it is obvious that Bulgaria would not have remained quiescent (except for occasional raids) during the Austrian invasions had either Ferdinand or his Government been definitely committed to the Central Powers. That his sympathies were from the first with Germany there is no doubt, but he is not only an ambitious but an extremely cold and calculating schemer, and he is not the man to allow any sentimental regard for Germany to seduce him from what he might consider as the path of advancement. His German sympathies might give him greater faith in German military power, and incline him to exact the full pound of flesh in any bargain with the Entente, subject to those considerations. But he was eminently a man who could be seduced from his sentiments, and indeed held himself out quite frankly to the highest bidder. In spite of his German birth and his belief in German military might, he could probably have been brought over to the side of the Allies at any time before June had the offer been large enough.

THE CAUSES OF THE ALLIES' FAILURE.

How came the Allies to miss their opportunity? The chief explanation, perhaps, is that the negotiations were in the hands of Russia, who had no wish to encourage Bulgarian aspirations on the side of Turkey, and indeed had come to regard Bulgarian Nationalism as a source of real danger to herself. Russia, moreover, at this time probably exaggerated the value of her victories over Austria, and thought that her end was approaching; and naturally thinking that, she would not be prepared to pay a high price for Bulgaria's support. Moreover, the management of Servia was by no means an easy matter. To make certain of Bulgaria it would have been necessary to exercise an amount of pressure on Servia amounting almost to threats of coercion. Russia undoubtedly could and would have applied the necessary pressure had she realised how rapidly the sands were running out, but unfortunately she did not realise it until it was too late and her military misfortunes had set in. France and Great Britain might have hastened the progress of the negotiations, but both at this time made it a principle of their diplomacy to leave as much as possible to Russia in the Near East, under the impression-certainly erroneous in our case-that Russia's interests were paramount. There were other reasons, too, for this easy-going attitude of the Western Powers. The risk that Bulgaria might join the Central Powers was considered, and in all probability rejected as negligible. There seemed to be a double insurance against it alike on the North and the South. could Bulgaria think of attacking Servia and tearing up the Treaty of Bukharest with Roumania's attitude



Ferdinand of Bulgaria photographed with his two sons and the chiefs of the Bulgarian army. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



Bulgaria mobilises: Bulgarian troops in their field quarters.

[L.N..1.

uncertain and with Greece bound by Treaty to support Servia? And for the first three or four months of the year the double insurance seemed to be quite satisfactory. The resignation of M. Venizelos, no doubt, came as a shock to complacency; but between a refusal by Greece to take part in the Dardanelles expedition and make concessions to Bulgaria in the common interest and actual desertion of Servia, there was a great gulf which the Western Powers never dreamt could be bridged.

THE POSITION OF GREECE.

An alternative policy for the Allies would have been to form a close alliance with Greece. That would in all probability have meant abandoning all hope of inducing Bulgaria to take up arms against Turkey; it would certainly have meant the employment of a larger army in the East than the Western Powers had any thought of in the first four or five months of the year. But the alternative was well worth considering. As has already been described (Vol. II., 254), an arrangement was provisionally made with M. Venizelos in January for Greek intervention in the war. Greece was to obtain large cessions of territory round Smyrna, and to cede Kavala to Bulgaria. But it was a condition of the bargain that Bulgaria should abandon her neutrality at the same time as Greece; and this condition wrecked the whole arrangement. The cession of Kavala was soon seen to be too unpopular to carry, and without it there was certainly no chance of inducing Bulgaria to throw in her lot with the Allies. Yet Greece, unless she was sure of Bulgaria, did not dare to commit herself to operations in Asia Minor or in Gallipoli. The General Staff objected to operations against Turkey without security against an attack by Bulgaria, and at the same time refused to make the concessions to Bulgaria which would have ensured Greece against such attack. M. Venizelos resigned in March, but at the General Election which followed his party was returned to power with much the same majority as in the last Parliament.

The only way in which Greece's support could now be secured was by throwing over Bulgaria and guaranteeing Greece against an attack by her. The project of reviving the old Balkan League, though it might have been practicable if it had been taken up with energy early in the war, was so no longer. Now it was either Bulgaria without Greece, or Greece without Bulgaria. The first alternative meant putting pressure on Servia to make the necessary concessions in Macedonia, and also liberal promises of territory in Thrace. The second meant a guarantee to Greece against attack by Bulgaria, and the only form which that guarantee could take was the presence of a large Allied army. For neither alternative were the Allies prepared. They believed that Greece was in any case bound by Treaty to go to the assistance of Servia if she was attacked by Bulgaria, and that that fear would keep Bulgaria quiet on the side of Macedonia. They were sceptical about German co-operation from the North, and without that co-operation they thought that there was no chance of Bulgaria's abandoning her neutrality in favour of the Central Powers. And, lastly, the Western Powers, hoping to win a decisive victory in France and grudging troops even for the Gallipoli campaign, could not bring themselves to further commitments in the Balkans. For these reasons the offers said to have been made by Greece early in summer for intervention on the basis of an armed A3-VOL. IV.**

guarantee against Bulgarian attack were rejected or ignored. Summer was passing, and the Powers were still between Greece and Bulgaria, nursing the hope of a revival of the old Balkan League, yet shrinking from the sacrifices by which alone the chances, in any case faint, of reviving it could be realised; trusting that Bulgaria's fear of Greece would keep her neutral, yet refusing to give the guarantees of armed assistance that would remove Greece's fear of Bulgaria; anxious for Bulgaria's support against Turkey, yet unwilling to pay the price that would make it certain; and hoping against hope for a victory in Gallipoli, which, by forcing the Dardanelles, would bring down the price.

THE GERMAN SCHEMES.

Very different was the policy of Germany. failure of the Austrian invasions had shown that the conquest of Servia would be no easy matter, and it was obvious that if it were attempted by frontal attack alone it would be terribly expensive of men. Neither Germany or Austria could spare many men for the enterprise; with two uncertainties on their hands already, they could not afford to risk many German lives on a third. It became necessary, therefore, to make sure not of the neutrality of Bulgaria but of her active intervention on their side. A Bulgarian attack on the Servian right flank would not only weaken the defence against attack from the North, but would also make it difficult for Greece to reinforce her Ally should she wish to do so; and while it enabled Germany to limit her military liabilities in the Balkans, it promised immediate satisfaction to the dominant passion of the Bulgarian people, their desire for unity with their brothers in Servian Macedonia. But the attack on Servia was only part of a great plan of campaign in the East. Germany felt that she was not getting her full value out of the Turkish Alliance, for, left to herself, Turkey must inevitably sooner or later succumb to the Allied attacks. The fear of our winning some decisive success in Gallipoli and forcing the Dardanelles had worried Germany all through the summer. It was the sword of Damocles at the banquet of her Russian victories, for the sword if it fell meant that the future of Asia was henceforth in the hands of sea-power, and that whatever victories Germany won on land her Eastern policy, for which she had begun the war, was finally defeated, and that England would reap at her leisure where Germany had sown. But if only she could win through to Turkey, she had hopes not only of saving Constantinople and her great expectations as the heir presumptive to the great Turkish estate, but also of using the splendid fighting material in the Turkish army to attack our position in the East. The British Empire in the East was all but an island empire, unassailable so long as it retained the command of the sea. But it had two bridge heads, one between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, the other at the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and with these in her hands she had hopes of making her future in the East independent of British sea-power. There was another motive too. She had begun to feel the drain of men, and it was important that she should tap fresh sources of supply. Bulgaria's army, though comparatively small, would be valuable in holding lines of communication, and the material of the Turkish army, if only it were well-equipped and directed, was among the best in Europe. By these means she counted on adding to her military reserves the equivalent of a million men. She attached



The King of Greece with a group of Staff officers. [Newspaper Illustrations.



The Greek mobilisation: Reservists arriving at the Salonika barracks.

[Central News.

the greatest importance to flinging her battle line as widely as possible in order to disperse the armies of the Allies by threats at many different points. Already she saw a new war in the East arising, with a right front in the Balkans, a centre in Egypt and Syria, and a left wing in Mesopotamia and in Persia, where she had already begun to foment and organise rebellion. And the great advantage of this new war, in her view, was that it might almost be made self-supporting except for supplies of officers and munitions, and while spending the enemy's armies might relieve the drain on her own. It might be no bad thing for Germany if Turkey and Bulgaria were both bled white, for the less would be their power of resistance to the work that she proposed to begin in the Near and Middle East after the war.

Such were the calculations with which Germany approached her new Balkan campaign.

TURKEY'S CONCESSIONS TO BULGARIA.

Germany could not offer Bulgaria so much at the expense of Turkey as the Allies, but on the other hand she could give it for nothing, whereas whatever there was to be got in that direction as an Ally of the Entente Powers would have to be got by hard fighting. Germany, who by this time was the real master in Turkey, induced her to cede to Bulgaria not only the whole of the Maritza valley, with the railway to Dedeagatch which follows its right bank, but a strip of territory on the left bank too. The gain to Bulgaria was important. Hitherto the railway, after passing Mustafa Pasha, had entered Turkish territory and had remained in Turkish territory past Adrianople to a point considerably south of Dimotika. Bulgaria now got her own railway all the way to the Ægean, and

though Adrianople itself remained Turkish the whole district between the Tunsha and the Maritza, including Karagatch and the suburbs of Adrianople, passed from the Turks. Bulgaria also asked for the district round Kirk Kilisse, which has a large Bulgarian population; but here she was disappointed. The Treaty, however, declared that the concession made south and west of Adrianople was compensation for the neutrality of Bulgaria, and thus left it to be inferred that if she not only resisted the offers of the Entente but succumbed to the temptations offered by the Central Powers she might expect a second reward later. Germany played her cards with much skill. The Allies had offered her a great stretch of Turkish territory if

she could get it by fighting; Germany gave her peaceful possession of less, with the prospect of more later. On the side of Servia, the Allies offered her portions of what she thought was hers by right, of which, however, there was to be no possession till after the war. Germany offered her all, immediate possession, and the prospect of certain victory over the hated Serbs, with the help of German troops, whose reputation after the victories in Russia was now at its highest.

The railway was handed over to Bulgaria on October 6th, the day on which the Germans crossed the Danube. It was obvious then, and had been obvious to many for a month and more, that Bulgaria had made her choice in favour of Germany.


When Bulgaria promised her support to Germany is

uncertain, but it must have been before the third week of September, the date of her mobilisation. For nearly two months before, the Allies had been negotiating actively with Bul-On August 5th garia. they offered to Bulgaria the territory in Macedonia which was assured to her under the Treaty of 1912, and repeated the offer in more detail on the 16th. On September 1st Servia expressed its willingness to make the sacrifices of territory demanded. On September 14th the Allies, becoming anxious at Bulgaria's delays and wishing to force a prompt decision, made the following declaration to M. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian Premier .-

"The four Powers are prepared to guarantee to Bulgaria the cession, immediately on the termination of the war, of the portion of Macedonia along the line of 1912. This guarantee is conditioned by the promise on the part of Bulgaria to conclude in the near future a Military Convention with the Allied Powers on the subject of our action against Turkey. If no reply in the foregoing sense

is given within a short time, the offer contained in this Note will be regarded as null and void."

No reply was given to this Note by the Bulgarian Government, and on September 23rd her mobilisation began. The probability is that she had been playing with the Powers since the beginning of August, by which time she knew that the Central Powers had decided to attack Servia, and that their preparations were approaching completion. Her mobilisation is slow, and she had to move very cautiously lest Greece and Servia should attack her. Having made her choice, military prudence required that she should avoid giving alarm to the Allies lest they should induce Greece to go in at once against her. She succeeded perfectly. After the Bulgarian mobilisation had begun,



The territory ceded by Turkey.



The Allied landing at Salonika: A detachment of the Army Service Corps riding into the town. [Central News.



French, soldiers resting on their way into camp at Salonika

[Central News.

Servia was anxious to attack Bulgaria at once before it was complete. Yet as late as September 27th Sir Edward Grey is said to have vetoed her project, still clinging apparently to the hope that Bulgaria might be kept neutral or brought over to our side.* On what he based these hopes is not very clear; indeed his view later was that the Allies' diplomacy had no chance against the logic of the stricken field in Russia and Gallipoli. It would appear, however, that he put much faith in the gratitude of the Bulgarian people to Russia, their liberator in the war with Turkey, and was anxious not to ruin any chance that the Opposition party might have of influencing the Government's policy. The Opposition spoke sometimes with considerable freedom; at an interview between the King and the Opposition leaders one of them reminded him that there was some danger of his losing his head if his adventure failed. But politics in Bulgaria are not highly organised as in the West, and the passion of the Bulgarians for union with their brothers in Macedonia was sufficiently general to sweep away cross-currents of gratitude to Russia for her services a generation The Italian papers showed themselves during the crisis by far the best-informed in Europe, and as early as June 26th, in a letter from Sofia, a correspondent gave an account of the state of Bulgarian politics which still held months later when Bulgaria took the plunge. He wrote:

"The great European conflict and the prospect of a definite solution of the Eastern question has wrought no change in the Balkan atmosphere. Bulgaria is filled with resentment and rancour against the Servians, against the Greeks, against the Triple Entente, against the Tsar of Russia. The racial sentiment is forgotten in a joyous salutation of the Austrian attack on Servia as a deserved punishment; the last Russian defeats have been hailed by a section of the Press and by the Vice-President of the Sobranje with satisfaction. The axis of Bulgarian politics is, and continues to be, Macedonia and the Treaty of Bukharest. Drive the Turks from Thrace! Why, the Turkish deputies from the new territories determine the Government majority, and, as I know, adds Signor Magrini, from a reliable source, Bulgaria is bound by a Treaty of Alliance to cede the whole of Thrace to Turkey in exchange for Macedonia in the event of a war against the Greeks and Servians. Bulgaria has never ceased supplying Turkey with munitions, cement, and petrol, and has allowed free course to contraband of war across its territory. Under the auspices of Germany, Bulgaria has opened negotiations with Turkey for the cession of the strip of territory traversed by the Philippopoli-Dedeagatch Railway, and Ministers and generals cross each other on their way to and from Sofia and Constantinople. The sentiment of reprisals and vendetta has formed a Germanophil atmosphere at Sofia which is cleverly made use of by German agents. The Minister of War, General Fitcheff, and General Savoff, senior, and the Inspector of the Army, General Bojadjeff, are avowedly Germanophil. The rural population are, however, Russophil, and would not march against Russia; neither would they favour war on the side of the Entente. They distrust the Government, diplomacy, Europe, and the issues of a war; they have not forgotten the events of 1912 and 1913.

"The Radoslavoff Cabinet is carried along with the Germanophil stream; the Socialists, about twenty deputies, are decidedly neutralists; the Tsar Ferdinand—mysterious, impenetrable, almost invisible—is a mythical figure locked in his palace. He holds no receptions. Even his Ministers are admitted as little as possible; the Premier often communicates with him in writing; some of his Ministers have not seen him for months. One of the few visitors admitted this year was Marshal von der Goltz on his way to Constantinople. Tsar Ferdinand, it is said, has secret envoys at Berlin and Vienna who keep him posted up on the changes in the situation. Mysterious nocturnal colloquies with the Austrian Ambassador are reported; he dreams of

a Great Bulgaria and of circling his brow with the Byzantine crown at Constantinople. His is the decisive word, and the Constitution permits him to sign agreements and Treaties without the knowledge of the Government.

"The political situation is formed of three elements hatred of Servia, a lack of grasp of the actual historical position, and failure to perceive the vast horizon opening out in the East due to a narrow view of supposed immediate material advantages. Bulgarian politicians are obstinately preoccupied with the Treaty of Bukharest and Macedonia, and they cannot see further. They do not grasp the fact that if Austria and Germany were to win, Macedonia, so generously promised them by the Central Empires, would be an Austrian and not a Bulgarian Macedonia, since it is the necessary bridge for an Austrian outlet at Salonika. They fail to see that Bulgaria would be forced into an Austro-Turko-German vassalage. Still less do they understand the great moral position they would gain in the Balkans and in Europe by marching on Constantinople; Europe could not and would not forget that Bulgaria had wrested Constantinople from the Turks.

"By demanding Macedonia, say the Bulgarians, we only ask for what is ours historically and ethnographically. Macedonia is inhabited by Bulgarians; it is a Bulgarian land. For Macedonia we have fought and conquered in the first Balkan War. We ask for justice; our demands are founded on the most sacred of rights—the principle of nationality. So long as Macedonia is not restored to us you may delete the word peace from the Balkans, for we shall seize any and every opportunity of retaking what belongs to us. We bore three-fourths of the burden of the first war, and we have been despoiled by Allies when we were weakened by our efforts."*

THE ATTITUDE OF GREECE.

The game, however, was far from being lost when Bulgaria began to mobilise. Had Greece gone to the support of her Ally Servia, and had the Powers given Greece prompt and strong military support, the issue might have been very doubtful. For a time it looked as though both conditions were likely to be fulfilled. How far the King of Greece had given private assurances to Germany is still uncertain; it is difficult to believe that Germany could have induced Bulgaria to move unless she had been able to convince her that there was no real danger to be apprehended on her However that may be, there is no doubt that the Bulgarian mobilisation took Greece by surprise. M. Venizelos, now, as always, a strong friend of the Entente, immediately went to the King, who, willingly or because his hand was forced, signed the order for the mobilisation of the Greek army. On September 28th Sir Edward Grey, speaking in the House of Commons, made his famous pledge that in the event of attack by Bulgaria "we are prepared to give to our friends in the Balkans all the support in our power in the manner that would be most welcome to them, in concert with our Allies, without reserve and without qualification." The history of that pledge made a stormy passage in British and French politics, and must be dealt with in another place. Here it will The Servosuffice to note the sequence of events. Greek Treaty binds either party to come to the assistance of the other if it is attacked by a third. At the outset of the war, M. Venizelos, who was then in Brussels, received a telegram from the Servian Premier, M. Pashitch, asking him what the attitude of Greece would be towards Servia in view of the Treaty between them?

"I replied then to him telegraphically that without being able to give him a reply engaging Greece I would inform him of the opinion which I would submit to the Council of Ministers and to the approval of the King. I

^{*} Mr. Seton-Watson in the English Review for Pebruary.

^{*} The Milan Secolo.



The Balkan Frontiers before and after the War of 1912.

told him then that Greece would not be able usefully to come to the assistance of Servia in the European War which was about to commence. She could render Servia only one service on the basis of the Treaty, but that would be a valuable one. Greece would stand at attention with her arms ready and declare that if Bulgaria were to attack Servia Greece would attack Bulgaria. Such was the assistance which a loyal interpretation of the Treaty imposed upon Greece as regards Servia, since the despatch of the Greek army to the centre of Europe would be but a small enterprise at a moment when the principal enemy would be lying in watch on the right flank ready to rush and to destroy the Greek and Servian armies by cutting their communications with Salonika.

"On my return to Athens this opinion was approved by the Council of Ministers and the King. It was communicated as an official reply to the Allied State. And the Allied State recognised that an assistance of this kind corresponded entirely to the engagements assumed by us and interpreted loyally."

THE LANDING AT SALONIKA.

There was, therefore, no doubt in M. Venizelos's mind that in the event of Bulgaria joining in the war and attacking Servia it was both the duty, under the Treaty and also the interest of Greece, to go to the assistance of her Ally. But supposing that Bulgaria should attack Greece instead, leaving Germany to deal alone with Servia? In that case it would have been Servia's duty, under the Treaty, to lend 150,000 men to the assistance of Greece—a duty which, under such circumstances, it would be quite impossible for her to perform. On September 21st M. Venizelos took this difficulty to the two Western Entente Powers who alone

were in a position to act, and asked whether they would make up to Greece the assistance that would otherwise have been given—in other words, whether the Powers would support Greece with 150,000 men. The promise was given, and shortly afterwards the Powers began to land men at Salonica. The troops arrived slowly and in insufficient numbers, probably for the same reason which had led to the abandonment of our efforts in Gallipoli after the failure at Suvla and Anzac, namely, that we were now committed to the great offensive in France. But though the promise was likely to be somewhat tardy of fulfilment, M. Venizelos was prepared to act upon it. On September 20th M. Venizelos made a long speech in the Greek Chamber warning Bulgaria:—

"When the Chamber met after the outbreak of the great European war in September last I had the honour of informing it of the policy of the Government with regard to the situation created by this war. In the month of February of this year the Cabinet over which I then had the honour of presiding considered that a modification of this policy was incumbent upon it. On this point the Cabinet found itself in disagreement with the Crown, and had to leave office. After the elections, once more called to office, it considered that, the circumstances having altered in the interval, it should again return to the policy which it had mapped out at the beginning of the European war, the policy that I revealed to the Chamber last September. But the Bulgarian mobilisation could lead to no other reply than the decreeing by the Greek Cabinet also of a general mobilisation. I must, however, inform the Chamber that after the proclamations ordering these two mobilisations reassuring assurances were given by both parties. M. Radoslavoff informed our Minister in Sofia that

the Bulgarian mobilisation had no aggressive aim either against us or against our Servian Allies. It was made necessary to Bulgaria by her proximity to the theatre of war, and its object is to make it possible henceforth for Bulgaria to maintain armed neutrality. We replied that as long as the character of the Bulgarian mobilisation was defined in that sense our mobilisation, the inevitable result of hers, must not be regarded as implying any aggressive object, but also as a means for the maintenance of our armed neutrality. Nevertheless, in spite of these mutual assurances, the situation must be regarded as serious. Under the modern system of national armies a general mobilisation, which entails a profound disturbance of the economic and social life of a country, and leads to an enormous expenditure, cannot be prolonged without grave danger to peace, and these dangers are all the greater when one of the mobilised countries does not disguise that it does not consider satisfactory the territorial status quo established by Treaties between itself and its neighbours. I do not say this in order to depict the situation in colours more sombre than the reality, but, on the other hand, I have not the right to conceal the true state of affairs from the country. For if all of us in Greece ardently wish for peace, I also know with what a spirit of incomparable self-denial the Greek people in arms is ready to defend its integrity and the vital interests of the country, and to oppose any attempt by any Balkan State to create for itself a preponderant position which would mark the end of the political and moral independence of the others. (Prolonged cheers.) I should, however, be glad if the reassuring explanation given on both sides by the Governments of the two mobilised States were to bring about promptly and without delay a simultaneous demobilisation, thus eliminating the dangers to peace which would naturally be engendered by an indefinite prolongation of mobilisation."

THE BREACH WITH BULGARIA.

On October 1st the British Foreign Office authorised a statement complaining that German and Austrian officers were directing the movements of the Bulgarian army, and adding that "since the Allied Powers are bound to support the States who are threatened by such proceedings in Bulgaria this news is regarded as of the utmost gravity." Two days later, Greece protested against the landing of Allied troops at Salonika, but this protest was generally understood to be purely formal and designed to save Greece from being committed to war should Bulgaria in fact not attack Servia or Greece. The protest was evidently a compromise reached between the King and the Premierthe former anxious to keep a way of retreat open for himself, the latter confident that Bulgaria would make it impossible for Greece to go back. On the same day, Russia presented an ultimatum to Bulgaria threatening to withdraw her Minister if she did not within 24 hours openly break with the enemies of the Slav cause and of Russia, and send away the German and Austrian officers. Two days later, on October 5th, M. Venizelos defended his war policy against strong criticism in the Greek Chamber, and carried the Parliament with him by a majority of 30 in a House of 244. On the next day the King of Greece forced M. Venizelos to resign.

We had failed to get either Greece or Bulgaria. We had acquired a new and powerful enemy, and we had failed to keep a friend.



Citizens at Salonika watching from the quay the arrival of the first British and French troops.




Preparing for the attack on Servia: A great massing of German and Austrian troops in the Balkans. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.]$



Servian troops leaving for the trenches.

. [Central News.



The beginning of the campaign against Servia: Austro-German troops crossing the Danube. [Photopress.]

CHAPTER II.

THE CONQUEST OF SERVIA.

THE GERMAN PLANS—SERVIA'S POSITION—THE EFFECTS OF BULGARIA'S INTERVENTION—THE CROSSING OF THE RIVERS—THE BULGARIAN ATTACK—THE FRENCH EFFORT—THE SERVIAN RETREAT.

HE course of the Servian campaign of 1915 was determined by the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers and the decision of the King of Greece to repudiate his alliance with Servia. The German plan of invasion was, therefore, quite different from those followed by the Austrians in the autumn and winter of 1914. The Austrians had on each occasion attacked only the north-western corner of Servia with converging armies, which fought their way into the mountainous interior until the difficulties of the country and supply gave the Servians their opportunity; but, probably because they were not able at that time to spare the necessary men, they made no effort to invade from the north by the valley of the River Morava, which offers the most hopeful line of attack to an army strong enough to clear the mountains on either side of it. The Germans began their enterprise under far other conditions. They were assured of a great numerical superiority over the Servians, for not only did they dispose of the Bulgarian army, but they had positive assurance from the King of Greece, it must be assumed, that Bulgaria had nothing to fear from the Greek army.

Except, therefore, for such troops as fear compelled her to keep on her Roumanian frontier, Bulgaria could throw almost her whole weight against Servia. The name of Germany protected her sufficiently against both Turkey and Greece.

THE SERVIAN POSITION.

The understanding of the Servian campaign is a simple problem in geography. There were no battles that could be called decisive. There was only for some weeks a pressure so steadily maintained and directed from so many strategically important points that the Servian army, fighting stubbornly and inflicting heavy loss, but still always weakening, was finally pushed clean out of its own country.

To follow the course of events it is necessary to keep in mind a clear outline of the position and character of the Servian frontiers which were now attacked.

The southern boundary of Servia, where it marches with Greece, may for the moment be neglected (since the Greeks did not enter the war and the Allies marching from Salonica did not exercise any decisive influence



A typical crowd of Servia's peasant fighting men.

[Central News.



Bulgarian troops entering Nish with a band at their head.

[Photopress.


on the fighting) and may be considered simply as the apex of a triangle of which the western, northern, and eastern frontiers of Servia are the sides. Of these, again, we are not concerned for the present with that part of the western frontier which adjoins Montenegro and Albania. But along the whole of the rest of the triangle (except for the small north-eastern corner where Roumania lies across the Danube) Servia lay open to attack. The actual length of the exposed frontiers was some 600 miles. On the north the base of the triangle, constituted by the River Save as far as Belgrade and then by the River Danube to the border of Roumania, was 160 miles in a straight line, but made much more by the windings of the river. The eastern side—the Bulgarian frontier was, similarly calculated, 220 miles. The western side, down to the Montenegrin border, is marked out for almost its whole length by the River Drina, and is about one hundred miles.

As soon as the Germans knew that they could rely on Bulgaria to assist them and Greece not to oppose, they had a situation to deal with which was, in essentials, very simple. The Servians had to defend all three frontiers. If, while a mixed Austro-German army were attacking the northern base of the triangle, the Bulgarians knocked in the eastern side, the Servian defence of the base became hopeless, or the defence in the east might have to be abandoned because of the increasing pressure in the north. Both fronts must hold or both must yield. At the same time a similar danger threatened the Servians from the hundred miles of exposed western frontier if the Germans thought it advisable, and had the means, to attack from that side also. The situation in which Servia found herself was precisely of the kind of which there had already been some famous instances in the war. The Bulgarian frontier bore the same relation to the northern Servian boundary as Russia's Galician front bore to the Carpathians; and just as the Germans by breaking through in Galicia automatically forced the Russians back from the passes of the Carpathians, so the Germans might reckon that their attack in the north would at least be simplified by the Bulgarian threat against the Servian rear. Another illustration may be found in France, where the German advance, had it not been checked at the Battle of the Marne, would have knocked away the foundations of the French eastern front, and where the stability of the eastern front is still essential to the security of the French line from Soissons to Verdun. Thus the Germans, in attacking Servia, had in their hands all the elements of a great strategical success, together with an immense superiority in numbers. Only two things could deprive them of victory. One was the intervention of some new force which would neutralise the Bulgarian army. The Greek mobilisation and M. Venizelos's intention to attack Bulgaria, even if that meant meeting the "German bayonets" behind her, seemed up to the last hour to promise hope. But the hope passed, and with it the immediate prospect of Roumania's intervention, which, had it been combined with Greek action, would have ground Bulgaria to powder. Nor was it practicable for the Allies, who had counted confidently on Greek assistance, quickly to assemble an army large enough to neutralise Bulgaria. Time may have been lost in reinforcing the troops which landed at Salonika in the first week of October, but the blame did not attach to the military authorities who were responsible for getting the troops there. The mischief sprang from the original mistake of all the Allies, including Servia, which wrongly believed that M. Venizelos after his return to power could speak for Greece, and that if Bulgaria went to war Greece would take arms against her. There being, then, no practicable way of neutralising the Bulgarian army, the Servians could have no hope of wresting victory from a hopeless situation except in their own courage and the strange chances of war.

THE GERMAN PLAN.

Bulgaria had mobilised in the middle of September, and the German attack was launched in the first week of October. It fell into five sections, the purpose of each of which is readily intelligible if the geographical outline already given is borne in mind. The campaign was under the general direction of Field Marshal von Mackensen, who had directed the fighting in Poland in the winter of 1914-1915, and in the following spring had commanded the armies which drove the Russians from Galicia and the Carpathians. Under his general command were five armies-one Austrian, one Austro-German, one German, and two Bulgarian. The Austrian force--a small oneadvanced against the southern end of the hundred-mile stretch of Servian frontier on the west-at Visegrad, near the point where the boundaries of Bosnia, Montenegro, and Servia join. The further this force could push forward into Servia towards the east the more it inconvenienced the Servian army facing the Save river on the north—that is to say, that section of the northern frontier stretching along the Save up to and including Belgrade, which was now attacked by an Austro-German army under Von Koevess (the general who had captured the fortress of Iwangrod on the Vistula, in August, 1915). The positions of these two forces are an illustration of the ease with which, owing to geographical conditions, the Germans were able to carry out their general scheme of envelopment by breaking it up into smaller schemes and executing them at the points where great pieces of Servia projected into hostile territory. The attacks of these two forces—the Austrian from Visegrad and Koevess's from the Save across country up the valley of the Kolubara rivermeant, had they both been vigorously pressed, that the Servians defending the whole of the north-western corner would have been driven to retreat. In point of fact, the attack from Visegrad was not pressed severely, and was not much more than a demonstration until the advance of Von Koevess was well on its way to the south. The point is interesting, for a serious advance from Visegrad would have added greatly to Servia's difficulties, and that it was not made shows pretty conclusively, what may be inferred from other evidence. that the Germans were compelled to be economical of men, and were anxious about their weakness in other parts of the field.

The strength of the Servians lay in the mountainous character of their country and the difficulties which beset an enemy attempting to move over it with his transport and compelled to attack a prolonged series of strong natural positions. The Germans, though they had to face constant fighting of this character, were anxious to reduce it, wherever possible, by manœuvring the Servians out of their positions. Just as the attacks from Visegrad eastwards and from the Save southwards worked in with each other, so did the advance southwards of the third, the German army, from the Danube section of the northern front and the advance of the First Bulgarian army westwards from the northern section of the Bulgarian frontier. Von Koevess had been instructed to take Belgrade; from Belgrade eastwards to



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE CONVERGING ATTACKS ON SERVIA.

Orsova, on the Roumanian frontier, the front was held by Von Gallwitz's German army. (Von Gallwitz was the general who broke through the Russian front on the Narew river in August, 1915, and helped greatly to bring about the abandonment of the Warsaw positions.) His orders were now to pass his main army over the Danube near the mouth of the River Morava, and to advance due southward up the valley towards the arsenal of Kraguyevatz and the capital at Nish. He was at the same time to advance up the lesser valley of the Mlava river, which runs roughly parallel with the lower course of the Morava, and is not many miles from it, and finally to cross the Danube at Orsova, near the Roumanian frontier, clearing the Servians

away from the Danube bank which looks over to Roumania, and so open a way for German munitions of war to be sent down the Danube for the benefit of Turkey. It was said that as many as two thousand waggons of munitions of all kinds were waiting for the opening of the river. While Von Gallwitz was thus striking into Servia from the north, the First Bulgarian Army, under General Bojadjeff, was to co-operate with him by advancing westward and cut the ground from beneath the Servians resisting the German attack.

The part which was to be played in the north-west corner of Servia by the converging armies from Visegrad and the Save was thus to be reproduced in the north-eastern section by the Bulgarians and Von Gallwitz, and


the result of their co-operating movements, if either was successful, would necessarily be to squeeze the advancing Servian forces out of the whole mountainous region lying between the Morava valley and the Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier. This was the chief, but not the only, object of Bojadjeff's advance. His left wing was to advance north-westwards to the capture of Nish, while his centre and right gained possession of the valley of the Timok and seized the railway running through it to the Danube. The Bulgarians had one of the hardest tasks of the campaign set them in this quarter, for the Servians held strong positions on the hills overlooking the Timok valley, which ran alongside, but gave no access to them.

THE SECOND BULGARIAN ARMY.

There was yet another army to join in the attack—the Second Bulgarian Army, under General Tödoroff. It held the southern half of the Bulgarian frontier, and should have been opposed by the Greek army. Its mission was to advance into Servian Macedonia and cut the railway running from Salonika to Uskub and thence to Nish on the north-east and Mitrovitza on the north-west. This was the line by which alone Servia could hope to receive any assistance from the outer world, and as soon as it became clear that the Greeks had failed Servia, but that the Allies were sending what aid they could, it became doubly important that this line should be held as long as possible. The seizure of the railway was the first

object of General Todoroff; his second was to break through or drive back whatever force the Servians had put against him, and push on across the country towards the Albanian frontier in order to take in the rear the Servian forces in the north. The precise consequences of such a march could only be decided by the event. The Servians might be cut off entirely from the Salonika expedition, or some of them might be driven back into the corner of Macedonia and over the Greek frontier. But it was clear, at all events, that the Second Bulgarian Army had an important function, and had every prospect of performing it successfully.

Such was the predicament of the Servians. It is impossible to say whether they really expected that the Allies could do



General von Gallwitz, the German Commander in Servia, riding through a captured town. [Central News.

much to save them; all the probabilities pointed to the Germans and Bulgarians, having accounted for the main Servian army in good time, being able to send reinforcements to deal with the advancing Anglo-French. However that may be, the Servians had definitely laid their plans in the belief that they would at least be relieved by the Greeks of the defence of this southern front, and they now found themselves called on, with a total of perhaps 250,000 men—it may have been as much as 300,000, but that is very doubtful—to provide for its needs also. They were unable to do so, and the messages which correspondents sent about this time from Nish showed that they continued to hope against hope that the Allies



German transport in difficulties on a bad road in Servia.

[Photopress.



Austrian troops endeavouring to put out a fire caused by the bombardment in a Servian town. [Photopress.

might be able to send sufficient men to threaten the rear of Tödoroff's army when it moved forward into the interior of Servian Macedonia.

THE SERVIAN SCHEME.

It is not easy, except on the supposition that the Servian plans had been fixed and could not easily be remodelled, to explain the course which they now followed. In both the Austrian invasions of 1914 they had steadily retired before the enemy into the mountains, so as to gain the advantage of a concentrated front and bring their weight to bear more easily against a particular portion of the enemy's line. But neither of those invasions could be compared with the danger which now threatened. them, nor was the front which they at any time held in 1914 so extensive and so widely threatened as now. It might have been supposed, therefore, that as soon as the Greek repudiation became known to them they would have decided on a slow withdrawal into the interior, strengthening their line where it was weakest-against the Second Bulgarian Army-and hoping that on a shorter front they would be able to make a better fight against superior numbers. If the Servians considered this possibility, they found its difficulties too great. Their position, with the enemy threatening them along the whole of their eastern and a large part of their western frontiers, was so bad that only a very deep retirement into the interior could have improved it substantially, and though they might have discovered a defensible front resting on the mountains of Montenegro on the one flank and linking up with the Allies from Salonika on the other, they would have had little of Servia left at their backs when they got to it. They would have had to abandon all their chief places, and the truth may be that, having concentrated their supplies at certain points in order best to support their plan of campaign, they would not now have been able, had they wished, to alter all their arrangements to suit a radical change of plan. They decided to do what they had not done even in 1914-to meet the Austrian and German invaders at the crossing of the rivers, to deny them the passage, and to contest every foot of ground on the Servian side. It was a heroic plan, and almost hopeless. It was perhaps just conceivable that the Servians, from their positions on the heights on the southern bank of the river and with their improved artillery, might defeat the attempts to cross, or might inflict a heavy defeat on the troops that had made the passage and then turn their attention for a time to the northern Bulgarian army. But it was in the highest degree unlikely. The Germans came with an army larger than the Servians could spare for the northern front, and with an overwhelming mass of artillery; the front was long, and in such country it was impossible to transfer troops-and still more guns-rapidly from one point to another. The Servians, therefore, neither remade their plans, whether because it was too late or because they relied on the assistance of the Allies, nor could gain a decisive victory in any other way. They, therefore, fought where they stood, dealt what blows they might, and fell back when they must.

THE CROSSING.

On October 3rd and 4th there were a number of skirmishes along the rivers, and on the 6th the attack began. Von Mackensen had concentrated his army in the Hungarian Banate, to the north of the Danube stretch of the Serbian frontier. He had his base at Temesvar, whence a number of railway lines radiated

to the river. Crossings were attempted at many different points. The first object of the Germans was to bridge the rivers and pass across a number of troops and light guns under the cover of a tremendous bombardment by artillery on the northern bank. All observers agree that in the Servian campaign, as in the Russian fighting of 1915, the Germans assured themselves of victory by preponderance in gun power; and although at this time the Servians were somewhat better equipped with artillery than they had been in the previous year, they found themselves at what was a decisive disadvantage. M. Barby, the correspondent of the Paris Journal, who went through the campaign, asserts that the proportion of Austro-German to Servian guns was as five to one, although the proportion of troops was only as three to two.

The successful passage of the rivers, however, depended on more than the establishment of bridges. The Servians occupied very strong positions on mountainous heights at most of the points at which attacks were made—on the hills, for instance, overlooking the mouths of the river valleys of which it was necessary for the Germans to obtain possession. The Germans had not merely to get their pontoons across, but to clear the heights on the southern bank so completely as to remove the Servian field-guns out of range of the rivers, the bridges, and the troops crossing over them. They had, therefore, to face a great deal of heavy frontal fighting in order to gain possession of these heights, especially since, as they drove the Servians slowly but steadily back, their own heavy guns on the far side of the river were the less able to give them assistance, and they could not bring them across until the way was made secure. Some of the heaviest fighting of the whole campaign took place at this stage, and it was during the first ten days or so that the Servians gained such isolated successes as they were able to obtain.

VON KOEVESS AND BELGRADE.

Von Koevess's right wing crossed at the bend of the salient in the far north-eastern corner of Servia; farther to the east he bridged the Save near the mouth of the Kolubara river, up which he intended to advance. The Kolubara lies to the south-west of Belgrade, and therefore by turning eastward from it he would help to compel the Servians holding the heights south of Belgrade to abandon their positions. At the same time his troops were to attack Belgrade itself, and on October 6th he bombarded the islands lying in front of Belgrade, occupied them, and then proceeded to the attack of the capital. Belgrade was defended vigorously by the small force which had been left in it, but now, as in the invasion of November, 1914, the Servians could have no hope of holding it, and they might have evacuated it rapidly, as before, in the hope that it would be spared bombardment. They prolonged the contest, however, as long as possible. Even after the Austrians had landed, fighting was continued in the streets and the city itself suffered very heavily from shell fire.

"The Servians had for the defence of Belgrade less than one battalion and some comitadjis and six guns. Two of these belonged to Admiral Troubridge's naval contingent, two to the French, and two to the Russian forces. The Russian guns were put out of action early in the battle. The French followed after a long interval. The British guns were the last to succumb. They were twice buried by the volumes of earth thrown up by the explosion of enemy shells. They were unearthed and brought back to action, and at the end they were blown up and destroyed by the



The conquest of Servia: Civilians being driven off as prisoners by the German troops. [Photopress.]



enemy's shells. Out of twenty British marines and Servian soldiers who manned them six only came out unscathed.

"Twice the handful of Servians repulsed the Germans from obtaining a footing on the Servian bank, and when they finally did so the fighting was continued in the streets of Belgrade by the comitadjis. One fifteen-year-old boy defended the street in which his house was situated, with five other boys, for two hours. He was named corporal for his valiant conduct. He looks proud in his new uniform, and speaks very modestly of what he has done."*

A DIARY OF THE BOMBARDMENT.

An account of the bombardment and the scenes in the city appeared some time afterwards in a Hungarian newspaper, the *Pesti Naplo*. It was taken from a diary kept by one of the inhabitants during the attack, and ended abruptly at the point where the extract given below comes to an end.

"October 6th.—They began to bombard the city. We took refuge in the cellar. The neighbours come in occasionally with news. The slaughter-house is on fire. In the factory town Kupinovo Street has been demolished. Some eighty people have been killed. German aviators threw bombs on the Topcider railway line. At six in the afternoon I remembered that I had forgotten to lock my shop door. I ventured to the street. An officer passed, and I asked him how long it would last. He said that English officers told him that Antwerp was nothing compared to this bombardment.

"October 7th.—I thought the din could not be worse than it was last night, but this morning it is ten times worse. We do not hear each other's voice. We write our sayings on paper. They say the Austrians are using such great guns as they never used yet on any of the fronts. I met Lusshiych, the engineer. He kissed me and said: 'They are fighting on the banks already. Belgrade will fall in a few hours. If they could cross the river, all is lost.

"October 8th.—All is over. They are fighting on the

"October 8th.—All is over. They are fighting on the Kalimegdan and in the factory district. General Zsifkovitch has left the city, and the troops have retreated to the Avala. One can hear bullets pinging against the walls already; they are nearing every minute. They are defending the town with the fury of madmen. Two women are rushing down the road with hunting pieces; schoolboys are running towards the scene of the battle with bayonets found on the street. I return to the cellar. From the direction of Dushan Tsar Street the sound of machine-guns is heard.

"October 9th.—Again I ventured to the street, but only for a minute. I had to rush back. The pavement is covered with bodies. I fell over them, and actually stepped on the head of a woman. Across the road the proprietress of the tobacco shop is lying dead in the doorway, beside her a German soldier. The firing is still going on. The Hotel Srbski Kral is being fired at from machine-guns. There are soldiers in it, and they have a machine-gun also. They are certainly lost, yet they do not surrender. It is terrible. . . .

"October 10th.—In the morning a German patrol came to arrest me. My wife followed me crying to the Town Hall. I was half dead, having had no sleep for three days. My wife is groaning and crying on the staircase below, while I am being examined and searched. The sights on the way are disturbing my mind—bodies everywhere, men, women, and children; most of them I knew by sight. Hundreds of soldiers' bodies lying about, Servians, Hungarians, Germans—terrible.

The strongest resistance which the Servians made against Von Koevess was at the Kolubara mouth, where their guns destroyed one of his bridges completely, inflicted heavy losses on the troops who had crossed, and for some time pinned them to the bank. It is worth recording that in this quarter the Austrians employed asphyxiating gases against the Servians. In every case where the Germans had broken the rules of civilised warfare they invariably began by alleging that they were only retaliating on a particular enemy for a similar outrage. No sooner,

* Daily Telegraph Correspondent. † Morning Post's Buda Pest Correspondent. however, had they paid this tribute to the conventions than both they and their Allies applied the method wholesale to enemies against whom they did not even allege that they had a similar grievance. The use of asphyxiating gases was at first declared to be a reprisal on the French and British, but it was shortly afterwards brought into use against the Russians before Warsaw without any suggestion that it was there a weapon of retaliation, and now, with a like shamelessness, it was employed against the Servians. (So, too, the atrocities of the submarine campaign, which the Germans first sought to justify on strictly limited grounds against the British only, were afterwards extended to the Allies in general, and adopted in turn by Austria.)

Von Gallwitz crossed the Danube at points lying immediately to the east of Semendria, that is to say, along the flat stretch of land at the mouth of the Morava and the two rivers on either side of it, the Jesava and the Mlava. The landings stretched a few miles further to the east, and covered in all a distance of about forty miles. The chief work before Von Gallwitz's troops was to drive the Servians from the heights between the rivers and capture the town of Pozarevatz, a few miles from the Danube and the meeting place of several roads. The importance of the river valleys was that they were the main arteries by which the heavy transport and artillery of the Germans could penetrate into the interior, and that it was from them that flanking and enveloping attacks were to be pushed into the hills at point after point in order to assist the frontal advance as it proceeded slowly southward. The Servians fought hard for Pozarevatz and the heights, knowing that as long as they held firm they could bar the valleys upon either side. Here, on October 9th, they gained one of their few successes, and succeeded in capturing a number of machine-guns and putting a battery of howitzers out of action. While Von Gallwitz was pressing this attack he did little more than make demonstrations in the region of Orsova on his extreme left flank. It was, of course, important that he should expel the Servians from the Danube bank, but this end would be gained much more easily as soon as the converging advance of his own forces and the First Bulgarian Army had developed. The general effect of the first fortnight's fighting on the northern front was that the invading armies had established themselves firmly on the line of hills south of the rivers, and were in possession of the mouths of the river valleys. The time had now come for Bulgaria to strike.

THE FIRST BULGARIAN ARMY.

The Germans had crossed the rivers on October 6th, but it was not until the 14th that Bulgaria declared war and began to advance. It may have been that the delay formed part of the German plan of campaign, and, the success of the attack being what it was, it cannot be said that the Germans suffered any injury from the interval which passed before Bulgaria moved. On the other hand. since the only hope of the Servians clearly lay in striking a severe blow at the northern enemy and so gaining a breathing-space in which to turn on Bulgaria, it might have been expected that the Germans would have insisted on Bulgaria opening operations simultaneously with their own. Supposing that by some superhuman chance the Servians had succeeded in flinging back the German attempts to cross the rivers, they would have had a somewhat freer hand for dealing with the Bulgarians. The possibility was very remote, but it was unlike the Germans in a matter of this kind to leave anything to chance. It is perhaps not far-fetched to assume that the Bulgarians had decided not only to see the beginning of the German

attack, but to make sure that the beginning was also a good and successful one before they themselves took the plunge. The more deeply the Servians were involved on the northern front, the easier the Bulgarians might hope their task would be.

With the beginning of the third week in October both Bulgarian armies began to move. For the First (the Northern) Army there were three or four possible lines of advance. From the valley of the lower Timok, which for some distance is the boundary between Servia and Bulgaria, a road ran north-eastward towards the Danube, and an advance by this route fell in very well with the plan of co-operating with Von Gallwitz and squeezing the Servians out of the north-eastern corner. From the same point of departure a road and railway ran westward towards the Morava valley, and would lead the Bulgarians to the point where a junction might naturally be made with the advancing Germans. From the upper region of the Timok river an advance was possible towards Nish from the north, while the left wing could march down the course of the Nishava river leading to the same destinationfrom the south-east. Each of these routes was hedged round with difficulties. If the Bulgarians succeeded in crossing the Timok they were immediately faced by a series of mountainous and fortified positions; while the Nishava valley was narrow and surrounded by hills, and led up to the formidable defences of Nish.

THE RIVER ROAD TO TURKEY.

In the last week of October, as Von Gallwitz was beginning to make progress with his main body, and the Bulgarians had crossed the Timok near its mouth and were pushing northwards, the time had come to drive the Servians clean away from the bend of the Danube

1



General von Koevess.

[E.N.A.



General Jekoff.

the Servians clean away from the bend of the Danube opposite Roumanian territory and free the railway for

the transport of goods to Turkey. Tekia, the town on the Servian side opposite Orsova, was bombarded, and

the enemy crossed in a large number of boats. The Servian forces to be met were small, and the Germans soon established contact with the Bulgarians advancing from the south. The German Wireless Press has recorded the scene:—

"On October 26th patrols of the Allied Powers were looking out for each other, when suddenly two Bulgarian officers with twenty-five men appeared.

appeared.

"According to the Cologne Gazette, they were all splendid soldiers and well equipped, the majority of them being veterans who fought in the Balkan War against Servia. They were led by Lieutenant Gadieff, and met with an enthusiastic reception from the soldiers of the Central Powers. The military commanders and the Duke of Mecklenburg hastened to the place north-east of Brza Palanka, where the historic meeting of East and West took place.

"Later on a brilliant parade in the conquered Servian fortress of Kladovo was held. The resounding cheers and the national anthems could be heard on the opposite bank of the Danube, where the Roumanian population listened to the celebration of the inauguration of a new passage from Germany through AustriaHungary and Bulgaria into Turkey, touching only territory belonging to the Allied Powers."

The invasion now proceeded slowly but systematically. The Servians fought an unending succession of rearguard actions, but for some time their losses were, by the admissions of the enemy, comparatively small. Austrians and Germans alike admitted the difficulties of the campaign, now aggravated in the lowlands by very heavy rains and the toughness of the Servian resistance.

"Position after position," wrote a Munich correspondent, "could only be gained after the fiercest fighting with the Servian rearguards, and it must be admitted that the Servians are magnificent soldiers. Their numerous sharpshooters concealed in the rugged mountains caused us

considerable losses." "Servian prisoners," reported the correspondent of the New Freie Presse, "say with the

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greatest emphasis that the troops will not hear a word of capitulation. The fights up to now have only been

rearguard fights, although from time to time very bitter ones - mostly only infantry fights, for the Servian artillery was withdrawn at the beginning of our attacks in order not to increase the losses of material." The question was, however, how long this orderly and systematic retreat could be maintained. A large part of the general population were joining in it, the enemy were drawing their line closer, and the Bulgarians in the south were threatening to narrow the possible means of escape.

FALL OF KRAGUYEVATZ AND NISH.

While the Germans and Bulgarians were celebrating their union on the Danube, a fresh danger began to threaten the Servians on the extreme west. The Visegrad force of Austrians crossed into Servia at the same time as Von Koevess's army came along and over the Kolubara valley. Von Koevess, moving over the hills where the Austrians had come to grief in December, 1914, came down from the east and north on Kraguyevatz, his left wing being here in touch with the right of Von Gallwitz on the slopes above the Morava valley. An advance of a few more miles up the Morava, and Von Gallwitz's left in turn joined up with a column of Bojadjeff's Bulgarian army advancing from the east.

A few days later the Bulgarians, approaching Nish from the north and the east, captured it after three days' heavy fighting. Their right wing pressed forward into the valley of the Morava, and from this time the pursuit was urged by Austrians, Germans, and Bulgarians more and more vigorously. break-up of the Servian army began, and in the next step of the retreat they suffered heavy losses both of men and guns.

Meanwhile, in the south of Servia the Second Bulgarian

Army, under General Tödoroff, had been making rapid progress. This was the army which linked up with



General Tödoroff.





General Bojadjeff.

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Bojadjeff to the south of Nish and held the line down to the frontier of Greece. Its chief business was to seize the Salonika-Nish railway line, occupy Servian Macedonia, and push in a wedge between the Servians in the north and in the south. The first object was quickly attained. Almost immediately after the declaration of war, Tödoroff's right wing reached out and cut the railway at Vranya. The full consequences of the defection of Greece were now seen. Servia had made a gallant fight on the south and south-east, but in the south she could only oppose weak forces, and those from the least-trained of her soldiers, to a large Bulgarian army equipped, it was estimated, with three hundred guns. So far as her own efforts depended it was quite certain that she could not save the railway, nor do more than hold the Bulgarians back at certain defiles until superior numbers manœuvred her out of them. Something, however, might be done by the Allied troops if they were strong enough to attack the flank of the Bulgarians as they pressed forward into Macedonia.

> Immediately after the capture of Vranya the Bulgarians drove back the Servians to the line of the Vardar river, behind which runs the railway, and captured Uskub and Veles, both on the eastern From Uskub they bank advanced north-westwards towards the pass which gives access to the Plain of Kossovo, so that by this time scarcely any way of escape remained open to the Northern Servian army except into Montenegro. Veles was retaken by the Servians and then lost again, but the issue in this part of the field depended not on the Servians but on the strength of the Allies.

> As the French troops landed at Salonika they were sent up to the Servian frontier, and gradually took the place of the Servians defending the line of the Vardar for a distance of some forty miles. On October 21st

the Bulgarians attacked the positions at the extremity of these lines, where the Servian, Greek, and Bulgarian



Servian prisoners and German transport on the march. The photograph shows the kind of road along which the Servians retreated right back to Albania. [Photopress.]



Hungry Servian peasant women waiting outside a German military depôt in Podzarevatz for relief. $[Central\ News.]$



Civilian refugees, bearing all their belongings, struggling along the road leading to Albania-

[Topical,

frontiers meet, but were completely beaten off, and the French, following them up, occupied the border heights over against Strumnitza, on Bulgarian soil. The main point to be settled, however, was not whether the French could maintain their ground on the extreme right, but whether they could take the offensive successfully on their left.

It was clear that for the present the French could hold the line of the Vardar nearly up to the point where it receives its tributary, the Cerna, which runs into it from the south-west at a point a few miles south of Veles. North of the mouth of the Cerna the Bulgarians had crossed the Vardar. The road running south-west from Veles to Monastir passes through hilly country which rises to the height of between three and four thousand feet at the Babuna Pass, and here the Servians were planted in strong positions. Bulgarians succeeded in breaking through, or, what was more to be feared, outflanking this position, they would have a clear run through low-lying ground to Monastir, and the whole of Southern Macedonia would be in their hands. For a number of days the Servians successfully resisted repeated frontal attacks on the Babuna Pass, in the hope that the French would arrive in time to fall on the left flank of the enemy and drive them back on Veles. On November 5th General Sarrail crossed the Cerna and made the experiment. The results speedily showed that the Bulgarians were in too strong a force to be dislodged, and eventually he withdrew again to the right bank of the Cerna. The Bulgarians came round the flank of the Babuna Pass, and the fate of Southern Macedonia was decided.

THE THIRD STAGE.

Up to this point the campaign had fallen into two definite stages. The first had included the crossing of the rivers and the occupation of the heights commanding them. In the second, the three Allies had advanced by a series of enveloping attacks on the

most important towns in Servia. Von Koevess, with some assistance from the Austrian detachment on the Upper Drina and from the Germans advancing on his left in the Morava valley, had mastered all the rugged country which protects Kraguyevatz and had captured it. Von Gallwitz had pushed the Servians out of the whole north-east corner, in conjunction with the First Bulgarian Army, and had cleared the Danube route. The First Bulgarian Army had captured Nish; the Second had taken Uskub and was hastening to attack the rear of the Serbs retreating in disorder; while another column was occupying Southern Macedonia, holding the Anglo-French forces fast on the Vardar and working round against their rear. The Bulgarians had the immense advantage of knowing the precise strength and organisation of the Allied army at Salonika. Its position was wholly anomalous. It was on neutral territory, and not only Greeks, but Germans, Austrians, Bulgarians, and Turks alike were free to take notes of every military detail, and of this opportunity they took full advantage.

There was nothing up to this point to indicate that the Servians might not be able to attain their object and draw off their army in substantial strength, together with the greater part of its guns, to Montenegro, or to such parts of Albania as were open to them. The retreat had so far been conducted both with resolution and with skill. Their losses had been small, their guns had been saved. They were now to meet with difficulties which it was beyond even their ingenuity or courage to overcome. Pressed back within an ever-narrowing line, they had to carry off the guns and the whole of the equipment and transport of a still large army along a small number of roads, some of which were of little military value, and the whole of which were now congested with the masses of the civilian population who, bag and baggage, joined in the retreat.

Mention should be made here of the bombardment by British, French, and Russian ships of the Bulgarian

coast. The port of Dedeagatch was heavily shelled, and substantial damage was done.

"The ships engaged in the work mostly consisted of monitors and destroyers and some cruisers, under the personal direction of Vice-Admiral de Robeck. The first shots were fired at the barracks at Dedeagatch, which were full of soldiers. These could easily be seen rushing out of the building in hundreds and running to and fro seeking shelter. The heavy guns continued to shell the barracks, whilst the destroyers trained their guns on the fleeing soldiers, inflicting heavier punishment. Every building of military importance came under the fire of the ships' guns and was razed to the ground.

"Whilst the bombardment was proceeding a troop train sped along at top speed. The destroyers chased it, subjecting it to a heavy shelling. All the time shells fell thickly in front and to the rear of it, but it was not observed whether any struck it. The railway line was

absolutely torn up, and the railway station was completely wrecked.

"A number of railway trucks were lying along the railway line fully loaded. When these were shelled they soon caught fire, flames shooting up to a great height. They contained black powder, and were ready to be moved to the ammunition factory, which was likewise wrecked. The soldiers repeatedly but unavailingly attempted to remove them, but the flames, aided by the hail of shells directed against them, soon reduced them to ashes. Black, thick volumes of smoke issued from the trucks, which hid the town from the fleet. When the smoke cleared the church appeared to be the only lofty building standing.*"


Bulgaria, unfortunately, is not a sea-power. The bombardment of Dedeagatch was a necessary and a useful measure, but it was impossible that it should have any great military value.

* Press Association telegram.



A destroyed bridge over the Morava, with the pontoon bridge built to replace it on the right.

[Sport and General.



A British camp near Salonika.

[Central News.

CHAPTER III.

THE ALLIES AT SALONIKA: THE SERVIAN EXODUS.

THE FALL OF MONASTIR—DANGER TO THE ANGLO-FRENCH ARMY—ITS RETREAT TOWARDS SALONIKA—THE GREEK ATTITUDE—CLOSE OF THE SERVIAN CAMPAIGN—THE EXODUS.

HE failure of General Sarrail's effort to link up his left wing with the Servians on the Babuna Pass meant the fall of Prilep and Monastir, the loss of Southern Macedonia, and the retreat of the Anglo-French force along the Vardar. The position now was that as the Bulgarians steadily made their way southwards towards Monastir they more and more threatened the rear of the French army, which lay on the other side of the River Cerna. General Sarrail's line extended along the Vardar as far as Krivolak, nearly one hundred miles from Salonika, and the Bulgarians were already far south of this point, with the River Cerna holding them back from an immediate attack on the French communications. As the campaign in Northern Servia had been decided, and the Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians had more than enough men for what was still to do there, it was certain that they would turn their attention to the Anglo-French army and attempt to drive it off Servian soil, whether or not they pursued it on to Greek territory. By the middle of November it was clear that Monastir was about to fall.

"On Friday, November 12th, we saw a strange procession pass through the streets. It was a little regiment of Servian farmers and workmen with shovels. In their queer fur coats, their woollen stockings and their odd hats, they presented B3-VOL IV.

a peculiar sight. Their long-handled, diamond-shaped shovels took the places of bayonets. The long line marched out of the town in irregular formation. Women and girls ran along-side, carrying baskets of food for men relatives among the shovellers. After journeying a few miles they came to a halt, and began to dig trenches under the direction of Servian officers. This was the first sign that Monastir was in danger.

"Far to the north the little Servian army was falling back against terrific odds. These trenches were being made ready for the men of that little army. Sometime soon they would come, falling back, through the mountain passes and over the farms and hills to these trenches which these farmers were digging, and here would make their last stand. The men with the shovels told Monastir the whole story.

"Sunday was a bad day. The sound of the guns came from nearer points. Two big British Red Cross motoromnibuses made journeys between the Russian Consulate and the railroad station, depositing at the latter point huge bundles, wrapped in heavy blankets. It was apparent that the Russian Consul was getting ready to go. The British Consul, who owned the only automobile in the town, dashed up and down the streets to the Italian Consulate, the French Consulate, the Russian Consulate, and the Greek Consulate. In the late afternoon waggons began carrying packages from the Italian and French Consulates to the station. The story was being told before our eyes of what was happening to that brave little army to the north of the city.'*

^{*} Exchange Telegram, quoting United Press Correspondent.



Doiran, where the frontiers of Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece meet.

[Topical Press.



A view in Uskub, showing the River Vardar and the hills behind the town.

[Topical Press.

GREECE AND THE ALLIES.

While the danger from the Bulgarians was increasing, the Allies had been feeling more and more the difficulties of their relations with Greece. They had sent an army to Salonika, believing that it would arrive there to co-operate with the Greeks in attacking Bulgaria. M. Venizelos had made a formal protest against the violation of Greek neutrality, but it was known that with M. Venizelos in power the protest was intended to be only formal, and that it was his policy to carry Greece into the war and to obtain for her the assistance of an Anglo-French contingent. But M. Venizelos fell, and the Anglo-French force remained at Salonika in the midst

of a mobilised Greek army, whose commanders—Staff, Government, and King-had been averse to its coming. were fearful of its presence, and were anxious only to be rid of it with speed. The ruling motive with King Constantine was a desire to avoid a conflict with Germany. He was thoroughly afraid of what Germany might do to his country, and had always, as he said himself, the thought of Belgium before his eyes. His General Staff shared his fears and his belief that Germany could not be beaten. His Government, the successor to \mathbf{M} Venizelos's, had been appointed specifically to keep Greece out of the danger of collision with Germany. That was precisely the danger into which the presence

of the Allied forces at Salonika was likely to bring her. Hence his hostility towards it, and the difficulty and danger of its position.

There were Greek batteries along the Salonika coast, and Greek troops in Salonika itself. There were Greek positions along the line of the Allies' communications, and Greek guns commanding the routes by which the Allies might have to retreat towards Salonika. Allowance ought to be made for the difficulties of a Government, like that of Greece, which was afraid lest an unwelcome guest should involve it in trouble, not only with Bulgaria, the hereditary enemy, but with the new and dreaded neighbour, Germany. But the commanders of the Anglo-French force had only to consider the predicament in

which they were already placed, and how terrible it might at any moment become if the Greek Government decided to pass from a semi-hostile neutrality to open attack. The position was impossible to tolerate. What would be the attitude of Greece towards Anglo-French troops retreating from Servian territory into Greece? Suppose that the Germans demanded that such a force should be interned. Would Greece endeavour to intern troops who were retreating, while others were still landing at Salonika and pushing northwards to reinforce them? The idea seemed ridiculous, but some colour was given to it by statements made by Greek Ministers that the Servian force at Prilep and Monastir


would be interned if it were driven into Greece. Treatment which was good enough for Servians would presumably be good enough for their Allies, the French and British. And if the French and British declined to be disarmed and interned, what then would the Greeks do? The possibility had to be considered that they would take arms to enforce their demands, or, in other words, make common cause with the Germans and Austrians.

This possibility gathered force when one considered the unhappy position of the Greeks should the Central Powers not only push back the Anglo-French over the frontier, but follow them on to Greek soil. The Greeks might then attack the invaders, but such a collision it was the cardinal point

Record Press.

a collision it was the cardinal point of the King's policy to avoid. Or they might let the contending parties fight their quarrel out on Greek territory, in which case they would probably look to see the Germans victorious, and they would not forget that where Germans, Austrians, or Bulgarians occupied Greek territory, there one or other of them was not unlikely to stop. The German satirical papers declared, when Calais became a British base at the beginning of the war, that perfidious England had learned just sufficient French to be able to understand "J'y suis, j'y reste." It was a poor enough sneer in this application, but to Greek minds the maxim must have had point when Salonika was the prize and Austria and Bulgaria the aspirants to it.

Clearly, Greek interests might be most simply served



General Sarrail walking through the streets of Salonika. $[Record\ Pres.]$

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French_troops in possession of the railway station at Krivolak. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



French stores of fodder at Salonika.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

by an attack from the rear on a retreating Allied force, and, however alien such an idea may actually have been from the minds of the Greek King and Government, it was one with which the Entente Powers did right to reckon. Pressure was put on Greece, and eventually a settlement was reached. A Military Commission was sent to Salonika, and after conference with the Allied Commanders it was arranged that, except for a small force in Salonika itself, the Greek troops should be withdrawn eastwards and westwards away from the line of the Allies' communications. This secured the way of retreat, and meant that the Allies would be able, if driven to retreat from Servia, to maintain their hold on Salonika, and make of it an entrenched camp. King

Constantine's hopes were sufficiently indicated by his statement that if the Allies on the Vardar should be driven back into Greek Macedonia he would give them his protection until they had all safely re-embarked at Salonika.

THE BEGINNING OF THE RETREAT.

At the beginning of December the main front of the Allied army stretched for about fifty miles on the eastern side of the Vardar. The British held the Their right wing. line began just to the north of Lake Doiran (through which runs the boundary between Greece and Servia). Then the line ran north-westwards towards the Vardar, and continued northwards to Krivolak. The position was in itself a strong one, but it became unten-

able so soon as the Bulgarians, by approaching Monastir, came down towards the left rear of the troops holding it. Either the Bulgarians must be definitely held off, which demanded many more troops than was available, or withdrawal must begin. General Sarrail, therefore, began in good time to withdraw.


"Up to the advanced points, to Krivolak more especially, just 100 miles from the Salonika base, large quantities of all kinds of stores had been sent in anticipation of the advance. It was necessary to evacuate all these, and the only means of getting them out was a single line of railway. a marvel of engineering, runs along the Vardar Valley. Mostly that valley is narrow, and it often closes in to dim, fantastically wrought gorges.

"Here the line clings to a high mountain, there it is deep down in an awe-inspiring ravine, where the noise of the passing trains is lost in the loud, wild music of rushing waters.


"Not only was the army bound down to a single line, but it was hampered in addition by the scarcity of rolling About half-a dozen trains daily was the maximum number that could be run. Loading and then waiting for an empty train to return, waiting and loading again—so the work went on, day after day.


"Shrapnel puffs and the pillars of débris made by bursting high-explosive shells were never far distant. Sometimes they fell quite close to the trains. In addition, this is a country without roads, properly speaking. So the railway was the only way back, and if that failed then it simply meant disaster. The success of this great work of evacuation of supplies depended on the holding of the advanced posts beyond.

Bridgeheads were called, and they take the form of a wide arc of posts stretching across the valley and bending inwards so as to protect the flanks, each end stretching far into the mountains on either side of the valley. Behind this tremendous arc the work of evacuation was carried out."*



On December 3rd the attack on the British and French positions began. The attacking army was almost, if not wholly, Bulgarian in character. There were reports that some of Von Gallwitz's troops had been sent southward to join the Bulgarians, but the German contingent, if there was one, was certainly small. There were good reasons for this: the first that the Germans were anxious to transfer their armies from Servia with all





The railway line at Demir Kapu.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

^{*} Daily Chronicle Telegram.



The meeting of the Kaiser and King Ferdinand of Bulgaria at Nish: The two allies inspecting Bulgarian troops.

[Central News.]




(The occupation of Servia: A German soldier bargaining for meat in a Servian town. [Central News.



Servian prisoners making a road for German transports.

[Photopress.



Where three frontiers meet.

and it is not rash to suppose that, had the Germans been in command of it, they would have made more use of the formidable advantage which they had gained by the advance towards Monastir.

The main attack was delivered in three separate quarters. An attempt was made to cross the River Cerna at a point about twelve miles from its junction with the Vardar river. A crossing here would have threatened the left wing of the Fench army, but the Bulgarian attempt was defeated. A fierce attack was made on the French positions in the gorge of Demir Kapu. There was no question on the part of the French of anything more than heavy rearguard fighting, for it was soon clear that the Bulgarians had a great superiority in numbers, and that the Allied line could not be held. At Demir Kapu, however, the Bulgarians were made to pay heavily for the attack. The French feigned a complete retreat, and were thought to be abandoning the whole of their positions. The Bulgarians then "attempted to pursue, and when their troops were well engaged in the defile, two French regiments, with a battery of machine-guns, who had cleverly hidden their presence, suddenly opened on them a murderous fire. One of their regiments, the Eleventh, was exterminated almost to a man. The rest of their forces engaged in the defile broke and fled." The French fell back steadily on both sides of the Vardar. The British forces were fiercely attacked on December 6th, and the Bulgarians succeeded in breaking into some of the forward trenches. They were driven out again on this day with the bayonet. On the 7th they renewed the attack with overwhelming forces, and the Tenth Division, which held the positions north and north-west of Lake Doiran, were compelled slowly to fall back. The Munster Fusiliers, the Dublin Fusiliers, and the Connaught Rangers especially distinguished themselves in all this fighting.

"Our most advanced position was known as Rocky Peak. The Bulgarian attack began at three o'clock in the morning with a tremendous hail of lead poured upon our trenches, which also suffered from whirling fragments of stone, the Bulgarian high-explosive shells splintering the rocks and sending fragments in all directions, thus greatly intensifying the effect of their fire. Their infantry then advanced to the attack in massed formation, and were punished severely by our fire. But the scarcity of our guns did not permit us to take a proper toll of his exposed ranks. Our men emptied their magazines, firing rapidly into the advancing crush, and then tried to stem the tide with the bayonet, but they were overborne by sheer weight of numbers, and the position was lost.

lost.

"Nevertheless, the casualties suffered by the Bulgarians made them very cautious about approaching our second line, and, having the range to an inch, they plastered our trenches with shrapnel and high-explosive shells. It was soon recognised that the position was untenable owing to the weight of the fire which the enemy were able to bring to bear, and our troops fell back to their third line of defence.

"Two companies of the Inniskillings, however, held on to a ridge and kept back the Bulgarians practically the whole morning, although they were backed only by rifle-fire. Hardly a man escaped, but their stand impressed and delayed the Bulgarians, thus giving us much-needed time to complete our defensive dispositions on our third line, where the Bulgarians were finally held up."*

The French and British lines were now falling back together, and the Bulgarians renewed their assault with great vigour on the 8th and oth, and again on the 11th, when the Allied forces fell back from the heights immediately west of Lake Doiran. On the 12th they were close to the frontier, and on the following day they had entered Greek territory again. The whole of Macedonia was now, as the Bulgarian reports triumphantly proclaimed, free of the enemy of whatever nationality, and safely in Bulgarian hands.

^{*} Press Association Telegram.



French artillery disembarking at Salonika.

Newspaper Illustrations.



On the quay at Salonika: Serving out soup to newly-arrived French soldiers. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$

THE LINES AT SALONIKA.

The Allies retired on positions in front of Salonika, and proceeded to fortify them against attack. A correspondent of the *Vossiche Zeitung*, who wrote about the position as he found it at the end of the third week in December, thus described the lines:—

"On December 19th the Entente had already completed the first defence line around Salonika, and were at work on the second. The key to the first line is the village of Topsin, twenty kilometres north-west of Salonika and between the railways to Karasuli and Monastir, where an extremely strong bridgehead has been established. From there the first line runs first along the heights on the left bank of the Vardar to the north, then bends at about thirty kilometres (nineteen miles) as the crow flies from Salonika towards the east, then

goes in a very regular bow which comprises each height eastwards round Salonika. This ground has already soaked with blood, for it is chiefly the same field of battle upon which in the first Balkan War the fate of Salonika was decided.

"The chief point of support of the second line, which is still being made. is the hill ridge about one kilometre to the north of Salonika on the railway to Doiran, also constituting a sort of bridgehead on the River Galiko. This second semicircle is almost parallel with the first. It lies, however, so close to the town that if it had to be defended the town itself would longer be safe."


The Allied commanders had not only to think of obtaining strong natural positions north of Salonika; they had to occupy positions, whether good or bad, at

good or bad, at such a distance from the town that it, or rather the waters of its harbour, would not easily be open to bombardment by the besieger. It would be of little use to have several strong lines of defences round Salonika if the Germans or Bulgarians, after carrying the first of them, were in a position to shell the shipping in Salonika harbour. The siege of Port Arthur was virtually over when the Japanese had broken so far into the Russian defences that they could destroy the Russian squadron of warships in the port; and the moment that an army besieging Salonika got within range of the transports and supply ships in the harbour, the existence of the Expeditionary Force would be virtually ended.


THE BULGARIANS AND SALONIKA.

The Bulgarians showed no sign of following the enemy over the Greek frontier, and the motives for their modesty have been much discussed. It was obviously essential that if they meant, as they said, to drive the Allies into the sea, they should follow them up at once and attack them before they could dig themselves in on the heights round Salonika. If the war had proved anything at all, it had shown conclusively that an army well equipped and commanded could very soon put itself in an almost impregnable position by means of fieldworks, provided, of course, that its flanks were well protected. There was a strong current of feeling in Bulgaria that when Servian Macedonia had been gained the object

of the war had been achieved, and that if a fresh and more formidable campaign had to be undertaken the Germans and Austrians—and perhaps especially the Germans-ought to bear a large share of the liability. The Bulgarians were well aware that an attack on the Salonika positions, unless they pushed on at once, would need heavier guns than they themselves possessed, and would in any case be very costly, and their generals gave interviews freely to German and Austrian newspaper correspondents in which they threw out plain hints that the Germans would yet find the Allies at Salonika a great danger to their communications with the Near East through the Bal-




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The Greek Commander-in-chief at Salonika talking with Allied officers. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



Bulgarian soldiers searching for abandoned guns in the river at Nish after the Servian evacuation.

[Sport and General.



Ruined houses in Podzarevatz after the Servian retreat.

[Sport and General.



The Greek army leaves Salonika: Infantry marching out of the town.

[Central News.

the ousting of the Allies from Salonika was by no means their exclusive business. They remained impassive on the Greek frontier. Up to a certain point this suited the plans of the Germans very well. It meant at least that a large Anglo-French army was immobilised at Salonika, and that if it advanced it would be fighting Bulgarians rather than Germans. On the other hand, if the Allies really meant business, and eventually took the offensive in great force against the Bulgarians, the Germans would have genuine cause to fear for their positions in the Balkans, their power to keep Roumania neutral, and their communications with Turkey. The year came to an end with the question still undecided.


THE PURSUIT OF THE SERVIANS.

Meanwhile in the north the enemy were urging the pursuit of the main Servian forces, which were now on the verge of dissolution. Von Koevess, having captured Kragujevatz, was pushing on to the valley of the Western Morava, which here runs east and west across the country; on his left, Von Gallwitz was marching rapidly up the main stream of the Morava, and swinging round to face the west in line with the First Bulgarian Army, which, having taken Nish, was advancing due west; while in the south, the Second Bulgarian Army was marching from Uskub towards the north-west in order to cut off the Servian retreat. The Servians were thus being thrust back within an ever-narrowing are towards the borders of Montenegro and Albania. From Nish they could not withdraw along the main railway to the south, for the Bulgarians held it. They

were compelled, therefore, in the first instance, to retreat north-westwards to Kraljevo, and then make their way southwards through the mountains to Novi-Bazar and Mitrovitza, which alone with Pristina and Prizrend now remained to them. But it was clear that these could be no more than halting places in a flight. Von Koevess was descending on Novi-Bazar; Von Gallwitz on Mitrovitza; both he and the Bulgarian, Bojadjeff, on Pristina, and the Southern Bulgarians were making towards Prizrend.

The retreat, though the Servians fought gallantly to the end, was embarrassed by the very nature of the country, which under other circumstances had helped the Servian defence. The Servians-military and civilian alike-retreating from Nish fell in with and were impeded by the simultaneous withdrawal from the north, which was in full swing. The result was seen in the heavy losses which were sustained in the fighting at Kraljevo and Krusevatz, both in the valley of the Western Morava. The converging enemy were gradually pushing the Servian army in upon itself, and only good and numerous roads would have enabled it to get clear away without heavy losses of all kinds. It is not easy to imagine the extraordinary scenes which marked this exodus towards the south, the miseries of which were aggravated by the inclemencies of the weather and by lack of food. Already at the taking of Nish a Hungarian observer had noticed the starving condition of the people.

"It is evident that the people are practically starving; one can see by their pale faces that they have neither bread nor potatoes; yet they walk about in the streets



THE CONVERGING ATTACK ON SERVIA.

with a dignity and contempt, especially for the Bulgarian soldiers, as if in the best of circumstances. The Bulgarian Prefect . . . said that the misery of the population as regards foodstuffs was indescribable, for there was absolutely no bread, butter, eggs, or milk, and only a very little meat was available. The authorities were unable to supply them with foodstuffs owing to the blowing-up of the bridges and the destruction of the railway lines by the Servians, a circumstance which, under the present weather conditions, makes the transporting of large quantities impossible. The men, especially the German engineers, are working hard to put the lines in order, but at least another three weeks will pass before railway communication can be reopened.

"Next morning I was invited to breakfast by Prince Windischgratz, who lives in the building of the Austro-Hungarian Consulate. When I arrived there at nine o'clock I found hundreds and hundreds of old men, women, and children before the building, the most terrible-looking misery-stricken group I ever beheld, who had come there in their heartrending misery to beg for bread. I had seen misery already two years ago after the fall of Adrianople, when the Greek refugees arrived at Salonika, and this year in Galicia and Russian Poland, where the havoc of war ruined everything, but nowhere did I see misery so terrible and so naked as at Nish before the house where a sumptuous breakfast was awaiting me. But there was nothing to be done for them, and nothing will be done until railway communication has been re-established. The Prince himself distributed many thousands of crowns, Austrian money, among the famine-stricken population, but money does not mean anything to them, as they cannot buy food with it."*

THE FUGITIVES.

The road leading south to Novi-Bazar and Mitrovitza was choked with the flood of fugitives. M. Barby, the French correspondent, has described how he saw gathered at Kraljevo the members of the Servian Government and Chamber, the local officials, the foreign legations and their staffs, foreign military and sanitary missions, French aviators, and the like. "Here were the French colony from the mines of Bor (in the north-east of Servia), a hundred men, women, and children, who had been for three weeks a veritable wandering tribe. . . . Here, too, among the mass of fugitives, were the Austrian prisoners; in groups of 300 or 400 they marched on, almost left to themselves, under the guard of a single Servian soldier, a veteran of the last line of defence.' A graphic description of the scenes south of Kraljevo was given by Mr. Lyon Blease, an Englishman, who was in the midst of the early part of the exodus, but turned off westwards into Montenegro, while the main stream flowed south to Mitrovitza.

"From Kraljevo to Rashka the road follows the course of the River Ibar. For the first six miles it runs over a flat plain, then climbs a hill and descends by a great zig-zag into a narrow gorge, which winds south for fifty miles. Along this gorge run side by side the road and the river, the road now a hundred or two hundred feet above the water. now sinking till it almost reaches it.

"We moved with a vast, unending procession of men, animals, and vehicles of every kind. For three days and two nights we tramped and rode along the gorge, and it seemed as if all the world tramped and rode with us. Empty waggons were coming north, but were like mere ripples on the surface of the tide. A train of field kitchens drawn by oxen; a Servian ambulance train; a caravan of gipsies, bargaining by the wayside for the sale of horses which they had doubtless stolen further north; two battalions of the newest Servian levies, boys of 16 and 17, armed with one rifle among five, fed with bread one day in three, once at night trying to raid our provision cart, and constantly offering to buy our rice and cocoa, sometimes beaten by their officers, but on the whole cheerful enough, and every one of them bearing across his back one

of those brilliant rugs which Servian mothers weave at home for their sons going to the war; troops of Austrian prisoners, ill-fed and ill-clad, hurried south fest they should be rescued and once more pressed into the ranks; officers on horseback; officers and civilians in carriages; a prince and his household in motors; waggons loaded with public or private stores; great military automobiles storming through the press of slower traffic; and slipping in and out where they found a way, the foot passengers, whose homes were already in the hands of the enemy, and who were going south, not because they had anything to find there, but only because the enemy was behind.

'It was the volume of this persistent stream rather than any particular thing in it that made it so terrible. It went on when we halted, and went on during the night, whirling in and out of the light of our wayside fire without ceasing, a nightmare of motion. Isolated scenes of horror were not wanting. I saw a horse pushed over the edge of the road, and watched it scramble back, trembling and sweating, two hundred feet above the remorseless river. At another place a cart and two oxen had fallen eighty feet, and as we passed we could see the oxen drowned in the water, and the hapless peasants saving pieces of crockery that had been scattered in the fall. There was no more hope for an animal that fell on the road than for one that fell in the river. Neither stream would wait. I saw a great cart urged over the body of a living ox, and Gordon shot a poor horse which had collapsed in the very middle of the track, and was being crushed before our eyes."

THE LAST BATTLES.

On November 23rd, forty days after the Bulgarians had declared war, all of Servia was overrun except a small patch around Pristina and Prizrend, close to the Montenegrin and Albanian borders. On that day the Servians were thrown from Pristina. On November 28th, the Bulgarians reported that the Servian army had become mere "straggling crowds." On the 29th Prizrend was captured, and with it, according to the enemy reports, fifty field guns and howitzers, and a large quantity of transport. German Headquarters reported the close of their campaign: "With the flight of the scanty remains of the Servian army into the Albanian mountains, our great operations are brought to a close. Our object of effecting communication with Bulgaria and the Turkish Empire has been accomplished." The Bulgarians had one stroke more to deal. Servians were now in the Albanian mountains, seeking to carry off as much as was possible of their artillery and transport towards Scutari, near the Adriatic coast, or to Dibra, in the south. In the valley of the River Drin the Bulgarians overtook and dispersed them on December 3rd. "The Servians lost here 100 field guns and howitzers, 200 motor-cars, a great quantity of war material, 150 transport waggons, and such quantities of uniforms and equipment that the road was blocked with them." So the Bulgarian bulletin. Least of all the official reports do those of the Bulgarians deserve to be trusted; in the first Balkan War the Bulgarian Staff fabricated a whole series of reports in order to mislead. But though the details of the Servian rout may have been exaggerated, it was almost inevitable that the Servian army should be broken up and scattered. It had been fighting incessantly for almost two months; all its bases and strong positions had been captured; food was lacking, and, we may say with certainty, shells and ammunition also. At the finish it was only a question of what remnant could be brought safely to the coast in the hope that, rested and refitted, it might fight again by the side of the French and British.

The Servians who had been defending Monastir retreated westwards towards Elbasan, in Middle Albania, and with them was a small force which had come down

^{*} Morning Post, Buda Pest Correspondent.



Departure of Bulgarian troops for the Greek frontier.

[Photopress.



Albanian troops under Essad Pasha parading in Durazzo.

[Photopress.



Servian refugees arriving in Marseilles.

[Photopress.

from the north to help them. Their miseries were worse even than those experienced in the retirement from Kraljevo.

"The aspect of the troops was heartrending, and the hardships they endured baffle all description. They trudged along footsore, weary, and hungry, in a whirlwind of snow, over ice-paths, bearing their sufferings heroically. Holding together in groups and small detachments, the stronger ones encouraged and helped the weaker ones. Nearly all were almost overcome by hunger and cold. The picture was no longer one of an army but of a ghost of an army, and the wonder was they still held together. The Bulgarians were pressing them hard, and finding difficulties also in their pursuit, but, naturally better supported, they formed a semicircle extending over a line of twenty kilometres from Prilep to Novak and Krusevo.

"The reinforcements from the north, which formed a total of 6,000 men, might have prolonged the defence of Monastir, but they were so exhausted by their march of seventeen days over impossible roads, with uniforms torn and ragged, hardly any boots, and a scarcity of bread, that they were unfit for strong resistance. They went for forty-eight hours without eating, and lost 120 of their number, who fell overcome by the rain and the snow, and were left dead on the mountain paths. These troops could not be called reinforcements—rather a multitude of haggard spectres, more fit for the hospital than for the battlefield."*

Such was the condition of the troops, and besides them, in similar case, were many thousands of refugees straggling along the Albanian border in the hope of reaching safety at Monastir, which, if they reached it at all, was in Bulgarian hands. Help was sent out from Salonika to these fugitives. "Twenty motor-cars loaded with flour," wrote the United Press correspondent, "are fighting their way through the blizzard towards Dibra. They say that nearly the whole route from Prizrend to Monastir is lined with corpses of human beings and the carcases of horses and mules dead of starvation, while thousands of old men, women, and children are lying on the rocks and in the thickets besides the trail, exhausted and without food, awaiting the end." Little could be done to mitigate this extreme of misery, and all that was done was the tardy despatch of relief supplies to the Eastern Adriatic coast. The Greek island of Corfu was afterwards commandeered by the Allies as a rest-house for the remnant of the Servian army.

KING PETER.

King Peter remained with his troops to the last. In the third Austrian invasion (November, 1914) he had inspired them by his personal example, and now also he went to the front and took part in their retreat. At the last, according to the *Corriere della Sera's* correspondent, he refused for some time to leave Servian soil. "No one," he said, "can force a king to leave his country." Eventually he yielded to the importunity of those about him.

"The flight through Albania was almost like a mythical story. The motor-car could not go beyond Yuncula, as there is no proper road, and the path crosses steep mountains. It rained hard, the wind was blowing, and the ground underfoot was all mud. 'Often,' said Colonel Teodorovitz (one of the escort) 'we were sorely tempted by hunger and weariness to lie down and end it all. I do not

^{*} Corriere, Salonika Telegram.

know what inner feeling, revolting against the idea of death, gave us the strength to resist.' Sometimes riding his horse and often on foot, with an escort of three officers and six soldiers from the Guards, the King of Servia, old, ill, had to journey a hundred miles in horrible weather from the frontier to Scutari. He never lay on a bed, and his meals consisted of bread and cheese, which he shared with the soldiers.

"The old King and his companions went on their way, moving as if in a dream. They had only three horses, and it was impossible to persuade the King to save himself. Like the others he stood his turn, so that all rode half the way, doing the rest on foot. Some climbs, moreover, could not be attempted on horseback at all. They travelled the whole day with two short intervals, when they took some food. For seven days they never had a hot meal, and once they were without bread. But this did not trouble them much, for they knew that they were better off than those in the retreat who had died of hunger, and the others who in despair had eaten grass and the bark of the trees. At night they slept in the hut of some Albanian shepherd, and the simple, poor hosts never knew that the old, pale, weary officer who passed the night lying on the ground, and in the morning mounted his horse after swallowing a mouthful of bread, was the King of Servia.

"One evening the little train of fugitives missed the road and darkness fell. No one was about, nor was there

any sign of life. They called loudly, but no answer came. Then the King remembered a little electric torch in his saddlebag. Would it work? They found it, and the King himself pressed the spring. A tiny luminous circle showed on the ground. They felt as if they were saved, and following the King they went on, trusting to chance. After a time they saw footprints in the mud, and following the track they reached a shepherd's hut, where they rested for the night.

"The soldiers had to ford torrents, carrying the King on their shoulders, and finally they reached Scutari. The town was full of Servians and Montenegrins. The Servian Government was also there, having arrived by another route. But the signs of ruin and misery and famine were still to be seen everywhere. And over them circled like vultures the Austrian aeroplanes. Colonel Teodorovitz said: 'I believe that the Servians have touched the utmost limit of human suffering.'"

From Scutari the King went to Durazzo and Valona, then to Brindisi, and finally to Salonika, in order to be with the Servian contingents that were expected there to join the Allies. All was over, for the time, with Servia. But hope still lived. The presence of the Anglo-French at Salonika was a visible pledge that the Allies had made the cause of Servia their own.



A scene on the quay side at Durazzo during the embarkation of the Servian refugees from the port. On the left are horses sent to collect supplies of corn for the Servian troops on the outskirts of Durazzo. Soldiers and civilian refugees line the quay. In the harbour can be seen the masts of several small craft sunk by the Austrians.



A view of Salonika from the sea, taken from the deck of an Allied warship.

Official Photo.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SALONIKA CRISIS.

SIR EDWARD GREY'S PLEDGE TO SERVIA—ITS INTERPRETATION—SIR EDWARD CARSON'S RESIGNATION—POLITICAL OPINION IN FRANCE—THE MOTIVES OF BRITISH POLICY—GENERAL JOFFRE'S VISIT TO LONDON—THE FRICTION AT SALONIKA—LORD KITCHENER'S VISIT TO THE EAST.

a deep effect on the public mind at home and in France, and stirred the surface of politics into a storm. Up to now people had accepted the greater preparedness of the Germans for the war under the circumstances as inevitable, and as a left-handed and highly inconvenient tribute to the righteousness of our cause. When Belgium went under there was no self-accusation, but vows were registered that whatever else happened as a result of the war, at any rate, she should be compensated. But when, after a year's fighting, another of our Allies was driven into exile, with every circumstance of pain and indignity, this philosophy broke down. For the first time in the war a wholesome wind stirred the stagnation of politics.

The story of diplomatic happenings which brought Bulgaria into the war against us and ejected from power for the second time in the war M. Venizelos, the only genuine statesman of modern Greece, and on that account the best friend that the Allied cause had in the East, has already been told in the first chapter of this volume. In this chapter, the politics of the Balkans will file before us again, only they will be seen from the opposite side. Here we are concerned not with the motives of Balkan intrigue, but with the workings of the British and French Foreign Offices, as an expression of the minds of their nations and the instruments of their will.

At the end of September, before the rupture with Bulgaria, Sir Edward Grey made a statement in the House of Commons on the policy of the Government. It opened with some sentences which gave offence in Greece, for Sir Edward Grey, anxious even at the eleventh hour to save Bulgaria for the Allies, declared that "not only is there no hostility in this country to Bulgaria, but there is traditionally a warm feeling of sympathy for the Bulgarian people." These words were used by the enemies of M. Venizelos to support the charge that British policy was inspired by sympathy with Bulgaria, whereas their only object was to save her from what everyone in England was convinced would be her ruin. Sir Edward Grey continued:—

If, on the other hand, the Bulgarian mobilisation were to result in Bulgaria assuming an aggressive attitude on the side of our enemies we are prepared to give to our friends in the Balkans all the support in our power, in the manner that would be most welcome to them, in concert with our Allies, without reserve and without qualification.

It is difficult to imagine a more unequivocal promise of support to Servia than this, and the interpretation everywhere put upon it was that if Bulgaria attacked Servia we should land an expedition at some point from which we could most effectually give her the support that she desired. But Sir Edward Grey later denied that this was the natural interpretation to be put on his words. He explained that on September 24th, answering a Servian appeal for help, he informed her that "we were offering to Greece to send forces to Salonika to help her to fulfil her obligations to Servia." "I said nothing," he continued, "as to what we could or could not do in the contingency of Greece refusing to assist Servia." As for the words "without qualification and without reserve," they meant no more than this, that promises and concessions to



Lord Kitchener's visit to Gallipoli: His meeting with the French commander-in-chief. $[Official\ Photo.$



Lord Kitchener on a tour of inspection round the trenches in Gallipoli.

[Official Photo.

Bulgaria were at an end, and that our troops would be used solely to help our friends and fight our and their enemies. It was, he thought, obvious that the words could not bear a military construction, for no one had suggested that "His Majesty's Government could send all the British armies to the Balkan theatre of war, or that we could send troops to the Balkans without reference to needs elsewhere, especially in France and Flanders." This statement must be accepted as an account of Sir Edward Grey's meaning; but he could not have expressed that meaning in a more unfortunate or more misleading manner.

THE POLICY OF FRANCE.

On October 12th, a fortnight after the promise made by Sir Edward Grey, M. Viviani made a statement on French policy in the Chamber. He spoke of a mission

to help Servia that affected "both our interests and our honour." Although France's first duty was to her soil, she had also a duty in Servia, and he assured the Chamber that the Commander-in-Chief was in perfect accord with that view. His speech closed with the following words:

> "The understanding between the British Government and the Government of the Republic is complete, and I cannot express it better than in the following form :-

> "France and England, in accord with their Allies, are now fully agreed to send help to Servia, who has asked for our assistance, and also to ensure for the benefit of Servia, Greece, and Roumania respect for the Treaty of Bukharest, of which we are guarantors.

> "The Anglo-French Governments are at one as to the importance of the forces to be employed, in conformity with the views of their military authorities.

> "Russia has expressed her anxiety to join her Allies in sending help to the Servian people, and to-morrow her troops will fight side by side

"Gentlemen, with our Allies

we have done our duty. Never has accord between Allies been so complete and so close. Never have we been more confident of our common victory."

Whatever, therefore, Sir Edward Grey may have meant by his promise at the end of September, a fortnight later M. Viviani's language seemed to leave no possible room for doubt that our intention was to give Servia our armed assistance. M. Viviani made his speech a week after the Germans had crossed the rivers, but two days before the Bulgarians had declared war on Servia and begun their advance. It was still not too late.

THE RESIGNATION OF SIR E. CARSON.


Between the first promise made by Sir Edward Grey and this statement of M. Viviani there had been anxious meetings of the Cabinet, and as a result of them Sir Edward Carson had resigned. It was thought at


first that the resignation was due to the Government's refusal to adopt some measure of compulsory military service, of which Sir Edward Carson was a very strong advocate, but on October 20th he explained that he had resigned because he could not agree with the policy of the Government in the Balkans, and at the beginning of November he made an elaborate statement to the House of Commons of his reasons, in the course of which he read his letter to Mr. Asquith announcing his resignation. After quoting Sir Edward Grey's pledge at the end of September, the letter continued:--

"I cannot understand how England can now abanc'on Servia to her fate without national dishonour (cheers); even if we were not so bound in honour, such a course is, in my judgment, a policy of despair, and an admission of failure which could only be justified after every other alternative had been exhausted. Bulgaria will be given a

free hand to crush our Ally; all hope of inducing Roumania to come to Servia's assistance will have been abandoned, and she may even find it to her interest to join our enemies; and every encouragement will be given to Greece to follow the policy of the King rather than that of Venizelos and his majority in the Chamber.

"The loss to our prestige restored






"(2) The Anglophile and anti-Turkish parties Bulgaria would be strengthened and encouraged. (3) Roumania would be more likely to help.

"(4) The policy of Venizelos and the majority of the Greek Chamber would be greatly stimulated.

"As regards Greece, I think vigorous efforts should be made to compel her to fulfil her treaty obligations. (Cheers.) It is on her invitation we have sent troops to Salonika in conjunction with the French, and we shall be rendered ridiculous in the eyes of the Powers if we are compelled to withdraw and placed in a position of dishonour towards

"Greece, that is the King's party, is afraid of the Central Powers. We ought to make her afraid of us. (Cheers.) Our naval supremacy enables us to do this, and for my own part I would not hesitate to inform her that unless she is prepared to continue her policy of joining with the Allies in defence of Servia, we will break off friendly



M. Aristide Briand.

[Topical.



A detachment of French Zouaves passing through Salonika.

Official Photo.



A British caterpillar tractor hauling a heavy gun through the streets of Salonika. [Official Photo.

This letter was dated October 12th, and it appeared from it that it was despatched in consequence of a decision reached by the War Council of the Cabinet on the previous day, which Sir Edward Carson interpreted as equivalent to the abandonment of Servia and a violation of the pledge of September. That is to say, on the very day on which M. Viviani announced to the French Chamber that the Allies were now determined to assist Servia Sir Edward Carson resigned because this country had definitely made up its mind that it could not assist her. To the misleading ambiguity of the September pledge there now succeeded another, and hardly less dangerous, misunderstanding between England and France of what their policy was, and what each country was willing to do at Salonika.

Later, the Government disputed that this country had made up its mind early in October that nothing

effectual could be done for Servia. "When it became clear," said Sir Edward Grey, in answer to a question in the House of Commons in the middle of November, "that Greece was not going to fulfil her obligations, the Government had to consider, in consultation with our own military authorities and those of France, whether what would have been a safe operation with Greece on our side would be a safe operation without her." They did consider those points, and it was while that consultation was going on that Sir Edward Carson left the Government. "No decision had then been arrived at, but all the preparations were going on to send troops, and finally it was decided to despatch the troops to Salonika as soon as they were ready." The plain meaning of these words is that Sir Edward Carson had misunderstood the decision of the War Council early in October, in consequence of which he refused to remain

in the Cabinet. To this view Sir Edward Carson made a reply on November 15th, which seems conclusive, and it is worth quoting:-

"I should have had no right to leave the Government on the question set out in my letter of resignation if no decision had been come to.


"But at the last War Committee that I attended in my opinion a most emphatic decision had been come to-a decision founded upon the advice of our military advisers that it was too late to assist Servia. I myself protested with all the warmth I could that, having regard to our pledges, if that was so Servia ought to be told through her Minister—(cheers)—in order that the little nation might take such steps as she thought necessary to preserve herself from absolute destruction. I left the Cabinet because that decision had been come to. What is more than that, if that is controverted as a fact, I say that I discussed the question with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and also with the Minister of Munitions, as being two of the

Ministers on whose judgment I most relied in the Cabinet, and they certainly never dissented from that view. Each of them had sent in a memorandum on the subject, and if my statement is controverted I call upon the Government, in justice to me and the statement I now make, to produce the memoranda of those two gentlemen. (Cheers.) say something more.
"During the course of the week that followed I was

asked by the Prime Minister to reconsider the question and not to announce any final decision until after some meeting not to announce any final decision until after some meetings, either of the Committee or of the Cabinet, had intervened, but it never was suggested to me in either of those letters, after I had sent in the letter which has been read in this House and published in the Press, that I was labouring under any delusion whatsoever. Therefore, although I am sure the Foreign Secretary makes his statement bona fide, I am obliged, according to my recollection, to give it the most absolute contradiction I can."

This controversy is worth setting out in detail,

because it is so rare that the curtain is raised for so long on the interior of the Government counsels. The net residuum of facts precipitated by this mass of contradiction and crosspurposes is, first, that a promise is given to Servia which is misleading in its terms, and did, in fact, mislead nearly every one; secondly, that just before Bulgaria declared war a decision was reached the War Committee which was interpreted by Sir Edward Carson and others as meaning it was too late to do anything for Servia, though the official view put forward later was that it did not mean anything in particular; thirdly, that Sir Edward Carson resigned on what was afterwards said by the Government to be a misunderstanding of the position, though at the time no attempt was made to clear up the misunderstanding; and lastly, that on the same day that Sir Edward Carson resigned, M. Viviani, who also apparently misunderstood



the policy of this country, but in exactly the opposite sense from Sir Edward Carson, declared that not only England and France, but Russia, too, recognised it as a duty to help Servia.

M. PAINLEVÉ'S DISCLOSURES.

On the day after M. Viviani's statement, M. Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, resigned. He had been the Foreign Minister when the Entente Treaty with Great Britain was concluded, and the foreign policy of France for the last ten years had been his making. Only the existence of a very serious body of discontent with his diplomatic handling of the questions of the war would have led to his fall. How serious that discontent was became clear in a debate which followed the statement of M. Viviani. The speech made in the Chamber in this debate by M. Painlevé, the President of the Committee





The first French troops marching through Salonika after their arrival. [Official Photo.



[Official Photo.

for the Navy, is one of the most important documents in the history of the war. M. Painlevé pointed out that an ill-supported military movement might have the gravest effect on the fortunes of the war, and demanded that the Chamber should be placed in possession of the facts. "It was amazing," he said, "that an understanding had not been reached between the Allies in order to prevent the overwhelming of Servia, and in order to put a 'wall of brass' between Germany and Turkey. There had been 'delays and mismanagement' of the Balkan problem."

"'Who is to be held responsible,' asked M. Painlevé, 'for these shortcomings? It is my duty to say that the responsibility does not fall upon Parliament, nor upon the Committees which Parliament has appointed in order to follow the course of this war; the responsibility, I say, cannot be regarded, from any point of view, as resting upon the Committees. I have proofs of this in my portfolio.' (Cries of 'Read them,' 'Read them,' from the Left of the Chamber.)

'After some discussion, M. Painlevé's contention that the complete documents could not be read in the Chamber was accepted. M. Painlevé then continued: 'The Dardanelles Expedition has never ceased to occupy the attention of your three Committees for War, for the Navy, and for Foreign Affairs. Since we were confronted with that expedition as an established fact not a week has elapsed that we have not made it clear to the Government that. in our opinion, it was necessary that this expedition should be one of strength, and not one which would give the Balkan peoples an impression of a half-hearted undertaking. When the faltering faith of Bulgaria made it plain that it was still more necessary for us to act at full strength we arrived, with the approval of the Government, at certain resolutions. In view of the delays which were taking place we looked about for a means of speeding up the measures which were essential. On the 13th August we addressed ourselves to the highest authority of the State, whom we had acquainted with our doubts on the course of affairs. We had thought of a secret Committee. but on the 27th August, seeing that such a Committee had been shelved and that the difficulties in the Balkans were increasing, we put the following document in the hands of the President of the Council, of all the Ministers concerned, and the President of the Republic. I give you in substance the unanimous resolutions of the three Committees:-

"'Seeing that the massing of Austro-German troops on the Servian front must be regarded not only as the preliminary of an attack on Servia, but also of an attempt to give assistance to Turkey and to raise the blockade of the Narrows;

"'Seeing that the Austro-German forces have in view the seizure of the Sofia-Philippopolis Railway;

"'Seeing that, in this event, there is no ground for anticipating that Bulgaria will resist their attempt, that such an enterprise will have disastrous political consequences, and that no satisfactory steps have been taken to prevent the attempt;

"'Seeing that all delays and all setbacks increase the danger, and that the issue of the war is bound up with the taking of Constantinople,

"'We ask the Government to take the urgent measures that the circumstances demand and to organise an expedition which will ensure the fall of Constantinople.

"'These considerations and conclusion represent the attention and deliberation of two months.""

From these remarkable passages it appears that whatever were the reasons for the failure to give adequate support to the Gallipoli campaign, the French Chamber had no sympathy with them. On the contrary, its three principal conditions were in favour of a vigorous prosecution of the campaign, and as late as August 27th, when the concentration of Austro-German troops on the Servian frontier had begun, its Committees were of opinion that the best answer was the forcing of the Dardanelles and the occupation of Constantinople. In other words, their

policy was that of Mr. Churchill, who held (Vol. III., page 237) that all through the spring and summer of 1915 the main strategic interest of the war had shifted from the West front to the East, and that our true policy was to remain on the defensive on the West, and at all costs to force the defences of Constantinople and complete the encirclement of the Central Powers on that side. Our strategy fell between two alternatives. A break-through on the West would have had decisive results had it been possible; the forcing of the Dardanelles, though it would not have been so grave a shock to the German military strength, would have ruined the political hopes of empire in the East for which Germany had begun the war. The Allies could at their leisure have dissected Asiatic Turkey, cut off all help or communication with Europe by the forcing of the Straits; and the Balkan States, which were convinced after the defeats of Russia in Galicia and Poland, and of the Allies in Gallipoli, that success in the war on land was assured to Germany, would have hastened to join themselves to us. The Allies secured neither result, and failed to break through either in the West, where the task was one of enormous difficulty, or in the East, where success was only a question of six more divisions. That the French should have insisted on a continuance of the efforts in the West would only have been natural, for their interests in the East were not great, and the presence of the invader on French soil was felt by every man as a bitter personal insult. The British, on the other hand, had vital interests in the East, and were more concerned than any of their Allies in preventing the junction of Germany and Turkey over the body of Servia. Yet, strangely enough, the main pressure to put more strength into the campaign came not from England but from France, and when the attack began on Servia it was France who agitated in favour of decisive action and the English Government that held back.

THE ARGUMENT BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS.

All through October the argument continued between France and England. First came M. Viviani to urge vigorous measures on behalf of Servia, then M. Millerand. They both secured what they thought were pledges; but each time the British drew back after they had returned, and put forward the plea that it was too late to do anything for Servia. The agitation had now spread to the newspapers, but whereas the French Press was almost unanimous for action, it was only a minority of the English newspapers that took a decided line, and of these again only a minority urged that something might still be done to save Servia. Finally, on October 20th, General Joffre came over to England to plead for action in Macedonia. Sir Edward Grey is believed at the Cabinet Council which met to hear General Joffre's reasons to have urged withdrawal from Salonika, which would have meant the abandonment of the Servians to their fate. "General Joffre replied with the historic phrase: Vous nous lâchez sur le champ de bataille! (You are deserting us on the field of battle, and we shall have to tell the world!)"... The taunt was effective. General Joffre carried his point, and, in the biting phrase of Sir Edward Carson, the Government decided that what was too late three weeks before was in time three weeks after."*

^{*} Mr. Seton-Watson in the Linglish Review, Feb., 1916.

It was stoutly argued on behalf of the Government, after the end of October and the decision to take up the Salonika campaign in earnest, that nothing had been lost by the period of hesitation, because the preparations had never stopped. It is tempting but very difficult to accept this conclusion, which would remove for this country the sting of the events described in the last two chapters. The delay, it is true, did not begin in October, but was a legacy from previous months, in which we were miscalculating the probable action of Bulgaria. Undoubtedly the wise policy for Servia, if she had reason to think that Bulgaria was only waiting for the German invasion to get under weigh before attacking her, would have been to anticipate that attack; and

there is reason to believe that this is what she would have done had she not been dissuaded by the Powers. But even if we rule out of account the delays of these early months, it is hardly credible that doubts as to whether the expedition was wise -indeed, a conviction on the part of our military advisers that it was definitely unwisedid not affect the speed of our preparations. A more important result, perhaps, was that it affected adversely the strategical dispositions of the Servians. Had their hopes been realised, they might have restricted their own efforts to the defence of their northern frontiers, and left their Allies to deal with the Bulgarians. As it was, they had to defend the whole line of their eastern frontier besides the northern, and



M. Thomas, the French Minister of Munitions, and Mr. Lloyd George, during a visit of the former to London. $[Central\ News.]$

the first breach in their defences by the Bulgarians was made at the southern end, for which, under normal circumstances, they probably counted on their Allies to make themselves responsible. It must have been to them a source of the gravest embarrassment to be uncertain all through the month on what degree of assistance they could count from their Allies.

Yet it is only fair to bear in mind the difficulties of the Allies, and especially of the British. All our calculations had been based on the assumption that Greece would be true to her Treaty obligations to Servia; and if those who directed our policy had imagined that this condition of all their plans would not be fulfilled, their whole attitude towards Balkan affairs would undoubtedly have been different. They would at least have ensured themselves against this breakdown. But so certain were they, that they never took any precautions against the danger of failure at this point; and when M. Venizelos was dismissed by the King, and it became clear that Greece meant to do nothing, they had to begin reconstructing their plans ab initio. They tried bribing Greece, and England offered her Cyprus, and then, when the offer was refused, ostentatiously withdrew it. Both offer and withdrawal would seem to have been unwise. A mere bribe was not likely to influence Greece to perform a duty from which either fear or some personal motive with the King had deterred her; on the other

hand, the withdrawal amounted to a confession that the offer of Cyprus was only a bribe, and not a concession to justice.

THE BRITISH

But if we leave out of account the vacillation of the summer, and put ourselves in the position of the **British Government** at the beginning of October, disappointed in the expectation on which it had counted most confidently, compelled suddenly to build up a new policy out of the ruins of the old, its fumbling at a which moment demanded prompt decisions becomes at any rate intelligible. It had many reasons for hesitation. There was in the first place our position in the Dardanelles. In so far as the Churchill

policy had any sympathisers in the Cabinet, their whole influence would be thrown against the new enterprise from Salonika. Obviously, it was impossible for us to conduct with any effectiveness two campaigns in the Near East; one or the other must inevitably suffer, and of the two alternatives success in the Dardanelles, if it was to be had, would have been the more effectual answer to the German designs against Servia. Those who had been praying in vain all the summer for more liberal and prompt support to the Gallipoli enterprise must have regarded the Salonika project with jealous eyes. They knew that it meant the ruin of their design against Constantinople, which had cost the country so

dearly, and their influence was thrown against the new rival expedition. If the men were to be had, let them rather, they said, be used in Gallipoli; to begin the new enterprise was to incur certain failure in Gallipoli for the sake of a new and greater uncertainty in Macedonia. To this argument the only answer was that the whole plan of campaign in Gallipoli had now no chance of success, and that voluntary withdrawal from Gallipoli in order to begin a fresh campaign in Macedonia would be less damaging to British prestige in the East than one which was forced. But however great the strength of these arguments might be, it was hardly to be wondered at that the British Government did not immediately acknowledge and act upon them. Moreover, the military advisers of the Government were convinced that our troops could not possibly arrive in time. If the Gallipoli force could have been transferred bodily to Salonika, there might have been some hope; as it was, the Government was not as yet prepared to submit to the idea of evacuation, and all the troops would have to be brought from England. Fewer than a quarter of a million men could not hope to save Servia. Nothing less drastic than the occupation of Uskub and a march direct on Sofia would suffice to draw off the Bulgarians from their prey. The British military advisers argued—and, as it turned out, perfectly correctly—that the force required could not be got there in time, that the port was not suited to be the base of so large an army, that the transport service in a country extremely deficient in roads could not be organised hurriedly, and that by the time the new force was ready to act Servia would have ceased to exist. Against that, the French had nothing to oppose but the argument which carried very great weight with them, and especially it would seem with General Joffre, that to do nothing would be shameful, and that it was better to try and fail than to stand by with folded arms and a collection of arguments against action while a brave Ally was being done to death. It was certainly urged later, and may have been argued in October, that there was grave risk if the Allies did nothing that Greece would go over to the Central Powers, that Salonika would be utilised as a submarine base, and that Roumania, too, would be finally lost to the Allied cause.

But the argument that weighed most strongly of all with the British Government in hesitating to put heavy stakes in Salonika was the revolution in the attitude of Greece towards the Allied cause which was made by the King's dismissal of M. Venizelos. Even M. Venizelos had thought it wise to enter a formal protest against the Allied entry into Salonika, though it was meant to support Greece in the policy of intervention to which M. Venizelos was definitely committed, at any rate in the event of Bulgaria's attacking Servia. But the new Government formed by the King might not rest content with merely formal protests. Suppose that it resented our entry as an invasion of Greek sovereignty (and the graver the suspicions with regard to the King the more likely it was that he would seek an opportunity to punish us), what sort of a campaign was this on which we were to enter with a possibility that we might suddenly be deprived of our base by the Greek army, and in which it was certain that every movement that we made would be instantly reported to the enemy by his agents, with which the city swarmed? Moreover, how were we to keep this occupation of Greek territory from overstepping the limit of what was permissible and becoming an invasion of neutral right? Might not Greece resent it, and be driven into the arms of the enemy? In any case, would not the occupation of Salonika against the will of the Government be a strange proceeding on the part of England, who had entered the war, nominally at any rate, on behalf of the law of Europe and the rights of neutrals? These arguments would no doubt appeal with especial force to Sir Edward Grey, always the most sensitive of Foreign Ministers to questions of form, and the most genuinely conscientious according to his lights. It was some answer to these objections that the King, by his unconstitutional action in dismissing M. Venizelos, had forfeited his right to speak for Greece, and that we were justified in going behind the throne and interpreting on their behalf the wishes of the people and their probable view of their interests. Another answer had already been suggested by Sir Edward Carson, namely, that as Greece was a maritime country, completely dependent on the sea for her supplies, she could not dare to carry her objections to our action in Salonika to the point of breach But it was a dangerous doctrine, that we were justified in doing a small wrong to redress the monstrous wrong of Servia's desertion, and one that was repellent to Sir Edward Grey's high principles. He yielded, but unwillingly.

"TOO LATE."

In the hesitation of the British Government during October there was no selfish or dishonourable motive. It showed, however, a marked inability to adapt itself to the new circumstances that are always arising in wartime, and to take the prompt decisions that are necessary. Measured by time alone, a month may not have been long to make up the mind on the difficult alternatives that presented themselves when the German invasion of Servia began; but measured by the needs of Servia, it was dilatory in the extreme. The strong criticism which the Government's hesitation aroused in the country was actuated by no malice towards individuals, nor was there any failure to appreciate the very real virtues of the Foreign Office-its highmindedness, its sincerity, and its desire to be fair. But there are only two ways in which quick maturity of thought and the instant correspondence between mind and action which make for success in war can be attained. is by elaborate and systematic thinking out of problems in all their bearings beforehand, so that no development can take place and find us without some plan. The other is by having at the head of affairs a man with a genius for action. Neither condition was satisfied. Our foreign policy was painstaking and conscientious, but at no time did it show prescience or real insight. It followed, instead of anticipating, events. On the other hand, the Committee vice, to which the English mind is very prone, prevented the taking of rapid and clearcut logical decisions. The grave defect of Government by Committee is that its decisions are not only slow, but are also, as a rule, compromising in character, and war is especially severe on compromises. In building up a measure of legislation, or a policy which is meant to stand the test of time, it is desirable, as far as possible, to meet objections and to disarm opposition by compromise. In action, simplicity and speed are the qualities that are desirable. What is done must be done promptly, and carried through to its logical conclusion; of two courses of action, better either with boldness and conviction than a combination. "Too late," said Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons, were the fatal words of the



A deputation representing the Russian, French. and Italian armies leaving the Ministry of Munitions.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



French naval representatives on a visit to London

[Topical Press.

"I wonder whether we are not too late. Too late! The fatal words of this war. Too late! Too late in moving here; too late in arriving there; too late in coming to this decision; too late in starting that enterprise; too late in preparing for this war. The footsteps of the Allied forces have been dogged by the mocking spectre. Too late! Unless we quicken our movements damnation will fall upon the sacred cause for which so much gallant blood has been shed."

THE SITUATION AT SALONIKA.

The Allies were too late to save Servia, but not to save Salonika, which, but for the presence of the Allies, would certainly have fallen under the influence, if not into the occupation, of the Germans. As it was, November was an exceedingly anxious month for the Allied armiesthe British under General Mahon and the French under General Sarrail. Although we had gone to Salonika with the compliance, if not at the request, of M. Venizelos, the new Greek Government showed very clearly that its chief desire was to get us out. No sooner had the first detachment landed than prices of everything that it required went up double and treble. A super-tariff was put on the transport of the army and its supplies by railway. The Greek army was concentrated round Salonika and along the routes that the Allies would have to follow in the event of retreat from Ghevgheli. A Frenchman was thrown into prison on the false charge of speaking with disrespect of the Crown Prince in a café. At a critical moment in the operations a train for reinforcements which were needed at the front was refused to the Allies without a just excuse. The Greek General Staff, which had made up its mind that Germany was invincible, was openly hostile. A German emissary, Prince Hohenlohe, arrived at Salonika by train from Dedeagatch, and left for Athens in a Greek destroyer-a quite unnecessary attention; submarine mines were discovered at the mouth of the Vardar, and trenches and barbed wire entanglements were erected facing our camps, and in some cases even artillery was trained in our direction. The Karaburun Fort, at the entrance to Salonika Bay, was hastily strengthened and mounted with heavy guns.* Some of these precautions may have been innocent in their intention towards us, and the situation was an exceedingly delicate one, not only for us, but also for the Greeks, who feared, or professed to fear, that Greece would be punished for the use which the Allies were making of her territory, and openly doubted our ability to defend ourselves or them. A discussion arose about what the Greek Government would do if our army were compelled to retreat, and the French Minister thought it desirable to make inquiries from the Greek Government, of which M. Skouloudis was now Premier. His answer was that the British and French troops would be disarmed by the Greek army, and the Servians disarmed and interned. This was too much, and on November 19th the British Government announced its intention of putting an embargo on Greek commerce unless adequate guarantees were given that the Allies would not be molested in their operations. On the following Sunday the situation was so critical that the Allies actually suspected that the Greek troops meant to attack. The fleet cleared for action. Nothing, however, happened, but obviously the situation was one that could not continue. The Greek Government, embarrassed by the embargo on her commerce, first agreed in general terms to give guarantees, and then accepted the detailed demands of the Allies. Amongst these demands were the evacuation of Salonika by the Greek army and the right of policing Greek ports

and territorial waters. With every desire on the part of the Allies to be considerate to Greece, these were the minimum of what was required for the safety of their armies. Whether the Greek Government ever meant mischief-it was, it must be remembered, the unconstitutional Government of a minority- and, if so, whether it was the embargo or some other reason that restrained it, is still uncertain. Had the Germans attacked the Allied armies in Salonika, the Greek army would certainly not have resisted; on the other hand, it would probably have resisted the Bulgarians had they entered. But as the Germans had no present intention of following the Allies on Greek territory, and the Bulgarians no wish to provoke a war with Greece, the question never arose, and Greece had no alternative but to yield to the not unreasonable demands of the Allies with the best grace. All through the winter the Allies were occupied with making their position secure at Salonika, and with seizing from time to time Greek islands which were being used as bases for the enemy's submarines. It was found necessary to occupy both Corfu and Kara Burun Fort in Salonika Bay.

The long inactivity of the Allied army in Salonika, following the failure to save Servia, confirmed the scepticism that had all along existed in England about the wisdom of the new adventure in Macedonia. The motive of the landing at Salonika was to save Servia, or make some attempt that would, at any rate, redeem us from any suspicion of indifference to the fate of a gallant Ally. In this second and more limited object, the landing achieved its object; but when the Allied army in Salonika began to grow in size, and apparent inactivity was only broken by news of the seizure of Greek islands, there were more who were disposed to give the British Government credit for military sagacity in fighting shy of the Macedonian Expedition than had been willing to do so in October. The strength of the Allied army round Salonika reached 200,000 by the end of the year, and this was a very large force to keep on purely defensive work in a neutral port which did not promise to be one of the decisive points in the war. Particularly serious were the demands which the upkeep of so large an army made on the fleet. It remained, however, to be seen what use the Allies would be able to make in the spring of a base so expensive in men. In the meantime the gains, though unseen, may have been none the less substantial. The occupation of Salonika may have prevented Greece and Roumania from being lost to the Allies, and it was something to have shown sympathy with Servia in her misfortunes, even though its practical results were small.

LORD KITCHENER'S MISSION.

But the most serious objection to the landing at Salonika, as had been recognised from the first, was the effect that it was likely to have on the fortunes of our army in Gallipoli. On November 6th it was announced that Lord Kitchener had left England for a tour in the East. The objects of this tour were no mystery. The war in the East was growing in magnitude, and this country was more directly concerned than any other. Four great British armies were engaged on the Turkish and Macedonian front. On the left wing was the Allied army at Salonika; on the right was the British expedition in Mesopotamia; in the centre were the armies of Gallipoli and of Egypt. Now that the Germans had through communications to Turkey, the situation of our forces on the Peninsula might be expected to become

^{*} Mr. G. J. Stevens, telegram from Salonika, Nov. 20.

more serious. The Turks had had no heavy artillery to use against us. What would happen when the Germans began to bring up their heavy guns and to lavish supplies of shells on the Turks in the hope of driving us into the sea? Could we maintain our position, especially if their attacks coincided with winter storms, when the fleet could not lie close in and the army might be marooned on an inaccessible coast for days together? Might it not be wise, with this new expedition in Macedonia on our hands, to cut our losses in Gallipoli, and to withdraw before a worse disaster befell? What chance was there of a successful withdrawal, and what approximately were our losses in such a movement likely to be? Or was it wiser to take the risks and stay rather than acknowledge defeat, which might be a serious blow to our prestige in the East, and was wounding to our pride after all our losses? There was, besides, the question of Egypt and its organisation against an attack which the Turks might, with the new resources opened up to them, think wise to deliver. The first attack had been made with small forces, and the defence, though successful, had not been brilliant. It seemed desirable that we should have an authoritative opinion on these and other

questions raised by the war in the East. It was also possible that Lord Kitchener, who had shown himself not unskilful in diplomacy, might also be able to do good service by visiting the King of Greece.

The journey was the more desirable because the opinions on our policy expressed by the officers on the spot in Gallipoli were contradictory. General Sir Ian Hamilton had resigned because the Government had refused to reinforce him after the defeats at Anzac and Suvla. His successor, General Sir C. Monro, had advised evacuationa fact which was first made public by Lord Ribblesdale in a speech in the House of Lords on November 18th. The indiscretion was bitterly attacked, but Lord Lansdowne, in his reply, not only admitted the fact, but added that General Monro's report and the evidence by which it was accompanied "did not seem to the Cabinet sufficient to enable them to come to any conclusion on the great questions of policy involved." For that reason they had asked Lord Kitchener to go to the Eastern Mediterranean and make a report.

Lord Kitchener visited Gallipoli and Greece, and returned to London on November 30th. What his report was, later chapters will reveal.



Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and Sir Francis Bertie (British Ambassador in Par's) leaving the French Foreign
Office after an interview with members of the French Government. [Sport and General.



After the flight from Montenegro: King Nicholas of Montenegro and his wife (seated) photographed on their arrival at Lyons. Behind (reading from left to right) are: Princesses Vera, Xenie, and Militza (wife of Prince Danilo), the President of the Council, and Prince Danilo.

CHAPTER V.

ITALY AND MONTENEGRO.

MONTENEGRO AND HER NEIGHBOURS—THE AGREEMENT WITH ITALY—ITS EFFECT ON THE WAR—THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE ADRIATIC—THE CAPTURE OF LOVICHEN—EXILE OF KING NICHOLAS.

ONTENEGRO is the smallest and weakest of our Allies in the war, but not the least famous. The Black Mountain, which gives the country its name, is a bare limestone height overlooking the Gulf of Cattaro. When the Turks invaded South Eastern Europe this mountain was the only spot that escaped being submerged under the flood. The Turks failed, as the Venetians had done before them, to conquer the independence of the people, and this diminutive State was for five centuries the ark of political liberty, with the Black Mountain, or Lovtchen, for its Ararat. In the whole history of partisan warfare there is probably nothing quite so fine as the long struggle which the Montenegrins successfully maintained against the Turks and their other powerful enemies. They are a branch of the Servian race, of the same language and religion, and sharing the same political hopes and fears. The King of Montenegro was a glorified feudal squire of his people.

The land is narrow and barren. It had from time to time received small increases, of which the most considerable was that which followed the Balkan War of 1912, when Montenegro received an increase of territory

in the old Turkish province of Novi-Bazar. Her expansion, however, on the side of Albania was limited, and Scutari, on which she had set her heart, was denied her. In this refusal the Powers were probably right, for great as were the qualities of the Montenegrins they were not to be trusted with the fate of other races. Immediately to the south of Montenegro is Albania, inhabited by a people which, in spite of their political backwardness. are one of the most promising and, in some ways, the most attractive in the East. Descendants of the old Illyrians, the Albanians had never attained a national unity. They were divided not only by the physical configuration of their country, which is a chess-board of valleys enclosed by mountains that made friendly intercourse between the clans difficult, but also by differences of religion and political sympathies. Some of the Albanians, for reasons more of prudence than of conscience, had embraced the Mohammedan faith; others, especially in the north, were Roman Catholics; others, again, belonged to the Greek Church. In general the religious faiths of the Albanians were so distributed as to make them the enemies of their nearest outside neighbours. The Catholics of the north, for example,



The main street in Cettinje.



The Palace of King Nicholas, Cettinje.



A summer scene in Cettinje.

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were bitter enemies of the orthodox Montenegrins, and there was constant feud between the Moslems of the south and their Greek neighbours. The experiment on which the Powers decided after the last Balkan War of setting up an independent Principality of Albania, under the Austrian Prince of Wied, was one that promised a stormy history, but had the sympathy of those who knew the Albanians best. Had the Albanians been left to themselves they would, given time, have made a State. But it soon became apparent that the experiment was not to have a fair trial. Austria regarded the new Prince as a forerunner of the Austrian Governor who would one day, she hoped, be established in the country. Italy, on the other hand, was found to be acting in close sympathy with Essad Pasha and the Albanian Moslems.

THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ALLIES AND ITALY.

The position of Montenegro, between Italian and Austrian rivalries on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, was an exceedingly unpleasant one, for Italy was as little disposed as Austria to encourage the aspirations of any Slav State in the Adriatic. At the beginning of the war Montenegro had not recovered from the exhaustion of her Balkan War, but she had no alternative but to make common cause with Servia. Her security depended largely on the power of the Allies to keep the Adriatic open for the passage of supplies, and in the first six months of the war the French fleet succeeded in this object. Lovtchen, or the Black Mountain, stands at the head of the Gulf of Cattaro,

the extreme southern limit of Austrian waters in the Adriatic. Cattaro was blockaded and its forts bombarded by the French. At the beginning of November there seemed to be a prospect of their falling. Then came the Dardanelles Expedition, which diverted the naval energy of the Allies from the Adriatic to the Ægean. In April, 1915, the Allies concluded an arrangement with Italy by which, as one of the considerations for her entering the war, she was assigned not only all Istria, with Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, but the Dalmatian coast as far as Spalato and the country at the back up to the Dinaric Alps. The

territory of Austria in the Adriatic extends some distance further south as far as Cattaro; and no doubt Italy thought that in leaving to the new Servo-Croatian State that seemed likely to emerge after the war the stretch of Dalmatian coast between Spalato and Cattaro, she was giving the Slavs enough to make them prefer Italian to Austrian rule on the eastern shores of the Adriatic. The Servs, Croats, and the Jugo-Slavs of Dalmatia, however, took a very different view. The new agreement meant that at least 700,000 Slavs—and these the Slavs who were most inclined to make head against Austria—would merely change Austrian rule for Italian, nor was it any consolation to them that in the interior there was a prospect after the war that a great Slav State would grow up from which they would be

exiles. In place of the old Italia irredenta on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, they saw a new Slavonia irredenta rising in the future. There seems little doubt that the loss of the sympathy of the Jugo-Slavs of Dalmatia went far to neutralise the military advantages of Italy's accession to the cause of the Allies *

The grievance of the Servs and the Montenegrins over this agreement was less serious than that of the Slavs of Dalmatia, but it undoubtedly introduced a cause of dissension between them and the new Ally of the Entente Powers which had serious results later. The first result was to divert the energies of the Servs and Montenegrins from the north to the direction of Albania. Scutari, in Albania, was occupied by the



Montenegrins listening to a blind street musician.


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Montenegrins. As Italy had designs on Albania, and had already occupied Valona in the South, the occupation of Scutari gave much offence to her, and the rift between her and Montenegro grew wider.

THE AUSTRIAN SUBMARINES.

When the German offensive against Servia, described in the last few chapters, began, Montenegro protected

* Mr. Seton-Watson goes too far in saying that "Italy's entry into the war was the one thing needed to galvanise Austria-Hungary into life at a moment when she was cracking at every joint."—English Review, February, 1916.



MONTENEGRO AND HER NEIGHBOURS.



The Bocche di Cattaro, photographed from the road to Cettinje near the summit of Mount Lovtchen.


the left flank of the Servian armies, and but for her assistance the Servian armies would have been cut off from retreat to the west as they were by the Bulgarians on the south. The Montenegrin defence of the Novi-Bazar undoubtedly saved the remnants of the Servian army. But its arrival in Montenegro and the Scutari district of Albania made the shortage of food supplies, already serious, quite desperate. "The troops and population arriving amongst us," said the Montenegrin Prime Minister, in a statement issued after his arrival at Lyons, "were destitute of everything. It was necessary to provide for them. They were given what we had in our military stores, but this was entirely insufficient. Several times our troops on all the fronts received no provisions for a whole week." It is difficult to understand why, with the Allies in great naval supremacy, there should have been any shortage of supplies in Montenegro. The explanation seems to be that after the intervention of Italy the Anglo-French naval forces withdrew from the Adriatic, and left the management of the naval campaign in these waters to the Italian fleet. It was unequal to the task. The eastern shores of the Adriatic are well adapted for submarine war, and what happened to the Italian fleet might just as well have happened to the Anglo-French fleet had it stayed in these waters. The Austrians at the beginning of the war were slow to realise the possibilities of the submarine in making an effective blockade impossible. The example of the

Germans taught them better, and the entry of Italy into the war coincided with the beginning of a vigorous submarine campaign in the Adriatic. Italy lost two cruisers. What is more, the Austrians succeeded in mining the entrance to Antivari, the Montenegrin port. The result was that the control of the Narrows between Italy and Montenegro was lost. Italy was either unable or deemed it unsafe to provide convoys for provision ships. The French Government despatched a number of ships with supplies, but they were sunk, and meanwhile Montenegro was beginning to starve both for food and munitions.

SIR ARTHUR EVANS'S CRITICISM.


Some English critics have blamed Italy for this failure to support Montenegro, and have ascribed it to deliberate hostility in Italy. Sir Arthur Evans, an authority on Balkan affairs, by no means unfriendly to Italy, not only warned English opinion of the probable effect of the agreement between Italy and the Powers on the coast of Dalmatia, but has spoken with exceeding frankness on what he regards as the inexcusable abandonment of Montenegro. He wrote:—

"It might have been thought that Italy, with her exposed eastern coastline, had an even stronger motive than ourselves, by fostering the growth in its hinterland of an united South Slavonic State, to keep the German naval power from riveting its hold on the opposite coast. Unfortunately, however, the agitation fomented by a small but loud-voiced faction




A panorama of Montenegro, showing the road to Cettinje.

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Scutari, showing the Bojana Bridge.

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Mount Lovtchen from the Bocche di Cattaro.

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of Italian-speaking immigrants-not representing more than at most 5 per cent of the population of Dalmatia-has had a long innings. The effects of this propaganda, which for over two generations has been continually at work, cannot be thrown off in a day, and seem still to exercise a quite disproportionate influence in Italian councils. At a time when it would seem that the common interests of both should have made for friendship and concerted action, the Servs and the Slavs of the Southern Hapsburg provinces generally have been the victims of what they, at any rate, regard as a deliberately hostile attitude.

"Distinguished representatives of the South Slav cause who had sought a refuge on Italian soil from Austrian persecution have suffered treatment at the hands of the Italian police which has had a deplorable effect in alienating opinion among their countrymen. Even more regrettable, since it is so widespread that it has become practically universal among the whole Servian people, is the result of the attitude adopted by the Italian authorities at Brindisi towards the unfortunate refugees, many of them persons of education and position in their own country. The unique opportunity offered to Italy for cementing friendship with her Slav neighbours was worse than lost. The offers of hospitality in Calabria and Lipari made on behalf of the Government came too late. and fell on deaf ears. The Servian refugees, who have made

their way to Switzerland and are receiving such wide hospitality in Corsica and elsewhere on French soil, have to-day a common saying that their days at Brindisi were worse than those in the Albanian Alps, for in the former case every kind of humiliation was added to privation.'

It is not to be supposed that the policy of the Italian Government was actuated by malignity towards Montenegro. Our own experience in the North Sea supplies us with a ready explanation


of Italy's failure to keep the command of the Adriatic, and it is not necessary to go beyond the known naval facts. The resources of Italy in her shipping were not great, and she had her communications to keep open with Valona, where she had a garrison. But it is hardly open to doubt that she could and would have done more for Montenegro if their political relations had been those of complete cordiality. As it was, she regarded the Servian ambitions on the Adriatic as unreasonable, seeing that if all went well she was likely to succeed to Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia. Would it be much gain to Italy, she may have asked herself, to expel Austria from the eastern coast of the Adriatic and to instal there in her place a great Slav Power such as the new Servian Confederacy was likely to become? Disloyalty to Servia and Montenegro there was none, nor any opposition to what Italy regarded as her legitimate interests in the interior, and still less any desire to punish them for their political rivalry. The political disagreement between Italy and the Slavs worked more subtly in emphasising the natural caution

of her military and naval policy, and making her less inclined to run risks than she would otherwise have been. Had Valona, with its Italian garrison, been in Montenegro, the seas would doubtless have been kept

THE FALL OF LOVTCHEN.

After the expulsion of the Servian army it was clear that the Austrians would not leave Montenegro alone. They attacked the country from the side of Servia, and at the same time began to press down along the coast towards the Black Mountain itself. They had every motive for wishing to obtain possession of an eminence which commanded the Gulf of Cattaro, and, moreover, the possession of the Black Mountain was certain to lead to the occupation of Cettinje, the Montenegrin capital. With Montenegro in their possession, the Austrians would be able to push forward into Albania. and there take up a position flanking the Allies' line of advance from Salonika. Montenegro and Lovtchen, or the Black Mountain, had therefore great strategic importance, both for the Austrians and for the Allies.

An Italian army of 25,000 men, with that the mere holding of Lovtchen





A Montenegrin big gun in position on the mountains

[Newspaper Illustrations.

would not in itself prevent the Austrians from advancing to the south and overrunning Albania. To hold Lovtchen might be easy, but it would, in Italy's opinion, have been useless. Nothing would serve but to defend and hold all Montenegro, and this was a task to which Italy did not feel herself equal. Lovtchen fell to a combined attack from sea and land in the second week of January.

For some time there had been a small party in Montenegro which favoured negotiation and an accommodation with Austria, and this party had some support at Court. The sons of the King of Montenegro are not chips of the old block. The eldest is of weak constitution, and lives in the French Riviera, and the two other sons have neither of them kingly qualities. In consequence, the majority of the Montegrins look forward to union with Servia after the death of the old King. But it is not likely that this view recommends itself to everyone at Court. "Among the entourage that surrounded the old King, and among which his daughter, Princess Xenia, played a leading

part, the dynastic interests of the Petrovitch family have continually conflicted with the wider national aims. A separate pact, which might guarantee the succession within the family, was an object that could not fail to weigh." If this Court faction was intriguing we can easily imagine how the political discord with Italy and the discontent caused by her failure to succour the Montenegrins would strengthen its hand. After the fall of Lovtchen, negotiations with Austria, which may have been conducted in secret before, became open. In the second week of January Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, interrupted a Budget debate in Parliament by the announcement that the King and Government of Montenegro had asked to be allowed to open peace negotiations. In reply to this request, he went on to say, Austria had demanded unconditional surrender, and this condition had been accepted. The statement, which probably concealed a long history of secret intrigue, was most enthusiastically received all over Germany and Austria. Montenegro was, except for her geographical position, an Ally of no military importance; but it was no small matter even for the weakest of the Allies to give up the

struggle and to surrender unconditionally. At the least, the surrender proved a lack of organisation and a certain indecision of the common purpose of the Allies; at the worst, it was an advertisement of failure hardly less eloquent than the conquest of Servia.


The Montenegrins afterwards explained that the negotiations were no more than a ruse to gain time. What seems to have happened is that the negotiations were begun in despair at the instigation of a clique, and were repudiated later because the Austrian demands were such as no proud nation could accept. They included the surrender of all arms, even of the heir-looms of the old struggles with Turkey, a "beat" of the whole country, and the internment of the men, with, as a special concession, permission for the women to remain in "some of the villages." It is no wonder that the beaten Montenegrins refused to accept such terms, and attempted once more to make head against the invader. But the time for effective resistance had passed.

King Nicholas had meanwhile left the country, and after a short stay in Italy went on to France, the third of the Allied monarchs to be driven into exile.



The invasion of Montenegro: Montenegrin soldiers being marched to an internment camp after delivering up their arms to the Austrians.

[Topical Press.]



Native bearers, attached to the Allied force in the Cameroons, fording a stream.

Central News.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONQUEST OF CAMEROON.

HOW WE LOST CAMEROON—RESOURCES OF THE COLONY—THE NAVAL ATTACK—THE HINTERLAND COLUMNS—SIEGE OF GARUA—THE FALL OF JAUNDE—THE GERMAN FLIGHT.

HE attack on Germany's great West African Colony, begun on the outbreak of war, proved one of the most arduous tropical campaigns in which we had ever taken part, and was not concluded till February, 1916, when the German commander, with the last of his forces, made his escape to Spanish Muni. It is curious to reflect that a little foresight in British Colonial policy in the 'eighties would have made a campaign in West Africa needless. It was the great Portuguese navigator, Fernando Po, who, in the fifteenth century, discovered and named the Cameroon river (literally "river of prawns," from the abundance of crustacea found in its estuary). European trading centres were established there as early as the seventeenth century, the coast tribes acting as agents between the traders and the hinterland, which was jealously guarded. Throughout almost the whole of the nineteenth century the coastal chiefs, who became wealthy under the system, were largely under British influence, and in 1837 one of them ceded to Britain a large tract of country on the Bay of Cameroon. Baptist missionaries, who established a settlement in 1845, continued the spread of English civilisation, and were able to end the considerable slave trade with America. In this connection the name will always be remembered with reverence of Alfred Saker, who worked among the Cameroon natives from 1845 till 1876, reduced their language to writing, enlisted British naval help

to stop the slave trade, and founded a colony of freed slaves at Victoria, on the Cameroon estuary.

The first German factory was established in 1860, by Messrs. Woermann, of Hamburg. From time to time thereafter the coastal chiefs made requests for British protection, but they were neglected, and when, in the early 'eighties, Germany set out to secure unappropriated slices of Africa, her representative. Dr. Gustav Nachtigal, was able to obtain from one of the Cameroon chiefs a treaty which founded the German colony. Five days after the treaty was signed (July 15th, 1884) Mr. E. H. Hewett, British Consul, arrived with power to negotiate for Britain. We had awakened to the value of our opportunity just too The missionaries continued to occupy their settlement for a time under special privileges, but they eventually handed over their work to Germans. Their influence, and the traditions of British trade connection, were, however, lasting. Pidgin English remained the language of the natives in the Cameroon ports. Attempts, moreover, by Germany on the outbreak of the war to arouse the considerable Moslem population in this part of Africa to a "holy war" against England proved quite vain. A manifesto in Arabic, for instance, was circulated in North Cameroon, alluding to the Sultan of Turkey as the friend of Germany, and describing it as Britain's aim to capture Constantinople and give it to the Pagans. It provoked


only messages of loyalty from the Mohametan chiefs under British rule in West Africa, and its effect even in the German sphere was negligible.

RESOURCES OF THE COLONY.

The colony which we thus allowed to slip through our hands was a large and rich one. Successive delimitations of its frontier, notably one at the expense of the French, extracted under cover of the Agadir threat of 1911, gave it access finally to Lake Chad at its north-eastern corner, and to the Congo on the south (see map). It has three watersheds: one, the

sky dominating the chief port, Duala, at the mouth of the Cameroon river.

The value of the colony's exports—chiefly rubber, palm oil, cocoa and copra—amounted in 1913 to £1,100,000. The vast forests of the south abound in wild rubber, and Germany had spent in the Victoria district alone over £1,000,000 on the development of plantations of tropical produce. The native population of Cameroon, some two and a half millions in number, is composed of Bantu negroes in the coastal districts and in the east of various kinds of Sudanese. Thirty years of German rule had not reconciled these peoples.



The Cameroons.

most notable, towards the sea, on which lie the Wuri, the Cameroon, and other rivers navigable in parts; while lesser streams flow to join the Niger in the north and the Congo in the south.

The colony covers some 200,000 square miles - an area almost as large as that owned by Germany in Europe. Lying just north of the Equator, it has a climate that tries the white settler severely. It is visited by torrential rains in its two wet seasons, and the heat is very great, except on the high pasture lands to the east and on the upper slopes of the Cameroon Mountain, whose 14,000 feet tower to the

They resented the use of forced labour from the interior to work German plantations on the coast, and on the outbreak of war the Germans thought it well to hang several native leaders whom they suspected of sedition.

In 1914 there were in the territory some 1,700 Germans, mostly males of military age. They had recruited from among the natives a regular defence force of 3,000, and had supplied it with a number of maxim guns. They had, moreover, as soon became clear from officers' letters, armed numbers of untrained natives, and encouraged them to shoot stragglers from

the Allied columns. The invaders, moreover, found their progress impeded by fever-breeding swamps, impenetrable forests, dense and trackless jungle, crocodile-infested rivers, and stretches of man-high elephant grass, in which big game abounded and sometimes charged the lines. The roads were few and bad, and beyond the termini of the short railway lines lay a huge hinterland perfectly adapted for guerilla warfare.

NAVAL HELP.

We have already seen (Vol. I., Chap. XXV.) that the attack, which opened disastrously with the defeat at Garua and elsewhere of British raiding columns from Nigeria, was continued, with the co-operation of H.M.S. Cumberland and Dwarf, from the coast. The enemy made three attempts to destroy the Dwarf, by an infernal machine, by ramming, and by torpedo; but the ship escaped,

secured with her consort the mouth of the Cameroon river, capturing eight German merchantmen, and by bombardment compelled the surrender of the Port of Duala in September, 1914. One of the crew of the Cumberland described in a letter the use to which the ship was put:—

"We did all sorts of fighting. Sometimes ship bombarded places on the coast, sometimes she went into the estuaries of the rivers, at others we went up the creeks in pinnaces armed with guns from the ship, and then we fought on shore. When we captured Duala we had very tricky work in-deed. The cruiser crept through the water whilst boats were out sweeping for mines, of


which we found several fields. We had a pretty warm time, but bombarded the place without any loss. Then we went up the rivers with the French and British troops advancing ashore, and attacked and captured numerous German stations on the banks and in the hinterland. This went on week after week, and we were very often indeed at work twenty-four hours a day, and then only on half rations. None of the Cumberland's men were lost; in fact, we are considered the luckiest ship in the navy in this way. But we had an awful time. To add to the fearful heat, malaria, the long course of anxiety and little food, there were the rains, for all this took place during the rainy season, and there isn't heavier rain anywhere."

From Duala the railway to Japoma, the valley of the River Wuri, and a second railway to Edea spread out like the stays of a fan, of which the port is the handle (see map), and gave access to the interior. The enemy retreated, and were pursued along all three routes. The

command of the Allied troops was given to Brigadier-General C. M. Dobell, D.S.O., Inspector-General of the West African Forces, and he made Duala his headquarters.

By the end of October a British column had advanced along the northernmost stay to Japoma, Allied troops had taken Jabassi on the Wuri, and French Colonial troops, under Colonel Mayer, had reached Edea on the southern stay.

The enemy now made his headquarters and temporary capital at Jaunde, far in the interior. The bulk of his forces were concentrated in the central plateau between Jaunde and the important station of Ngaundere, further north, but elsewhere throughout the colony, notably at Mora in the north-east, and Banyo, east of Jaunde, small bodies of Germans took advantage of almost impregnable mountain positions to prepare themselves for a long resistance.



A file of native bearers in the Cameroons.

[Central News.


THE HINTERLAND COLUMNS.

While the Allies' fan-like advance from the coast was slowly extended, the rounding-up of the enemy was assisted by long columns entering from all the Allied colonial territories by which Cameroon is surrounded. Nigeria, to the north, sent three; one came from the French Chad territories to the east; and two from French Equatorial Africa to the south. Valuable help was, as we shall see, also given by a well-equipped force and gunboat from the Belgian Congo.

No useful purpose would be served by following in detail the advances of these various columns from point to point in their

gradual concentration on the heart of the colony; but some account of their chief adventures and successes will make clear by what means the German resistance was overcome.

On the Nigerian border we had two disasters to avenge, but it was some months before we could make headway. Throughout the winter of 1914 raids and counter-raids left the honours even; and the most notable incident was the defence, in April, 1915, of Gurin, a post within our territory, from an attack in force by German troops from Garua. The small mud fort of Gurin, protecting the rambling native town of that name, was garrisoned by forty native soldiers under an English sergeant and lieutenant. It was attacked by a force of 350 infantry and forty mounted infantry, with six maxims. The lieutenant was killed and the



Native troops drilling on the parallel bars during their training.

[Universal.



Native troops in a fortified position in the scrub.

[Topical Press.

sergeant wounded, but the direction of the defence was taken over by a political agent, Mr. J. F. Fitzpatrick. The fort held out against a bombardment of some 60,000 rounds, which lasted seven hours, and finally beat off the enemy. Next day a relieving force arrived from Yola, having covered sixty-two miles in twenty-two hours.

THE TAKING OF GARUA.

With the co-operation of the French column from the Chad Territories, the reduction was now begun of the German fort of Garua across the border. It was here that in August, 1914, a British force had lost almost half its men, including its commander, Colonel Maclean. The place was of considerable strength, defended by one fort on a plain and three on the surrounding hills, but shortage of munitions made it impossible for the garrison to reply for long to our lively bombardment, and on June 10th, 1915, it surrendered unconditionally, handing over to us 37 Europeans, 270 native rank and file, and a large quantity of armoury and medical stores. The German officers confessed that their native troops had been demoralised by our shell fire, and had refused to man the forts. Two thousand labourers had been employed on the fortifications for six months, and we were fortunate to secure the place so easily.

The force which had captured Garua now marched rapidly southward upon Ngaundere, a centre where a number of roads leading to different parts of the colony converge. Standing high, on a healthy and fertile tract, it had been made a base for the whole defence forces of Central Cameroon. The enemy were driven from it on June 20th, and fled in a south-westerly direction to Tibati and Banyo. The kind of country through which the pursuit was made was well described in a letter from an officer with our Nigerian troops:—

"The path is an absolute quagmire, the worst bush track I have ever seen. We crossed twenty-three rivers and streams, and five precipitous mountains. In some places the road was in the beds of streams for a mile or more. You go marching along in single file. . . . The enemy may be only a few yards away, but you cannot see them, the bush is so thick."

The same officer writes of the eerie effect of marching silently for hours in eternal twilight under mighty trees interlaced with creepers that meet overhead, with strange, brightly-coloured birds, beasts, and insects flitting about one. Owing to the need to proceed in Indian file, a column would sometimes cover three miles of track, and take an hour to pass a given spot. The difficulty of maintaining communication and transport, and of guarding against ambush, was therefore very great. Other letters speak of the horrors of the mangrove swamps, "in whose black, sticky mud and snaky roots it is easy to be lost entirely"; of the frequent tornadoes and torrential rains that sweep the country, and of occasional encounters with a rhinoceros, or with a herd of wild elephants, who would sometimes overrun the camp.

THE EXPLOITS OF THE "WAFFS."

Despite these hardships the Nigerian column pressed on, and at Banyo fought one of the most remarkable actions in the history of Colonial warfare. The force from Garua, under Brigadier-General Cunliffe, arrived at Banyo in time to meet a second Nigerian column, under Major Mann, which had advanced directly on that place by way of Gashaka. The enemy retreated from this town to a mountain top, three miles to the south,

that was as nearly impregnable as any position could be. Huge boulders covered its steep sides to the summit, with thorny scrub between, and from the top the enemy's maxims dominated all approaches. "It seemed hard," said one who was present, "to ask brave British officers to lead their men against such a position." But the "Waffs," as the West-African Frontier Force are known to their admirers, were eager for the attempt, and on November 4th the attack was begun. The men climbed doggedly upward, foot by foot, drenched with rain, and under incessant maxim fire. By evening they had scaled half the hill. Next day the enemy backed their rifle and maxim fire by rolling boulders down and throwing dynamite bombs; but despite this, a little more of the peak was gained. The ground so won was clung to through yet another sleepless night, in which a thunderstorm was added to the hardships, and on the morning of the 6th the summit was stormed. An officer has described the extraordinary sight the troops met with at the top of this mountain:--

"Scattered in all directions were broken furniture, burstopen trunks and tin boxes, blankets, bedding, clothes, tins of food, broken bottles of wine and beer, smashed up rifles and gramophones and telephones, and a medley of every conceivable sort of thing. The Germans had built several good mud houses (with glass doors and windows, good furniture, carpets, pictures, &c., in them), sign-posts erected pointing the way to defensive posts and picquets, two fine cement-built reservoirs of water, a vegetable garden, caves converted into granaries and filled with mealies and guineacorn, cattle, pigs, and sheep browsing about, and chickens galore. This was very clear and conclusive proof of the conviction of the Germans that the mountain was impregnable, and their intentions to either make it a point d'appui in case of a reverse of their troops in the south, or at any rate a position they meant to hold indefinitely, and from where they could continually worry us."

The officers in command of the "Waffs" in this and other engagements spoke very highly of their curious troops. "They are good fellows and work well," wrote one. "They stand things that no white man could, and are always cheerful." Another wrote, in more detail:—

"They are big, strapping fellows, very black, and rather appalling to look at owing to their custom of tattooing the face with hideous and fantastic designs. The head is either shaved clean or odd little topknots are left, somewhat like those of a circus clown. They are armed with the 303 Lee-Enfield rifle, with sword-bayonet. They take their fighting very seriously, and when they go into action they have a peculiar way of stamping their feet in a sort of rhythm, at the same time giving vent to the most blood-curdling and ferocious war chants. If properly led they will do anything and go anywhere."

FRENCH AND BELGIAN HELP.

The French, meanwhile, had pushed two columns of their Colonial infantry into Cameroon from Equatorial Africa. Their help in this quarter was specially appropriate, since they were operating in territory wrung from them by Germany during the Agadir crisis some years earlier. One column followed the course of the Sanga river which joins the Congo at the extreme southern point of the wedge which Germany had forced into French territory, while another, which ultimately joined it, crossed the frontier further north. The Sanga column had the help of the Belgian steamer Luxembourg, with three guns and a mitrailleuse, and of a Belgian force of over 500. General Aymerich, who commanded the French Equatorial troops, paid a warm tribute to the work done by this Belgian ship and men in forcing the

enemy positions on the Sanga. The French made excellent use of the waterways, and by January, 1915, had penetrated as far as Bertua, in the heart of the colony, via the Sanga, the Kadei, and the Dume rivers, all of which connect. By midsummer a portion of the same force had occupied Lome, an important port on another tributary of the Sanga, and the enemy had been cleared from the whole of the territory that had formerly been French. Most of his remaining forces were now penned in the district around Jaunde, and upon Jaunde the British and French coastal and hinterland columns were slowly but surely advancing.

The coastal forces, in the autumn of 1914, had completed their hold on the seaboard by occupying Victoria, north of the Cameroon River, which fell to a French cruiser, a Nigerian armed yacht, and a party of Royal Marines. They had then forced the enemy to relinquish Buea, the former seat of Government, which, lying on the slopes of the Cameroon Mountain, is the healthiest and pleasantest town in the colony. Thereafter, for almost a year, the coastal columns delayed their advance on Jaunde, preferring to wait until the forces coming through the hinterland should have progressed far enough to make possible a combined attack from all sides on the main position.

THE FALL OF JAUNDE.

The winter was spent in strengthening our positions and communications. Transport, which had to be almost wholly done on the heads of native carriers—50 lbs. per man—was a serious problem. Moreover, in a country that gave the enemy every facility for ambushing, sniping, and all the art of savage warfare, a considerable portion of our forces had to be used in manning blockhouses, which were strung out in our lines of advance at intervals of some thirty miles, with fifty to a hundred men in each. The direct advance from the coast to Jaunde was not begun till the autumn of 1915.

A glance at the map will make clear the plight to which the enemy was then reduced. A rough semicircle drawn from Victoria on the coast through Jabassi and Edea to Spanish Muni, would include the territory held by our coast forces based on Duala. A line from Gashaka on the Nigerian border, through Banyo, Bertua, and Lome to the Congo, would show approximately the land wrested from the enemy by the Nigerian, French, Congo, and Belgian troops. In the high pasture-land between these lines lay the Germans, with [Jaunde as the pivot of their defence.

On October 9th, when the dry season had begun,

a British force from Edea attacked the German position at Wumbiagas, half way to Jaunde by road, and after a severe engagement lasting twenty-four hours turned the enemy from their trenches. On October 25th, the French column which was co-operating took the adjacent town of Sende, on the Duala-Jaunde railway, which the enemy had been feverishly completing since the outbreak of war. Meanwhile, the French Congo columns, which had now accomplished the remarkable feat of fighting their way across some 400 miles of Cameroon, were menacing Jaunde from the south-east, while our Nigerian troops approached from the north. By January the German Governor and Commandant, Ebermaier and Zimmermain, realised that further resistance was useless, and fled southward to Ebolowa. A British force, under Colonel Gorges, occupied Jaunde on New Year's Day, 1916, meeting no resistance.

THE GERMAN FLIGHT.

Ebolowa was entered by French and British on January 10th, but they were too late to prevent the escape of the bulk of the enemy to Spanish Muni. Many deserters surrendered with their arms, but the Commandant and the Governor, with 900 Germans and several thousand natives, succeeded in crossing the border. The Spanish authorities shipped the Europeans to Spain for internment, and utilised the island of Fernando Po for the natives. A little band of Germans, who had been beleaguered for a year and a half on a peak at Mora, in the extreme north-east, soon surrendered, and Germany's last colony but one passed into the hands of the Allies.

The end of the campaign had never been in doubt since the time when our blockade of the coast prevented the defence force from replenishing their munitions, but great skill had been shown in securing that invading columns starting from points hundreds of miles apart should converge at the same moment on the heart of the enemy's resistance. The co-operation between our naval and West African forces and the French Colonial troops had been close, cordial, and effectual. Both French and British native soldiers, moreover, had splendidly justified their leadership and enhanced their reputation, not only by their endurance in forcing their way through a land of extraordinary difficulty and danger, but by their courage in the face of shell fire, which to many of them was a totally new experience.

With the occupation of Cameroon we had wrested from Germany colonial territories over five times greater than her Empire in Europe. Of her overseas possessions there remained only East Africa to conquer.



The last day for attesting under the original group system: Recruits waiting for admission to a London recruiting office. [Topical]

CHAPTER VII.

THE LAST OF THE VOLUNTARY SYSTEM

RECRUITING AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR OF WAR—THE NEED FOR NEW METHODS—THE APPLICATION OF THE NATIONAL REGISTER—PLANS AND AMENDED PLANS—THE EVOLUTION OF THE "DERBY SCHEME" AND PLEDGE TO MARRIED MEN—THE SCHEME IN OPERATION—ITS FINAL YIELD.

Y the beginning of September, 1915, most people in this country had the question of recruiting pretty constantly before them. The National Register had been safely taken and gathered in, and a committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Lansdowne, was considering the information which it vielded with the intention of discovering the best way, of applying it to "the successful conduct of the war." Whatever value the data provided by the Register may have had to the Ministry of Munitions, or to other Government departments, it was generally and very correctly assumed in the country that the War Office was, above all, the authority for whose benefit the data had been collected; and though Mr. Walter Long had specifically denied in the House of Commons that the National Register was "in any way connected" with the principles of compulsory military service, the public conviction that it was at least the herald of some decided change in our recruiting methods was not to be shaken.

Lapse of time and the progress of the war had, indeed, made some new development inevitable, and the

Government at any rate can be acquitted of having forced any change upon the country. For here, as in most of the other problems of the war, the opposed elements in the uneasy Coalition Cabinet managed to cancel each other out with such success that the Government seemed to do nothing until they were forced into action by immediate necessity, the demonstration of the necessity coming usually and with most effect from the Press of the country. If we were to continue the war on the basis on which it had been begun, the necessity of a change in the matter of recruiting was not very difficult to discover. In the earlier chapter on the "Citizen Army" (Chap. XVIII., Vol. III.) something has been said on the magnificent response of the country under the voluntary system as practised during the first eighteen months of the war. Certainly it sufficed to provide, with its three million volunteers, an example of free national determination which was worthy of much more general congratulation than it often received, thanks partly to our being a people in many ways curiously attached to a habit of self-depreciation, and also to the



Men home from the front on leave stop to have a word with recruits waiting to attest. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



Another tail of men waiting to attest.

[Central News.

fact that, in this case, the habit was helped not inconsiderably by the inveterate advocates of compulsion, who had their own axe to grind in belittling the voluntary effort. That effort, as was pointed out in the earlier chapter, was a very much greater one than had ever been made before by this country, even in the Napoleonic Wars, with their element of compulsion in the shape of the Militia Ballot Act—an Act and occasion to which some of the advocates of compulsion were fond of pointing as a precedent for their own contemporary panacea.* It was asked once in the House of Commons itself-when some one was disparaging the voluntary system-whether the critics could so very readily conceive three million Continental citizens volunteering to assist in driving a common enemy out of England. The question is a rhetorical one, but it is entitled to consideration in view of the self-criticism which was inflicted upon this country.

FAILING RECRUITING RETURNS.

But grand as had been the response of our unamended voluntary system, it could not work miracles. It could not-even if the achievement were desirable-drain the country of every able-bodied man, after the manner of Continental conscription. It could and did take all who were free to go, or eager and able to free themselves; but it certainly left behind many men with responsibilities, great or little, and some who had not yet seriously asked themselves whether these responsibilities were such as could, in the face of evident necessity, be laid aside without overwhelming difficulty or hardship. And at the time of which we are writing—the late summer of 1915—it was evident that the yield from the voluntary system, as it had been known in the past, was failing. Up and down the country local recruiting campaigns were in progress or preparation, with every assistance from the Press, hundreds of speakers, bill-posters, brass bands, and even the kinematograph. Whole battalions of enlisted men were turned loose, with the recruiting sergeant's cockade in their caps, to wander the crowded city streets and tackle all potential soldiers. But the time when over 4,000 recruits could be extracted from the London area alone in one day, or-later still-when Manchester could raise two "City" battalions in a week, in addition to general enlistments for other branches of the army, was gone, and nothing remotely resembling it remained. Manchester was now preparing a special appeal, supported by local patriotism and every new wile that the recruiting sergeant had taught himself during the past twelve months, for 10,000 men for the new formations of the East Lancashire Territorial Division. The whole return of the long and strenuous campaign was little more than a quarter of the men it was hoped to secure.

This state of affairs was reflected both in politics and in the Press. All through the Parliamentary recess the cry for compulsion was kept up by the one or two powerful newspapers which had long been avowed advocates of this system of recruiting. Beyond these papers, and the public opinion which they represented, there were forces within the Government which were

making for compulsion; and they were known to be strong. The general effect was scarcely fortunate. However necessary a change of some kind might be if our national undertaking was to be carried through on the scale on which it was conceived, the professional advocates of compulsion if they may be so described -certainly managed to produce an unhappy conviction with a good many people that whatever change might be effected it would be more a political move than a national necessity. All were, however, prepared for a change of some kind, and the reassembling of Parliament was anxiously awaited in the hope that the Government proposals would be announced. Parliament met on September 14th. (On the previous day Mr. Lloyd George's much-discussed preface to his collected speeches on the war had been made public, with its dramatic and curiously unqualified insistence on the most unquestioning national sacrifice as the only way of winning the war.) But the Government, it seemed, had no proposals to offer as yet. At the end of his speech Mr. Asquith drily admitted that the cry for compulsion was a matter which had "not escaped the attention of His Majesty's Government," but explained that the recruiting problem was one which was still under the consideration of the Cabinet. As soon as a decision was reached, which would be without delay, the result should be made known to the House.

PROPOSALS FROM SUPPORTERS OF VOLUNTARY SERVICE.

To what decision the Government would have come, bereft of outside assistance, it is impossible to say. In the meantime, since the Coalition Cabinet was unable to make up its divided mind and a large and influential part of the Conservative Press had long since made up theirs very heartily on the side of compulsory military service, it was necessary for the supporters of the voluntary system to move, and to do so quickly. At the end of September a conference representing all the important bodies, in and out of Parliament, which are entitled to speak on behalf of the Labour movement, in an official statement issued through Mr. Arthur Henderson, declared its belief that "the number of men required for the navy, army, and munitions works in order to carry out the war successfully can be obtained by voluntary means." The conference pledged itself to assist the Government in every way in proving this assertion, and suggested that recruiting would be helped if the Government could in the first place state a little more explicitly the future needs of the various services of the Crown, and, in the second, insist that employers should no longer prevent their men from enlisting. Beyond this, the conference decided that their own campaign should include :-

- "(1) Meetings of workers in industrial centres throughout the country, either in the form of conferences or such other gatherings as may be deemed advisable.
- "(2) The systematic circulation throughout trade union and Labour organisations of special recruiting literature.
- "(3) The sending of deputations to trades councils and other influential Labour organisations to explain the needs of the country and to secure co-operation in supplying them."

This did not go very obviously beyond methods which had already received full trial. But the unanimous conclusions and proposals of the conference are not without significance as proof both of the constitutional distrust of compulsion on the part of organised labour and of its realisation of the strength, at the moment,

^{*} Whether the working of the Militia Ballot Act was quite such an indication of national endeavour, or a stimulus to patriotism, as has been sometimes asserted, is open to doubt. The legal compulsion was for home service only, and the purchase of substitutes was permitted. And it is worth noting that in 1803, out of 45,492 men raised under the Act, no less than 40,008 were substitutes.

of the forces making for conscription. Elsewhere among the supporters of the voluntary principle there had already been made suggestions for a considerable extension of that principle as it had hitherto been interpreted, but extensions which might very well in the special circumstances be regarded as saving the essentials of it, and preserving the country both from the legal acknowledgment of compulsory military service and much of the great hardships and disorganisation which such an acknowledgment would inevitably bring about. The argument on which these were based was simple. The voluntary system was precious to us, but it was, after all, less precious than victory. Therefore, if the voluntary system proved insufficient to secure victory, compulsion must be accepted as a regrettable and temporary expedient. This rested on the assumption that the voluntary system, and the last legitimate extension of it, had really failed us; and until that system had been applied with more foresight and science than had yet been the case—an application which could be greatly assisted by the National Register-its failure could not be alleged, and the case for compulsion would not be accepted as proved. This view found its most prominent public expression in the leading articles of the Manchester Guardian, and many of the ultimately adopted suggestions for the final and exhaustive trial of the voluntary system were first heard from the same source.

It was decidedly necessary that they should be heard from somewhere, for the Cabinet and the War Office, left to themselves, seemed singularly sterile of suggestions as to how the data available from the National Register was to be used to the best advantage of the voluntary system. Mr. Asquith's promised statement of the Government's considered attitude towards the military service problem was never made. If any decision was arrived at, events gave it no time to be announced; and for the immediate future official statements in Parliament on the subject of recruiting were not so much announcements of policy as subsequent justifications for things already done. The first step towards trying out the voluntary system on the basis of the National Register was taken by the War Office. It was a simple but scarcely exhaustive one. In the classification of the National Register returns all the names of men who were within the age limit for military service had been transferred to "pink forms," as indicating that, unless "starred" as men engaged on munition work or other industries recognised as necessary to the conduct of the war and essential national interests, they were suitable subjects for enlistment. It had frequently been suggested that all "unstarred" men should be personally canvassed, and the need for their services as soldiers individually pointed out to them. This the War Office resolved to have done, and on October 3rd the following instructions were issued to recruiting authorities throughout the country:-

"As it is evidently the duty of every man who has not been starred to at once join the army, he being no longer required for necessary services in his country, you are to take whatever steps you consider most effective to induce such men to join the army. In carrying out this you will doubtless be assisted by the local authorities.

"You should see in your district that no unstarred man is able to complain any longer that he is not wanted in the army as he has not been fetched.

"You should report the number of non-starred men in your district who refuse to give their services to the country by enlisting in the army, where they are so much needed."

This, maintained the supporters of the voluntary system, was a very poor way of using the information which had been secured by the National Register. A scheme devised on these lines, declared the *Manchester Guardian*, would fail, or at least result in no sort of permanent solution of the recruiting problem. It was added:—

"But if we are to be asked to take such a failure as proving the final failure and bankruptcy of the voluntary system we shall assuredly decline. The scheme is wrong, and the method is wrong. There should be discrimination and order in place of the proposed chaotic procedure. To begin with, it is idle to attempt to enlist everybody at once. The pink forms have been sorted, or are in process of being sorted, into married and unmarried and according Let the youngest of the unmarried, whose to ages. responsibilities presumably are least and who have not so many dependants to be provided for, be called on first. If they responded adequately that would give Lord Kitchener as many men as he could handle for months to come. And how are they to be got to respond? Assuredly not by a call from persons whom they neither know nor respect. There should be a direct individual summons from the highest authority in the land-that is, delivered in the name of the King-and the man who felt himself unable to comply should be under an obligation to state his reasons before a competent and impartial authority such as could be easily and speedily appointed from among every bench of magistrates in the kingdom. Then at least you would have done something effective to bring home to each man his responsibility, and there are few men, we believe, not restrained by serious reasons such as any fair tribunal would recognise, who would not respond. At any rate, on some such system as this the voluntary system could really be tried out, and we have faith that it would not fail."

LORD DERBY'S APPOINTMENT.

The next day (October 6th) it was announced that Lord Derby was appointed to a new office as Director of Recruiting; and his first and immediate decision in this capacity was to cancel the War Office's instructions for its ill-considered canvass of all "unstarred" men. Lord Derby's appointment was received with general approval. Though by long conviction a supporter of the principle of compulsory "national service," during the course of the war no man had worked harder or with better effect to make the voluntary system of recruiting suffice our needs. In the course of a speech shortly after his appointment, the new Director of voluntary recruiting drew a little criticism to himself by suggesting that he was in the position of a man appointed to take over a bankrupt concern, but no one doubted his will honestly to carry out a reorganisation of it, in the event of a feasible scheme being devised. For the present it was understood that Lord Derby's attention was occupied with the problem of devising one.

The history of the system of deferred enlistments, with the attested men called up in groups according to their age and responsibilities, is a very interesting one. The scheme leapt full grown from the brain of no Zeus, in or out of the Government; and it would certainly not be doing justice to an important and significant chapter in the domestic history of the war if it were represented as having done so. Roughly speaking, during the month of October, 1915, there was thrashed out, between official announcements and newspaper criticism, a typical British compromise on the recruiting problem, which, important enough in itself, was destined ultimately to have some extraordinarily wide and mostly unforeseen consequences. Parliament, characteristically enough, had little to do with the shaping of it; and the Cabinet seemed to follow rather than lead, apparently content that if a thing could be done without disturbance it must clearly be done for the best. To the general public the result of the evolutionary process which was at work was known as the "Derby Scheme"—just as, by the same conveniently anthropomorphic tendency, all the new army formations which had been made necessary by the war became permanently labelled as "Kitchener's Army." Lord Derby himself, in one of his speeches, gave the credit for the essentials of the scheme to three Lancashire men, all of whom had been officially interested in recruiting for the county. But the history of its development hardly permits of the credit or responsibility for the scheme being so definitely apportioned as Lord Derby's generous tribute to his assistants would suggest.

THE GROUP SYSTEM ARRIVES.

The first step towards a new arrangement was taken on October 15th, when Lord Derby explained to representatives of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee and

the Joint Labour Recruiting Committee (whose formation and aims have already been mentioned) his own plans for the canvass of potential recruits. They contained no mention at all of a system of deferred enlistments. They simply outlined the provisions for canvassing all the men of military age who were not engaged on war work, and the only apparent difference between this scheme and the discredited one, which the War Office had been obliged to withdraw a few days before, lay in the fact that the canvass was now to be undertaken by civilians instead of soldiers, the campaign being conducted through the Parliamentary associations mentioned, and somewhat on the lines—the simile was Lord Derby's-of the political canvassing for a General Election. Each unstarred man was to receive a letter, signed

by Lord Derby, asking him to enlist, so that in any event it would be impossible for any man to maintain that he had not received an individual notice that his services were needed. Though in some districts the returns from the National Register had not yet been formulated, and the "starring" of essential men was still in progress, it was intended, said Lord Derby, that the whole of the canvass should be taken and the returns made up by November 30th.

If this was the best which those who were responsible for the final trial of the voluntary system and the National Register could do, after all the deliberation and discussion which the subject had lately been given, it was a remarkably poor best. Again the Manchester Guardian pointed out that if this scheme should fail, as it could hardly help but fail, no one but a determined advocate of conscription would accept the failure as the final bankruptcy of every other device save legal compulsion.

"We confess to being utterly unable to account (declared the Manchester Guardian) for the absence of any attempt to make use of most of the information laboriously obtained from the Register. Why are the married and the unmarried to be called upon together, and the men of all ages also to be called together? Why were the various classes carefully sorted out if no use was to be made of the information? What sense or justice is there in placing the same obligation at the same time on the boy of twenty with no responsibilities and the man of forty with a wife and family and heavy business responsibilities? Men should be called as they are wanted and in classes, and, knowing they were wanted and that some sense and discrimination was used in calling them, they would come."

This criticism was obviously very much to the point, unless the sole object of the new campaign was to slay the voluntary system and get hold of its death certificate with as little delay as possible. There was a brief interval of three days, and at the end of it Lord Derby, in an address to some of the London agents who were to carry out his canvass, produced the first outline of a system which should pay some real regard to the

information secured by the Register.

" I suggest (said Lord Derby) that everybody who recognises the State has a right to call on his services for its protection should enlist. They would be medically examined and, if found fit, attested there and then. Any who might wish to join the colours would be allowed to do so, and the rest would go on with their usual vocations and would be subject to be called up only when required. A list would be compiled dividing the men who had so enlisted into 46 groups, the unmarried men being put in the first 23 groups, according to age, and the married men into the next 23 groups, also according to age, and they would not be called on until all the unmarried groups had been exhausted.

"These men would be called in successive groups as required. A fortnight's notice would be given to every one of them before they need actually join in order to assist them in winding up any business, giving notice to their employers, &c. They could also appeal when called up to

be put in a later group, giving their reasons for the request. For instance, there might be a man in Class 3 who might point out he was the sole support of his mother. That, I think, would justify his being put in a far later class and only called up when absolute necessity for his services arose.

"I am consulting as to the best way by which local committees can be set up to deal with these claims, and, if they consider the claims are legitimate, to put men into such later groups as they may think desirable."

This, it will be seen, was an honest attempt to profit by criticisms of the kind which have been quoted. The scheme closely followed the essential demands of those criticisms. In one important point it went beyond them—in the insistence that a mere verbal promise on the recruit's part, that he would present himself for training when the call came to men of his years and responsibility, was not sufficient, and that he must formally join the army and be transferred to the reserve. But it was a scheme which most supporters of the voluntary



Lord Derby.

[Lafayette I.td.



December 11th: A typical scene outside a recruiting depot in any large town.

[Central News.

system readily accepted as a test by which they could abide.

"I don't believe (Lord Derby had added) that anybody could ever construct a scheme that would be absolutely without a flaw. I recognise perfectly well that there will be difficulties arising in various localities with regard, perhaps, to the whole of my scheme, but I want you clearly to understand this—that I have endeavoured to make it as elastic as possible, and that you won't find, if you apply to me or to my representative, that we are in any way bound by red tape."

It was an encouraging beginning after several false starts, and the end of Lord Derby's speech admirably summarised the spirit in which the scheme was generally accepted:—

"This is the last effort on behalf of voluntary service. It is not the effort of an individual, it is the effort of a body of men representing all shades of politics, and with the representatives of the Joint Labour Recruiting Committee acting in thorough harmony with them. It is an appeal to the people of the country to recruit for the people, and it is an appeal which I hope will not be made in vain."

THE BEGINNING OF THE CAMPAIGN.

The groups were to be recruited simultaneously with the taking of the canvass, and both efforts were to end at the same time, that is, on November 30th. The reason for this extreme haste was not apparent, and, as will be seen, it too obviously defeated its own end, and the time limit had to be three times extended. The scheme as it stood at present was really in the nature of a suggestion to be worked upon; its more exact details, and, above all, the spirit in which it was to be applied, were constantly being thrashed out and amended as the scheme was put into action. The original canvass was the first part of the scheme to be applied. The aim was that every man of military age throughout the country should receive a personal call, and be requested either to enlist

at once or under the group system as soon as the groups were open. A great number of voluntary canvassers were, therefore, necessary, and it was not always easy to find sufficient for the work to be completed within the time limit. Each canvasser took with him-or her, for women might also be employed—a card for every man on whom a call was to be made, and on this card were repeated the particulars collected by the National Register regarding each man's case—whether he was married or single, his age, number of dependants, and so forth. To these details were to be added the result of the canvasser's visit-whether the man promised to enlist, and if not, any reasons that he gave for his refusal. All particulars were to be regarded as confidential, and canvassers were specially cautioned to use great tact in conducting their enquiries. The date of the beginning of the canvass varied considerably in different parts of the country. Meanwhile, preparations were being made for the opening of the deferred enlistments under the group system. The Royal Warrant, which was necessary in order to constitute the New Army Reserve into which the attested men could be passed, was issued on October 22nd. On the following day a letter from the King "To My People" was issued from Buckingham Palace, and facsimiles of it were published in most of the newspapers. It was a grave and dignified appeal on behalf of the new effort—though this was not specifically named—from the traditional representative of the State's authority. It ended with the words:

"The end is not in sight. More men and yet more are wanted to keep my Armies in the Field, and through them to secure Victory and enduring Peace.

"In ancient days the darkest moment has ever produced in men of our race the sternest resolve.

"I ask you, men of all classes, to come forward voluntarily and take your share in the fight.

"In freely responding to my appeal, you will be giving your support to our brothers, who, for long months, have nobly upheld Britain's past traditions, and the glory of her Arms."

The actual opening of recruiting for the groups was fixed for the first week in November, but the effect of a definite programme, after so long a period of debate and indecision, was felt at once. The voluntary system might be about to be put on trial, to stand or fall by Lord Derby's ultimate report on the enlistments under the group system and the results of his canvass, but it was capable of an additional spurt on the incentive of its approaching trial alone. It had been explained that the great need was of men for the infantry-it was understood that where other branches of the service needed one man the demands of the infantry were roughly sixand also that only those who enlisted for immediate service could be promised any definite choice as regards what branch of the army they were to serve in. It was promised that, as far as possible, the " Derby recruits "and more particularly the married men-should be given a choice when their groups were called up, but everyone knew that the possibility was a small one. All over the country, therefore, there began a little boom in direct enlistments, the usual experience being that the figures for the last week in October were double, or a little more than double, those of the preceding week. It is probable that the needs of the infantry were not appreciably reduced by these direct enlistments, though some sanguine people seem to have reached the hasty conclusion that the recruiting problem was already and permanently solved.

THE PRIME MINISTER'S PLEDGE.

But there were others, besides those who were now discovering that it was possible for them to enlist at once, who had been giving a little hard thinking to the announced terms of the group experiment. The upshot of their reflections was destined to have a most important effect on the whole future of recruiting—and incidentally to provide a most illuminating example of the amount and kind of pressure which, thanks to their own lack of foresight and initiative, was brought to bear on the Government. The groups for the married and single men were arranged on the following scheme:—

| Unmarried. | | Married. | |
|--------------------|--------|---------------------|-------|
| Age. | Group. | Age. | Group |
| 1819 | 1 | 18—19 | 24 |
| 19-20 | 2 | 19-20 | 25 |
| 20-21 | 3 | 20-21 | 26 |
| 21-22 | 4 | 21-22 | 27 |
| 22-23 | 5 . | 22-23 | 28 |
| 23-24 | 6 + | 23—24 | 29 |
| 24-25 | 7 | 24-25 | 30 |
| 25-26 | 8 | 25-26 | 31 |
| 26-27 | 9 | 26-27 | 32 |
| 27—28 | 10 | 27—28 | 33 |
| 28—29 | 11 | 28-29 | 34 |
| 29-30 | 1 2 | 29-30 | 35 |
| 30-31 | 13 | 3031 | 36 |
| 3132 | 1.4 | 31-32 | 37 |
| 32-33 | 15 | 32-33 | 38 |
| 33-34 | 16 | 3334 | 39 |
| 34=-35 | 17 | 34 * 35 | 40 |
| 35 36 | 18 | 35- 36 | 41 |
| $36 \sim 37 \dots$ | 19 | $30 - 37 \cdots$ | 42 |
| 3738 | 20 | $37 \cdot 38 \dots$ | 4.3 |
| 3839 | 21 | 38 - 39 | 44 |
| 39-40 | 2.2 | 3940, | 4.5 |
| 4041 | 2,3 | 40 41 | 46 |

These groups were to be called up strictly in their numerical order, and this, coupled with the announced facilities for putting men with responsibilities beyond the average for their group back into a later group, provided a very fair recognition of a principle which had long been preached in the newspapers. There was one practical objection which readily occurred to most of the married men. The system would ensure that they were not called up before their juniors or the unmarried men, but it could give no indication at all of how long it would be before the turn of their group arrived This, it was seen, depended entirely on the number of men who attested in the earlier groups, and if these fell short of requirements there was no guarantee that Group 46 would not have received its call within a month. The situation was raising, in the acutest form in which it had yet been raised, the old war-time quest for equality of sacrifice. The scheme demanded the attestation of every man, including many who plainly considered that their responsibilities were such as should excuse them from military service save in the last resource. But it was still the voluntary system, and only the good sense and patriotism of the country could ensure that every man did attest, particularly those in the debated single groups. This, by a large number of the married men, was obviously regarded as an insufficient

The point was made vigorously in the Press and elsewhere, and the attention of the Government- or, as it seemed, of Mr. Asquith—was secured. In the course of a speech in the House of Commons on November 2nd, the Prime Minister—after declaring that he would accept compulsion on the clear proof that the new voluntary effort had failed, at the same time dismissing that failure "as a contingency which I don't believe will arise," continued:—

"I am told by Lord Derby there is some doubt among the married men who are now being asked to enlist as to whether they may not be called upon to serve, having enlisted, while younger and unmarried men are holding back and not doing their duty. Let them disabuse themselves of the notion at once. As far as I am concerned, I would certainly say the obligation of the married men to enlist is an obligation which ought not to be enforced and ought not to be held binding on them unless and until we cannot obtain, I hope by voluntary effort, but if it was needed and as a last resort by other means, as I have stated, unmarried men."

This was the first stage of the famous "pledge" to the married men, and it will be noticed that it seemed binding only on Mr. Asquith, and not very tightly on him. But for the immediate present it appeared to serve, and in the hand-to-mouth way in which the recruiting problem was being tackled, and the group system evolved, an arrangement which would go for a week without challenge was apparently sufficient for the Cabinet. The quarrel between the compulsionists and the supporters of the voluntary principle was supposed to be suspended until the publication of Lord Derby's report on the canvass and group system, but both sides managed to read what they wanted into Mr. Asquith's "pledge"—a result that was probably not altogether unforeseen by the maker of it—and, for the present, all seemed reasonably well.

A DEFINITION OF THE "PLEDGE."

Unfortunately, the pledge would not abide the test of practice—or at least the Director of Recruiting decided that it would not. It was not considered binding enough by many of the married men. Ten days after



Sunday midnight at a London recruiting depot: The last batch of attested men taking the oath. $[Topical\ Press.]$



Women clerks filling in particulars on the recruits' attestation forms.

[Central News.

its appearance the following statement was issued by the Press Bureau:-

"Lord Derby is authorised by the Prime Minister to express his surprise that his statement in the House of Commons on November 2nd should be considered in any way ambiguous.

The Prime Minister on that occasion pledged not only himself but his Government when he stated that if young men did not under the stress of national duty come forward voluntarily, other and compulsory means would be taken before the married men were called upon to fulfil their engagement to serve.

"Lord Derby is further authorised to state definitely that if young men, medically fit and not indispensable to any business of national importance or to any business conducted for the general good of the community, do not come forward voluntarily before November 30th, the Government will after that date take the necessary steps' to redeem the pledge made on November 2nd."

This was, very obviously, a considerable extension of Mr. Asquith's earlier statement. And unless it is to be read that the surprise which Lord Derby was so curiously authorised to express was his own, it looked as though Mr. Asquith had forgotten the terms of his speech; for the use of the phrase "as far as I am concerned," as an introduction to his original statement, was certainly highly ambiguous if the Prime Minister's intention had throughout been to pledge " not only himself but his Government." It was felt by the anti-conscriptionists that the Covernment's hand was being forced; and meek as the House of Commons had become towards encroachments on its authority, many members did not see why contingent legislation should be threatened by Lord Derby through a Press Bureau announcement, and without any reference at all to Parliament's voice in the matter. What, too, was meant by this implication that every single man must attest before one of the married could be held to their obligation, and how far did this amazingly unqualified proposal represent the view of anyone in authority, except Lord Derby?

These points were at once discussed in and out of l'arliament, and it was soon apparent that, in spite of the Prime Minister's paramount and tremendously sincere desire to avoid trouble, he had merely managed to let the difficulties drift to a sudden climax. A statement in response to the questions which were being asked was promised for November 10th, and in making the announcement a political correspondent remarked with truth, "It will be a great triumph for Mr. Asquith if he succeeds in pleasing both compulsionists and anti-compulsionists again as he did on November 2nd."

Mr. Asquith did his best. He did not make a speech, as had been announced, but answered several questions in the House. Replying to an enquiry whether the "other methods" of enlistment which had been foreshadowed were to be taken as meaning compulsory methods, the Prime Minister said, "I must refer to, and repeat, what I said in the House on November 2nd," adding that it was his "confident hope and belief that no question of resorting to coercive methods will be found necessary.' Questioned whether his pledge on November 2nd had not been considerably extended by the statement which had since been issued by Lord Derby, the Prime Minister contented himself with the remark that the point was "rather a matter for argument."

Later in the day, Mr. Bonar Law, in the absence of Mr. Asquith, and speaking definitely on behalf of the Government, managed to throw a little more light on what was meant by the pledge to the married men. It simply meant, he explained, that if there was "a general

shirking of their duty" by the unmarried men, "then they will be made to go before men with families and responsibilities." But even this, it seemed, was not good enough. Recruiting officials in various parts of the country reported that married men when canvassed were declining to attest on the ground that the Prime Minister's pledge was still not sufficiently exact, and in answer to such reports Lord Derby sent the following telegram:

" "Married men need have no fear but that faith will be kept with them. The Prime Minister's assurance to them is most definite and binding."

Again the device proved ineffectual when put to the practical test of producing recruits for the married groupsor so the recruiting authorities alleged. The point at issue was, after all, considerably more than a matter for argument, since it vitally concerned the interests and calculations of a large number of citizens; and many of these were apparently of the opinion that the only person who could with authority explain the Prime Minister's pledge was the Prime Minister himself. Such an explanation was finally secured by means of the following instructive correspondence, published in the Press on the morning of November 20th:

"Derby House, Stratford Place, W.,

"November 19th, 1915.

"My DEAR PRIME MINISTER.—As some uncertainty exists as to the effect of the various statements recently made in Parliament and the Press on the subject of recruiting, may I endeavour to put the position in a few words?

"Married men are not to be called up until young unmarried men have been. If these young men do not come forward voluntarily you will either release the married men from their pledge or introduce a bill into Parliament to compel the young men to serve, which, if passed, would mean that the married men would be held to their enlistment. If. on the other hand, Parliament did not pass such a bill, the married men would be automatically released from their engagement to serve.

"By the expression 'young men coming forward to serve' I think it should be taken to mean that the vast majority of young men not engaged in munition work or work necessary for the country should offer themselves for service, and men indispensable for civil employment and men who have personal reasons which are considered satisfactory by the local tribunals for relegation to a later class can have their claims examined for such relegation in the way that has already been laid

"If, after all these claims have been investigated and all the exemptions made mentioned above, there remains a considerable number of young men not engaged in these pursuits who could perfectly be spared for military service they should be compelled to serve.

On the other hand, if the number should prove to be, as I hope it will, a really negligible minority there would be no question of legislation.

"Yours sincerely, "DERBY."

" 10, Downing Street, S.W.,
" November 19th, 1915.

"MY DEAR DERBY, -I have received your letter of to-day. It correctly expresses the intentions of the Government. s the intencion.
"Yours sincerely,
"Signed) "H. H. ASQUITH."

CONTINGENT COMPULSION FOR SINGLE MEN.

Thus was finally evolved the famous pledge on which the whole issue between voluntary and compulsory military service henceforward hung. In theory that issue was by no means settled, for the question of what constituted a "really negligible minority" was still open to the vigorous discussion which it began to receive as soon as the recruiting for the group system closed.



Calling up the first groups: Called-up men waiting to receive their uniforms. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



The first groups report themselves for training: Several hundred recruits escorted by their friends crossing Westminster Bridge on their way to barracks.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

But in practice the principle of compulsion had already been admitted, and for the rest of the "Derby campaign the voluntary system was little more than a polite fiction for a great majority of the single men. Recruiting authorities and canvassers "appealed" to them, holding over them as a threat this thrashed-out version of the Prime Minister's remarks at the beginning of the month, and few hesitated to suggest, or even to declare, that, if those single men who had more than usually heavy responsibilities did not attest and trust their cases to the decision of the tribunals, under the contingent measure of compulsion they would be denied any appeal at all. From the point of view of the inveterate compulsionists the situation had been successfully manœuvred; for the vast majority of people in the country were more concerned with practice than with principle, and the more unmistakable indirect compulsion became, the more readily could the dividing line be crossed and the country induced to accept, for the first time in its history, military service abroad as a legal obligation. It was not, however, so much the adroitness of the compulsionists which had produced the situation out of the undoubted difficulties caused by the failure of the ordinary methods of voluntary appeal; the hopeless inability of the anti-compulsionists within the Government to take any steps of their own played their opponents' game only too well. Unwilling to do anything until they were forced, or to say anything until it had been dragged out of them, and with no sort of effective control over the actions of all the various agencies which are lumped together under the heading of "recruiting authorities," lack of foresight on the part of the Government was destined to make a present of the recruiting system to the compulsionists.

ARMLETS FOR ATTESTED MEN.

For the present, affairs seemed to be tolerably settled. Recruiting for the groups was proceeding fairly steadily, though on November 24th Lord Derby warned the country that during the next three weeks recruits would have to present themselves in far larger numbers than they had been doing if they were going "to make the position of voluntary service absolutely unassailable." The original time limit for the group scheme and the canvass had, of course, proved as inadequate as had been predicted, and it had been extended first from November 30th to December 4th, and later still, to Saturday, December 11th. The problem of the armlet, which had originally been promised not only to attested men as proof of their having responded to the appeal, but also to men who had offered themselves and been rejected by the doctor, and to those who had been invalided out of the army, was still in a characteristic tangle. There were very few armlets to be got, and the instructions concerning them were revised with regularity about once a week. In the first place they were to have been of three types, to distinguish the three classes of men to whom they had been issued. But it was pointed out that for a man to brand himself as medically unfit might seriously prejudice his chance of securing civilian employment, and it was therefore resolved to make all the armlets identical—that is, of khaki cloth with a Royal Crown in red upon them. But on what terms they were to be issued to anyone except men who had passed the doctor and duly attested was a mystery of cancelled official announcements, and not ultimately to be solved-and then with some scandal, as was to be

seen still later -until well on into January. However, in the last stages of the group enlistments the medical examination was small enough barrier between a man and the possession of an armlet. On November 25th the eyesight test was abandoned in the case of the "Derby" recruits. Thenceforward—though no announcement or explanation was ever given of it—an important change of policy was evidently decided and applied by the War Office. The medical examination of recruits became an increasingly perfunctory business, and in the case of men already rejected, who, in order to secure an armlet, afterwards presented themselves for re-examination and were promptly passed into the army as fit for foreign service, the system grew into a notorious scandal. The armlets and the desire to possess them was a not unimportant part of the group enlistment scheme. When the military authorities could supply them in sufficient quantities-which was not until after the closing of recruiting for the groups—the wearing of them became general, particularly after the King had expressed his desire that all those who were entitled to an armlet should wear it.

CONSTITUTION OF APPEAL TRIBUNALS.

One other important matter which had still to be settled was the constitution of the appeal tribunals, which were so important a part of the new group system. For some days after the method and machinery of appeal had been first indicated there was a doubt in the minds of many men with heavy domestic or commercial responsibilities whether they were not entitled to have their case decided by the appeal tribunals before they actually attested. Had this course been recognised and permitted the new recruiting scheme would have preserved much more of the voluntary principle than it did, and would have followed almost exactly the line indicated in the Press suggestions which have already been quoted. But it was not the intention of Lord Derby's scheme to take any such course; it was definitely explained after a day or two that "the State" alone was to decide whether an unstarred man was essential to the conduct of his business, or whether his other responsibilities were such as gave good reason for the postponement of his entry into the army, and that the State would only decide these points in the case of the attested man. As the State in this new, intricate, and highly responsible capacity meant no more than the appeal tribunals, the constitution of these, and the selection of appropriate men to sit on them, was clearly a matter of the greatest importance. It scarcely received the attention which it deserved. The ultimate decision—the responsibility for which seems to have been divided, characteristically enough, between three separate authorities: the Local Government Board, which took the National Register, Lord Lansdowne's Committee, which had considered the best way of using the Register, and Lord Derby and his Parliamentary Recruiting Committee—was that each local authority throughout the country should appoint from its members a tribunal of five. This was obviously taking the line of least resistance on a matter which was worth the closest attention, and the decision was at once criticised. It was all very well to talk blandly of "the State," and "competent authorities and tribunals," and it was, of course, quite possible to select admirably competent tribunals from the city councils of many of the large towns. But it was clearly impossible to establish from many of the urban or rural district councils of the



Members of the first four groups receiving their first day's pay after being called up. $[``Manchester\ Guardian\ ''\ Copyright.$



Serving out uniforms to some of the first attested men to be called up. [Newspaper Illustrations,

country, and from men who had originally been elected for very different duties, the ideal tribunal equipped with the best qualifications available for the solution of the intricate problems of service and estate that were certain to arise. This was, however, the system which was adhered to, though—perhaps out of respect to the criticisms which had been urged against it—an important qualification of it was made by the establishment of "Advisory Committees" to each tribunal, committees which were entitled to settle a good many claims on their own responsibility, so that only the more difficult cases were referred to the tribunals, and these after some preliminary sifting of the evidence. The following official particulars were published on November 22nd:—

To deal with appeals, it was stated, "The elected local authority has been requested to appoint a committee ordinarily consisting of five persons to form the local tribunal. In England and Wales a local tribunal has been appointed by the Council of each town, urban district, and rural district.

"A claim for postponement may be made either because a man is considered by his employer to be individually indispensable in a business, the continuance of which is important in the interests of the community, or for reasons, business or domestic, personal to the man himself. A claim is to be made by filling up a form showing the grounds on which it is put forward, and the fact that such a claim has been made will prevent the man in question from being called up for military service until his application has been decided.

"The local tribunal will send the claim to the military representative in the locality, who will have the assistance of an advisory committee composed of persons conversant with local industries and local conditions of life, and representing both employers and employees. If they and the military representative consider the claim is a reasonable one they will inform the local tribunal that it is assented to, and the man will be placed in a later group.

"If it is thought that the claim requires further investigation the local tribunal will fix a date for hearing and deciding the claim. The local tribunal will hear the claimant and the military representative and any necessary witnesses in order to ascertain the facts of the case, but no person will be allowed to appear merely as an advocate on the merits of an application.

"It is obviously necessary that tribunals should be able to deal expeditiously with cases. A man cannot be put back more than ten groups on any one claim, but if a reasonable time after the claim has been decided the claimant makes an informal application to the military representative, and he and the advisory committee think that adequate reasons have been shown, the man may be placed in a still later group, without the necessity of any further formal claim.

"It is hoped that the vast majority of cases will be settled satisfactorily on the first application, but provision is made in case any party is aggrieved by the decision of the local tribunal for an appeal to a Central Appeal Tribunal."

THE ATTESTING OF "STARRED" MEN.

On the same day was also published a long list of official instructions to the appeal tribunals, from which it was clear that, though unstarred men must attest before their claims could be heard, this stipulation did not apply to the claims of (a) men engaged on munition work, (b) coal miners, (c) all other "starred men," or those engaged in any of the new "reserved occupations" (lists of which were being drawn up by the Board of Trade for the purpose of safeguarding the export trade and other industries which were judged to be essential to national interests), and (d) even men who, though not actually starred, might be alleged to be employed in one of the foregoing occupations. The cases of all these men, said the instructions to the tribunals, "may be considered" whether the men had been attested or not. It is amazing to note how swiftly this concession was demolished in practice. Almost as soon as the instructions had been issued munition workers were being freely attested, and before the closing of the groups men in some of the occupations which the Board of Trade had newly reserved were being assured, in flat contradiction to provision (c)of the instructions, that their reservation was conditional only upon their attestation! The whole group system was rapidly drifting into an unedifying muddle of cajolery and threats, the main business of the recruiting authorities being now to get every man, whatever his trade or responsibilities, to attest, and trust to his case receiving justice from authorities who were clearly unable or unwilling to apply the announced theory of their own scheme. It was not a too-promising outlook for the man whose case was a hard one; and, in spite of all its official statements, the new recruiting scheme looked rather like an overwhelming edition of the old recruiting sergeant of peaceful tradition, whose blandishments ceased when the King's shilling had once changed hands.

THE FINAL RUSH TO ATTEST.

But there were, as has been pointed out, more than blandishments behind this recruiting sergeant. And though in the earlier days of the group system the recruiting for it had been somewhat slack, in the last four days the most extraordinary rush began. The country had worked its way into indirect compulsion of the most pressing kind, and the effects were proportionate. By December 8th, the existing recruiting depôts in most large towns had proved unable to deal with the men who were presenting themselves, and additional stations were hastily provided. Their staffs were working until midnight, and in some places until five o'clock on the following morning. The rush continued and increased. On Thursday, December 9th, the number of men enrolled at one Manchester recruiting station established a record for any single depôt in the country during any previous day of the war. It was speedily surpassed. On the Friday the medical examination was dropped altogether in many places, the men being required simply to take the oath and present themselves for the completion of their attestation at a later date. It was announced by Mr. Tennant that no further extension could be granted beyond Saturday midnight, when recruiting for the groups would irrevocably close. All sorts of men, starred and unstarred, were waiting in long lines outside city recruiting stations, and the final Saturday found a slight extension of the time-limit absolutely necessary unless large numbers were to be turned away unattested. The extension was for twenty-four hours (until the Sunday midnight), but it was stated that the names of men whom it was impossible-even with the abandoning of the medical examination—for the recruiting authorities to attest within that time might be simply taken down, and, as long as such men presented themselves at the same recruiting office before the following Thursday, they would be attested under the same conditions as the earlier recruits. The authorities, as Lord Derby afterwards said, were "snowed under" by recruits at the end of the campaign, but one or two important recruiting stations reported that a misunderstanding of the terms of the last extension had sent some men away who never returned in time to attest. They read the extension as lasting, without qualification, until the Wednesday, and neglected to give in their names on the Sunday. It is worth noting that on the Saturday, when thousands of starred men had attested on the instructions of the recruiting authorities, Lord Selborne, as a member of the Cabinet, was crossing the t's and dotting the i's of another

official confusion by informing a meeting of Winchester farmers that their agricultural workers, being starred men, ought not to have attested, that it was not the wish of the Government that they should attest, and that if he could find the recruiting officer who had advised them to do so he would "make it pretty hot for him."

THE RESULTS OF THE SCHEME.

The "Derby Scheme" was now completed, and the report on it was awaited with keenest interest, for on the number of single men which it revealed as unattested was supposed to depend the legal fate of the voluntary system. But before these particulars were published the first of the groups were summoned to the colours. By an Order dated December 20th, Groups 2, 3, 4, and 5 were ordered to report themselves for service on January 20th, after the month's notice, which had been promised to each group as it was called up, had elapsed. On December 21st, while applying for permission to add another million men to the army, Mr. Asquith announced that Lord Derby's report had been placed before the Cabinet on the day before, and that it was receiving their consideration. For the present no statement could be made. Christmas was spent in an atmosphere of political crisis, it being well known that the Cabinet was seriously divided on the testimony of Lord Derby's report and the necessity for a legal measure of compulsory

military service. The compulsionist Press was busy demonstrating, with no reliable figures at all, but on the strength of its conjectures, that the last shadow of the voluntary system must speedily be removed from our midst. At a fateful meeting on December 28th the Cabinet came to its troubled decision on the report. Parliament reassembled on January 4th, and the same day Lord Derby's figures were made public. Their details will be examined in the next chapter; for the present it will suffice to extract the essential points. These were as follows:—

| | Single. | Married. |
|--|-----------|---------------|
| Total of men available (October 29th) | 2,179,231 | 2,832,210 |
| to December 15th | 1,150,000 | 1,679,263 |
| Of these there were starred but not attested | 378,071 | 465,683 |
| had to be deducted the medi- cally unfit | 651,160 | 687,264 |

On the same day was also announced the resignation of Sir John Simon from his post as Home Secretary in the Government. And on the following day (January 5th) the Prime Minister introduced in the House of Commons the Military Service (No. 2) Bill, which provided for the compulsory drafting into the army of unattested single men.



The attested man's badge: South Wales miners going to work wearing their armlets.

[Central News.



Labour and the Compulsion Bill: Delegates to the Great Labour Conference on the Compulsion Bill outside the Central Hall, Westminster, before the opening of the conference.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

CHAPTER VIII.

COMPULSION.

COMPULSORY SERVICE AND ITS PLACE IN ENGLISH HISTORY—HOW THE PROBLEM WAS AND MIGHT HAVE BEEN FACED— THE DERBY FIGURES—MR. ASQUITH'S SPEECH—SIR JOHN SIMON'S RESIGNATION—LABOUR AND COMPULSION—THE PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY SERVICE BILL—ITS MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

HERE is nothing in British military traditions against compulsory military service as such. On the contrary, compulsion has from the earliest times been part of the law of the land, and if it has not been enforced it is for practical reasons, and not out of any consideration for individual right. In Saxon times the obligation to serve in the shire militia was universal, and a refusal to obey the King's summons made a man liable to very severe penalties. Under the fully-developed feudal system of the Norman Kings military service was a duty which went with the ownership of land; or, to put it in another way-which is paralleled by some of the posters that appeared urging men to attest under the Derby scheme—the right to carry arms was a privilege that attached to the status of the freeman. Except in the case of invasion the duty to serve did not strictly extend beyond the bounds of the county; and, in any case, the period of feudal service, being limited to forty days, was much too short for foreign expeditions. For their French wars the Plantagenet Kings never had any trouble in getting the men they wanted, and there was never any question of supplementing their numbers by general compulsion. But as feudalism decayed and the power of the Crown grew, the obligation of service extended, and under the Tudors impressment was regarded as one of the prerogatives of the Crown. The Long Parliament of Charles I. in 1640 combated this prerogative, and declared that D3-VOL. IV.

"by the laws of the realm none of His Majesty's subjects ought to be impressed or compelled to serve out of his country, except in case of necessity or invasion, or except they be otherwise bound by the tenure of their lands." This is the only legal enactment prohibiting compulsory service outside the bounds of Great Britain, and even this Act, by excepting the case of necessity or invasion, acknowledges that the duty is one that circumstances may make it necessary to impose. Indeed, this very Act goes on to authorise the impressment of men for service in Ireland, where disorders had broken out which, if not suppressed, it was declared would endanger not only that kingdom but also the kingdom of England: So far then is compulsion for military service from being foreign to British institutions, that the one old statute dealing with it expressly recognises the duty of service for home defence, and gives statutory authority for the impressment of men for service in Ireland, which at that time was rather more foreign-and considerably more distant-than France is now.


THE OLD MILITIA.

In so far, then, as compulsion was an issue in politics before the Revolution of 1688, it was confined to compulsion for foreign service, and those who protested against it were not concerned to enforce any right of the individual, but to resist what was regarded as the encroachments of the Executive on the powers of



The Labour Conference on the Compulsion Bill at Westminster: A view of the platform.

[Central News.]



A view of the hall and the delegates.

[Topical Press.

Parliament. One of the strongest prejudices of the Revolution of 1688 was its objection to standing armies, which it regarded as an instrument of domestic tyranny only to be trusted into the hands of the sovereign with great caution. It needed the invasion of the Young Pretender in 1745 to convince the country of the dangers of its military condition, and in 1757 a species of compulsion for the militia was established by Act of Parliament.

"A certain number of men specified in the Act (usually known as the quota) were to be raised in each county. I.ists of all men between the ages of 18 and 50 in every parish in the county (except those expressly exempted) were to be sent to the lord-lieutenant and the deputy-lieutenants, who were to hold meetings and apportion the quota of the county among the different subdivisions, and again subdivide the quota of each subdivision among the parishes in proportion to their population, and then choose men by lot from each parish list up to the number apportioned to that parish. Every man so chosen had to serve for three years, or to provide a substitute, and vacancies were to be filled from time to time by a like process of ballot which was to be repeated every three years."

The Act not only allowed substitutes for balloted men, but enabled the parishes to avoid the ballot altogether by raising, if it could, a number of volunteers equivalent to its quota, so that the degree of compulsion was very slight, except on poor men who could not afford to pay substitutes. Moreover, the force was for home service only, and so far was it from assisting the country in its main military difficulties-which were to find men for foreign service—that it actually competed with the regular army by enlisting men as volunteers or substitutes in the militia who would otherwise have joined the regular army. Still, in spite of these drawbacks, the principle of compulsion for home defence was clearly recognised. Many changes have been made in the detailed organisation of the force, but in outlines the balloting provisions of the Act of 1757 remained, and, what is more, are still part of the law of the land. The ballot has twice been actually enforced since the Peace of 1815, namely, in 1830 and 1831, and the suspension is by an Act of Parliament passed every year. All that is necessary to bring the ballot into force again is to drop the Ballot Acts out of the Expiring Laws Continuance Act which is passed annually. Probably, if the machinery for the ballot were not so antiquated, compulsory service for home defence could be brought into existence at any moment by a mere Order in Council. Moreover, it must be remembered that though the obligation to serve in the militia is for home defence only, the Government was, by an Act passed in 1898, authorised to accept from the militia volunteers for service in any part of the world. Lord Kitchener, in the early stages of the Derby scheme, is believed to have favoured a plan of reviving the Ballot Acts as a means of raising recruits, trusting, no doubt, that the men so raised would volunteer en masse for foreign service, like the Territorials. This would have been a species of indirect compulsion for foreign service.

THE REAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST COMPULSION.

Further, it must be remembered that compulsion was a recognised means of obtaining men for the navy, which, though one of its chief duties is to defend our shores from invasion, cannot be described as an arm for home defence 1 ke the county militia, and that the Acts authorising the press-gangs for the navy have never been repealed. Neither legaly nor constitutionally, there-

fore, can compulsion be said to be abhorrent to our traditions. The repugnance to conscription is based on other grounds than these. It is partly practical, partly political. A nation which maintains not merely superiority at sea but supremacy might, with reason, deem itself safe from the necessity of having to raise such large numbers of men for service abroad that only conscription would give them. Desperate as our struggle with Napoleon appeared at times to be, the notion of compulsion for foreign service was never seriously entertained. The war strategy of the elder Pitt was simple. It was to make ourselves entirely responsible for the war at sea, and to leave to our Allies the major operations on land. That, in itself, would seem not an inequitable distribution of the burdens, but Pitt threw in as extra contributions from us the assistance of our army in subsidiary military operations which could be supported from the sea, and our financial support. Had these principles of strategy been followed in this war, there would have been no Expeditionary Force to France, though there might have been military operations in Belgium. We should have forced the Dardanel'es and occupied Constantinople, and we should have conquered the German colonies in Africa, but we should not have assisted in the defence of Paris any more than we did in the defence of Berlin and Vienna against Napoleon. Whether the war could have been won on the lines of Pitt's strategy is open to grave doubt, but, at any rate, no compulsory service would have been necessary, and there would have been no break such as this war was to bring with the continuity of our military history. It would have been a terrible war, but its cost in money would have been perhaps a third of what this war has cost us, and the disturbance in the economic and social life of our country would have been comparatively slight. Considerations such as these form the core of the British objection to compulsion, an objection which is neither moral nor legal, but eminently practical—an enemy might say selfish. The other main objection to compulsion was political. The old Whigs objected to the standing army because it gave the Crown too much power, and whatever substance there was in this objection applied with enormously greater force against an army for foreign service of a size which made resort to compulsion necessary. Lastly, it had always to be remembered that compulsion adopted before a war to support a policy that had been accepted by the nation was one thing, conscription adopted in the middle of a war in support of a policy on which the nation had never been consulted was another and a more serious thing.

The complete argument, therefore, for compulsion would have required a comprehensive survey of the whole strategy of the campaign. It would have shown that our success in the land war was being endangered for lack of men, that there were no alternative plans of campaign which would dispense with the imperious demands for more men, that the shortage of men could not be made good by voluntary means, and that the resultant gain to the military situation would not be offset by other drawbacks, such as injury to our financial position which might result from the withdrawal by compulsion of men from the ranks of commerce and industry. The argument might have gone on to compare our management of this with that of former wars, and shown how such changes as had been made were the inevitable consequences of the conditions under which this war was being fought. Such a review of the situation would not only have been instructive to our



The Labour Party Conference at Bristol: A view of the platform, with Mr. W. C. Anderson as chairman $[Central\ News.]$



Mr. Ramsay Macdonald talking with three members of the French Chamber who were visitors to the Bristol Conference. [Central News.

own people, but would also, by showing how great were the sacrifices we were making compared with anything that we had done in our past history, have had an excellent effect on opinion in Allied countries.

MR. ASQUITH'S PLEDGE.

Instead, the whole question of compulsion was made to turn on the interpretation of a pledge given by Mr. Asquith during the Derby enlistments, and of certain statistics known as the Derby figures. The terms of the pledge have already (p. 79) been given. In introducing the Military Service Bill, on January 5th, Mr. Asquith explained why he gave that pledge: "It is the literal and simple truth to say that if an assurance of that kind had not been given there was serious danger of the whole campaign breaking down." On the other hand, he thought that the pledge as given had helped to make the scheme a success; it had brought large numbers of married men into the scheme who would not, or could not, have come in if they were liable to be called up in the earlier groups. The question then remained whether the numbers of unattested single men were "considerable," in which case Mr. Asquith's pledge had bound him to have resort to compulsion if no other means would bring them in, or merely "negligible," in which case the pledge did not apply.

"Thus arises the third question. Has the occasion arisen, has the contingency occurred which makes the fulfilment of the pledge a matter of obligation? As I reminded the House a few moments ago, Lord Derby estimated the number of unmarried men who are not accounted for at 650,000, and as I said, and I repeat, large deductions must be made from that figure to make it correspond at all with the actual fact. By actual fact I mean people who are not only unaccounted for, but who are not available. I am prepared hypothetically for it is a matter to a large extent of conjecture and speculation to make very large deductions from that figure. Bring it down to one-half-bring it down to less than half--and I have been totally unable, making the largest possible deductions that I can conceive, to treat the hypothetical figure which would remain as anything but a substantial and even a considerable amount.

"Our primary obligation, mine at any rate, most of all, must be to keep faith with those to whom I have given that promise. If that be so, if there is, so far as we can judge from figures—which I agree must be to a large extent conjectural -- any evidence, not only prima facie, but substantial and to my mind convincing, that a substantial number of these men had not enlisted or attested, it must be clear there are only two ways in which the promise given can be fulfilled. The first would be to release the married men, over 400,000 in number, from their obligation, and thereby create a huge gap, a gap which I don't see my way to fill, in Lord Derby's provision for the million men for which the House has voted. The second course, the course we are going to ask Parliament to adopt, is to provide that if, after due opportunity of inquiry, it is found that single men of military age have no ground whatever for exemption or excuse, they should be deemed to have done what everyone agrees it is their duty to the State to do, what in times like these they should do, and be treated as though they had attested for enlistment. That is the course we propose to adopt."


THE DERBY FIGURES.

The use of such words as "considerable" and "negligible," without definition or reference to any standard of comparison, was certainly unfortunate, and led to much dispute. Whether the number of single men was negligible or not must depend on a number of considerations, not one of which was explained, such, for example, as the precise importance attached to numbers as compared with other elements of military efficiency, or the total numerical strength which it was desired to

attain. But what criticism mainly fastened on was the estimate of the number of unattested single men who might be made available for military service by compulsion. The figures as to the single men given by the Derby Report were as follow:—

| Single men of military age | | 2,179,231 |
|-------------------------------------|---------|-----------|
| Less Enlisted | 103,000 | , , , , , |
| Attested | 840,000 | |
| Rejected | 207,000 | |
| | | 1,150,000 |
| Single men who did not present then | nselves | 1,029,231 |
| Starred men | 690,138 | |
| | | |
| Attested starred men | 312,067 | |
| Attested starred men | 312,067 | 378,071 |

These figures seem at first sight to imply that there were in round numbers no fewer than 650,000 single men available for compulsion, if it was decided to apply it. But other Derby figures reduce this gross total by at least two-fifths. The following table shows the deductions made from the totals of attested men before the number actually available for military services was reached:—



SIR J. SIMON'S CRITICISM.

That is to say, among the unattested single men a gross total in round figures of half-a-million has to be reduced to a net total available for service of 300,000, and on the same proportions the 650,000 unaccounted for single men would only yield a net total of, say, 400,000 men available for service. But even from this reduced total further deductions, as will be seen, would have to be made.

The decision of the Cabinet to introduce the Military Service Bill had been taken on December 28th, and before New Year's Day Sir John Simon, the Home Secretary, had resigned. On Sir John Simon, therefore, fell the leadership of the Parliamentary opposition to the Bill. Mr. Asquith had put the case for the Bill on the very narrow ground that as the number of single men unaccounted for was not negligible he was honourably bound by his pledge either to release the married men or to compel the single men to serve. Sir John Simon's main argument against the Bill was that the number of single men unaccounted for was negligible, and that the pledge therefore did not bind. With this object he attacked the figure 650,000 given in the Derby Report:—

"How was this figure of 650,000 arrived at? It was arrived at by subtracting a figure of Lord Derby's from a figure which appeared in the National Register—two figures which were arrived at by different methods, by different persons, and at different times. The National Register included



South Wales miners attesting under the reopened group system

[Central News.



Called-up recruits answering their roll-call on the Horse Guards Parade, London.

[Sport and General.]

all the clergymen, curates, Roman Catholic priests, and Non-conformist ministers, who had to be deducted from the 650,000. Then there was the members of the mercantile marine who were included, while the Register also included criminals, the weak-minded, the inebriates, the blind, the halt, and the maimed, and everybody who had got an obvious physical incapacity for military service. When the National Register was taken they were given a pledge that it had nothing to do with compulsion. Included in the 650,000 were other large blocks of persons, as, for instance, the men who were now being recruited from day to day for the army and navy, and there was the class of the last remaining son at home. When they had excluded those special blocks, who would say that the figure left was going to be more than a negligible minority?

"But even when all those people were excluded the figure obtained would not enable them to judge whether the minority was negligible. The Prime Minister had just told them that it would have to be severely discounted. Lord Derby's report gave some pretty good reasons for supposing that the figure left would have to be reduced by an enormous percentage -40 per cent medically unfit, 10 per cent indispensable, 10 per cent badged or reserved. But did the House of Commons suppose that those were percentages which would apply when they got to the bottom of the basket, and were dealing with the last few hundred thousands that they could possibly secure? Just in proportion as there were swept into the net a large part of the people who might at first sight be supposed to be available as soldiers, those who remained would be found in increasing proportion to be indispensable. That was still more true of people medically unfit. Did anybody suppose that when three million men had been called into the army by voluntary means before Lord Derby's scheme, and when, thanks to Lord Derby's great efforts, nearly three million more men had offered themselves—did anybody suppose that when they were dealing with the miserable remnant the percentage of people medically unfit would be the same as before? No man who would examine the figure of 650,000 as he had suggested it should be examined could possibly be so bold as to assert that there will be left more than a negligible number.

Sir John Simon went on to dispute the proportions between the married and single men on which the Derby figures were based. "The estimate was made in the most absurd way possible. They assumed that the proportion between single and married men who enlisted in the middle of the Derby campaign would correspond more or less to the proportion of single and married men in the country. They disregarded the obvious fact that Lord Derby's whole campaign would have the effect of deterring married men from enlisting straight away, and encouraging single men to enlist. If that estimate of distribution was wrong by even 50,000, the result was that 50,000 more single men would be accounted for and as actually enlisted in the army without any deduction." The whole of Sir John Simon's criticism of the Derby figures was very damaging. The original 650,000 of the Report has, it has been seen, to be reduced on the data given in the Report to 400,000 men actually available for military service, and if we halve this figure to 200,000, on the basis of Sir John Simon's criticism, we shall have an outside estimate of the number of men who might be expected to be added to the army by a measure of compulsion. Whether this number so reduced was "considerable" or "negligible" was a mere question of words that could not be determined except in reference to the military realities, which Mr. Asquith and most supporters of the Bill studiously avoided.

THE PROVISIONS OF THE BILL.

The Bill consisted of four clauses and two schedules. The first clause, the main operative one, provided that every male British subject who on August 15th, 1915, was (a) ordinarily resident in Great Britain, and (b) had attained the age of 18 years and had not attained by-vol. 1V.**

the age of 41 years, and (c) was unmarried or was a widower without children dependent on him, should be deemed to have been duly enlisted in His Majesty's Regular Forces for the period of the war, and to have been transferred to the Reserve. The effect of this clause was to make every man who did not answer the call of his group to the colours a deserter, and liable to the penalties of desertion. The First Schedule of the Act laid down certain exceptions to the operation of this clause, of which the chief were the existing members of the Regular or Reserve Forces, or Territorials liable for foreign service, men serving in the navy or recommended for exemption by the Admiralty, men who at the date of the passing of the Act were in Holy Orders or ministers of any religious denomination, or men who had offered themselves for service and been rejected since August 15th, or who held a certificate of exemption under the Act. The second clause of the Act laid down the conditions under which a certificate of exemption would be granted. A certificate could be granted by Military Tribunals to any man, or any body or class of men, on the following grounds: -

 $^{\prime\prime}$ (a) On the ground that it is expedient in the national interests that he or they should, instead of being employed in military service, be engaged in other work; or

"(b) On the ground that the man by or in respect of whom the application is made has any person dependent on him who, if the man was called up for army service, would be without suitable means of subsistence; or

"(c) On grounds of ill-health or infirmity; or

"(d) On the grounds of a conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant service."

The exemption certificates might be absolute, conditional, or temporary, as best seemed to meet the case, and if the application were on conscientious grounds the certificate might take the form of an exemption from combatant duties only. The Second Schedule of the Act laid down the constitution of the Military Tribunals. There was to be one for each local electoral registration district or for any division of such district that might be adopted. The members of the Tribunals were to be not less than five nor more than twenty-five in number; and if the Army Council gave permission, an appeal should lie from a decision of the Tribunals to an Appeal Tribunal, and from the decisions of the Appeal Tribunals to a Central Appeal Tribunal. A sub-section of Clause 2 gave Government Departments power to grant certificates of exemption to people in their service. A third clause contained two provisions which were of very great interest to labour. The first of these provisions was that any one who held a certificate must give notice to the authority mentioned in the certificate of any change in the circumstances under which the certificate had been granted. And a second sub-section provided that where a certificate ceased to be in force owing to the withdrawal of the certificate or failure to comply with the conditions on which it was granted, or by expiry of the time mentioned on the certificate, the holder was to be deemed to have been transferred to the Reserve as if no certificate had ever been granted. These clauses gave rise not unnaturally to the suspicion that a species of industrial conscription might be possible under the Bill. "An engineer, or a coalminer, or a shepherd," wrote one commentator on the Act, "may receive a certificate which enables him to remain in his present occupation, and it may be made conditional on his remaining in that occupation. . . . The miner, engineer, or shepherd who has sought to change his occupation, better his conditions, or merely find another employer may discover as a consequence

that he has become a soldier. Conversely, the employer who does not wish a man to leave him, whether for the purpose of improving his conditions or for any other reason, is enabled to point out to that man the possible result of any ill-advised action on his part. The Military Tribunals . . . become for single men of military age the arbiters of industrial conditions. . . . They have no power given them to impose fair industrial conditions, but they can prevent any man or any class from rejecting such conditions as may obtain in the work which they are permitted to do."

LABOUR AND THE BILL.

It had been evident from the first that the only effective opposition that was to be feared to a Compulsion Bill introduced by the Coalition Government would come from the Labour Party in and out of Parliament. Some very strong language had been used from time to time by spokesmen of the Labour Party on compulsory service. Mr. Thomas, for example, speaking in the House of Commons in September, warned members that the "entire trade union movement was opposed to compulsory service. If it was impossible," he continued, ' to put the Munitions Act in force against 200,000 men, what would they do with three million men against them?" Over and over again had Trade Unionists and Labour men declared their opposition to compulsion. On December 30th, the Executives of the three chief Labour organisations, the General Federation of Trade Unions, the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Unions Congress, and the National Labour Party met in London to decide their policy in view of the intention of the Government to introduce a measure of compulsion. A conference of delegates was held in Westminster a week later, to which a resolution was submitted reaffirming old resolutions against compulsion, but regretting that the situation was apparently governed by the Prime Minister's pledge, and leaving Labour members free to vote upon it as they individually thought fit. This resolution was rejected, and an uncompromising amendment against compulsion was carried by a very large majority. The Labour members of the Coalition Government, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Brace, and Mr. Roberts, resigned their positions in the Government in consequence of this vote, but were later induced by Mr. Asquith to reconsider their position, doubtless in consequence of representations made to them by Mr. Asquith, who, on January 12th, had a conference with the Labour members and the Executive in the House of Commons. Meanwhile, at most of the meetings of branch Labour organisations up and down the country resolutions were passed against compulsion. At the end of the month, after the Bill had been passed, there was a conference of Labour at Bristol, at which the whole policy of Labour towards the war and the methods of recruitment was reviewed. Five resolutions were passed by majorities whose variation in size are instructive. They are worth setting out:---

| Resolutions | Passed by majority of |
|--|-----------------------|
| Supporting the Government in the prose- cution of the war | 900,000 |
| cruiting campaign | 1,641,000 |
| Protesting against conscription | 1,577,000 |
| Opposing Compulsion Bill | 1,356,000 |
| Refusing to agitate for the repeal of the | |
| Act | 35,000 |

The figures show that the objection of Labour to compulsion was as strong as ever, but its support

of the Government in the prosecution of the war was hardly less strong, and there was, it was thought, no effective way of opposing a measure of compulsion after it had become the law of the land that would not embarrass the Government in the prosecution of the war and (if it took the form of a strike, an idea with which South Wales miners coquetted) gravely injure the success of a cause which Labour, in common with all parties, had at heart. The Miners' Conference which met in February took a similar view, and it is greatly to the credit of the Labour movement that it distinguished so clearly between opposition during the progress of a measure to Parliament and the continuance of that opposition after it had passed into law. The clearness with which this distinction was drawn was all the more creditable seeing that there was in the Labour party a minority, mainly Socialist, whose influence was greater than its numbers, which had an active dislike of the Government's war policy.

MODIFICATIONS IN DEBATE.

The Military Service Bill was carried on January 24th by a huge majority, in a form substantially the same as that in which it was introduced. Yet some changes had been made in the course of the debates, and, slight as they were, they were not without value in helping to reconcile opinion to what, when all is said, was a very great revolution in British war practice. The position of the genuine conscientious objector was made safer, for whereas the Bill as originally drafted made the grant of a certificate of exemption permissive only, in the Bill as amended it was mandatory. Provided that a man could convince the Tribunal that he had a conscientious objection to military service, it had now no option but to give him his certificate, whereas before it could decide for itself whether in any particular case a conscientious objection should be admitted as a ground of exemption. Some further changes in the wording of the Bill took most of the sting out of the clauses which, as already explained, seemed to threaten a form of industrial compulsion. An amendment by Sir John Simon (who worked exceedingly hard during all the stages of the Bill) prevented exemption from depending on employment under any specified employer or in any specified place of establishment. "Thus it is no longer possible for the Tribunal to give John Jones an exemption as long as he remains in the employment of Messrs. Brown and Co.—a proceeding which would have enabled Messrs. Brown and Co. to deal with any complaints on the part of John Jones by a dismissal which would have automatically converted Jones into a soldier. This is no longer possible. On the contrary, when Jones leaves his job he has two months to turn round and look for another in the same sort of work before his career as a civilian is brought to an end. He could only, so far as we can see, be brought under the new law by some concerted action of employers in his trade or by sheer misfortune."

An important point to note with regard to the Bill is that its operation was limited to one year. Only those who had attained 18 years and not reached 41 on August 15th, 1915, were affected by the Bill. An attempt to make it apply automatically to young men as they reached the age of 18 was defeated. It was perhaps the mildest dose of conscription that could have been administered.

SOME CRITICISMS.

Never was a change that affected the life of the nation so intimately made in such an atmosphere of unreality


At no point did the discussions seem to touch the realities of the situation—military, political, or economic. There was obviously a point at which the supply of men to the army would begin gravely to compromise the other services that England was rendering to the common cause, of which, next to her command of the sea, finance was perhaps the most important, and one of the first conditions of any rational policy of enlistment was to determine when this point would be reached and to direct the policy of the country accordingly. It is supposed that Mr. McKenna and Mr. Runciman were much preoccupied with this side of the question, and raised it repeatedly in Cabinet discussions. It is to be presumed that they received satisfaction of a sort, for they retained their seats in the Cabinet, but what its exact nature was is not known. It may be that they accepted the Prime Minister's pledge, made in introducing the Military Service Bill, that he would be no party to a general measure of compulsion as a sufficient guarantee that compulsion would not be carried to a point which threatened ruin to the economic position of the country and its power to finance the war. They may have been of Sir John Simon's opinion that the number of men who would be compelled to join the army under the Bill would be very small. But whatever may have been said in the inner counsels of the Cabinet on this matter, there was no rational pronouncement on it outside, and the general impression left was that the relations between recruiting and national finance had not been worked out, and were being left very largely to chance.

Even laxer was the treatment of the problem on its political side. The whole idea seemed to be to avoid anything like a clear-cut issue of principle and to reduce the question to one of simple morality, with all politics emptied out of it. Hence the paradox—surely the most amazing in our history—of this country discussing whether its young men should be compelled to serve in Flanders and France as though the precise interpretation of a contract made by Mr. Asquith were being tried in a court of law. Whether that contract should have been made,

how it came to be made, and a host of other questions that went to the heart of the matter were never discussed at all. The duel between Mr. Asquith, who did not believe in conscription, and those members of the Cabinet who did, had long been in progress. Wonderful master of fence as he was, Mr. Asquith's guard was broken through for once, and conscription came not so much on its meritscertainly not on any public discussion of its merits that received any assistance from the Government-but, as it were, on points in the duel between the leaders of the two factions. And lastly, and as a consequence, conscription was introduced in a form which bore very little relation to military realities. The distinction between married men and single which ran through the whole discussion is unknown to conscriptionist countries. The only rational grounds for distinguishing between one man and another are his age and his physical fitness, his value to the State as a civilian and as a soldier respectively, and the degree of hardship which his withdrawal from his ordinary employment would inflict upon his dependants. The distinction between married and single might be one of the tests of this degree of hardship, but only one, for in many cases the single man has more dependants than the married. But on the other military grounds for choosing one man for service rather than the otherphysical fitness and value to the State-the distinction between married and single was wholly irrelevant, and should never have been made.

The general question of whether conscription was in accord with the soundest British strategy in the war was never really reached. It was evaded, as so many other questions were evaded. But even in the limited area within which the discussion ranged the introduction of conscription, however desirable or inevitable it may have been, was made with singular lack of foresight as to details. The policy of the Government as it presented itself to the country was distinguished mainly by hand-to-mouth, day-to-day patriotism.

The working out of the scheme must be left for treatment in a later chapter.



The Home Office, from St. James's Park.

[Photochrome.

CHAPTER IX.

THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACTS AND PERSONAL RIGHTS.

IMPROVISATION OF THE DEFENCE CODE—THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND TRIAL BY COURT MARTIAL—RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY PROVISIONALLY RESTORED—CONSTITUTION AND POWERS OF COURTS MARTIAL—THE "DRUM HEAD"—THE OLD AND THE NEW PRACTICE—SOME ADVANTAGES OF TRIAL BY THE CIVIL COURTS—POWERS OF THE MILITARY AND THE POLICE—BRITISH SUBJECTS IN INTERNMENT CAMPS—THE ZADIG CASE—PARTIAL SUSPENSION OF THE HABEAS CORPUS ACTS.

URING war the laws are silent." A stout Manual of Emergency Legislation and three supplements attest the paradox. In this war many laws, and one very great and fundamental law, have been silenced, and, on the other hand, many new obligations, sanctioned by heavy penalties, have been laid on the everyday life of the citizen. Under the letter of the Defence of the Realm Regulations it is probably an offence to ask the soldier in the train where he is camping—perhaps even to look at the letters on his shoulder straps—or, in a private letter to a friend, to make casual allusion to the visit of the last Zeppelin, though even in time of war English magistrates usually require at least some proof of a guilty mind. The stranger in an East Coast town who is held up by the local constable and assailed with what in ordinary times would be rightly regarded as an impertinent catechism on his comings and goings, may well find consolation in the thought that these are the most trivial and unconsidered of grievances in the lands where fighting is going on.

THE FRENCH "STATE OF SIEGE."

There are some larger matters touching what have hitherto Leen regarded as the inalienable rights of the

subject to which this sort of consolation scarcely applies, and which can only be judged by the test of necessity. These will be dealt with in their proper order, but in estimating the effect of war legislation on personal rights one may properly begin from the point that some restrictions on the liberty of the subject were inevitable. In France the power to impose them operates automatically under the Constitution whenever the Executive think that a sufficiently grave emergency has arisen. On the Proclamation of the State of Siege all the powers of the civil authorities, except such as the military may choose to leave them as a matter of convenience, pass to the army, and the army proceeds to administer justice through its own courts. In England, where no foreign foe worth speaking of has ever set foot since the Common Law took shape, and where in modern times we have been far more free from serious risk to internal order than our neighbours, the Constitution has never provided for anything resembling a state of siege. In those cases where the military authorities have apparently taken the law in their own hands-the Featherstone riots afford a fairly recent instance—they have done so not merely on their own responsibility, to be justified afterwards, but, indeed, in obedience to the Common Law duty which requires every citizen, civilian as well as soldier,

to prevent the commission of a felony if he can, and gives him the right to use any necessary force in doing so. This, of course, is a very different thing from the trial and punishment of offenders by court martial, but this itself may be justified on much the same principle, that is, by necessity, and the only test of necessity which has ever been accepted is that of the ability or the inability of the ordinary courts to carry on "business as usual."

AN IMPROVISED CODE.


In a great European war, with a possibility of invasion, and with a certainty of espionage, preventive powers for something short of open and violent felony were necessary. English criminal law is concerned with the punishment rather than the prevention of crime—a great blessing to the citizen, but an undoubted weakness to the State—and therefore a new code had to be improvised. This has been done under the Defence of

the Realm Acts, with signs of very hasty improvisation indeed-there have sometimes been additions at the rate of three a month, and alterations have been frequent. There is still no sign of a conclusion, and one can only take the Code as it happens to stand at a given date. Before going into any detail it may be well, for the sake of clearness, to note three things which govern the spirit of the new laws, and which, for the duration of the war, directly affect the liberty of the subject. One is that the power of arrest without warrant, which has always been jealously restricted, is extended so as to touch any person who is suspected of having committed an offence against a code which ranges from acts akin to high treason to the discharge of a schoolboy's squib. Another is that, although thanks to a vigorous protest in the House of Lords the right of the civilian to be tried by judge and jury has been preserved for the present, it may be suspended, with full legal

authority, by the mere Proclamation of the Executive, in which case trial by court martial would become the ordinary procedure. The third is that as the law stands at present, subject to appeal to the final tribunal of the House of Lords, it is lawful to intern without specified charge, and without trial even by court martial, any British subject whom the Home Secretary considers to be of "hostile origin or associations." All these are great changes, and after a period of acquiescence a healthy disposition to examine their necessity began to show itself in the country.

The foundations on which the Defence of the Realm Code was erected are contained in several Acts of Parliament, from which it takes its title. The first Defence of the Realm Act was passed on August 8th, 1914, a few days after the outbreak of war, and the very

day after its introduction as a Bill. It gave the Government powers in general terms to make regulations by Order in Council for the public safety and the defence of the realm, and expressly authorised trial by court martial for breach of regulations designed to prevent communication with the enemy and offences of the same nature. An amending Act (the Defence of the Realm No. 2 Act), passed on August 28th, extended the scope of the authority, and, in particular, strengthened the Press Censorship by sanctioning the making of regulations to prevent "the spread of reports likely to cause disaffection or alarm." Under this power it did not matter whether the report was true or false so long as the court considered it likely to injure the public moral. The vague width of the word "alarm," which may be tested on the one hand by the steady nerves of the average phlegmatic citizen, and on the other by the reputed fearfulness of a maiden aunt, passed unnoticed at the time.



Lord Loreburn.

[I. Russell and Sons.

THE CONSOLIDATION ACT.

On November 27th, 1914. the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act was passed to consolidate and amend the two previous statutes. some directions it extended still further the power of making regulations, but there were one or two significant amendments of the previous Lord Robert Cecil, then a private member, and one of the few commoners who seemed to have taken the trouble to examine the terms of the Bill, took exception to the repetition of the word "alarm," and suggested that the Government might give the unfortunate impression that they wished to use it to keep people unnecessarily in the dark about the war. It was the first note of interrogation about the Defence of the Realm Acts that had been raised in four months, and Lord Robert received a mild support from Mr. Bonar Law, the Leader of the Mr. McKenna, Opposition. the Home Secretary, readily

consented to a modification, and the Censorship clause emerged as follows: "to prevent the spread of false reports, or reports likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty, or to interfere with the success of His Majesty's forces by land or sea, or to prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign powers." The spreading of a false report was made an offence irrespective of its likely consequences, and, on the other hand, the publication of a true report was equally an offence if it was likely to have evil consequences.

The words of this paragraph of the Act have been amplified in the Regulations so as to include reports or statements "likely to prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline, or administration of any of His Majesty's forces." These words, which leave much to the individual interpreter, and which may affect many different

types of propagandist from the sower of sedition to the peace idealist, have probably produced a larger number of cases in the courts than any other part of the Regulations. But, taking the Act itself, the formula used in the Consolidation Act may be regarded as an improvement on the corresponding provisions in the earlier Acts. The Consolidation Act, again, mentioned for the first time the trial of "minor offences" by courts of summary jurisdiction, though it still left it open to the military authorities to send an accused person before a court martial if they saw fit, and it did not pretend to restore the right of trial by jury. Finally, it gave large powers of commandeering munition factories—powers which have been greatly extended since the establishment of the Ministry of Munitions.

LORD LOREBURN'S PROTEST.

There was a short but very important debate on the Consolidation Bill when it reached the House of Lords. Perhaps one of the most notable political facts of the war has been the resurrection of the Second Chamber. With a House of Commons which, at any rate in the iearlier days, came very near to a total abandonment of its functions, there was a great chance; but, tactics apart, on the Defence of the Realm Acts and some other matters arising out of the war, the Lords have shown a true regard for the more permanent elements of the Constitution; they have, in fact, revived a guardianship which had lain dormant since the days when Whiggery was fashionable and aristocratic. When the Consolidation Bill came up, Lord Loreburn made an earnest protest against the provision under which British civilians were to be subjected--and had, in fact, been subjected for several months—to trial by court martial at a time when the ordinary courts of the realm were fully accessible. The protest had a powerful backing. Lord Bryce, not only the most eminent of British diplomats but also one of the most distinguished jurists the Bar has produced, endorsed it on the Government side of the House, and Earl Halsbury, the veteran ex-Chancellor, and the stoutest pillar of ancient Toryism, and Lord Parmoor, better known in the North Country as Sir Alfred Cripps, once member for Stretford, and now one of the most learned members of the final appeal tribunal, gave it a peculiarly valuable support from the side of the Opposition. And, apart from its sponsors, it had a great intrinsic weight. The right of the subject to be tried by his peers had withstood the most violent commotions; during the tensest period of the Napoleonic struggle, when England was not only in fear but in daily expectation of invasion, it had not been denied, and never since Magna Charta had Parliament consented to its surrender by its own The Government received some impression of the force of the argument, but Lord Loreburn's amendment was ruled out for the time being on a plea of urgency, and he had to be content with an assurance that pending the introduction of an amending Bill no British civilian would be executed by sentence of a court martial, coupled with a promise that the necessity of a departure from constitutional usage, taken for granted in the House of Commons, would be reconsidered during the Recess. The readiness of these concessions may perhaps sugrest that the Government themselves were rather surprised by the complaisant and even cheerful way in which the House of Commons had voted all the measures for which they had asked, measures in which they had, no doubtas is the cautious way of all governments-allowed a margin not only for safety but also for compromise.

THE AMENDING ACT.

The debate in the House of Lords bore fruit at the beginning of the new session. On February 5th, 1915, Lord Parmoor introduced a Bill to amend the Consolidation Act by restoring the right of trial by the ordinary courts to civilians. He laid down the sound constitutional doctrine that, in so far as it is recognised at all, martial law can only come into force when the ordinary tribunals cease to be accessible, and he was, of course, able to show that not a single court in the realm from the High Court down to Petty Sessions had had to suspend its sittings because of the war. The Government were prepared to yield the substantial point, but they had a considerable reservation in mind, and they intimated that they preferred to draft their own Bill. Sir John Simon, as Home Secretary, introduced this Bill on February 24th. The House of Commons now showed some sense of the real importance of the liberty of the subject, and many speeches were made which would have come equally well, and perhaps far better, on the introduction of the first Defence of the Realm Bill seven months before. Efforts were made to simplify and extend the measure, but most of these came to nought. The Bill, which became law on March 16th, 1915, and which must now be read into the other Acts which have been mentioned, did, however, make an improvement. In effect, it provides that any offence against the Defence of the Realm Regulations which is triable by court martial may be tried by a civil court with a jury, and a British civilian subject may demand such trial as of right. "British subject," by virtue of the Naturalisation Act, includes naturalised subjects, and for the special purpose of prosecutions under the Defence of the Realm Regulations it also includes expressly women who have lost their British nationality by marriage; under the ordinary law, the British wife of an alien takes her husband's nationality. As soon as practicable after arrest the general nature of the charge made is to be communicated to the accused in writing, together with a written notice in a specified form of his right to trial by jury, and he has six clear days in which to signify his adoption of that right; if he does not claim it within that time the right lapses, and he may be tried by court martial. Where he chooses the civil court, the trial is in the High Court or at the Assizes (not at Quarter Sessions), and for the sake of expedition the Crown has the right to change the venue; the accused may be tried in any place "to which he may be brought for the purpose of a speedy trial." The trial may take place in private where the prosecution makes application to the judge on the ground of national safety, but the sentence must be passed in public.

SUSPENSION BY PROCLAMATION.

The amending Act contains one obvious weakness, which those who interested themselves in the matter in the House of Commons were unable to cure. Its governing provision, the right of trial by jury, can be suspended by the Executive at pleasure. "In the event of invasion or other special military emergency arising out of the present war," says Sub-section 7 of Section 1, "His Majesty may by Proclamation forthwith suspend the operation of this section, either generally or as respects any area specified in the Proclamation." The Regulations follow suit, and the result is that if such a Proclamation is issued it will be left entirely to the discretion of the military authorities to decide whether an offence shall be prosecuted before a court martial or before the magistrates, and if they come to the conclusion that the offence

is a serious one the court martial will be the only tribunal available. The Regulations made in view of a suspension of the right of civil trial go further. They bring in for the first time the field general court martial, the "drum head" court of active service. At the present time, and so long as Section I of the Act of March 16th, 1915, is not suspended by Proclamation, a person accused of a major offence against the Regulations who does not choose the civil jurisdiction may be tried either by a district court martial or a general court martial.

COURTS MARTIAL AND THEIR POWERS.

Both tribunals are quite unfamiliar to the civilian, and it may be well-though one hopes the knowledge will never have practical utility-to state their constitution and powers. The district court martial is, of course, the inferior tribunal. Under the Army Act the legal minimum number of members is three, and they must all

be officers who have held a commission for not less than This does not two years. mean, of course, anything higher than a junior subaltern, though in practice these minimum requirements are always more than satisfied. The district court martial cannot award any greater punishment than two years' imprisonment. A general court martial, when held in the United Kingdom, must consist of not less than nine members, each of whom must have held a commission for three years, and not less than five of whom must be of a rank not below that of captain-here, again, the minimum requirements are always more than satisfied where officers of higher rank are available. A general court martial can award penal servitude for life, or where an offence against the Regulations was committed with the intention of assisting the enemy its sentence may be death. Under the Regulations made on July 28th, 1015, a field general court martial is given the same powers as an ordinary general court

in case the Act should be suspended by Proclamation. In military law the "field general" is intended to provide for the speedy trial of offences committed abroad, or on active service, in cases where it is not practicable with due regard to the interests of discipline and of the service to try such offences by an ordinary general court. The legal minimum number of members is three, or two where three are not available, and, so long as they are commissioned officers, they may be of any rank.

The procedure of the "drum head" is more summary than that of the ordinary court martial, but there are some limitations: if the court consists of only two members its sentence cannot exceed field punishment or imprisonment, and whatever its numbers a sentence of death cannot be passed without the concurrence of all its members (in the case of an ordinary general court

a majority of two-thirds is sufficient), nor can it be carried into effect until it has been confirmed at least by the general or field officer commanding the force with which the person under sentence is present; this officer himself is only given the power where it is not practicable to delay the case for the purpose of referring it to the officer in chief command in the field. Under the Defence of the Realm Regulations a civilian tried by court martial is to be treated for the purpose of the constitution of the court as if he belonged to the unit in whose charge he may be.

Supposing a Proclamation were to be issued suspending the right of trial by jury, and establishing what would really be a full system of martial law-martial law previously sanctioned by Parliament-then, making allowance for the limitations which have been described, it would still appear to be legally possible for a civilian whom a "drum head" court of three junior subalterns


> found guilty of an offence against the Regulations, committed with the intention of assisting the enemy, to be executed with no higher confirmation than that of the colonel or major in actual

command


It would be possible to do this by legal warrant, and in making sure that it never will be done one has to put

THE GOVERNMENT'S PLEDGE.

one's trust in the British officer's respect for the ordinary forms of legal procedure rather than in "the grand inquest of the nation," which in this and many other matters has thought fit to impose no check. A Proclamation can only be issued in the event of invasion or other special military emergency, and in the last resort the judges might have to decide whether such an emergency had, in fact, arisen. But the responsibility of overriding a Proclamation issued with the full force of the Government, acting ostensibly under



But the future student of the history of the Constitution will no doubt note their mere grant as a striking departure from almost immemorial custom. It is the first time in history that Parliament has given at any



[J. Russell and Sons.

rate a previous recognition to the institution of martial law. In the past, as one has observed already, martial law has derived its sanction not from Parliament but solely from the necessities of the situation, and those who administered it have done so under the sense of added responsibility given by the knowledge that a full account might be called for when their actions came to be ratified by an Act of Indemnity.

AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE.

The change made in this war brings us very near to our Ally's "State of Siege." The difference between a previous authority and a subsequent ratification is no mere lawyer's quibble; it may be expected to show itself in the consequences. It is, in fact, just the same difference that there is between an honourable understanding that you will pay a man's reasonable and necessary expenses when he has finished his job, and giving him a book of blank cheques with an unlimited account to draw upon before he begins. In this case there is no reason to suppose that either the Government or its agents will abuse the trust, but there are many besides old-fashioned Constitutionalists who would have preferred the older and safer way.

The Regulations supplement the Acts in many particulars, and have, of course, equal authority. Reading them with the Acts (which is not always an easy matter) one may briefly state the alternative courses, which, so long as no Proclamation is issued, may be taken when a person is arrested for an offence against the Regulations:

- (1) Some offences—e.g., the breach of a Home Office Lighting Order—are declared by the Regulations to be "summary offences"—these must be tried by a court of summary jurisdiction. The accused is deprived of the usual option to go before a jury, but in case of conviction he has the right of appeal to Quarter Sessions. The maximum punishment is six months' imprisonment, with or without hard labour, a fine of £100, and forfeiture of any goods in respect of which the offence was committed.
- (2) Outside "summary offences," the competent naval or military authority, who (except in the case of Press offences) is charged with the duty of investigation, may decide that the offence is a "minor offence," which can be adequately dealt with by a court of summary jurisdiction, and the case must then go to the magistrates, under the same conditions as stated in (1).
- (3) If the competent authority decides that it is not a "minor offence," then if the accused is a British subject he may claim trial by jury, and, if the Attorney-General consents, he will be tried accordingly; if he makes no such claim he may be tried by court martial. In both cases the maximum punishment is penal servitude for life, except where the offence was committed with the intention of assisting the enemy, in which case capital punishment may be awarded.

PRESS OFFENCES.

"Press offences," as defined by the Regulations, come in a separate category: the consent of a central authority is required to all prosecutions here. The duty of investigation rests not with the competent naval or military authority, as in other cases, but with the Director of Public Prosecutions (in Scotland the Lord Advocate, in Ireland the Attorney-General), who determines whether the case should be proceeded with or not, and, if it is to be, whether it should be prosecuted as a minor or a major offence. If he takes the graver view it is doubtful whether the consent of the Attorney-General is not also required

to a prosecution in England; the Regulations are not clear on this point. Some central control was especially necessary in the case of prosecutions for Press offences; otherwise there was no provision for securing that the local authorities would act in conformity with the policy of the Press Bureau, which, both in its permissions and its prohibitions, is the agent of the central departments of Government.

Many of the Regulations may be ruled out of the scope of this review as affecting public rather than personal rights, and of the rest one has only space to give a few examples. The Regulations begin by declaring that "the ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property will be interfered with as little as may be permitted by the exigencies of the measures required to be taken for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm, and ordinary civil offences will be dealt with by the civil tribunals in the ordinary course of law," but this is a direction rather than a mandate, and even as a direction it necessarily leaves a good deal to the discretion of the authorities. The "competent naval or military authority" has power to require the whole or any part of the inhabitants to leave the area in which they reside if their removal is necessary for naval or military reasons; he may ring the curfew at any time he likes, and require every inhabitant within his jurisdiction to remain indoors between specified hours; he may call upon them to make a true return of all their goods, animals, and commodities; he may prevent the embarkation of any person whom he suspects to be leaving the realm for the purpose of communicating with the enemy; and any person who withholds from him or his agent any information which may reasonably be required, and any person who does not comply with any order issued in pursuance of the Regulations, are guilty of offences. It is forbidden, without lawful authority, not merely to publish or communicate but to collect or record, or to attempt to elicit, any information as to the movement. numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the forces-a prohibition which, if enforced with any degree of strictness, would send every journalist in the kingdom to gaol to-morrow. The complementary regulation against the spread of false or injurious reports has already been noted.

THE POWERS OF THE POLICE.

The "competent naval or military authority" (who may be any appointed officer not below the rank of lieutenant-commander in the navy or field officer in the army, and who, where there is no special reason for the appointment of an officer of higher rank is often the colonel commanding the regimental district) is not the only agent of the Executive. Any police constable who has reason to suspect that any premises are being used or kept "for any purpose, or in any way, prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm," or that an offence against the Regulations is being or has been committed, may enter by force and search and seize anything on which his suspicions fasten-" any type or other plant used or capable of being used for the printing or production of the newspaper or other publication" are specifically mentioned in connection with the prohibition against the spread of false or prejudicial reports. This may be done without a warrant, and the competent naval or military authority may himself order anything so seized to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of. This is one of the Regulations that has been most criticised, and with some reason. The suppression or V. ..

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suspension of a newspaper by the confiscation or detention of its plant may be a far more serious thing than the fining or the imprisoning of its editor, but under this regulation it may be done, in effect, by administrative action, without any form of trial such as a charge and conviction on a specific offence would involve. The authorities seem to have thought of this, for under another regulation there is an alternative form of procedure by which, where there is reason to believe that objectionable matter is about to be published, application may be made to a magistrate for a warrant to search and seize, in which case the owner has an opportunity of showing cause in court why his property should not be destroyed, and appealing to Quarter Sessions if the magistrates make an order for destruction. It is curious, and indeed inexplicable, that whereas under this latter regulation no police officer below the rank of inspector is even permitted to apply to the justice for a warrant, the first regulation

allows any ordinary constable to search and seize without any warrant at all; one can only suppose that, in this case, previous instructions from the military authority are meant to be implied. Both regulations have been acted on, and it was under the first that the Globe, whose editor was never brought into court, was, in effect, suspended.

A general power of arrest on suspicion by any constable without warrant is added, and this is strengthened by a general obligation, under the penalty of a full offence, to stop and answer to the best of one's ability and knowledge any questions which may be reasonably addressed to one by a naval or military officer, a soldier on sentry patrol, or similar duty, or a constable.

In judging the reasonableness of such regulations as these last, one must, of course, consider them not from the point of view of a dweller in an inland town, who is seldom troubled in practice, but in the light of the actual

conditions on the East Coast, where, if the enemy's Intelligence Department is half as efficient as it advertises itself to be, every stranger may reasonably be expected to give an account of himself.

THE INTERNMENT OF BRITISH SUBJECTS.


The most famous of the Regulations, which has recently been considered by the courts, and which, subject to the possibility of a final appeal to the House of Lords, has suspended the fundamental guarantee of the liberty of the subject, remains to be mentioned. Nowhere, either in the Defence of the Realm Acts or the Regulations, is any mention made of the internment of alien enemies. The explanation is that this has been done under an assertion, and perhaps an extension, of the Royal prerogative, by which civilian alien enemies, although

long settled in this country, are treated as "prisoners of war." The necessity of this power of internment is obvious, but the fact that the Government should have chosen to rely on the Royal prerogative-a dangerous weapon which strengthens by use-instead of taking powers from Parliament, which it could have had for the asking, or something less, has not passed without criticism.

The prerogative, however, has only been used in the case of alien enemies; the Regulations make provision for other cases. Under paragraph 14 the competent authority has power to order a "suspect," even though a British subject, to leave his place of residence and take up his abode in another district; this may be done by the competent authority on his own suspicions without reference to anybody else.

On June 10th, 1915, another Regulation—14 B—was issued, by which, on the recommendation of a competent

> authority or of an advisory committee that it is expedient, "in view of the hostile origin or associations of any person," the Home Secretary may order such person to be interned. If the person is not an alien enemy - that is, if he is a British subject or the subject of a friendly or a neutral State —the order is to include express provision for the due consideration of any representations he may make against the order by one of the Advisory Committees appointed by the Home Office with respect to the internment and deportation of aliens. Under the Regulations each of these committees must be presided over by a judge, or an ex-judge, and they no doubt afford some protection against arbitrary internment. But they are not bound by the rules of evidence or of law; the public know nothing their proceedings or decisions, and it can hardly be pretended that a departmental committee, whatever its composition, can ever be a satisfactory substitute for a court of law.



Lord Parmoor. Lafayette, London.

THE COURTS AND HABEAS CORPUS.

On January 11th, 1916, the power of the Executive to make a regulation for the internment of British subjects without trial by due form of law was raised in the King's Bench, on a motion for a habeas corpus. The applicant was one Zadig, who had been naturalised in 1905. It seems possible that Zadig had made himself more of a nuisance than a danger. His brother, who was not naturalised, had been interned, and after writing foolish letters to the Home Secretary to secure his release, Zadig finally wrote to the King. A Home Office order for internment was afterwards issued. Zadig applied for a writ of habeas corpus, the time-honoured and highly efficacious remedy for all varieties of unlawful restraint, and the point turned not on his deserts, but on whether or not

Regulation B14 was ultra vires. The Attorney-General contended that it came within the general words of the statute which give the King in Council power "to issue regulations for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm." On Zadig's side it was argued that if these words were capable of bearing so wide an interpretation, then the Government might also have got their Military Service Act by making a regulation; that there had been no case in history of a regulation having imposed restrictions on the liberty of the subject without direct and specific Parliamentary sanction; and that in the Defence of the Realm Acts themselves, notwithstanding the general words, Parliament had thought fit to provide specific powers for far less

important matters than a suspension, in a particular class of cases, of the Habeas Corpus Acts. A court of five judges, presided over by the Lord Chief Justice, held that the Regulation was intra vires, and refused a writ to the governor of the camp. A critic, in a leader headed "An Historic Judgment," wrote that "the temporary suspension of the Englishman's most cherished guarantees of personal liberty has been brought about apparently without the knowledge of the public, and possibly also without the full appreciation of the House of Commons," and, while offering no criticism on the decision of the judges, felt constrained to "draw attention to the almost unparalleled powers which, according to

the Divisional Court, have been conferred upon the Executive, and to note the constitutional importance of the new law." On February 9th, the Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the judgment, and, subject to the right of a further appeal to the House of Lords, there the matter stands.

AN ANCIENT RIGHT.

In letters to the Press, Sir Edward Fry, a distinguished ex-member of the Court of Appeal, and Lord Parmoor called attention to the grave importance of the new law in cancelling a right of the subject which was confirmed in Magna Charta itself, for, as both these eminent lawyers pointed out, and as generations of judges had pointed out before them, the Habeas Corpus Acts

simply provide machinery for the more effective enforcement of the famous clause in the Charter which says that no freeman shall be imprisoned except by the lawful judgment of his equals. In a debate in the House on March 2nd, raised by Mr. Wilfred Ashley, the member for Blackpool, who, as a descendant of the Lord Shaftesbury who passed the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II., may be supposed to have an hereditary interest in its preservation, Mr. Samuel, the Home Secretary, admitted that at that time there were sixty-nine persons interned on Home Secretary's orders issued under the Regulation. Of these, eight, presumably deemed to be persons of "hostile associations," were British in origin as well as in nationality. Some others were natural-

born subjects with preventive the instance.

The Royal Throne.

A. Ullyett, Upminster.

an unspecified degree of enemy blood, six were German women who became British by marriage, nineteen were naturalised Germans or Austrians, and twenty - eight, described as not British subjects at all, presumably belonged to neutral or friendly countries. Mr. Samuel's justification was that it was necessary to have a power of detention in cases where, although there was ground for suspicion, no legal proof of assistance to the enemy, or of an intention to assist enemy, was available. It has, however, been suggested that Mr. Samuel ignored or at least underrated, the effect of the Regulations themselves in facilitating proof. There is, for Regula-18A, under tion which a person

who, without lawful excuse, has been in communication, or attempted to communicate, with a spy, is guilty of an offence unless he proves that he had no reason to suspect that he was dealing with a spy, and this transfer of the burden of proof is strengthened by several presumptions which the Regulations lay down against the accused—among others, unless he proves the contrary, he is to be deemed to be in communication with a spy if the name or address, or any information regarding a spy, is found in his possession, or is supplied by him to any other person in such circumstances as to give "reasonable ground for suspicion," and any address "reasonably suspected" of being an address used for the receipt of communications intended for the enemy is to be deemed the address of a spy. Such provisions as these allow something far short of the full legal proof ordinarily required in a criminal charge, and though Mr. Samuel had the support of Sir John Simon, who was responsible for the Internment Regulation when at the Home Office, he did not perhaps quite satisfy the House why, assuming evidence of "reasonable suspicion," these interned people had not been charged under the Regulations, and tried in proper form. It was, of course, a disappointment to many in the House to find that, after the right of trial by jury had been painfully restored by the amending Act, a British subject might be put under restraint without any trial at all.

A NOTABLE BREAK.


The Government naturally laid stress on the very special and limited class for which the Regulation is intended, but it has been answered that a leak in the dyke is always immensely more important than it looks in

inches. With Regulation 14B overriding the Habeas Corpus Acts, it is, no doubt, true to say, if one has regard only to bare legal requirements, that there is nothing to stand between any British subject and indefinite imprisonment without trial but the sense of responsibility with which the head of a Government Department discharges his office. Putting aside the expediency, or the inexpediency, of the Regulation, the denial of the subject's right to trial under the ancient writ of habeas corpus, without the express and specific sanction of Parliament, is a very notable fact in the history of the war and in the history of England too. Hallam, like every other master of the Constitution, considered habeas corpus the "principal bulwark of English liberty," and his words seem apposite: "If ever temporary circumstances, or the doubtful plea of political necessity, shall lead men to look on its denial with apathy," he wrote, "the most distinguishing characteristic of our Constitution will be effaced."



The Houses of Parliament.

[Photochrome.





Electrified wire fences erected by the Germans along the frontier between Belgium and Holland in order to prevent the escape of any Belgians into Dutch territory.

[Central News.]


CHAPTER X.

BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE.

THE PLUNDERING OF BELGIUM BY LEVIES AND REQUISITIONS—ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND THEIR HANDLING—INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE TEMPER OF THE BELGIAN PEOPLE—CARDINAL MERCIER'S ARREST—TIGHTENING THE GRIP ON BELGIUM—THE EXECUTION OF MISS CAVELL.

ERMANY's reign of terror in Belgium was hideous, but it was comparatively brief. The terrible days of August and September, 1914, when the panic-stricken Germans were attempting to secure by terrorism the safety which their armed forces in Belgium were insufficient to achieve, passed, and the period of a more or less legitimate "military occupation" began, with all the difficult duties and relations which such an occupation imposed both on the invaders and the seven million Belgians who remained in the occupied territory. The marks of the terror were plain enough on the country. At Dinant, out of 1,375 buildings, 1,263 had been destroyed, and over the whole of the country -excluding Flanders, Limburg, and Hainault, the figures for which are not yet available—18,207 houses and public buildings were in ruins. The task of repairing the shattered organisation of the occupied territory and getting some sort of administrative machinery to work again was a large one, but, with certain deliberate and

scandalous exceptions, the Germans seem to have managed it with considerable efficiency. By International Law as laid down in the Hague Conventions-if those codes may still with any appropriateness be mentioned in connection with the German conduct of war-the task was conditioned by several important and very definite provisions. Though "New Germany" might be painted "in letters a yard long " across frontier posts on roads leading into Holland, and French place-names rechristened in German, the fact remained that the "new province" which tourists from the Fatherland were crossing the frontier to inspect as early as November, 1914—was not a part of Germany, but merely territory occupied for the period of hostilities. By the Hague Rules the occupying army was bound to respect many things, from private property, and, as far as possible, the original laws of the land, to religious convictions and liberty. Most important of all, the occupying power was to levy for its own advantage no money taxes beyond those which were



General von Bissing (marked with a cross) inspecting wire fencing on the frontier between Belgium and Holland. [Central News



A Belgian garden turned into a military kitchen by the Germans.

[Central News.

required for military necessities, and make no requisitions in service or kind except for similar necessities of the troops actually quartered in the occupied territory.

OUTRAGEOUS MONEY LEVIES.

These were the provisions which were most shamelessly disregarded by the Germans. Belgium was plundered most mercilessly, both in money and kind; and even if it were not notorious that much of the booty was sent straight into Germany, the totals reached were obviously far beyond any legitimate needs of the army of occupation. In the earliest days of their invasion the Germans began a system of illegal war-fines and levies upon individual towns. These were afterwards consolidated into a general levy, upon the whole of the occupied territory, of £1,400,000 a month for as long as the war should last. Early in 1915 this was increased to £1,600,000, and the increase consented to by the Belgian authorities in consideration of a promise that the monstrous requisitions of foodstuffs and manufactured goods which were being made should be reduced to legitimate proportions. The promise was not kept, but the payments were made, and by the end of 1915 a total of £19,200,000 had been

extorted from the stricken country by means of these monthly payments. The amounts were levied on the provincial authorities, and paid largely as a result of an arrangement which was made-with the sanction of the German authoritiesbetween these and one of the largest Belgian banks. Averaged over the Belgian population which remained in the occupied provinces, the levies amounted to a monthly payment of about five shillings in English money for every man, woman, and child in Not content the country. with this, the Germans devised a method of despoiling some of the Belgians who

had left their country. A list of Pelgian citizens who had not returned by March 1st was drawn up, and taxes amounting to £168,000 were imposed on them, the alternative to payment being the seizure of their property in Belgium. Later still, towards the end of 1915, when certain Belgian industries had become tolerably re-established, orders were served on public companies whose balance sheets showed a profit enforcing compulsory subscriptions to the German War Loan.

REQUISITIONS IN KIND.

Some idea of the magnitude of the requisitions in kind have already been given (Chapter XIX., Vol. II.). Thanks to these, and to the early disorganisation of the country, towards the end of 1914 the civil population of Belgium was brought very near collective starvation, and had it not been for the prompt and magnificent work of the American Relief Commission (dealt with in the chapter mentioned) a slower agony than the earlier reign of terror would undoubtedly have been added to the tribulations already suffered by the unhappy country. The requisitions, or forced exportations into Germany, of raw material and manufactured goods continued long

after the wholesale plundering of Belgian foodstuffs had been abated. One of the earliest of the many proclamations issued by Baron von Bissing, who succeeded Baron von der Goltz as Governor-General of Belgium, decreed that all inhabitants of the occupied provinces should inform the German authorities of the place and amount of any stores of benzine, petroleum, glycerine, oils and fats of all kinds, carbide, raw rubber, and rubber tyres. At least half of the total yield of the Belgian textile mills which were running was requisitioned. Vast quantities of coal, timber, metal ore, phosphates and similar raw materials crossed the frontier into Germany, and such supplies as were left behind were controlled by German organisations in the interest of the invaders. Most of these "exportations" were of direct military value; and yet by the Hague rules the occupying authority was forbidden to make requisitions, even for the benefit of the troops which were quartered in the occupied territories, of a kind which involved the native population in assistance to military operations against their own country. Meanwhile, the forced exportation of vast quantities of raw materials, coupled with the absence, owing to the Allied blockade, of any imports to replace



Baron Von Bissing.

[E.N.A]

the loss, was bringing Belgian industries to a more complete and hopeless standstill than ever. German interests were not badly served by this. The Belgian population was assured by its masters that the Allied blockade was responsible for the cessation of their industries and the consequent distress. the same time the German authorities professed their readiness to requisition no raw materials which might henceforward be imported into the country as a result of the relaxing of the blockade. The general lines of German policy are clear enough. Belgium was a storehouse from which the Germans held

themselves in any event entitled to remove the last pound of raw material imported before the war. When this had been done the sufferings of the Belgian population were to be used as a means of getting the storehouse restocked, the word of its original spoilers being accepted that none of this second harvest was to find its way into Germany. At the same time the lack of employment in Belgium would have the salutary effect of driving Belgian labour into Germany or German-controlled factories. The bargain was not good enough, and the blockade remained in force, with the incidental result that a good deal of opinion in Belgium laid much of their country's existing distress at the door of Great Britain and the Allies.

THE RAILWAYMEN'S STRIKE.

In recognising the occupation of their country the Belgian Government behaved with dignity, and in accordance with the spirit of the Hague Conventions. In November, 1914, the duties of the various public servants who remained behind in Belgium were defined by proclamation. All officials of the Post, Telephone, Telegraph, and Railway departments, and of the Ministry of Public Works, were forbidden to work under German adminis-



The Germans in Namur: German troops passing in review before the Military Governor of Namur.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A German military band playing outside the headquarters of the Governor of Namur. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$

tration. All others were called upon to perform their ordinary duties, and to refrain from acts which might prejudice the German administration, but were forbidden to swear loyalty to the German Government, an oath which, by the Hague [Rules, the Germans were expressly prohibited from demanding. Education was to be continued, and all teachers who did not resume their posts after a short interval from the date of the proclamation were to be considered as dismissed.

By the terms of the Belgian Government's proclamation the Germans were, therefore, left with a very fair machinery of administration ready to be adapted to the new conditions. The railway workers held by their orders, and such train services as were kept running were under the complete direction of the German military authorities, at any rate for several months. Belgian drivers and mechanics were offered as much as fifty francs a day to resume their duties, and when these fantastic wages were refused the German authorities arrested 300 of the recalcitrant railway workers and packed them off into Germany as an encouragement to the others. It was of course, a flatly illegal punishment, and it does not seem to have had the effect which

the Germans hoped. For some time, at any rate, they were compelled to withdraw German troops - amounting in all, according to the Belgian Minister of Railways, to 45 000 —from other duties in order to maintain a train service in Belgium. It is said, and with some intrinsic likelihood, that these troops secretly encouraged the strike of the Belgian workers, remarking that from their own point of view they had "better be on the locomotive than on the Yser."

On meeting with perfectly legitimate opposition in other branches of their administration of the country, the German military authorities did not scruple to make

their own law in the same way that they had made it with the 300 unfortunate railwaymen who were sent into exile. Early in 1915 the civil authorities in Brussels were informed that they must carry out extensive repairs to the main road between Brussels and Malines. The road lay beyond the territory for which the city of Brussels was responsible, and as it was a State highway the municipal authorities pointed to the Hague Conventions as proof that the Germans, as the present administrators of the central functions of the State, were responsible for the repair of the road and its upkeep. The military authorities who were attempting to saddle Brussels with the task refused to listen. The German civil authorities were then approached, and these supported the Belgian view of the responsibility. The military powers, as little loath, apparently, to break their own laws as anyone else's, at once denounced this decision, and settled the matter out of hand by insisting that the Corporation of Brussels should be fined £20,000 for disobedience, and threatened with further fines if the work on the road was not begun at once.

THE TEMPER OF THE BELGIAN PEOPLE.

In other ways the severity of German restrictions, and particularly the harsh treatment of individuals,

seems to have varied considerably in different places and under different officials. Many proclamations were issued by the Germans which directly restricted individual liberty, including one enforcing a stern censorship over all newspaper and printed matter and all public entertainments, from recitations to kinematograph shows. The sale of English newspapers was a particularly heinous crime according to the new German code. The penalty for being in possession of one was a month's imprisonment in a fortress, a penalty which, if it could have been enforced, would have put half the population of Brussels in gaol at one time or another. But whatever may be thought about the precise terms of the German proclamations, the interpretation of them depended on the mood and nature of the officials, and in one instance an unfortunate wretch who was selling copies of The Times in a Brussels street is said to have had his case simply and expeditiously settled by a revolver shot from a passing officer. In the earlier days of the occupation some of the steps taken, even by the central authorities, had the air of being inspired less by administrative necessity than by a groundless but instructive uneasiness, very closely related to the disgraceful panic which had accom-

> plished all the horrors at Louvain and elsewhere. Thus, as an official recognition of the rumours-which the Germans themselves had startedthat the population of Brussels was planning a general rising, in which all Germans were to be treacherously murdered, cannon suddenly appeared dominating the city from the high ground near the Palace of Justice, and machine guns were placed where they could sweep the approaches to the buildings in which the German authorities were quartered.

> Naturally, the Germans found the task of overawing the Belgian population one which could by no means

be completely achieved. Armed resistance could easily enough be prevented, but unqualified and respectful submission to German authority nothing could secure. The Belgian people, particularly those in whom the French strain is dominant, is a very different breed from the submissive Teuton of the Fatherland, for whom a police regulation is the last and unquestionable word in revealed authority and wisdom. The Bruxellois especially have a reputation for high spirits and a gay determination and the Germans, remembering with what dramatic suddenness the Revolution of 1830 began in their city, and how swiftly it spread to the rest of the country, making nonsense of the wisdom of Vienna and the pious intentions of the Holy Alliance, and ridding Belgium of her impossible partnership with Holland, had some cause for keeping as close a guard as possible over the temper of the occupied capital. But watch its temper as they might, they could not ensure its respect for their ordinances. Having driven the traffic in legitimate news underground, they posted official proclamations of "great German victories" at the street corners—only to find "menteurs" scrawled boldly across them by the next morning. Street urchins who had picked up some German words of command promenaded in companies, their



Cardinal Mercier.

[E.N.A.



The Germans repairing one of the destroyed Belgian rallway bridges.

[Central News.



German firemen examining the condition of damaged buildings in Antwerp.

"commander" halting them at intervals and giving the order Nach Paris—whereupon the whole of the troop began to march backwards. And in spite of the most careful watch over civilians, and the punishment threatened and sometimes carried out for unguarded remarks in public, the strong undercurrent of contempt and ridicule continued, to the evident annoyance of the Germans, whose dislike of being laughed at is only equalled by their talent for inviting derision.

BURGOMASTER MAX.

A great popular figure in Brussels during the very earliest days of the occupation was M. Max, the Burgomaster. Burgomaster Max was, indeed, of the right stuff for a popular hero. Quite as decisive and capable as the Germans with whom he had to deal, he had the French grace in clothing his strength with an ease and address in action—the invaluable *suaviter in modo* of the

Latin tag-the absence of which is, perhaps, the most profound and significant characteristic of the German people. Many are the tales told of Burgomaster Max, and the admirable way in which he yielded to the legitimate demands of the Germans, and resisted by every means in his power, and always with a suave imperturbability, the doings for which the invaders had no legal sanction, and all wrongful encroachments on the dignity of his own office and the Belgian civil authorities. When the German Military Governor of Liége issued a proclamation declaring that the French Government had stated that they could no longer give any help to Belgium, Burgomaster Max countered it with a placard of emphatic denial. when the Germans decreed that no placards must be posted without their permission, M. Max quietly disseminated the accurate news which he had gained from


official sources by the simple method of telling it to everyone whom he met in the streets. From the German military headquarters he extracted the grudging equivalent of an apology for the conduct of a party of subordinate officers who had held a disgraceful festivity in one of the chateaux of the Belgian Royal Family. And when the Germans wished to requisition all the cattle which could be found in Brussels, Burgomaster Max told them that a quarter was the utmost to which they were entitled. As the Germans still insisted on taking all, he hastily produced proof that three-quarters of the cattle had been sold to the American authorities, an arrangement which the Germans were forced to respect. But it is not the German way to have the worst of an argument when they can still call in brute force to cut it short. Unable to interfere by fair means, they soon resorted to illegal ones, and the gallant burgomaster was shortly afterwards arrested out of hand and sent into confinement in Germany. The


services he had rendered had been admirable, for during the most difficult and uncertain days of the German occupation of Brussels he had managed both to restrain the civil population from acts which might have brought down upon them penalties still harsher than those which had been imposed, and also to modify some of the exorbitant German demands in several important ways.

THE PASTORAL LETTER OF CARDINAL MERCIER.

Baron von Bissing began 1915 by accomplishing a very much greater scandal than the arrest of Burgomaster Max. It is characteristic of the Prussian military bureaucracy that not until the scandal was echoing round the world did they perceive that one had been created, and discover any need to put a better face on the facts or explain them away. Cardinal Mercier, the Archbishop of Malines, and, of course, as a "co-heir to the Holy See," entitled by long tradition to the greatest respect, both

spiritual and temporal, was, at the order of Von Bissing, placed under arrest in his palace at Malines, in an amazing attempt to force the Primate to withdraw or modify the Pastoral Letter which he had issued as a New Year charge to the Belgian clergy. The letter was a great piece of writing, one of the noblest that any war has ever called forth. It reviewed with restraint the agony which had been forced upon Belgium by the lawless invasion of the German armies, and, in so far as it dealt with the politics of the existing occupation, it did no more than explain to the Belgian people the precise legal standing of that occupation and their duty towards it.






"Thus, the invader's acts of public administration have in themselves no authority, but legitimate authority has tacitly ratified such of those acts as affect the general interests, and this ratification, and this only, gives them juridic value.

"Occupied provinces are not conquered provinces. Belgium is no more a German province than Galicia is a Russian province. Nevertheless, the occupied portion of our country is in a position it is compelled to endure. The greater part of our towns, having surrendered to the enemy on conditions, are bound to observe those conditions. From the outset of military operations the civil authorities of the country urged upon all private persons the necessity of abstention from hostile acts against the enemy's army. That instruction remains in force. It is our army, and our army solely, in league with



Miss Cavell.

[" Daily Mirror."



German troops in possession of a Belgian saw mill.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

the valiant troops of our Allies, that has the honour and the duty of national defence. Let us entrust the army with our final deliverance.

"Towards the persons of those who are holding dominion among us by military force, and who assuredly cannot but be sensible of the chivalrous energy with which we have defended, and are still defending, our independence, let us conduct ourselves with all needful forbearance. Some among them have declared themselves willing to mitigate, as far as possible, the severity of our situation and to help us to recover some minimum of regular civic life. Let us observe the rules they have laid upon us so long as those rules do not violate our personal liberty, nor our consciences as Christians, nor our duty to our country. Let us not take bravado for courage, nor tumult for bravery."

A conscience less guilty than the German, and an intelligence less befogged by the conviction that fear is the only workable basis for authority, would have seen in this Pastoral Letter a very real means of assistance in the task of administering the occupied country. But this was not to be expected of the Germans. The copies of the letter were seized at the printers, the reading of it forbidden in some, but not all, of the Belgian churches, and in some cases soldiers forced their way into the houses of the curés and seized the letters which had already been distributed. The Germans, as soon as the scandal with which they had saddled themselves by laying hands on the Cardinal was brought home to their wits by the feeling shown in other countries, began to make excuses for their conduct. Cardinal Mercier, they pleaded, had only been put under "technical" arrest by being prevented from leaving his palace; if he had been prevented from celebrating Mass at Antwerp it was only for one service

and one day-and, they might have added with perfect truth, even if he had been called upon by Von Bissing to sign a document withdrawing some parts of his Pastoral Letter, at any rate he declined to do so, and by this time the Germans saw that they dared use no more force towards him. The upshot of the whole matter was that the Cardinal held to his perfectly legitimate position, even to re-affirming his orders to the clergy that they should read the letter from their pulpits, and the Germans hastily raised their "technical" arrest of his person. There is no doubt that it was only the unanticipated outcry beyond Belgium which prevented them from going much farther than they did. They had, however, gone quite far enough to secure a publicity abroad for the famous Pastoral Letter which amply outweighed any suppression of it that they were able to effect in Belgium.

VON BISSING TIGHTENS HIS GRIP.

In the late summer of 1915 a new wave of nervousness, reflected in increased restrictions on individual liberty and vindictive sentences for all the scheduled offences that a stricter vigilance than ever could bring to trial, seems to have passed over the German administration of Belgium. It is rather amusing that this new uneasiness should have happened to coincide with a period of many assurances from the German press that Belgium had now settled down most comfortably under German administration, and that the Belgians who had remained in their country considered themselves much better off than those who had fled. But the tightening of Von

Bissing's strangle-hold on Belgium is more likely to have been ultimately inspired by circumstances quite outside the boundaries of the occupied provinces. In the virtual certainty of an impending offensive by the French and British in the West, and the fear that, with an important success and the driving back of the Germans, the Belgian civil population might be roused to a revolt which would still further embarrass the German operations, must be sought the reason for the harsh dealings which began about this time, rather than in any increased restiveness on the part of the Belgians themselves. A Belgian girl of sixteen—the Countess Helene de Jonghe d'Ardoye—was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for "publicly insulting" a German officer, and her grandmother was also punished for complicity in this vaguely described offence. The whole staff of a factory at Mons was imprisoned for refusing to work under German control, the sentences ranging from five years in the case of the proprietor to a couple of months. And when the Allied offensive of September had been made, and had given


the Germans in Belgium at least one day of the liveliest alarm, Von Bissing's methods grew harsher than ever. The population of Brussels was taxed in one of his proclamations with betraying "an unjustifiable hostility in every domain of life towards the German garrison." They were also accused of conveying information to the Allied forces which might assist air raids on military centres in Belgium, and of keeping hidden in their possession large quantities of arms-this though the order to surrender all weapons had been in force for over a year without any complaint that it was being evaded. As a punishment for these alleged offences troops were to be billeted on private dwellings in Brussels, though in the earlier days of the occupation a special levy of fifteen million francs was wrung out of the unfortunate city on the condition that

no troops were to be quartered on private houses within its boundaries.

THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF MISS CAVELL.

From this period dates an act which fastened almost as much shame upon the Germans as the sinking of the Lusitania—the execution of Miss Edith Cavell, an Englishwoman who had remained in Brussels as head of a training establishment for nurses, from which German wounded had received equal assistance to that given to soldiers of the Belgian and Alied armies. The outlines of the case are simple. Part of the growing German apprehension seems to have been based on the belief that a widespread organisation existed in Belgium, with its headquarters in Brussels, for assisting Belgian, French, and British subjects of military age to escape from Belgium and rejoin the fighting ranks of their countries' armies. As a supposed ringleader in this organisation, Miss Cavell was arrested on August 5th,

1915. In all, thirty-five men and women, many of them Belgian citizens of very good standing, were arrested on the same charge. As soon as Mr. Brand Whitlock, the American Minister in Brussels, heard of the arrest of Miss Cavell-which was concealed from him until the end of August-he wrote to the German authorities asking to be informed of the charge against her, and requesting to be allowed to make arrangements for her proper defence. Nearly a fortnight later the Germans gave him a reply, informing him of the charge against Miss Cavell, declining permission for him to see her, but explaining that a Belgian lawyer had already been appointed for her defence. The trial of the thirty-five accused persons at last took place on the 7th and 8th of October. The sentences were deferred, but Mr. Whitlock received an understanding that he should be informed of the delivered judgment of the court with as little delay as possible. He learnt nothing more until October 11th, when, at eight in the evening, he was informed from reliable unofficial sources that sentence of death had been passed upon Miss Cavell



Mr. Brand Whitlock.

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and eight other of the prisoners at five o'clock that a ternoon. Mr. Whitlock himself was ill and unable to leave the house. but he at once sent the Secretary of Legation to find the Spanish Minister in Brussels, and together the two neutral representatives waited upon Baron von der Lancken, the German Director of Civil affairs in Brussels. Von der Lancken at first denied that sentence had been passed and was to be carried out with such scandalous haste, but after some enquiries admitted that the news received at the American Legation was correct. He explained that the Military Governor, the newly-appointed General von Sauberzweiz, was the supreme authority. The only successful appeal from the decision would be to Emperor himself. He was induced to interview the Military Governor in order to

enquire whether there was any chance of clemency, but returned with the information that that official had resolved that the circumstances of Miss Cavell's case made "the infliction of the death penalty imperative," and was determined to listen to no plea for clemency or postponement.

Miss Cavell was, therefore, shot at two o'clock in the morning of October 12th. There is a very unofficial version of her execution which adds a little more horror to the deed by insisting that this brave woman fainted when she was led out of her cell, and was shot through the head, as she lay on the ground, by the officer in charge of the firing party. The German account denies that the execution was carried out in anything but the correct military fashion, and the story of Miss Cavell's fainting is in any event unsupported by the account of the British chaplain, who was with her until her last moments, and whose testimony is that "she viewed her fate with calmness, and died like a heroine." It is better, therefore,


to discard an account of her execution for which there is very little support. Miss Cavell's last words to the chaplain were of singular beauty and nobility—her "Standing as I do in view of God and eternity, I realise that patriotism is not enough; I must have no hatred or bitterness towards anyone" is already certain of a place among the sayings of the greatest Englishmen.

The news of her death caused the profoundest sensation, particularly in this country, but also in America, whose official representatives had been so deliberately thwarted in their humane efforts to save Miss Cavell, and in other neutral countries. The question of the heroic woman's "guilt" is hardly in question; she doubtless received a fair enough trial from the German military court which tried her, and in any event she freely admitted to the court the occasions on which she had assisted her fellow-countrymen and Allies. The monstrous things were, first, that the death sentence, though passed, should ever have been carried out upon a woman-a thing no British court, military or civil, could, in similar circumstances, have contemplated-and secondly, the dreadful haste which was displayed, making it quite evident that the military governor was determined to slay Miss Cavell before she could possibly be reprieved by a higher authority. (If any further support for this explanation of the haste were needed it would be found in the fact that, on the personal intervention of the King of Spain to the Kaiser, most of the other death sentences were reprieved; and also in the removal of Von Sauberzweiz from his office immediately after the execution of Miss Cavell.)

The deliberate singling out of the one Englishwoman concerned in the prosecution, and the determined, malevolent decision to let the protests neither of the American Legation nor of common humanity and decency prevent vengeance being wreaked on her, was a most hideous indication of the frame of mind which existed even in the high commands of the German military machine. The German apologies, in the Press and elsewhere, were as usual extremely lame affairs. They none of them attempted to deal with the real grounds for the universal horror which was felt beyond Germany at the execution of Miss Cavell-that is to say, the indecent haste which admitted of but one construction—but contented themselves with maintaining that Miss Cavell was clearly guilty of the offences with which she was charged, and therefore, by military law, her sentence was a legit mate one. But whatever sort of face the official apologists in Germany may have had to set on the affair, somebody in authority in that country must have had a truer notion both of how things stood and how they looked, as is shown by the speedy removal from office of the official directly responsible for this latest example of Prussian militarism in action.



A young stallholder in Belgian market bargaining with her German customers. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



A river gorge in the Caucasus.

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CHAPTER XI.


THE FALL OF ERZERUM.

THE SPREADING OF THE WAR INTO ASIA—THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST—THE STANDSTILL IN THE CAUCASUS—TURKISH ATTACKS ON PERSIA—THE REVOLT OF THE PERSIAN GENDARMERIE—THE NEW COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF—RUSSIAN VICTORIES IN PERSIA—THE CAPTURE OF ERZERUM—ITS MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE.

UST before the war began Sir Edward Grey was of opinion that there was nothing in the dispute between Austria and Servia that should induce this country to take one side rather than the other. But whatever truth there may have been in that view at the time-and Sir Edward Grev had shown by his negotiations that he was not hostile to Germany's legitimate claims in the Near East (Vol. III., page 344) the situation was completely changed by the entry of Turkey into the war. With a Turkey that was neutral or friendly to us the growth of German enterprise in her Asiatic possessions made comparatively little difference; with a hostile Turkey it made all the difference. It is possible that success in sinking and capturing the Goeben and the Breslau, or a more vigorous diplomacy at Constantinople, might have kept Turkey out of the war, but after she had come in the true motives of the war gradually came to the surface. Seeley, the author of "The Expansion of England," and the intellectual parent of the modern Imperialist movement in England, argued that though the apparent motive of the wars between England and France throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century was dynastic, the true cause was the struggle for colonial possessions. Similarly, it might be argued of this war that though its ostensible cause might E₃-VOL. IV.

be the demands of Austria upon Servia, or the invasion of Belgium, the real motive was Germany's desire for empire in the East, an empire stretching from Hamburg to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. The defeat of this ambition became, when Turkey entered the war, the chief material British interest in the war. It would have been possible by defeating Turkey and holding our own elsewhere to win the war, and the natural use of seapower, as Pitt exercised it, would have been to concentrate against Turkey and to punish her support of our enemy by appropriating such portions of her territory as we thought ourselves capable of digesting. It was thus that we acquired South Africa and Canada and other portions of the empire.

Whether because it was impracticable or because our policy was influenced by higher and more generous motives, this plan was not adopted; but although our measures against Turkey were somewhat half-hearted, we succeeded in inflicting very great losses upon her. Egypt, to which Turkey looked for hope of compensation for the losses that she had suffered in Europe, beat back the Turkish attempts at invasion. Our campaign in Gallipoli, as has already been related, broke down for lack of sufficient support, but, on the other hand, our invasion of Mesopotamia made unexpectedly rapid pro-





Two views of a military road in the Caucasus

[E.N.A.

gress, and the Turkish attacks on Russia in the Caucasus had suffered very serious defeat. The campaign in Mesopotamia must be reserved to later chapters; the story is taken in the chapter following this down to the failure of our dash for Bagdad. It must be left for later chapters, too, to carry on the story of our campaign in the Balkans and against Turkey in Europe. The subject of this chapter is the war in the Turkish Highlands and in Persia. A former chapter (Vol. II., Chap. IX.) has narrated the history of the great Turkish defeat at Sarikamish, in Trans-Caucasia, in the first Christmas week of the war. The inclemency of the winter season in the Caucasian Hills prevented the Russians from following up their victory, but it was generally expected that the arrival of the spring of 1915 would see them embarked on a successful campaign against Erzerum.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE TURKISH HIGHLANDS.

These hopes were not to be fulfilled for more than twelve months after the Battle of Sarikamish-months of great political complication in the Middle East and of terrible suffering among the Armenian population at the hands of their persecutors. It is not easy to follow the course of events without a general idea of the geographical configuration of these frontier districts. Turkey in Asia divides itself into a northern district which is crossed by numerous ranges of high mountains, with a general direction east and west and a southern district which is plain. These ranges are known by a multitude of different names, but they reduce themselves to two well-defined systems. The more northerly is the Caucasian system, which runs parallel with the Caucasus range between the Black Sea and the Caspian. These hills rise from the Russian province of Caucasia to the Turkish frontier, where in the region near Olti and Sarikamish they reach their greatest altitude. Erzerum, the great Turkish stronghold, stands at an altitude of 6,500 feet, the bulwark of Turkey against Russia. South of the latitude of Erzerum the general level of the Armenian Highlands is lower, but it is not until after the Taurus range is crossed that the plains of Syria are reached. The Taurus runs right across Asia from the south-east angle of Asia Minor to Lake Van in the east of the Armenian Highlands, and Lake Urumiah in the most northerly province of Persia, Azerbaijan. It divides Asia Minor from Syria, and Armenia from the plains of the Tigris and Euphrates, and under cover of the Taurus from the north lies the track of the Bagdad railway line connecting Turkey in Europe (for the shores of Asia Minor turn their back on Asia and belong rather to Europe both in geography and in their political interest) with the essentially Asiatic provinces of Syria and Mesopotamia. Except to the geographer, the configuration of the mountain ranges that form the Highlands of Turkey has little interest, but the student of military topography will notice that though the general direction of the hills is east and west, both eastern and western ends are blocked. The western end gives on to the plateau of Asia Minor, which has never been a military highway, and the best access to European seas is given round the shoulders of the plateau. The natural outlet to Erzerum and the Armenian Highlands is Trebizond, on the Black Sea. On the south side of Asia Minor are the famous Gates of the Taurus range in Cilicia, through which the Bagdad railway squeezes from what is really Europe, though the map assigns it to Asia, into the Syrian plains. At the head of an arm of the sea running up towards the Gates, and with Cyprus pointing like a finger


towards it, is Alexandretta, which is to the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria what Trebizond is to the Armenian Highlands and the Black Sea. The eastern end of the Caucasian and Taurus ranges is also blocked by the hills which form the frontier between Turkey and Persia, and are really a prolongation of the same range, but deflected from the direction east and west to one that is north and south. In the angle or hinge in which the direction of the hills changes to form the Persian frontier are the two lakes of Van and Urumiah, the first in Armenia, the second in Persia. This angle of hills and lakes has very great military importance. In Turkish hands, Azerbaijan would turn the Russian left, in Russian hands the Turkish right.

THE TURKISH MASSACRES IN PERSIA.

The frontier hills between Azerbaijan and Persia were held in the interests of Turkey by Kurds, wild tribesmen, who were a scourge to the inhabitants of the plains on both sides of the frontier. Before war was declared between Russia and Turkey the Kurds-acting no doubt on instructions from the Turks-suddenly descended into the Persian plain and attacked both Christian and Mohammedan villages. At this time there was a considerable Russian garrison in Azerbaijan, and it had no difficulty in dealing with the raiders. But at the beginning of 1915 the Russians, alarmed at the vigour of the Turkish offensive in the Caucasus, were compelled to withdraw their troops from Persia, and the whole of the population was left to the mercy of the Kurds, who once more poured down and occupied the whole of the district between the frontier hills and Lake Urumiah. There is no doubt that the invasion of Persia was part of a policy deliberately adopted by the Turkish Government, for among the bands of Kurds dispersed by the Russians a couple of months before there had been Turkish officers, whose bodies were afterwards found on the battlefield. But the distress caused by the first raid was nothing compared to the horrors of the second.

"The scenes that followed the Russian evacuation were indescribable. Eye-witnesses have described to me how 30,000 Kurds poured down into the plain. For two days and nights the city of Urumiah was given over to loot and pillage. Fortunately, however, Rashid Bey, a Turkish officer, who arrived with a small force of Regulars, put a stop to disorder in the city by shooting a number of Kurds. But in the villages of the plain ruin and massacre were let loose. Eight hundred Christians were murdered, 5,000 families robbed of all they possessed, and 20,000 homeless refugees crowded into the yards of the American and French missions.

"About this time a courageous piece of work was performed by the American Mission doctor, Dr. Packard, who at the risk of his life went to Geok-tepe, a village in the plain, whither some 2,000 Syrian Christians, the remnants of the surrounding villages, had retreated to make their last desperate stand in the church buildings against a host of Kurds. After conference with the Kurdish chiefs the doctor, through his personal friendship with them, succeeded in persuading them to spare the Christians' lives. He then made his way through the firing line, across vineyards scarred with trenches and whistling with bullets. Several Kurds had already got inside the village and were looting. On arrival at the church he found the Christians, men, women, and children, huddled up together, ready to die. All that was left of the young men had got up into the church tower, and were keeping up a fusillade with the Kurds in the vineyards. At length the surrender of all arms to the Kurds was agreed upon and the village given over to plunder. But Dr. Packard by his brave action saved 2,000 lives."



THE TURKISH EMPIRE.



A scene in the Caucasus.

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The reign of terror lasted for three months. The worst culprits were not the Kurds, who after loading themselves with loot were anxious to get back to their villages in the mountains, but the armed bands of low Persians which the Turks recruited locally, and who seized the opportunity to gratify their private vengeance and lusts. No district of the Middle East suffered as did Urumiah in these first months of 1915. To add to the horror of the time an epidemic of typhoid broke out, and carried away Moslems and Chri. tians alike.

"The missions of the French and Americans were filled with 20,000 refugees, all crowded into yards which could scarcely hold 1,000. The missionaries have described to me how during this time every available inch was covered with bodies in all stages of disease, wallowing in filth and half-melted snow. Day after day this devoted band of Americans and Frenchmen toiled in their labour of love. Nearly all of them broke down with the disease, and the mission lost many of its best workers. Five thousand Christians alone are estimated to have perished, and of the Moslems the number must have been many times larger. Twenty-five per cent of the Christian population of the plain has been wiped out at one blow, and I could clearly discern as I rode over the plain the signs of decimation among the population."*

THE GERMAN PLANS IN ASIA.

In their invasion of Persia the Turks were working to a plan, as was shown by their efforts to seduce powerful Persian chieftains from their duty of neutrality. This northern province of Azerbaijan occupied a position between Turkey and Russia comparable to that of Belgium between Germany and France, with this important difference, however, that whereas Belgium was completely independent, a Russian army had for some years been in occupation of the Persian province, on the plea that the weakness of the Persian Government made it


necessary to take special measures for safeguarding Russia's considerable commercial and financial interests in this frontier province. But the martyrdom of the Urumiah district, which had no interest in the war, was as bad-and in some respects worse-than that of Belgium. In occupying Urumiah and overrunning Azerbaijan the first motive of the Turks was precisely the same as that of the Germans in invading Belgium. They wished to turn the enemy's flank and to prevent their own flank from being turned. But they had other motives in addition, both of their own and supplied by their German Allies. Turkey had long had a frontier dispute with Persia, and no doubt she hoped to use the war as an opportunity of extending her own frontiers at the expense of Persia. But the whole scheme of operations is interesting as showing the influence of Germany on Turkish plans.

The dominating motive of Germany in beginning the war was, it is now agreed, to lay the foundations of a great Central Empire stretching across Europe to the Persian Gulf. It was necessary for the realisation of this ambition that Russia should be swept back as far as possible from the flanks of such an empire. Hence the vigour of the early Turkish offensive in Caucasia, which was obviously designed to prevent Russia from gaining a footing in Turkish Armenia—a position from which she could menace Turkey's hold of the mountain country, which was the barrier of Syria against aggression from the north as the Pamirs are of the plains of India. The early Turkish movement towards Kars had evidently been worked out at the suggestion of Germany, whose real motive was to cover the flank of her ambitions in Syria, and to use the Turks in the Armenian Highlands as a buffer against Russia, much as India uses the North-west frontier Pathans and Afghanistan. The massacre of Armenians was of a piece with the same policy; Germany did not instigate it, but she was none the less morally responsible, in so far as she stood to



A view of Teheran, looking east,

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The Mechedi Temple, Teheran.

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gain (or thought she did) by the suppression of the Armenian Nationalist aspirations. For the same reason Persia was important to the new empire which Germany hoped some day to form in Mesopotamia. It was no gain to Germany to have a Turkish Armenia between her and Russian territory in Caucasia if Russia was to flank her position in the Tigris Valley. The invasion of Persia, therefore, by Turkey was no mere outbreak of lawlessness, but part of a far-reaching scheme by which Germany hoped to secure her position in Syria and Mesopotamia. The idea of a series of buffer States : between herself and Russia was very deeply rooted in the policy of Germany. In Europe she hoped to make a buffer State of Poland in order to relieve herself of anxiety for her eastern frontier, and so be freer to look for her expansion to the west. In Asia, too, she hoped to make a strong Mohammedan buffer, with Turkey as a nucleus

The whole plan showed that Germany had carefully studied the principles of British defence in India. The great argument against expansion abroad-and no one ever expressed it more strongly than Bismarck-was that if the new possessions required large garrisons to defend they would weaken Germany's position as a European Power. Besides, she had always to bear in mind that her conscriptionist system, though it would give her a great army for employment in Europe, could not be counted upon to supply foreign garrisons in time of peace. The system, therefore, by which Great Britain maintained herself in the huge subcontinent of India with so comparatively small an army had great attractions for Germany. That system she saw depended on the existence of buffer States between India and Russia in Asia; and in her plans for laying out the foundations of her own India in the East. Germany kept the British model constantly in view. She made very skilful and unscrupulous use of Turkey to these ends. Egypt was dangled before her as a bait, but right from the beginning of the war the main Turkish effort, on the advice of the German masters, was made towards the Caucasus and Persia. And its main object was to secure the flank of the great new empire or federation of empires from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf which Germany hoped to obtain as the result of the war.

THE SITUATION IN PERSIA.

Germany was greatly encouraged in these hopes by the internal situation in Persia. The traditional policy of England in Asia had been one of jealousy towards Russia, but the Anglo-Russian Agreement had broken that down, and it had been worked in a way which made us many enemies in Persia. Persia had trusted England because she knew that the tradition of our policy was to preserve the independence of the States between India and Russia, and our policy in Afghanistan had shown her that a buffer State had not to fear any loss of its independence by its reliance upon us. The close co-operation between England and Russia under the Agreement had shaken that trust. When Persia saw us consenting to the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, her richest province, without serious protest, and conducting negotiations for a trans-Persian railway to India, which if constructed meant the breakdown of the old policy of the isolation of India by land, and when, further, it seemed to be Russia's policy to weaken the Government of the country in every way, it is not to be wondered at that there was an amount of discontent in the country, and a bitter hatred of what was regarded as Russia's persecution, which more than neutralised the old goodwill towards England. Germany had great hopes of turning this mass of discontent to good account. The centre of this activity was Ispahan, which was conveniently remote from the Russian frontiers. The new German Consul at Ispahan and Lieutenant Greizinger went about preaching a Holy War against England and Russia. A violent propaganda was started, and Ispahan was flooded with pamphlets in the German interest.

The Persian Government was in an exceedingly anxious situation. It wished to maintain its neutrality in the struggle, but found itself compromised by the presence of Russian troops in Azerbaijan, which it believed were a standing temptation for the Turks to attack. Rightly or wrongly-probably the Kurds would have come with or without an excuse—it believed that M. Orloff, the Russian Consul-General at Tabriz, in encouraging Shuja Ed Dowleh to lead a force of local levies against the Turks and the border Kurds, with whom Shuja had a blood feud, had brought on the troubles in Azerbaijan. It repeatedly asked for the withdrawal of the Russian troops in this province, believing that without them it could maintain order and preserve its neutrality, as the Turks would be deprived of their chief excuse for attack. Russia, on the other hand, suspected that this request for her withdrawal cloaked some design to go over to the Central Powers; and even if the Persian Government had no such intention, she feared that left to herself she might not be able to resist the Turco-German intrigues. She was particularly suspicious of the Gendarmerie, which, under its Swedish officers, had become a fairly efficient force. Sweden, fearing that the presence of her officers in the Gendarmerie might involve her in breaches of neutrality, withdrew all but the junior officers; and in spite of the protests of the Persian Government that this was to leave the country without a military force that could be depended upon just at the time when she needed it most, Sweden persisted

The situation in Persia in the spring of 1915 was grave. A mixed Turkish and Kurdish force was in occupation of the border districts of Azerbaijan, and some powerful Persian frontier chiefs had openly espoused the cause of the Central Powers. In the middle of April Halil Bey arrived with an army of 15,000 Turkish regulars, which had left Constantinople soon after the declaration of war and taken six months on the way, marching via Aleppo and Mosul. The arrival of Halil put a stop to the worst disorders, but it substituted for the reign of terror an organised Turkish invasion. About the same time a Turkish force crossed the hills further south and occupied the important Persian province of Kermanshah. The attacks near the Persian Gulf in the direction of Ahwaz, on the Anglo-Persian Oil line, have already (Vol. III., p. 347) been noticed. The outlook was most threatening, and the only bright spot was away in the south in the Tigris Delta, where, as has already been related (Vol. III., Chap. XXXIII.), the British Expeditionary Force was beginning to make steady progress. But in May a battle was fought in Azerbaijan which greatly relieved the situation in the north.

THE BATTLE OF DILMAN.

On May 1st Halil Bey, with 15,000 Turkish regulars and 5,000 Kurdish cavalry, was at Dilman, situated in



Russian troops advancing in the Caucasus.

Topical Press.

a plain at the north-west end of Lake Urumiah. The Russian force, which was barely 5,000 strong, lay across the road to Khoi, where it rises to cross the hills at the northern end of the plain. The Russians had also four batteries of mountain artillery and two field-guns concealed in the hollows of the hills. Their lines covered a front of four miles-a wide extension for so small a force. The first day's battle, on May 1st, was one of the few engagements in this war which bore any resemblance to the South African War. The Turkish attack across the plain was beaten to a standstill, partly by the fire of the concealed artillery, but mainly by rifle fire, which was kept up with such intensity and on so wide a front that the Turks had no suspicion how small was the force opposing them. The attack was renewed on the following day, and opened with the seizure by the Kurds of a position in the hills flanking the Russian position on the left. A similar flanking movement was made on the other wing. The efforts of the Cossacks to dislodge the enemy failed, and the enemy was prevented from carrying out his enveloping movement by the opportune arrival of Armenian reinforcements, under Nazir-Begov, who held the Russian line firm.

"The Russians knew they could not hold out much longer. They had only lost 800 in killed and wounded, and the Turks had lost over 4,000, but still the overwhelming superiority of the latter made their position almost untenable. Preparations, therefore, for evacuation were made that evening, according to the statement made to me by an officer who was present. About midnight the advanced posts reported that the Turkish trenches were half empty, and as the day began to dawn a long line of

khaki-coloured forms could be observed threading their way slowly south-west towards the passes leading over into Turkish Armenia. Loud hurrahs broke from the Russian lines as they perceived the enemy in full retreat. But no pursuit was possible with so small a force of Cossacks. Moreover, the Turks retired in good order, for Halil Bey had given orders during the night for the gradual evacuation of the Turkish lines. By morning the great Mosul army, the flower of the Ottoman East, had turned its back on the promised land, to which, thanks to the bravery of three Russian regiments, and especially of the Armenian Volunteers, they were never to return. What was the cause of this sudden and mysterious retreat? Halil Bey's ammunition had given out. Nor was this to be wondered at, for his only method of transport was by camels and mules, and it was therefore impossible for his army, which had left some 600 miles of desert and mountain between it and its base, to keep itself supplied for more than a two days' battle. Thus, as so often has been the case before, the Turkish bravery was of no avail against the forces of Nature."*

This success relieved Azerbaijan for the time being, but had no influence in checking the German propaganda. There was a remarkable resemblance between the methods of propaganda pursued in Persia and the United States. Here, as there, was an Ambassador who ostensibly held aloof from the more than questionable methods of the agitators and disowned responsibility for them, while all the time doing nothing to restrain them even if he was not actually financing them. The chief agent of the German propaganda was one M. Pujin, a "man from Chili," who was first a Swiss, then a French, and finally a German protégé. He came as a representative of the

^{*} Mr. Phillips Price.

Persische Teppiche Gesellschaft, and later began to speculate in real property round Ispahan. In May M. Kaver, the Russian Vice-Consul and representative of the local bank at Ispahan, was murdered. It appeared that he held leases of land round Ispahan from Prince Zel-es Sultan, the Shah's great-uncle, who claimed to be the real owner of the property around Ispahan which M. Pujin had bought from others who it was alleged had no title. The murder of M. Kaver, of which M. Pujin was suspected, probably unjustly, was an incident in the bitter feud which followed over the title to these lands. After the death of M. Kaver, M. Pujin's German propaganda became more open:—

"The murder of M. Kaver took place in May, and about the same time we heard of the arrival at Ispahan from over the Turkish frontier of a transport of arms, with two German officers; then at Kerman of four German agents accompanied by armed horsemen who were proceeding to the Afghan frontier; then again at Ispahan of ten German officers with a transport of arms, of a detachment of Fidais and 14,000 Bakhtiaris; and at last a wireless installation was erected at Ispahan, from which every day the news was spread of the successes of the German and Turkish armies against the Allies. According to the information which was published in the Russian press, even a bomb factory was established near Teheran, and a drill ground and shooting range were acquired by the Germans for the training of 3,000 men, representing the nucleus of a future Germano-Persian army.

"It may in justice be observed that Prince Reuss himself never directly or openly meddled in all this business, but it was suspected all the same that he was supplying the money for the various undertakings, and shielding the actors themselves by his official and unofficial authority with the Persian Government and the various members of the Mejlis. Naturally, Anglo-Russian diplomacy did not remain quiet, but its verbal protests for the most part led to no results. It was only when the Russians landed fresh troops at Enzeli and strengthened their garrison at Kazvin that the German activity abated. But only for a time. When they perceived that the Allies were reluctant to use coercing measures with the Teheran Government they resumed their activity, with the result described in Reuter's statement. On the other hand, our Resident at Bender-Bushir acted in a different spirit. Perceiving that the German local Consul was supplying the local tribes with money, arms, and even instructors, he promptly arrested the man and shipped him away to India. He was able to prove, by means of documents found at the German Consulate, that the Germans had violated Persian neutrality.'

THE SPRING CAMPAIGN IN THE CAUCASUS.

Meanwhile, the war had begun to go very ill for the Russians in Europe, and the renewal of the operations in the Caucasus in the spring of 1915 was by no means so successful for the Russians as seemed likely after the defeat of the Turkish offensive towards Kars. The regular Turkish troops based on Erzerum (the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Army Corps) still numbered 80,000 effectives, even after their defeats. Various irregular forces brought up the strength of the Turks on this front to perhaps 130,000 or 140,000 men. The British operations in Gallipoli prevented the Turks from sending reinforcements other than Halil's Division, which left Europe before the Dardanelles were threatened. On the other hand, the ill-turn which the operations in Galicia took in May compelled the Russians to withdraw part of their forces from the Caucasus, and the want of munitions, which was so disastrous to the Russians in Europe, was also felt on this front. On the Erzerum front the fighting mostly took place on Russian territory in the Olti Hills,

and with their weakened forces the Russians were content to hold their ground. Further east, they had better prospects. After the defeat of Halil, at Dilman, the Russians followed up their success with much energy. They not only cleared the shores of Lake Urumiah in Persia, but advanced into Armenia, and on May 19th captured the city of Van, with twenty-five pieces of artillery and a great quantity of arms. The tables had now been turned on the Russian left, and the whole of Eastern Armenia rose against the Turks, from Van right down to Mush and Bitlis. The prospects were now exceedingly good, and the Turks were compelled to divert a considerable force from the Erzerum front to Eastern Armenia. In July the Russians, advancing round the head of Lake Van, came into contact with the Turkish relief column near Melashkert, and had no difficulty in holding it. But suddenly there came from Russia orders for the complete evacuation of the whole of the vilayet of Van by the Russian forces. The reason for this order was the situation in Europe, which by this time had become exceedingly grave for the Russians, and it was not to be wondered at that the Russians, who had now been forced to abandon Poland and large tracts of Russian territory, should not be disposed to continue their campaign in Armenia, promising though it was. But the consequences for the Armenians were disastrous. They had risen in the rear of the Turkish armies, and when the Russians evacuated Van they paid a hideous penalty. (Vol. III., Chapter XX.)

THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS TAKES COMMAND.

In August, the Grand Duke Nicholas, who had commanded the Russian armies in Europe with such conspicuous ability, made way in the European command for the Tsar, and was appointed to the command in the Caucasus, where he took his Chief of Staff, General Yanushkevitch. The appointment of so distinguished a general was remarkable evidence of the importance which Russia attached to her Asiatic front, and it contrasts curiously with the comparative neglect by this country of her campaign in Gallipoli and in Mesopotamia. The energy with which Russia embarked on a new offensive in Asia while the enemy was in the heart of her own country is beyond praise.

The situation that confronted the Grand Duke on his arrival was one of much gravity. In Poland he had extricated the Russian armies from what more than once had looked like certain ruin. He found in the Caucasus a war that was still being fought on territory over positions that had not materially altered for more than nine months. Further east, the Kurdish chiefs still held the mountains where the frontiers of Turkey, Russia, and Persia meet. The Van and Urumiah districts, which earlier in the year had been triumphantly occupied by the Russians, had been evacuated, and in Persia feeling was steadily rising against the Allies. To Persia and Eastern Armenia the Grand Duke first turned his attention. He continued the policy which had been going on for some time of negotiating with the Kurdish chiefs, and promised an amnesty to all who should make their peace. By the end of the year most of the chiefs had been brought over by representations of the might of Russia, and the uselessness of continuing the struggle against her, and by reminders that Russia numbered over twenty million Moslems among her subjects, all of whom were contented with their political lot. These conferences between the Russian representatives and the Kurdish cavalcades, with their quaint head-dress, brilliant tunics,

^{*} The Manchester Guardian, September 11th.



Persian troops on parade at Teheran.

[E.N.A.



A band of Persian Irregulars.

[E.N.A.

and baggy trousers helping to tone down the ferocity with which they display their arms and warlike accourrements, supplied that element of the picturesque with which this war for the most part was so conspicuously lacking.

While he was thus securing his flank in the north of Azerbaijan, the Russian Commander proceeded to re-occupy Eastern Armenia, which had been abandoned a few months before. A correspondent has described these operations, which obtained so immediate and comparatively easy a victory as to suggest very grave doubts whether there was any necessity for the hurried evacuation in July, which had such tragic consequences for the Armenians.

"Lake Van lay before us, a sheet of haleyon blue, even deeper than the cloudless sky above it, its shores of sand and reed-beds bordering the rocky foothills and neglected cornfields that clothed its banks with a fringe of gold. On the horizon rose Mount Zipander, twin brother of Mount Ararat, its majestic cone sheathed in snow and shrouded in midday mist of blue and grey. Behind us lay the mountains, snowfields, and defiles through which we had struggled for four days, and from whence came chilly blasts, flakes of snow, and a sight of silent and hungry rocks, reminding us of our fight against Nature there.

"Before the first sheen of silver had begun next morning to light the eastern sky our mountain battery had occupied a position under a rocky ledge overlooking a beautiful valley, where several ruined Armenian villages nestled under an ancient monastery. On the right we were supported by a Russian field gun battery, while the Armenian infantry swarmed over the rocky ledge and took up their position ready for the attack. Across the valley on the other side ran a chain of hills which connected the mountains with the lake and barred the road to Bitlis. Here the Turks had taken up their positions. At eight o'clock our batteries opened fire, and from the observation stations I watched for two hours the Russian shells playing on the hills where the Turks lay concealed. Once or twice I saw groups of human forms issuing from the hollows of the hills and advancing towards us. They were attacking parties of Turks, but at once the well-aimed Russian shrapnel drove them in again. It is impossible to speak too highly of the Russian artillery. It was now the task of the Armenian infantry to cross the valley, occupy the monastery, scale the heights above it to the south, and so turn the Turkis'i right flank. They were like a waving line of black specks moving slowly towards the monastery, one portion now holding back under cover of shelving banks, another now pushing forward to a grove of poplar trees. At last the monastery and surrounding villages were reached amid a great fusillade of Turkish rifle-fire. The Armenians were now in their element, for beyond them lay the slopes of the mountain which commanded the Turkish right. minutes later they were swarming up the slopes like ants on a mound, dragging and pushing each other along, while the Russian infantry occupied the monastery and kept up a steady fire on the Turks. Meanwhile the Russian infantry detachments in the centre advanced along the open, their column alternately taking cover in the streams, so as to confuse the range of the Turkish artillery and so facilitate a general advance. The Turks had carefully planned their retreat, and in good order were now pouring along the valley tracks to the next range of high hills, some ten miles distant, which guarded the road to Bitlis.

"A two days' journey lay before us, and as we reached a ruined Turkish village that night a terrible wind from the mountains told us of a coming blizzard. We had again received no food that day, and could light no fire in that gale of sleet and snow. No head cover could be obtained, for every house was in ruins, and no tent could be pitched in the teeth of that terrible blast. We huddled our horses into the ruined houses, tied them to the walls, and lay down under our skeepskin coats. But the snow and icy blast forbade all sleep to the weary and hungry soldiers. Fortunately in the morning the transport arrived, and gave us that nourishment without which many of the soldiers could not have stood out another day against the elements.

"After facing the blast for eight hours the famous rock of Van peered through the snowy mist before us, and in an hour we had reached the ancient capital of Armenia."

Meanwhile, energetic steps had been taken to deal with the disorders in Persia, and not too early, for the Gendarmerie, deprived of the officers who might have controlled them, had been seduced by the German propaganda, mutinied, and gone over to the enemy. The British had already occupied Bushire on August 8th in consequence of an attack by the tribesmen, in which two officers lost their lives; but outrages became more frequent and widespread, and German consular officers, throwing off all respect for Persia's neutrality, placed themselves at the head of armed bands and boldly made war on the consuls of England and Russia. The British Vice-Consul at Shiraz was killed, and the British Consul-General at Ispahan was wounded, and both he. with the French and Russian residents, had to leave Ispahan, which was now wholly in the power of the Germans. At the beginning of November an agreement was made between the Russian and the British Governments by which Russia was given a mandate to take such steps in Persia as might be necessary to safeguard Allied lives and property. A Russian army advanced south, occupied Teheran, Hamadan, and later Ispahan and Kermanshah, and drove the Germans and Turks into the frontier hills between Persia and Mesopotamia.

THE ERZERUM CAMPAIGN.

The Grand Duke was now free to deal with Erzerum. Early in January the little streets of the famous plateau fortress of Kars were alive with troops hurrying up to the front which lay across the tableland to the south. How often in the last hundred years had Kars seen these sights? In 1828 and in 1854 the Russian wave swept over this once Turkish outpost only to recoil. In 1878 the wave came again, and finally submerged it. Now it was surging round the outpost of Erzerum. The Russian tide sweeps slowly onward, and the Turks themselves, with their pensive fatalism, seemed to think it irresistible. Said a Turkish "Mudir," head of a village in the Kars "oblast," who had remained there with his people when the Turks left in 1878, "Many of our Osmanlis left with them and settled round Erzerum. Fools! they will have to move from there again some day."

Writes Mr. Phillips Price, the only Englishman present during these operations: "Kars looked bleak and terrible in its winter clothing. An icy wind blew in violent gusts. The hills, in which lay buried the great fortress artillery, loomed dark and gloomy through the mist of snow. One envied the Cossacks in their 'Burkas' as they swung upon their shaggy ponies. The grey-coated infantrymen looked cold beside them. One of them told me that when they were in the trenches they welcomed the order for advance in the open. They feared freezing to death worse than the chance of a Turkish bullet.

"In the country behind this front signs of warfare against winter as well as against the Turks lay on every side. Snug little 'Zemliankas,' dug into the earth and covered with desert grass, dotted the plains and sheltered hillsides. From the holes, that passed as doorways, hairy Cossack faces looked out on wintry scenes of snow and rock. Here they retired from their rocky dug-out trenches on the mountains, where they faced the Turks, for a few days' rest and warmth. Mankind in this country becomes a troglodyte in winter. The natives not only become troglodyte but hibernate also. This the soldiers cannot do. But Tartars, Georgians, Armenians, Greeks.

Karapapachs, Ossetins, Kurds, and all the countless races of mankind with which the plateaux of Trans-Caucasia swarm, all live underground in winter and sleep like dormice. All that can be seen of their villages is a few dark lines marking the terraced approaches to the houses. Black spots in the ground mark the doorways. A deathly silence reigns, and only the coughing bark of a miserable pariah dog tells one that there is life at all. Beyond these villages, that I looked on, the Russian artillery was dug in behind hills that hid them from the enemy. Transport of much-needed shells kept on arriving. Platoons of grey-coated infantry, wrapped up in 'bashliks' and 'papachs' till nothing could be seen of their faces but two eyes, a nose, and icicles of

frozen breath, were moving steadily up to the front. All preparations were being made for the offensive against Erzerum. I marvelled as I looked on the scene at the race of men whose soldiers can fight in such a climate as this; who in the dead of winter at 6.000 feet, in wind and snow, in frozen trenches, and on impassable roads can attack a firstclass fortress defended by an equally brave enemy.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS.

At the end of October a regrouping of all the Turkish forces in the Eastern theatre was made. The British threat to Bagdad and the increasing strategic importance of Persia caused the Turks to strengthen themselves in those regions. From the region of Bitlis and Mush the

Third and Fifth Composite Divisions, which formerly belonged to the Fifteenth Army Corps, were withdrawn and sent to Bagdad. It appears also that the Eleventh Army Corps in the Erzerum region was weakened by a few battalions, which were also sent southward. The Turkish concentration of five or six divisions in Mesopotamia thus caused the withdrawal of General Townshend in November and the saving of Bagdad (see next chapter). In December it became plain that if a Russian offensive somewhere on the Caucasus front could be effected not only would it relieve the situation in Mesopotamia, but it would stand a good chance of driving the Turks back on their last line of defence round the fortress of Erzerum.

This plan, which has just been carried out, met with success beyond the wildest hopes, for it presently became clear that the Turks were very much weaker in this front than had been suspected hitherto.

After the withdrawal of three divisions to Mesopotamia, the Turkish strength on the Caucasian front consisted of fifteen divisions; the nine divisions of the Third Army (Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Army Corps) in the Erzerum and Black Sea region (total about 85,000), and five divisions distributed with Kurds and irregular cavalry in Armenia (Bitlis and Mush region) and North-West Persia (Urumiah and Suj-bulak). The geographical surroundings of the Erzerum region may be summarised as follows: East of the fortress lies the great Passan valley,

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Russian troops watching one of their number perform a peasant's dance. $[Record\ Press]$

an upland plain, where the Araxes river rises. eastern approach to Erzerum lies along this plain, and the outer forts on the east side are placed in the Deve Boyun, a chain of rolling hills dividing the headwaters of the Araxes from those of the Western Euphrates. For the defences of the Passan Valley and the Deve Boyun the Ninth and part of the Tenth Army Corps were detailed off, and after November, 1915, held the Passan almost up to the Russian frontier. To the north of the plain and the Deve Boyun lie the confused ranges of the Djelli Gol, Hey Dag, and the mountains round Lake Tortum. Access across this country is difficult, and only one approach to Erzerum is possible from the northeast, through the narrow valleys and defiles of the Olti

Chai. The Eleventh Turkish Army Corps seems to have been spread out in this region in prepared positions right up to the Russian frontier. South and south-east of Erzerum lies more rugged country leading up to the Bin Gol Dag. It is traversed by a road leading from Hassan Kaleh *via* Hunus Kaleh to the plains of Mush and Lake Van, and is the most direct route from Erzerum to the south, from whence help can come from Mosul and Mesopotamia, if needed. Part of the Tenth Army Corps were protecting this road.

The Russian forces, details about which cannot be written, were distributed in three columns, ready for advance early in January. The left column was to

advance from Karakurt, at the head of the Kars plateau, in a direct attack on the Turks in the Passan valley. The central column was to go from Sarikamish into the rough country north of the Passan, to cross the Djelli Dag by mountain tracks, threaten the Turkish left at Hassan Kaleh, and so force them to fall back on Erzerum. The northern Russian column was to advance from Olti along the narrow valley of the Olti Chai, threaten the right of the Turkish detachment round Lake Tortum, and so cause the retirement of the Eleventh Army Corps on to the fortress. Thus by creeping through the rough country north-east of Erzerum by mountain tracks, and so pressing on the weak spots, the strong Turkish positions in the Passan and before Olti would be threatened. It was the same sort of plan that Enver Pasha made against Kars in January last year. His plan failed because he could not keep up his communications, and the winter froze and starved his troops. The Russian plan, thanks to roads and railways and skilful handling, succeeded, and Erzerum was enclosed on the north, south, and east, leaving only the west open to the heart of Asia Minor. The complete encirclement of the fortress seems almost impossible on account of the mountain ranges on the north and south, which cut across any cordon that could be drawn. It is a fortress that can be taken by storm, if the necessary sacrifices can be made, more easily than it can be starved out.

THE ASSAULTS ON ERZERUM.

Early in January the Turks, in order to hide their weakness, made a demonstration against the Russian positions at Olti. The attacks were repulsed, and on January 10th the Russian advance began. The southern column reached Asap Keui on January 13th, and, after driving out the Turks from their position, occupied the village and waited. But the Russian columns in the mountains of Djelli Gol to the north had 9,000 feet to cross, and until this was carried out and the high country cleared of Turks it was not safe for the southern column to go on. On January 14th the Djelli Gol was occupied almost without fighting. The Russians passed at night by mountain tracks unseen by the enemy to positions almost in their rear. The Turks were completely taken by surprise, and had to fall back at once in order to keep up their connection with Erzerum. Thus the whole of the east Passan valley and the country to the north fell into the Russian hands by January 16th. The advance then continued. Kopri Keui was reached on January 18th. The village here commands the bridge over the Araxes. The Turks had got machine-guns in the village, and were sweeping with terrible effect the approaches to the bridge. The Russian artillery could not dislodge them, as the snowstorm then raging prevented accurate observation. It looked at one time as if the Turks would hold. But at five o'clock a battalion of Russian infantry charged under cover of the snowstorm at the bridge. The blinding snow and the failing light rendered the Turkish machine-guns useless, and by evening Kopri Keui was in the hands of the Russians. Next day the southern column continued its advance on Hassan Kaleh. Here a great tongue of rock juts out into the Passan plain from the north; beyond this ridge lies the upper part of the plain, which leads right up to the Deve Boyun and the eastern forts of Erzerum. Hassan Kaleh was the last line outside the fortress. Would the Russians take it? It was soon clear that such was the effect of the blow they had received that they could not reform themselves for its defence, and so only fought a rearguard

action as they retired on the forts. By January 19th the last column was to be seen disappearing behind the rolling banks of the Deve Boyun. In full cry the Cossacks pursued them right up to the gates of the fortress, and cut off 1,000 prisoners. Next day the Russian field artillery shelled the outer forts, and so, after thirty-nine years, Erzerum saw again a Russian shell within its precincts.

So much for the southern and central columns. The Russian northern column met with no less success in the headwaters of the Olti Chai. It seems that between this river and Lake Tortum two divisions of the Eleventh Army Corps were entrenched on rocky positions. The Russians advanced from Olti on January 10th, and for five days a stubborn fight raged, in which the Turks in their well-entrenched positions fully held their own. It seems probable that the Russian frontal attack would have failed altogether had it not been that on January 15th the central column, by its clever manœuvre in the mountains north of the Passan, crumpled the Turkish resistance in this region and so threatened to isolate the Eleventh Army Corps in the Olti and Tortum areas. On January 16th the Turkish commander ordered the retreat, but in doing so he had to fall back along a road which joined in an angle with the one along which the Ninth Army Corps was retreating. The Kara-gyubek gorges and defiles, moreover, did not improve the situation for them, and it appears that the retreat here became a disorderly flight. Large amounts of rifles and ammunition were abandoned, and 3,000 prisoners taken by the Cossacks. A part of a Turkish division which had been at Lake Tortum, being unable to reach the junction of the roads in time, fled into the rough country north of the Dumla Dag. They probably retreated to Baiburt, out of the Erzerum region altogether.

Meanwhile, the Cossack detachment in Melashkert, north of Lake Van, pushed westwards, and on January 26th occupied Hunus Kaleh. The two Turkish divisions in this region were completely taken by surprise, and allowed themselves to be cut off from Erzerum altogether. They fell back on Mush.

Thus the whole Turkish army along the Caucasian front was driven in some fifty miles along a front of about 130 miles; 4,000 prisoners were taken, with thirteen guns and seven machine-guns. Two divisions were cut off from Erzerum, and the Russians came now within shot of the eastern forts.

The Russians attacked Erzerum from the east and the north sides. It was the attack from the north that opened up the way. On this side Erzerum is defended by two important forts, the Kara Gubek and the Tafta. Advancing down the valley of the Upper Euphrates, the Russians passed the Guyebek defile on February 10th without opposition, and arrived in front of Fort Kara Gubek. Their artillery was hauled up the heights over rocks and snow, and the Turks, taken by surprise, fled, abandoning four guns. Tafta fell on the night of the 13th, after a bombardment in which the Russians blew up the principal magazine of the fort. Meanwhile, the Russians had been advancing from the east, had stormed a fort on the extreme left of this front, and on the 14th Chaban Dede Fort was carried by a converging attack from north and east. At the same time the southern extremity of the range protecting Erzerum from the east was occupied, and by the 15th the whole of the outer line of forts was in Russian possession. The Turks were caught in two minds. The reinforcements which were immediately available had gone to defend



[Universal.



Russian soldiers breaking stones for road making behind their advancing armies. [Topical.

Bagdad, and an army was on its way to Erzerum from Angora and Siwas, but it was soon apparent that it could not arrive in time. The old problem then confronted the Turks of whether it was better to defend a fortified position and risk being shut up and lost as a field force, or maintain its integrity as a field army. The Turks decided to compromise. Arrangements were hastily made for withdrawing the bulk of the army to effect a junction with its reinforcements, leaving a comparatively small force to conduct an obstinate defence until it was relieved. The Russian attack broke upon them before their arrangements were complete. Two hundred and thirty-five Turkish officers and 12,753 men were taken prisoners, and over 300 pieces of artillery. In addition, the Turks lost heavily in the fighting, and the divisions who

effected a retirement to the west had in some cases lost two-thirds of their effectives.


THE IMPORTANCE OF ERZERUM.

The fall of Erzerum was the most signal success that any of the Allies had yet gained over Turkey. It is much the strongest fortified town in Turkish Asia, and the Turks always attached the greatest importance to its possession. It is undoubtedly the key to Armenia, and the Power that holds it must before long be in possession of the Turkish Highlands from Trebizond and the Black Sea to Taurus and the the Persian frontier hills. Mush and Bitlis soon fell into the hands of the Russians, and

confronted with the necessity of choosing between the sacrifice of Syria and of the Caucasus, would be thrown on the side of the second alternative. The Germans, no doubt, attached value to the retention of the Caucasus as a means of securing their prospective empire in the east, but Syria and Mesopotamia were the citadel of those ambitions. It might always be possible later to come to an arrangement with Russia in possession of Armenia, but they knew well that with Bagdad and Alexandr.tta in the hands of the British there was an end for ever to their aspirations in the East. She might be the greatest of European military powers, but she could never be an Imperial Power in Asia. For these reasons, and also because it was so much easier—thanks to the Bagdad railway-to send reinforcements into Syria than into Armenia. Turkey made her main

effort not in the Armenian hills, but in the plains of Mesopotamia. We were the sufferers, as will be told in later chapters, but it is strange that the **British Government** should not have foreseen where the main Turkish efforts were likely to be directed, and made their preparations on a proportionate scale. As it was, our expedition in Mesopotamia was strong enough to make the Russian task in Armenia considerably lighter than it would otherwise have been, but not strong enough to win for ourselves the advantages that might have been ours. The contrast between the policy of Russia, who, with the enemy

in the heart of



The Erzerum Forts.

though the Mediterranean end of the Taurus remained in the hands of the Turks, and the extraordinary difficulties of the country delayed the operations against Trebizond for a time, Armenia, for which the Turkish Government both under Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks had incurred lasting infamy, was lost with Trebizond. Would that the Russian occupation could have been established six months earlier, before the massacres of Van and Bitlis. And would, too, that the British force in Mesopotamia had been strong enough to round off on the south the brilliant victories that Russia had won in the north. Unfortunately, the British Government not once but twice underestimated the amount of resistance that we were likely to meet in our advance on Bagdad. Yet it might easily have been foreseen that whatever choice the Turks left to themselves might have made, the whole influence of their German advisers,

her own country, still managed to muster up the resources to carry through a difficult campaign in the enemy's country, and the military policy of England, who, with access to all the resources of the world, with interests in Asia greater even than those of Russia, and with not a yard of her soil in enemy occupation, still hesitated to make a really adequate effort in Asia, and stood with her feet weighted in the clay of Flanders, was sufficiently remarkable. But even more remarkable was the absence of any sense of the magnitude of the issues that were being decided in Asia.

There was much criticism of our policy in Turkey and the Balkans. Thrice we missed great opportunities. First in Gallipoli, where success which greater efforts would have made certain would have cut off the war definitely from Asia and caused the whole of Turkey's Asiatic possessions to drop like fruit into the lap of the

Allies; later, in the Balkans, where we seemed until it was too late to forget that the war did arise out of the position of Servia in the path of Germany's Eastern ambitions; and a third time in Mesopotamia, where British victory, coincident with the capture of Erzerum by the Russians, would have relieved us of all anxiety in Asia. Yet in the first and third of these cases the burden of criticism, of which there was plenty, was not that opportunities had been missed, but that we were dissipating our energies on other objects than the defeat of Germany. As though there were nowhere else in the world than Flanders in which it was possible to beat Germany. It was not on such principles as these that we waged our great wars with Napoleon.

MESOPOTAMIA AND BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY.


Ambition and safety alike seemed to counsel a more direct interest in the future of the East than was shown by the people in the course of this war, or even by its rulers. It was a fundamental error of our diplomacy to begin by postulating that we had no real interest in the Servian dispute. Germany's whole attitude with regard to the Servian trouble was unintelligible except on the view that behind it all she was cherishing ambitions beyond Servia in Turkey and the East, and whatever concerned the East concerned this country more than any other. It was not mere perversity that made two generations of British statesmen so attached to the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. It was their conviction that an independent and friendly Turkey was necessary to the safety of our Indian Empire. A Turkey under the influence of a power at war with us would have seemed alike to Pitt, Palmerston, and Disraeli to threaten the foundations of our empire in the East, and, however great our other preoccupations were, this was a danger that nothing would have induced them to neglect. No doubt it was true, with limitations, that victory over the main enemy Germany would put us in a position to settle affairs in Turkey as we pleased, but these limitations might be serious. When the enemy is defeated, affairs in the subsidiary theatres of war are

apt to settle themselves on the principle of beati possidentes. So it might be with Turkey. But even if there were no risk of that sort, it was still important that we should think betimes of the settlement that was desirable, and as far as possible arrange our military policy in reference to those ends. If the war had brought out one fact more clearly than another, it was the military importance of the bastion theory the theory that a position of vital value is not wisely defended along its immediate front but on advanced positions that anticipate the enemy's attack, and enable the defence to resort effectively to the attack which is the only satisfactory form of defence. On this principle Egypt cannot be satisfactorily defended along the line of the Suez Canal, but should have a bastion in front of it, which in this case, as Napoleon and Mehemet Ali both realised, would have to be Palestine. But directly the interests of Egypt are seen to overlap into Palestine, the merest beginnings of a campaign in Mesopotamia at once revive the memories of the ancient connection between Egypt, Palestine, Babylonia, and Assyria, and suggest, by no great indulgence of the fancy, the question of whether history may not repeat itself and this ancient connection be revived. It used to be a commonplace with British statesmen that the defence of India began in Egypt; and if the defence of Egypt requires a bastion in Palestine, it follows that the defence of India begins in Palestine. It has, again, been an axiom for many generations that it is desirable for the safety of India that we should be the paramount Power in the Persian Gulf, and one cannot lay hold of a problem by the two ends without also thinking of the middle. The German ambition of founding an empire from Berlin to Bagdad is one to fire the imagination; and though under other conditions it might not have been necessary for this country to oppose it, circumstances have left us with no alternative. But the idea of a new Hither India under the British flag, stretching from Palestine to the Persian Gulf, is an alternative to the Bagdad railway scheme not unworthy to compete with it, and destined, we hope, in the end to supersede it.



A general view of Erzerum.

E.N.A.



The ruins of the "Palace of Chosroes" at Ctesiphon

[E, N, A]

CHAPTER XII.

THE DASH FOR BAGDAD.

CLASSIC SOIL—EFFECTS OF TURKISH MISRULE—BAGDAD, ANCIENT AND MODERN—A RACE BETWEEN REINFORCEMENTS—

—THE BATTLE OF CTESIPHON—OUR HOLD ON SOUTHERN MESOPOTAMIA—THE ARAB AND THE TURK—"TOMMY" IN BIBLICAL SETTING.

THE capture of Kut-el-Amara in September, 1915, marked the end of a period of almost unqualified success in our Mesopotamian campaign. The months which followed saw the failure of a great adventure—the dash on Bagdad—and many weeks of anxiety, during which General Townshend was besieged in the town of Kut, which he had so triumphantly captured. The advance from Kut to Bagdad-which was later criticised in Parliament as a rash enterprisehad much at the moment to recommend it. We have already seen (Vol. III., Chap. XXXIII.) that a campaign undertaken at first only for the occupation of Basra and the Shat-el-Arab region had given us control of the great triangular system of waterways which dominates Lower Mesopotamia. At Kut we were already more than half way by water from the Persian Gulf to Bagdad, and the stretch of the Tigris that remained to be ascended was easier than that already passed. Below Kut the river loses much of its water in the Shat-el-Hai Canal, which runs from Kut to Nasrie, on the Euphrates, and in other offshoots. Below Kut, moreover, the banks have under Turkish rule been poorly preserved, and the main stream floods into a hundred marshes on either bank which absorb the water that should go to make a deep channel. From Basra to Kut, indeed, the Tigris in flood time runs so swiftly that an up-going steamer is

often unable to make headway, and in the drought becomes so shallow that an unexpected sandbank may hang up traffic for days. At all times, moreover, some of its bends are so sharp that even experienced navigators of these waters run their vessels aground in the attempt to get round them. In its 220-mile stretch from Kut to Bagdad, however, the river is deeper, straighter, and more reliable. The curious but highly efficient flotilla which we had called into being, and whose operations have already been described, had successfully conquered the lower reaches. It would make better speed on the remainder. Again, considerable Turkish forces, which we had turned from the strong defences organised for them by German officers at Kut, had fled demoralised upon Bagdad; and though reinforcements from Syria were known to be on the way to support them, there was a good chance that we might inflict a crushing defeat before these arrived.

But, above all, the traditions, prestige, and commercial importance of the ancient capital of the Caliphs made Bagdad a prize worth a risk in the getting. We were fighting our way through a land that all the world held famous. The claim of Kurna, through which we had already passed, to be the site of the Garden of Eden might be fictitious—and indeed, it seems certain that in early Biblical times Kurna and the surrounding region




British aeroplanes in Mesopotamia.

[Topical Press.



Royal Engineers constructing a pontoon bridge across the Tigris.

[Topical Press.



A view on the Tigris near Kut.

[Topical Press.

were part of the Persian Gulf-but the land about Bagdad had been the site of famous cities since the days of Nebuchadnezzar. Babylon, itself, marked now only by a cluster of vast mounds, lay not far distant on the Euphrates; between Kut and Bagdad, at Ctesiphon, still marked by a mighty ruined arch, had stood the palace of the Chosroes, one of the greatest of the Parthian dynasties; and hard by is the site of the famous city of Seleucia, once the capital of the Macedonian kingdom of the East. The ancient empires of Mesopotamia had seen many a great battle joined to decide the fate of a drang nach Osten, from Greek and Roman times onward. It was at Tel Alig, on the Tigris, north of Bagdad, that the

Rakuba

DAD A

Emperor Julian died of his wounds, and in his death surrendered the sway of the Eastern world to the Persian kings. Cunaxa, where Xenophon and the Ten Thousand began their Retreat, lies on the Euphrates, west of Bagdad, and to many a British officer remembering his classics, as he went into action in this region in a temperature of 125 degrees, it must have seemed a miracle that the appalling damp heat did not work the havoc on the heavily armed Greek troops which the Persians could not compass. Alexander the Great took a hand in the vast irrigation works on whose prosperity the land depends, and whose neglect by the Turks has reduced so much of it to waste and marsh. At Shinafia, on a branch of the Euphrates, one can still see a part of the bank he constructed to contain the channel of

the river, and it is supposed that while working here he caught the fever which killed him.

THE TRAGEDY OF TURKISH NEGLECT.

The whole history of Mesopotamia, indeed, is the history of irrigation. In the ancient days when Babylon, Seleucia, and Ctesiphon were cities of world fame, and in the later times when Charlemagne addressed the Caliph of Bagdad as one who divided with him the dominion of the world, the Tigris and the Euphrates were harnessed by wise rulers to do the same work for their kingdoms as the Nile for Egypt. A glimpse of what the land was then like can still be got in the well-watered country that now fringes the Shat-el-Arab. Luxurious date groves rise from fields of clover, the trees festooned with vines from which hang rich bunches of purple grapes. But much of a land which was once the world's granary, and which might again produce heavy crops of corn, cotton, sugar, and rice, is now desert in summer and salt marsh in winter. Sir William Willcox was asked in 1908 by the Turkish Government to organise a scheme for the restoration of the old irrigation works of the country, but he was forced by the obstructions put in his way by Turkish officials to leave his work incomplete. He has estimated that reclamation work carried out in lots of 12,500 acres would cost only some £4 an acre, and that the land would be worth £40 an acre when reclaimed. "With the Euphrates and Tigris floods both really


controlled," he has accomplished

Lower Mesopotamia.

written, "the delta of the two rivers would attain a fertility of which history has no record, and we should see men flocking in from India and making of the plain of Shinar a rival of the land of Egypt. The value of every acre of land in the joint delta of the two rivers would be trebled before the irrigation works were carried out, and again increased many fold more the day the works were completed. Every town and hamlet in the valley from Bagdad to Basra would find itself freed from the danger, expense, and intolerable nuisance of flooding, and the resurrection of this ancient land would become an fact." " After more than 400 years' stewardship of this richest and most famous tract in the world," he adds, "the Turks can give no better account of themselves than the exhibition

mighty rivers flowing to waste themselves in the sea for nine months in the year, and desolating everything in their way for the remaining three."

Turkey's tenure of Mesopotamia is certainly one of the most discreditable pages in her record. Before the war there were not more than a few hundred resident Turks between Basra and Bagdad, and of these, though the higher officials were well enough paid, the smaller fry were salaried at a rate that made extortion and corruption the only means of livelihood open to them. Most of the native population is, of course, Arab. It has no love for the Turk, and is under little control. The town-dwelling Arabs, who have commercial interests in Basra, Amara, and Bagdad, are well accustomed to British methods, and would be little concerned at the



A general view of Bagdad.

[E,N,A]



A view of Bagdad from across the Tigris.

[E.N.A.

disappearance of Turkish rule. Of the nomad Arabs, who make up the bulk of the population, the best specimens are the Bedouin tribesmen, the Beni Shammar, the Muntafik, and others, whose picturesque encampments, which are shifted continually from one grazing ground to another, are a chief feature of the country. They are men of fine physique and courage, and, though the chance of accustoming them to use fixed grazing grounds and to civil habits of life seems a remote one, people who know the country well have not despaired of finding a useful place for them under a sound system of government. The bulk of the population are of a less admirable Arab type—thriftless, undependable, and poor-spirited. They live in huts, made of palm matting stretched over

reed hoops, or in mud hovels, clustering, perhaps, round a two-storeyed mud building which marks the residence of the Sheik. Our troops passed hundreds of such villages in their progress northward. Many of them on a return visit would have disappeared before the inroads of flood or drought to arise elsewhere on a more congenial site. Round the largest of these villages are signs of a little cultivation, but they serve only to throw into stronger relief the abounding waste. Not till Bagdad is neared are there signs of the fertile land being put to good use. date palms which flourish on the Shatel-Arab reappear again, and the river is fringed here and there by the attractive gardens that surround the houses of the wealthier Bagdad merchants.

it to-day. But of the wonders of his capital little survived the irruption of the Mongols, who, under the grandson of the terrible Ghengis Khan, sacked it with great slaughter in 1258, and left the last of the Caliphs to die of starvation in his own treasure tower. Turkish rule proper at Bagdad dates only from the seventeenth century, and to the Arab the Turk is still an interloper.

From a distance its crenelated walls and bastioned gates, its domes, its minarets, and its citadel, give the impression that modern Bagdad still enshrines the ancient spirit of the city. Its people, too, follow many of the customs of their forefathers of Haroun's time. They descend in the heat of the day into the deep cellars below their houses, in the evening they gossip on their

A street scene in Bagdad.

[E.N.A.

goofas, much as they have done for hundreds of years. But despite some fine mosques and spacious bazaars. the streets are dull for an Eastern city, the houses of dried brick unimpressive. and the hygienic conditions, as might be expected, deplorable. Now and then a reforming governor has mended things a little. Nizam Pasha, for instance, when he was Vali of Bagdad some years ago, ran a new wide street right through the place from north to south by the inexpensive process of clearing out, without compensation, all the buildings that stood in the way; but the rust of inefficiency and corruption has overspread the city beyond remedy at Turkish hands.

roof gardens, and

on the Tigris they

still use the queer

coracles, called

BAGDAD OLD AND NEW.

Bagdad itself is a young city as age goes in this ancient land. It is clear, from inscriptions found on a portion of the quayside, that a town with the name of Bagdadu stood on the site in the time of Nebuchadnezzar, 2,000 B.C.; but the present city was not founded till 760 A.D., when Al Mansur, one of the great Abbaside Khalifs, built a palace there. Its aspect in its time of greatest glory as a seat of commerce and learning is familiar to all who have read the "Arabian Nights." Haroun-al-Raschid built on both sides of the Tigris, and spanned the river by just such a bridge of boats as crosses

In commercial importance, however, it had not entirely decayed. Its position made that impossible. Despite constant brigandage on the Turco-Persian frontier, it carried on a brisk trade with Persia via the road through Khanikin to Kermanshah. Many local industries flourished, among them the making of plush and leather goods, carpets, and curtains; and despite vexatious restrictions on the river traffic with the Persian Gulf, it served as the distributing centre for Upper Mesopotamia by caravan routes leading to Damascus and Aleppo, as well as to Arabia and to Persia. The city, too, did a brisk business in pilgrimages, for it lies on the route to the shrines of Kerbellah and Nejef, where two of the sons of the Prophet



The Custom House at Bagdad.

[Central News.



The Bridge of Boats at Bagdad.

[Topical.

are buried. Most of its import trade was in British hands, though in latter years German competition had been keen. German hopes of advantage in this region were centred on the Bagdad railway, which would, they hoped, displace the river as the main traffic route. The strategic and commercial possibilities of the railway have already been discussed (Vol. III., Chap. XXXIII.).

In the years that preceded the war the British Consul-General at Bagdad had come to be an official of the first importance. He had a gunboat of the British Indian Marine at his doorstep on the Tigris, and a large community of British and Indian subjects looked to him for protection. They were held as prisoners by the Turks when war broke out, and they watched eagerly the fortunes of the British advance, which, after the occupation of Kut, had admittedly Bagdad as its objective.

A RACE BETWEEN REINFORCEMENTS.

Kut, as we have seen, fell on September 29th, 1915, and the defenders, numbering some 7,000 Turkish regulars and Arab tribesmen, retreated towards Bagdad. Sir Mark Sykes, who was with the British forces in Mesopotamia, sent home an interesting account of Kut after our occupation:—

"The Turks had fled in haste; our men, both horse and foot, reached the town soon after they had gone. For the last week the Turkish commander had been maintaining his prestige by daily hangings and shootings, his last act before leaving had been to shoot six individuals for desertion, spying, or cowardice. Enter the victors; within an hour the women were chaffering milk, dates, and sweet limes, the merchants were offering contracts, policemen were patrolling the dirty little streets, a governor was established in an office-tired troops were standing in the sun while billets were sought for them, and, most unbelievable of all, the Arab cultivators were dropping in to complain of a certain horseman who had ridden through a crop of beans, and of a supply and transport officer who had parked his belongings in a garden. If 'Frightfulness' is one theory of war, certainly the Briton has another with 'Carry on' as the motto instead of 'Kultur' and in lieu of the furor Teutonicus a kind of juris obsessio.

"So the Arabs eye with uncomprehending looks the bronzed, peaceful British soldiers who talk so quietly to one another, and who walk about the streets not with the swagger of conquest, but with the staid assurance of the city man returning from business. These British soldiers, so clean and so cheerful, have carried a wonderful load through this campaign; they have borne heat, vermin, mosquitoes, fever, double duty, heavy casualties in the field; sunstroke, heat-stroke, malaria and typhoid have exacted a dismal toll, and anyone who counts the casualties in the various actions and compares them with the numbers engaged will perceive that the fighting has in Mesopotamia been as severe, if not as persistent, as anywhere in the war. If the British soldier leads, the Sepoy has not been slow to follow."

After the capture of Kut General Townshend pushed on to Azizie, some sixty miles up stream, and only fortyfive from Bagdad. The place was occupied by the second week in October. Except by attacks from Arab irregulars our forces were not molested on the way, but at Azizie the Turks, daily expecting reinforcements, thought it worth while to make a stand. They had some powerful artillery among it, curiously enough, guns which had been brought from Adrianople while the attitude of Bulgaria was still nominally in doubt-but they had not time to construct positions as strong as those they had occupied at Kut. Our troops were confident of success, though it was clear that the ultimate issue must depend on a race between reinforcements. Officers who wrote home from Azizie spoke confidently of being in Bagdad before their letters reached England. The Turks, they admitted, had

already been partly reinforced, but they themselves were daily expecting fresh strength from India.

The enemy showed fight at Azizie just long enough to give their additional troops time to arrive, and again retreated northward. Berlin by this time was prepared for the fall of Bagdad. Major. Moraht wrote in the Tageblatt that the fall of the town might be expected, and that the moral effect of it would be great. As the advance proceeded rapidly and without check, hope rose high in Britain, and when Townshend was reported to be at Ctesiphon, only eighteen miles from Bagdad by road, the end seemed near.

THE BATTLE OF CTESIPHON.

In the battle which followed, however, we received the first check in our campaign, and a grave one. The engagement took place on classic soil, for here, within sight of the great arch of the Palace of Chosroes, which still dominates the desolate plain around it, two Roman emperors, Trajan, and later Severus, had received the submission of the Parthian kings whose capital it was. The British troops reached it on November 22nd, a little over a division strong. They were faced by an enemy who already outnumbered them by three to one, and who was hourly expecting further reinforcements. After a whole day of severe fighting, however, the Turkish positions were taken, in the face of superior artillery fire and across a coverless plain, and General Townshend bivouacked on the ground he had won. On the next two days heavy counter-attacks by fresh Turkish troops were repulsed, but on the 24th our force found itself short of water. It was a difficulty that had been present throughout the campaign. Officers' letters spoke often of the difficulty of carrying sufficient water in a desert land where the heat was so intense that goggles worn to protect the eyes would sometimes blister the face where they touched, and where such water as was come upon on the march was often so salt as to be worse than useless. The troops who repulsed the strong Turkish attacks at Ctesiphon on November 24th had not refilled their water bottles for thirty-six hours, and there was nothing for it but to retreat, after the engagement, to the nearest supply, some four miles back. It is more than probable that that short delay saved Bagdad for the time being. General Townshend returned to Ctesiphon to find that the enemy, too, had abandoned the field, but they were by this time more than four divisions strong, and had time to reform. To hack a way through against these odds was thought too great a venture, and our force was withdrawn towards Kut. The retirement was carried out in perfect order, and on the night of November 31st we turned and fought a successful rearguard action. Kut was reached on December 3rd, and General Townshend at once prepared it for a siege, which, as the event showed, was to last for many weary and anxious weeks.

We had sustained in the Battle of Ctesiphon and in the retreat to Kut upwards of 5,000 casualties, and had lost by a hairsbreadth the chance of dealing one of the most effective strokes in the whole of the war up to that time. Lord Crewe, replying later to criticism in the House of Lords on the propriety of advancing on a great city like Bagdad with so small a force, was careful to exonerate General Townshend from all charge of acting rashly on his own initiative. "The plan had," Lord Crewe said, "been carefully thought out by the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia, Sir John Nixon, and the force which was set apart for it was by universal military opinion considered to be sufficient." He emphasised



Curious river craft: Loading up one of the characteristic spherical boats which are used on the Tigris at Bagdad. [E.N.A.



A boat built of reeds and used by the natives of Mesopotamia. [Sport and General.



An old Nile gunboat on duty in the Persian Gulf.

[Topical.

the great results, military and political, that would have rewarded success, and ascribed our failure to the unexpectedly superior forces of the enemy and their powerful armament of artillery. Public opinion, however, was by no means reassured as to the wisdom of a plan which, however good in its intentions, had clearly left a British division on an all-important advance exposed to the chance of defeat from heavy enemy reinforcements without arranging for its speedy support.

OUR HOLD ON LOWER MESOPOTAMIA.

Meanwhile, we had tightened the grip on Lower Mesopotamia which our command of the waterways made possible. The limits of our effective occupation now reached to Kut on the north, westward to Nasrie on the Euphrates, and on the east to the Turco-Persian frontier. The Tigris served as line of communication and supply for British and Turk alike; but whereas our access to the Gulf enabled us to augment our fleet at will, the enemy were compelled to reply on such ships as they already had. Our hold on Kut, again, severed his line of supply at a point hundreds of miles from his southern frontier. His supplies were for the most part sent by water from Syria, on great skin rafts, as far as Bagdad. Thereafter they had to be carried by mule or camel along either bank of the river. To supplement this line of supply the Turk could make use of such portions of the Bagdad railway as he had been able to complete. The line was in order from Bagdad ninety miles northward to Samara, but from that point a gap of over 300 miles across the desert had not been bridged, and the tunnelling of the Taurus and Amanthus Mountains had not been completed. Below Kut the river was ours, and a fleet of transports could keep pace with our armies.

This advantage would have been greater but for the defects of the Tigris as a waterway. Long before the mouth of the Shat-el-Arab is reached from the Persian Gulf, the silt carried down by the twin rivers forms an ugly bar, which compels vessels of any size to discharge part of their cargo into lighters before they can cross. Britain had undertaken such buoying of the channel as had been done, but in view of the importance of Basra as a base for our campaign vigorous dredging was called for, and Sir George Buchanan, Chairman of the Rangoon Port Trust, was put in charge of this work.

The voyage from Basra to Bagdad occupies four to seven days, according to the state of the river. The shallows, floods, and "devils' elbows" which impede it could not be overcome except by some such complete system of drainage and embankment as had been outlined by Sir William Willcox, and for that there was neither time nor means. We had, therefore, to rely on transports drawing only some four or five feet, with a lighter attached on each side. Each brigade had a parent ship of this sort, and these in turn were fed by the local river boats, known as mahailas-picturesque little craft, with cutaway prows, masts raked forward, huge rudders, and lateen sails. By these means we supplied, with wonderfully few hitches, a fighting front hundreds of miles from its base; and the indefatigable transport work of our queer flotilla, as well as its fighting value, which was discussed in an earlier chapter, made it a chief factor in the success of our advance.

THE ARAB AND THE TURK.

With the regular Turkish forces pushed beyond Kut, the chief human enemy we had to face was the Arab




Fitting up a wireless apparatus in the desert

[Photopress.



Hoisting the aerial into position.

[Photopress.



Indian troops disembarking at Basra.

Topical

irregular. On promise of reward from the Turks, or on the chance of pillaging with impunity, he would hang upon our flanks, harass our outposts, and raid our camps, seldom charging in force, and always melting away before shell fire. Mounted on lean but wiry horses, armed with a rifle, a keen sword, a lance, and a bandolier of ammunition, and carrying only a packet of dates and a bag of grain, the Arab rode light, and was more than a match in mobility for our cavalry, with their six-stone load of accoutrements. The favourite plan of the Arab, however, was to close in in force on a small body of troops, or on a transport waggon in difficulties, and, firing from the saddle, shoot the horses first and try to wipe out the men without themselves dismounting. They observed no law or decency in their warfare, and were out less for victory than for loot. There was a curious childishness mixed with the savagery of some of their forays. As a reprisal, for instance, for the burning of one of their villages, they crept one night into a British slaughter-house, cut the tails off three hundred sheep, and made off. They showed no respect for the dead, and would leave their victims naked on the plain, or raid our cemeteries to strip the buried. More than once the burning memory of the rifled graves of their fellows lent more power to the bayonets of our Indian troops, in whose religion respect for the dead is a vital tenet. To the Turk the Arab was almost as great a discomfort as to the British. He would turn on his nominal ally and murder and rob him whenever the chance offered. The Turkish general, Saif Ullah, whom we captured at Amara, summed up the case against the Arab with the fervent wish that Briton and Turk could "join hands to make an end of these scavengers" before settling their own differences.

The Turk himself we found, on the contrary, a courteous and even chivalrous enemy, who did not conceal his disgust at the atrocities of his irregular Allies. The following incident, reported by Mr. Edmund Candler, who represented the British Press with the Mesopotamian forces, is typical of his conduct:—

"When two of our airmen fell into their hands some time ago the Turkish General Nur-ud-Din sent an Arab into our camp, at their request, asking us to send over their kits. The Political Agent handed over the men's belongings and some money for purchases, but the prisoners had gone north when the messenger arrived, whereupon Nur-ud-Din sent the kits and the money back, with his regrets and a courteous message that the airmen were his guests and would be in no need. We are gathering all our resources for the destruction of the Turk, but we bear him no resentment, and on the whole I think he nourishes no very deep-rooted malice towards us. I asked an officer why they had come in against us. He did not seem quite clear about it, said that we had not helped them in the Balkans War, and mumbled something I could not catch about politics.

"We often wish that we were killing Germans, the real menace to civilisation, and not these dupes."

THE BRITISH SOLDIER IN BIBLICAL SETTING.


The oldest land in the world soon began to take on at least the superficial signs of British occupation. Of its Biblical traditions the only one that impressed the Tommy with its continuity was that of the Great Flood. When he had been shifted from camp to camp by the overflow waters of the Tigris, and had pushed his guns for hours together on rafts over three feet of water occupying what the maps declared to be dry land, he was quite prepared for a repetition of the Deluge. At Kurna, where according to the Arabs lay the Garden of Eden, he was shown the authentic Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, and was so far moved as to re-label the streets with such names as "Serpent's Corner" and "Temptation Square." Elsewhere his changes were more prosaic. Mr. Candler thus describes Amara under British occupation:—

"At every turning from the main thoroughfare the street names are inscribed in English beside the Arabic characters. There is an opportunity here for an imaginative touch, but one finds a nomenclature which is truly British. The Sook-al-Casareen of the Arabs has become plain 'Butchers Street,' the Sook-al-Khabareen 'Baker Street.' 'Sapper Street,' 'Pontoon Street,' 'Soap Street' proclaim the needs of the hour as if the scribe of Harounal-Raschid had never existed. Every fifty yards or so there is an Arab café.

"It is here that the caravan route from Dizful, in Persia, meets the Tigris, and Amara is the headquarters of the Sabarans. A group of Kurds passed in the street in their high bulbous hats of rough felt, their smooth locks hanging free and clipped about their ears, like the Mahsuds or Powindahs of Afghanistan. Two of these rough mountaineers meet and embrace and salute each other in alternate kisses on each cheek. A Jew in his Turkish fez bound round with a kefich is proclaiming to an Arab policeman, now a servant of the British raj, that he has been robbed of a piece of silver, He repeats his tale with solemn gestures,

which might be an accompaniment to a recital of the Book of Jeremiah. A pale, scholarly-looking Persian from Dizful is appraising a skein of wool at the opposite stall. A wild-eyed Bakhtiari glances nervously into the café and hurries on. And threading these people there passes the proud, upright, well-groomed figure of the Indian sepoy or the young British subaltern, upon whom authority sits lightly, and whose competence to handle the tribes of the desert or the mountain is evident at a glance, back view or front, down the whole length of the street."

At Basra, which had been our base from the early days of the campaign, we made substantial improvements in the town and surroundings. We acquired land on a system of fair purchase, which came as a novelty to the natives, bridged the creeks, built new roads, and made embankments to contain the floods. We succeeded, too, in restoring order and confidence among the people. Before long the Arabs of the district came readily to work for us, thereby releasing men for the front; and an officer writing home towards the end of 1915 was able to report that no shot had been fired in Basra for months. The maintenance of peace and security in the great stretch of Mesopotamia which we now held depended, of course, upon the further progress of events at Kut and to the north of it, the consideration of which must be left to a later chapter.



A view of one of the streets in Kut.



The launching of an Italian gas attack against the Austrian positions on the Isonzo. [Central Press.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE CAMPAIGN ON THE ISONZO.

ITALY'S TRADITIONAL POLICY—A CLEARLY CONCEIVED OBJECT—ILL EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS—WHERE THE CHIEF BLOW HAD TO BE STRUCK—THE CARSO THE KEY POSITION—DESPERATE FIGHTING BEFORE GORIZIA.

AR, says Clausewitz, is policy raised to its highest power. The old tag should never be quoted without apology, but when the matter in hand is the Italian campaign the excuses need be neither many nor elaborate. Italy took the field against Austria in May, 1915, because the policy forced upon her by her history and her geographical position demanded it, and having opened hostilities she developed them with the strictest regard for the object at which she aimed. Even the uncertainty of will encouraged in Parliament by Signor Giolitti had a military consequence. Once committed, she served, as she still does, a clearly-conceived end with a single-minded devotion unequalled by any other belligerent Power. If now a more real unity with the Allies is desired, the change has been brought about by an understanding that, in a struggle which the strongest nations of the world are waging with all their force, even a limited particular object cannot be attained by a limited effort. The enemy must be finally defeated before any gains can be secured.

But the policy remains the same. Italy wishes to complete the work of liberation, and when the task is finished she must, if she is not to be exposed to continual F 3-VO1. IV.

danger, hold the mastery of the Adriatic. The stones which have still to be added to the fortress walls of the kingdom will necessarily be broken from Austria, who at different times, and after a resistance the obstinacy of which has varied with her momentary embarrassments, has furnished reluctantly much material for the main building, and when the walls are built the outer moat must be free from Austrian tampering. Even in 1866 Austria, while surrendering Venetia, was able to retain some fragments. Those fragments will be the victor's prize in the present conflict. Italy means to guard against attack across the Eastern Alps by attaching to herself the Italian-speaking districts of the Trentino, and to obtain control of the Adriatic by conquering Trieste and the surrounding country, with its Italian population. Austria is her enemy, and knowing her own mind she is really at war with Austria alone; between her and Germany peace is kept.

So much preface to a consideration of the Isonzo campaign is needed to resolve a contradiction which to many persons appears flagrant. How, they ask, can Italy be in deadly earnest, as we are told she is, and yet confine her energies to waging war in what is and must always remain a secondary and indecisive theatre? The



Italian artillery passing through a village on their way to the frontier.

[Central News.



Italian (artillery on the march through a mountain pass.

[Central News.

answer is that since she from the first set before herself a limited object her concentration is the measure of her earnestness. Of course, her leaders always understood the final agreement of her interests with those of the Allies. Although she might by her individual efforts occupy the coveted territories, nevertheless her ultimate possession would, they knew, be determined by the success of the wider cause. Their thoughts on this matter seem to have taken two directions. In the early months they hoped to seize Trieste and the Trentino, and thence, if the war continued, to join in more ambitious operations when the armies of a reconstructed Balkan League, rein-

forced by Russian, French, and British troops, appeared in Hungary; later, when Bulgaria had taken the wrong turning, and Servia had been overwhelmed, easy confidence gave way to prudent calculation. and they began to turn towards cooperation with the original Entente Powers as the necessary means to the conquests they desired, and not only as the method whereby they could secure to themselves the gains in which their own strength had already established them.

PLANS DICTATED By Geography.

When the Government at Rome declared war, on May 23rd, the Italian General Staff knew exactly what had to be done. On the north the Trentino, which is no more than the valleys of the Middle Adige and its tributaries, together with the flanking mountains, gave no oppor-


tunities for a great offensive, but many for a stubborn, prolonged, and successful defence against whatever force might be employed in the attack. There was nothing to be done except to press forward a little way into Austrian territory, and by capturing the passes beyond the frontier to prevent a later invasion of the Lombard and Venetian plains. North-east of the Trentino, in the Carnic Alps, all the natural advantages rested with the enemy. The Puster Thal and the Gail Thal provided them with excellent lateral lines of communication, a convenience which the Italians entirely lacked, while the varying angle of the mountain slopes, precipitous

on the southern face, but beyond the passes comparatively gentle towards the north, was worth many corps to the army defending Tyrol and Carinthia, or attempting an attack from bases in those provinces. So greatly did the conditions favour Austria, that Count Conrad von Hotzendorff, when as Chief of Staff in Vienna he planned an offensive campaign against Italy, chose, it is believed, the Carnic Alps as the front on which to deliver his decisive blow. In the circumstances, General Count Cadorna and his lieutenants who directed the Italian forces had reason to congratulate themselves on their capture early in the war of key positions in the mountains from which they were

able to frighten the enemy and check any advance against their own more vulnerable country. Over 300 miles of the 400 which the whole frontier covered being thus ruled out, there remained only the eastern frontier, the sixty miles or more of the Isonzo valley between Plezzo and the sea. Italy had scarcely a choice. Every wise consideration urged her to show a bold front to the north for safety. and to strike for splendour eastward with all the strength she could muster.

Happily the Isonzo sector, though the countryside presented difficulties enough, did very definitely promise success Austria was deeply involved in the great Germanic onslaught on Russia; she had also to watch warily the Servian border; as a consequence she had few troops to spare for the Italian theatre. Moreover, the

Moreover, the Government at Vienna seems not to have understood until the last moment that Italy would enforce by war if necessary her claims to territorial concessions. This failure of intelligence in Austria could and should have been turned to advantage. On May 4th Signor Salandra and his colleagues in the Cabinet at Rome, having decided that they were being trifled with in the negotiations which had dragged on uselessly for six weeks, denounced the Austro-Italian Alliance. Then was the time to strike. Delay only gave to Austria an undeserved opportunity to atone for her blindness by setting in order the defences she had neglected too long for her own safety.



The Isonzo Front.

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Heavy guns in position on the Italian front.

[Central News.



Firing an Italian field gun.

[Central News.

And there is every reason to believe that the Italian military chiefs fully comprehended the value of time, and meant not to waste it. They were thwarted by a political party.

Signor Giolitti, who had gone out of office after the war against the Turks in Tripoli rather than face the financial and economic difficulties into which his adventure had plunged the nation, was the most powerful man in public life. He commanded a majority in both Houses of Parliament. He had surrendered place but not power. It had long been his practice when an obstacle which threatened his popularity as a Minister confronted him to escape responsibility by resigning, and still to assert an authority none the less decisive because it was unofficial. The will to govern in opposition as well as in office is not unknown to Parliamentary leaders and parties in other countries-some eminent men have even prided themselves on being its instruments-but never have its effects been so unhappy as they were in Italy last year. When the Cabinet had not only taken but had publicly announced its choice, Signor Giolitti and his friends intervened behind the backs of the national representatives and sought, by making more modest demands, to strike an easy bargain with Austria and Germany. This manœuvre involved the Government in a political crisis which, though it ended in the triumph of Signor Salandra, held back the army for two, or perhaps three, precious weeks. Instead of seizing the vantage points which might have led to a rapid success and spared many thousand lives, the High Command was forced to wait, uncertain after all whether the campaign would be fought.

ALL HASTE NECESSARY.

What need there was for haste a glance at the map will show. For some four-fifths of its course the Isonzo flows through wild, broken, mountainous country, cutting its way seawards along a deep gorge overhung by steep and in many places almost inaccessible heights. At Tolmino a little pocket in the highlands affords a site for the village and military station, but the country is not easy there or anywhere else above Gorizia. At Gorizia the Friulian plain stretches across the river; and although the hills soon shut it in on the north, the east, and the south, the route across it is practicable for a large army advancing eastward. On the southern side of the little patch of lowland rises the Carso, a desolate, scarred plateau, whose typical forms, bitten out by water action on permeable limestone, might, with their barren rocky patches divided by ravines so deep and narrow that their beds are often invisible from the summits, have been designed to give every help to a small army resisting the advance of much more numerous forces. Gorizia and the Carso bar the way to Trieste. They are difficult to take, but once taken they give the invader the necessary room in which to develop his offensive. Both sides realised their value long ago. Austria's defence, however, was not completely prepared last spring, and the Italian armies, had they been allowed to act with the utmost haste, might have won in the first week of the campaign what they have since failed to secure during a year's hard fighting. It was in hindering a rapid advance on the Carso and the immediate capture of Gorizia that the Parliamentary crisis cost Italy most dear.

On May 23rd, freed at last, Count Cadorna advanced across the eastern frontier with two armies, under the subordinate command of General Frugoni and the Duke of Aosta. He designed to secure his flank and at the

same time to threaten the Austrian northern wing by capturing certain dominating mountain crests on the Upper Isonzo, to thrust his centre forward to the Gorizia bridge-head, and to strike hard with his right across the Carso against the rear of Gorizia. Thus the decisive blow was to be delivered in the south. Haste being of all things the most necessary, the Italian Commanderin-Chief, assembling his cavalry close to the head of the Adriatic, at the earliest possible moment launched the whole body across the frontier, with imperative orders to seize the bridges across the Isonzo due west of Monfalcone. to press on to the Carso, and to hold the plateau edge. The cavalry leader, however, was stricken with doubt on the way, permitted the Austrians to blow up the bridges, and failed utterly to accomplish his mission. Elsewhere things went better. On May 24th the troops on the left, crossing the Starasella Pass by the one good road leading north-eastward from Udine and Cividale, entered Caporetto, on the Middle Isonzo above Tolmino, while the centre occupied Cormons and other places west of Gorizia. But the right was the crucial point, and there the check, complete for the moment, was in its ultimate effects most serious. In fine weather the early military mistake would, perhaps, have been repaired, for the engineers, who at once busied themselves with choosing a suitable spot for a crossing and bringing up their appliances, were ready after four days to transport the advance guards across the river. Fortune was against them. A sudden flood, far exceeding in volume the ordinary overflows of late spring, swept down the Isonzo Valley, swelling to a roaring torrent the stream which had been shrinking rapidly into its summer bed. The enemy, not slow to benefit by his good luck, broke the banks of the Sagrado canal and turned the water over the countryside to multiply the obstacles created by the river. Thus the pause in the Italian offensive was prolonged until almost all hope of rapid progress had vanished. When at length the first troops were flung across the Isonzo and gained the slopes leading to the plateau the end of June was at hand.

DIFFICULT CROSSING AT SAGRADO.

The relation of the river below Gorizia to the canal, and of both waterways to the Carso, made the crossing peculiarly difficult. When it passes beyond the range of the guns on the Gorizia defences, the Isonzo runs close under the shadow of the plateau. At Gradisca and Sagrado the river bed can be swept by fire from the neighbouring heights. Further down, the stream takes its course southsouth westward, while the Carso, now with the canal, which begins at Sagrado, hugging its flank, falls back to the south-east. The plain dividing the lower reaches of the river from the upland would, had they moved quickly, have served the Italians excellently by giving them the chance to cross the Isonzo at a spot where the Austrian artillery in the dominating position was, by reason of distance, not troublesome. Count Cadorna intended his cavalry to seize the opportunity, and though the cavalry dash failed the opening remained until, when the floods came, the water from both canal and river poured out over the ground on which the invaders had hoped to secure their bridgehead. The Italians had either to wait or to attempt to force a passage higher up against more serious military opposition. They decided to act, and selected Sagrado because the immediate difficulties of the crossing were there counterbalanced in part by the cover that once the passage was made, could be found on the Austrian shore for the attacking troops. Hidden by the darkness,



Italian artillerymen hauling a gun over a rough road.

[Central News.



A cavalry patrol in the mountains.

[Central News.

late on June 9th, some infantry companies crossed the river in boats undetected. They reached the slope above Sagrado, where they secured a foothold. Behind them the engineers laboured to construct a bridge. Unhappily, at dawn the work was still unfinished, and the Austrians, unhampered by any serious attack, turned the full energy of their guns against the pontoons, which they wrecked beyond all prospect of early repair. The Italians, owning their failure, when night came withdrew all their troops to the western bank. They had suffered considerable losses for no result save the capture of some Austrian prisoners, whom the advanced guard took near Sagrado and carried off safely in the retreat after the day's fighting.

A different method was plainly essential to success. The engineers set themselves to hasten the draining of the flooded plains, while the Command prepared for an

advance on a wider scale. In the third week of June the new movement began. Close to the sea, but outside the Carso sector. and beyond the limits of the waterlogged area, which for a time cut them off from an effectual share in any important operations, the Italians were already over the Isonzo and holding Monfalcone. From Monfalcone, on June 20th, they pushed northward, marching through the drying marsh to join the force facing Sagrado. Meanwhile, the Sagrado crossing was attempted afresh. This time, after a severe struggle, complete success was attained. During June 23rd, 24th, and the following days the fighting was often desperate,

Plava

OPlava

The country round Gorizia.

but the assailants made headway steadily, until the last days of the month found Italian troops entrenched on the Carso slopes far up towards the plateau summit. The first step in the decisive sector had been taken towards the conquest of Trieste. Later, in two great battles, fought the first in July and August and the second in October and November, the Italians made good use of the gains they had obtained in June. They did not win a complete victory, but they advanced so far that before the end of the year the Austrian grip on the Carso was shaken.

THE FOURTH ATTACK ON GORIZIA.

It is time to turn attention to Gorizia, the prize for which the armies further south contended, and itself the object of a direct attack. Gorizia alone has no strength, but the

hills which protect it are almost impregnable. On the west, or Italian, bank of the Isonzo every approach is dominated by the Monte Sabatino ridge and its buttress Podgora. These two heights were converted into most formidable and elaborate fortresses by the Austrians, who understood well the value of a first-class bridge-head opposite Gorizia, and, although they were not concerned elsewhere south of Tolmino to defend any ground beyond the Isonzo, were resolved not to surrender a great natural advantage for any price below the maximum. And, as if Podgora and Sabatino were not in themselves sufficiently strong, the garrisons enjoyed the ever-ready support of heavy artillery on Monte Santo, a still higher and more formidable mountain on the Austrian side of the river-

Entering Cormons with its first rush, the Italian centre pressed on at once to the Gorizia defences. While the

main attack by the right wing across the Isonzo to the southward hung fire Count Cadorna sought to clear the west bank of the river higher up stream. His infantry advanced heroically. Without waiting for an adequate artillery preparation-and indeed the heavy artillery did not begin to intervene effectually until many weeks laterthe troops tried to storm Monte Sabatino and Podgora by frontal assault. They failed. Courage could do nothing against elaborate and undamaged entrenchments most advantageously placed and protected by miles of intricate, uncut barbedwire. Round the southern end of Podgora, where the uplands sink down into the Friulian

plain, the Italians made some slight progress, but there also the enemy line held. The Austrians had not neglected to carry their trenches from the heights across the lower ground to the river. They had not spared the use of wire, and they knew how to counteract any weakness inherent in the immediate position by an incessant fire from their guns upon the neighbouring summits. Italian infantrymen broke into a small village lying about 2,000 yards from the Gorizia railway bridge, and carried it house by house with the bayonet, but the trenches beyond were not pierced. Realising their mistake, and that all their sacrifices had brought them nothing valuable, the Italian generals ordered their men to stand fast while they planned a more methodical assault.

Early in July the second offensive began. It opened with a burst of gunfire which, though it was far surpassed

by the bombardments carried out later, was nevertheless immensely more devastating than anything before accomplished. On the Austrian positions upon Sabatino the shells did little damage, so that the storming columns who advanced when the cannonade ceased found the defence unshaken and suffered a complete repulse. On Podgora the state of things was very different. Across a tangled mass of broken steel and concrete fortification the Italians charged. They swept over the summit, and the hill was theirs. Then followed for them a worse experience than the horrors of the assault. For hours the enemy shelled them from all the dominating hills. Exposed utterly, without the possibility of finding shelter, they were forced to give way and retire a little down the western slope.

Another period of quiet followed. From early August until mid-October little was done because little was attempted. In the interval many heavy guns were brought forward to blast a road for the infantry through the Austrian lines. They set to work on October 18th; the effect they produced was, if the statements made by Italian officers and by prisoners taken later from the enemy are exactly accurate, enormous. Highexplosive shells shattered the huge boulders that covered the hillsides and sent the fragments hurtling through the entrenchments. The roofs of the underground passages from the rear, along which the Austrians rushed reinforcements, were wrecked, and fearful execution was done within. Once

The advance guard of an Austrian Alpine corps scaling a hillside. [Photopress.]

the southern face of Sabatino catching fire the flames went leaping upward across the Austrian trenches. Watching peasants on mountains far away in the west saw the distant glow, and delightedly shouted to one another: "Monte Santo is bathed in smoke and flame." Hope ran high, only to be disappointed. For a time the crest was untenable by either side, but when the fire had burned itself out the Austrians were once more in possession. Undaunted by failure, the Italians continued their offensive. Attack followed attack, and once the assaulting columns reached the summit. There a few terribly wasted battalions kept their foothold, waiting vainly for reinforcements, until sheer weight of numbers

hurled them back. Neither Podgora nor Sabatino could be taken and held. In December the third offensive ceased, leaving the Austrian main defences intact, and to the Italians no more result than the capture of some valuable but not essential positions on the Blavia saddle, which connects the two summits whereat the defeated attacks had aimed.

OVER THE ISONZO AT PLAVA.

Podgora and Sabatino proved nearly invulnerable, because loftier mountains on the Austrian side of the Isonzo lent them constant and unhampered support. One way to success was early obvious to the Italians. They might clear their own bank by progress beyond the

river. They decided to cross at Playa. about four miles above Monte Santo and eight miles above Gorizia, whence they could strengthen the offensive engaged in by their centre by driving southward against the northern defences of Gorizia. Besides helping the troops before Padgora and Sabatino, the threat from the north would be a real assistance to the main attack against the Carso.

On June 9th, when a crossing over the Lower Isonzo at Sagrado no sooner begun than abandoned because of the serious obstacles, a small force reached Plava by boat and surprised the Austrian pickets. There was no turning back, but with the Austrians once warned the reinforcing of the advanced guard from across the

Isonzo was so extremely difficult that several days passed before the bridge-head was made good. Plava was dominated by an isolated hill known as 383, itself dominated in its turn by more imposing heights. It would have suited the Italians best to seize at once both 383 and the neighbouring mountain fortress of Kuk, lying to the south-east. Their small available strength was not, however, equal to great adventures, and they contented themselves for the time with the lower position. Even the capture of 383 was no child's play. More than one attack failed before the troops in the final assault succeeded, after a gallant struggle through line upon line of wire and a furious hand-to-hand combat in the

Austrian trenches. On June 17th the Italians occupied the hill top.

After the excellent start the Plava operations languished. For several months the Austrians showed the only enterprise. They tried to retake the lost ground, while the Italians, who, though they yielded nothing, gained nothing, stood immovable. Neither the summer nor the autumn general offensive was forwarded by the brigades at Plava. Count Cadorna's plans for the October-November battle included an advance beyond Kuk against Monte Santo, and, as a consequence, a distraction of Austrian attention from the struggle west of the Isonzo for Sabatino and Podgora. His intentions were not fulfilled. Even Kuk held out, and Monte Santo was not gravely menaced. At the

end of the year the opposing forces stood upon the ground they had occupied in June.

BRILLIANT HILL FIGHTING.

Before returning to the Carso fighting, which, as taking place in the decisive sector, should be the last as well as the first special topic dealt with in this chapter, one may profitably glance at the rugged mountainous country between Plava and the Carnic Alps. Caporetto, it will be remembered, was seized on the second day of the war, and an approach to Tolmino was made at the same time, but whereas Tolmino, lying behind the Upper Isonzo, and guarded in front by two strong mountain positions, was not seriously threatened the Caporetto movement more than justified its first promise. When Plava was

An Italian field mortar in position. [Central News.

taken on June 9th the Austrians around Gorizia no longer concerned themselves about the troops at Caporetto, who had originally been, though far distant, a potential danger to their northern flank. The nearer risk had swallowed up the more remote. Relieved of their function as a menace towards the south-east, the Alpini on the higher reaches turned their attention northward, with excellent results. Despite all obstacles, many seemingly insuperable, they advanced steadily until their progress excited the fears of the Austrian General Staff. Against them neither the Plezzo basin nor the Predil Pass could be accounted safe. Ultimately they might arrive at Tarvis, where Masséna, in the French

Revolutionary Wars, opened the road to Vienna by a brilliant victory, and so come to command one main route from the north Italian plains to the Danube Valley.

The first move forward from Caporetto was a march up the Isonzo bank to near Zaga and an assault across the stream upon the Polonnik ridge. At Zaga the river makes a sharp bend, and after having flowed for many miles due south-westward turns directly to the south-east. The angle shuts in a tangle of desolate crests and broken, rocky slopes. The invaders' first capture, secured at once and without difficulty, was the Polonnik ridge; their chief objective was Monte Nero, a mountain which, overtopping all its fellows, promised to the successful assailant the mastery of the whole region.

defeated Austrians withdrew to Monte Nero, closely followed by the Italians, who had won the first advantage, while other troops swiftly built a bridge over the Isonzo at Caporetto, and themselves crossed to join in the fighting. The assault, delivered without delay from two directions, was entirely fortunate. A main column advancing from the Caporetto bridge ascended during the night by the obviously practicable southwestern face and stormed the summit. The Austrians should have watched this route, but permitted themselves to be drawn away to a far stronger part of their line by the Alpini, with the inevitable result that at the critical moment they could not meet promptly the most pressing

From Polonnik the

danger. On its north-western side Monte Nero is protected by a most forbidding precipice, yet up the precipice the Italian mountaineers climbed. Not numerous enough to seize the whole position themselves, they created a decisive diversion by their sudden appearance near the mountain top, roped together, and clinging with hands and feet to the rock wall, and played their part bravely in their fellows' victory. From Monte Nero the Italians, after defeating repeated heavy counter-attacks, pressed on north-westward, continuing their achievements against other mountain garrisons until they established a definite control over the Plezzo basin. Monte Rombon, north of Plezzo, was occupied during the early autumn. Since



Italian artillery officers range finding in the mountains.

[Central News.



An Italian siege gun and its crew.

[Topical Press.

then the fighting on the Upper Isonzo and among the surrounding hills has died away into something like the ordinary trench warfare. The one notable recent development is an advance, which is still continuing slowly, in the Mozeli, south-eastward from Monte Nero. It has not been pressed, as was the offensive in the direction of Plezzo, but it is none the less significant, for it suggests a resolve ultimately to extract every benefit from the advantages won in the hills east and north-east of Caporetto. From the Mozeli, Tolmino is vulnerable, and with Tolmino in their hands the Italians could, by joining the onceremote and soon-abandoned Caporetto threat to the Plava menace, confront the northern defences of Gorizia with a new and pressing danger.

BATTLES ON THE CARSO.

The Carso offensive was left above at the point to which the Italians had carried it by the end of June. Its later stages must be related briefly. Count Cadorna, having pushed his trenches almost to the plateau edge, suspended operations while his reserves assembled for what he hoped would be a decisive assault. The Carso, as one may be permitted to point out again, is the key to both Gorizia and Trieste. From the beginning the Italian General Staff held this opinion and acted upon it. Therefore, fierce and bloody as was the fighting for Monte Sabatino and Podgora during the summer and autumn battles, the struggle on the plateau was still more furious. July, the Italians developed a great offensive, designed to capture the western end of the Carso. The section they strove to occupy is backed by a depression known as the Vallone, which runs from north to south from the Gorizia face to Monfalcone. Upon the detached and threatened portion of upland, which in its shape and the relation it bears to the main block may be likened to the half-severed head of a short, fat caterpillar, stand two slight eminences, Monte San Michele on the one flank


and a small hill behind Doberdo on the other. The Italian wings fought desperately to secure both, and San Michele was occupied by Bersaglieri for a few hours. They were not completely successful, although, by persisting in their attempts until the end of August, they achieved much. They carried many Austrian defence works, took nearly 20,000 prisoners, and established vantage points from which they commanded the Vallone. After a six weeks' interval devoted to more elaborate preparations, Count Cadorna recommenced his attacks in October. Throughout the next month and a half his gallant infantrymen thrust their line painfully forward, at the cost of great losses. December found them resting, with San Michele at last safely in their possession and their south-eastern outposts on the shore of the Doberdo Lake. As matters now stand, and have stood during the winter and early spring, the greater part, perhaps seventenths, of the semi-isolated plateau head is held by Italian troops. To drive the enemy from the other fraction should not be beyond their power. The task once accomplished, they would own a compact hill position, five miles wide by two and a half deep, ringed round by valley or plain, as an advanced base from which to develop afresh with renewed confidence their campaign against Trieste. Among the brigades on the Carso are many Bersaglieri battalions, sure sign of the importance attached to the operations by the High Command. Their forward movement will, no doubt, mark the critical stage of the next general assault.

Since New Year's Day the general position on the Isonzo has not greatly changed. After eleven months of war the Italians have not occupied Gorizia. Part of the Carso is in their hands, and on the Upper Isonzo they hold many mountain strongholds, brilliantly taken from the Austrians. Elsewhere they have tested the enemy's defence to the full, but except for the river crossing at Plava have not advanced far beyond the line they took up during May, 1915.




General Cadorna, with officers of his staff, inspecting troops on the Isonzo front.

[Central News.




The ruins of a Zeppelin shed wrecked by the Russians

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Feeding a French airship from cylinders of hydrogen.

[Sport and General.



A German airship half-way out of its shed.

[Record Press.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE AIRSHIP.


THE NEGLECT OF THE AIRSHIP IN ENGLAND—ITS MILITARY USEFULNESS—THE VARIOUS TYPES—DESCRIPTION OF THE ZEPPELINS—THE RAIDS.

URING 1915 the airship, which had been despised by aeronautical "experts" in the Allied countries, became unpleasantly prominent in the war news, and its doings are, not even excepting those of the submarines, perhaps the most distinctive feature of the war. The Allied, and especially the British, Governments were accused very bitterly of lack of foresight in their neglect of airships, and, though the facts of the case cannot yet be told, it would give a false idea of the war to defer all discussion of their activities

The Government as a whole, which really and truly represented the people of the country in this matter at any rate, took practically no interest in things aeronautic. Consequently the amount of money obtainable before the war by the Air Department at the Admiralty and by the Department of Military Aeronautics at the War Office was very definitely limited. True, Mr. Winston Churchill, who was personally intensely keen on aviation, managed to extract more money for the Air Department than anyone on the financial side intended should be spent on aircraft, and this must always be accounted to his credit, for without this support many British aeroplane manufacturers


would have been ruined long before the war, and sources of aircraft supply would have been practically non-existent. Still, even Mr. Churchill could not drag forth unlimited money from the pockets of the Treasury, and the million or two pounds which would have been needed to start an airship fleet would have seemed gross extravagance in the days before Britain began to spend at the rate of five millions a day. Money, therefore, being limited, the Naval Air Department and the Department of Military Aeronautics had to make up their minds whether to spend their pocket money on airships or aeroplanes. Now an airship of the Zeppelin class would have cost at a first attempt probably £250,000 to build, and it would have needed at least two sheds in different parts of the country, away from where it was built, so that it could find a refuge at the end of its cross-country experimental trips, and these sheds would probably have cost another £50,000 apiece, so that all told, with these and other outside charges, half a million pounds would have gone before even one satisfactory big airship had been produced.

Aeroplanes, on the other hand, cost only about £1,000 apiece, so that with £100,000 spent on 100 aeroplanes,



One of the gondolas of a Zeppelin type airship, showing the central connecting passage.

[Central Press.]



German airships in their shed.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

and the other £400,000 spent on sheds, quarters for men, pay of officers and men, motor vehicles for transport, tools, spare parts, and all the other expenses of an aeroplane establishment, it was possible to make quite a respectable show, to learn a great deal about aeroplanes, to train a number of pilots, to lay out several aerodromes, and altogether to form the nucleus of a really effective, if very small, aeroplane force. Which is precisely what was done.

If the available money had all been spent on airships England would have had no aeroplanes at the beginning of the war, and no pilots, and yet would not have had an airship fleet either, but merely two or three experiments. Consequently the army would have been blind

at Mons for lack of aeroplanes, which would probably have meant that it would have been cut to pieces, thus exposing the French left wing and leaving the road to Paris open to the German advance, and quite possibly the war would have been over before the end of 1914, with dire results for the Allies. At best, England would have lost almost all her original Expeditionary Force, and would have been in a far less favourable position than she has been throughout the war. It seems to follow that, whatever blame rests on the country for not spending many millions on both airships and aeroplanes, no blame attaches to the Naval and Military Aeronautical Authorities in preferring, given a very limited sum, to spend it on aeroplanes rather than on airships.

stated publicly in Germany and in Scandinavia that the crew of one Zeppelin were all given the Iron Cross for this co-operation with a submarine, or submarines, which ultimately succeeded in sinking the Cressy, Aboukir, and Hogue in the North Sea, thanks seemingly to scouting by this Zeppelin. If all the Zeppelin fleet together could count no more success than this one action it would have justified its existence, for the value of these ships would pay for the majority of the Zeppelins built since war began, seeing that a Zeppelin costs a mere £100,000 to £150,000 or so—perhaps less, now that the Germans have improved their methods of production and have speeded up their output.

Up to the end of the first week in April, 1916,

something over 300 people were killed and over 700 injured in Great Britain, according to official statements, by airship bombs. But if the Germans had had the political foresight to save up their Zeppelins till they had a fleet of a hundred or two hundred of them ready to launch on England at once, as they would have had by the end of 1916, they would not only have done immense moral and material damage, but they would almost certainly have found the English—according to national custom -unprepared to meet them. As it was, they sent their ships over first of all one or two at a time, and then half a dozen at a time, so that England was able to take the measure of their effectiveness gradually, and has



A "listening post" used by the French anti-aircraft service.

[Sport and General.

THE MILITARY USES OF AIRSHIPS.


That, however, does not mean that neglect of airships by the country and by the Government was justifiable. The German airships have been one of the surprises of the war. It is mere self-deception to pretend that German airships have been of no military value—using the word military to include their work for the navy. Scouting airships over the North Sea and the Baltic have been of the greatest help to the German fleet in detecting the presence of British ships, and so enabling weaker German sea-squadrons to escape, and in co-operating with submarines. It has been

been warned in spite of herself to prepare defences

As for the effects of airship raids on the people themselves, it is gratifying to British national pride to find how little the people have been frightened. Naturally there has been a certain amount of panic where bombs have fallen in thickly-populated districts, but such an amount of panic is natural when unseen death is descending from heaven unexpectedly. Throw a cricket-ball into the air near a group of schoolboys, and then shout "Heads!" See how many will run aimlessly in panic, and see how comparatively few will stand and watch where it is going to fall.



An anti-aircraft gun and its revolving platform on the outskirts of Paris. [Sport and General.



A French anti-aircraft searchlight

[Sport and General.

Much of the air-bomb panic was of that sort, and it is surprising how few people have been affected by panic to the extent of leaving their homes and going to live in unraidable districts. If the panic were as great as the Germans would like neutrals to believe, all the eastern and midland cities would be depopulated by now, and the people would be living in Wales or Cornwall. Few people even go to the trouble of buying gas-masks, or of preparing cellars for residence during a raid. An overwhelming percentage, even in the most raided cities, prefer to gamble on the risk of not being hit; and as, up to the present, the odds work out at about 5,000 to I against, the chance seems worth taking, simply to avoid the trouble of all these preparations.

AIRSHIP PROJECTILES.

The bombs thrown from airships are of two kinds' The high-explosive bombs are commonly known as H.E.' or as T.N.T., owing to their being made of tri-nitrotoluol, an explosive of the nitro-glycerine species, but far more powerful than nitro-glycerine itself. The T.N.T. bomb is intended solely to shatter, and if such a bomb causes a fire it is by accident. Used against houses they are fairly deadly, and a 200 lb. T.N.T. bomb would probably demolish a good-sized hotel, or a large block of flats, if it fell fairly in the middle.

The other bombs used are incendiary. These have very low explosive powers, but contain a deadly mixture which, when the bombs burst, spreads over everything in the vicinity, and effectively sets fire to anything combustible. The stuff inside is called "Thermit," and is of the nature of the stuff inside the fireworks known as "Bengal lights," but burns much more fiercely—in fact, its burning temperature is about the hottest thing known, apart from artificially produced heats, such as furnace heats or oxy-acetylene flames. The result is that "Thermit" will set fire to damp materials, such as wet woodwork, when an ordinary petrol bomb would merely dry the outside.

The "Thermit" bombs are generally cone-shaped, with a handle at the apex and the fuse in the base. The casing is of thin metal, bound round with tarred rope, which increases the "burst" of the bomb, apparently by its elasticity—like those string-wound fireworks known as maroons—and also acts as an additional fire-lighter. Occasionally, however, the bombs never burst at all, but merely burn internally, so that one picks up a metal cone full of a kind of clinker or slag, and surrounded by burnt rope. Most of these bombs are big enough and heavy enough to knock a hole through the roof of an ordinary house, but would hardly smash a heavily-built public building, and they have no shattering power sideways, consequently unless they land squarely in the middle of a roof they are fairly harmless, for if they hit on the slant they merely glance off, and if they burst in the street they do no damage at all, unless someone happens to be standing close by where they burst and is sprinkled with burning "Thermit."

That is doubtless why the German airship people keep pretty closely to the system of dropping a big T.N.T. bomb or two, followed immediately by some incendiaries, so that if the high-explosives falling in a street blow out the side of a house the incendiaries may stand a chance of setting fire to the wreckage.

As a rule it does not work out in practice, though good enough in theory, and the most successful fires caused by bombs have been when incendiaries have fallen on cheap "match-box" dwelling-houses, or in storage

places, such as timber yards. Occasionally houses have set themselves alight after being smashed by high-explosive bombs, but, taking it all round, the actual effects of bombs have been—from the German point of view, and even from the enthusiastic bomb-designer's point of view—very disappointing. There have been some desperately narrow escapes. In one case they missed an important aero-engine factory by a matter of feet. In another they bombed, without hitting, a wayside farm alongside a straight, white road, evidently under the impression that it was a station on a somewhat important strategic railway.

TYPES OF AIRSHIPS.

The "Zeppelin" is only one type of airship among many, but as it is by far the most successful it gets the credit—or discredit—for everything. There are, in effect, three types of airships—the non-rigid, the semi-rigid, and the rigid.

The non-rigids are simply gas-bags of gold-beater's skin, or of special fabric, shaped to the approved cigar form, and with a car slung below. The gas-bag, or envelope, has to be kept in shape by internal pressure. To insure this the gas-bag has inside it another bag, known as a ballonet, which, when the main bag is full of gas, lies empty at the bottom of the envelope. As the gas escapes, or is let out, the ballonet is pumped up with air by a hand or engine-driven pump, and so the pressure of the gas above the ballonet is kept up, and the envelope is kept distended.

This type of ship has not been a very great success in large sizes, though it must be said that the German "Parseval" type and the French "Astra-Torres" have done very good work for the British Navy, as well as for the armies of their respective countries. In the smaller sizes, such as the little "submarine scouts," commonly known as "blimps," familiar to all who have travelled by sea along the British coast, the non-rigid type has been quite a success.

The semi-rigid type is a compromise, in which the non-rigid envelope has below it a rigid girder, to which the car is slung, so that if the envelope becomes flabby it does not interfere directly with the slinging of the car. Nevertheless, in this type also, which includes the German "Gross" and the French "Lebaudy," it is necessary to use ballonets to keep up the pressure inside the envelope so as to make it retain its shape. For some curious reason, connected perhaps with the difficulty of making a long, thin girder rigid enough to be reliable without being too heavy, the semi-rigid type has never been as successful as either the rigid or non-rigid types.

The rigid type differs from the others in having its framework outside the gas-bags. Thus, one may compare the three types to the invertebrates, vertebrates, and crustaceans of the animal world.

THE ZEPPELIN TYPE.

To the world in general there is only one rigid airship, the Zeppelin to wit. As a matter of fact the French "Spiess" airship was invented and actually made in model form long before the Zeppelin, and it is even hinted in France that Count Zeppelin, on a visit to some aeronautical meeting in Paris, saw the Spiess model and appropriated its basic ideas. However that may be, M. Spiess managed to get his ship out only a few months before the outbreak of war, and then it was not a huge success. Another rigid rival of the Zeppelin was the Schütte-Lanz, a ship which was in some ways





Another view: Destruction wrought by a single bomb during the same raid. $[Walshams\ Ltd.$

The cars contain

superior to the Zeppelin, in that it was built of wood instead of aluminium, and so was handier to make, experimentally at any rate, but more particularly in that it was cigar-shaped and not cylindrical, and so was a better "stream-line" shape—that is to say, it offered less resistance to the air, and so could move faster through it with the same engine-power. Three or four Schütte-Lanz ships were built before the war, and performed

quite well. It would seem, however, that under hard service conditions the wood skeleton "came unput," and so the good points of the Schütte-Lanz were combined with those of the Zeppelin, and the Schütte-Lanz works were turned on to build the combined and revised Zeppelins, which appear to be more of Schütte - Lanz shape and of Zeppelin internal construction. This story comes from a well-informed neutral source, and the idea is so eminently sensible that it is just what the practical Germans would be likely to do. Moreover, one Schütte-Lanz was wrecked by a gale on the Danish coast early in 1915; and as no one seems to have seen or heard of any others since then, the story of the amalgamation has much to support it.

ZEPPELIN CONSTRUCTION.

Viewed externally, a Zeppelin consists of a long narrow hull, shaped like a sixteen-sided tube, with egg-shaped ends, the nose end being blunter than the tail, rather

as if one had bisected an egg and had stuck the round top and pointed bottom on the front and back of the tubular body. The sixteen sides of the tube are an important feature in the structure.

Along the bottom of the body there is a V-shaped keel, which in itself forms a communication passage for the crew from bow to stern of the ship, besides acting as a stiffening girder against longitudinal strains to the ship. From the keel are slung two cars, or "gondels" as the Germans call them, from the fact that they are intended to float on water like gondolas. Each car is placed about half-way between the middle of the ship and the nearer end. In the centre of the ship the keel is bulged out to make a passenger cabin (in peace time), or a compartment for bombs and bomb-droppers in war.


With a British flying squadron at dusk.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

the engines, two in each car. Each engine works a shaft, like that of a motor-car, which again drives through bevel gearing a propeller, which is carried on a kind of outrigger of steel tubing built on to the sides of the tubular hull. Thus one gets two propellers forward, one on each side of the hull, and two aft, likewise one on each side. In addition, on some of the latest ships, the aft car carries a third engine, which drives direct on to a fifth propeller fixed at the stern of the car itself, just like the propeller on a ' pusher " aeroplane. Whether this is to be the standard fitting of the future is not known as yet, but it seems likely, as besides providing extra power it would probably be an advantage in " jockeying " the ship upwards with a sudden jump to escape from attacking aircraft or guns. This is done by depressing the tail and -pointing the nose upwards while driving full speed ahead. The sudden change in direction must necessarily put

a big strain on the structure of the ship, but it is possible in this way to jump 1,000 feet or so in about thirty seconds, so it is worth doing as an emergency exit from a tight corner.

In the forward car are located the navigating controls and the pilots. Each car also contains its complement of engineers. Machine-guns are carried in each car,



and in the central saloon as well, so that probably six machine-guns are carried below the hull.

It is stated, as the result of an examination of the wreckage of LZ 77, brought down at Revigny, in France, on February 21st, that two other machine-guns are carried on a turntable on top of the hull. This system of carrying guns to repel attacks from above was thought out for ships built in 1912 and 1913, and was abandoned for a time owing to the danger of the flame from the guns setting fire to the ship if there should be a gas-leak anywhere near them, but apparently this danger is regarded in war-time as being less than the danger from aeroplane bombs.

THE GIRDER WORK.

The hull of a Zeppelin is built up of sixteen longitudinal girders, made of a kind of lattice-work of strips of aluminium, or at any rate of an aluminium alloy. These main "stringers" are held in place and equidistant from one another by a number of thwartship girders, sixteen-sided hooplike polygons, of lattice-girder construction similar to the main girders. The number of these hoops varies according to the length of the ship, but there were about eighteen in the big ships built just before the war. These polygonal girders are braced internally and to one another by crisscross wire stays, which cut the ship into distinct compartments, the internal stays forming transverse walls in the tubular hull,

A five-storey house in Paris wrecked from top to bottom by a bomb from a Zeppelin. [Central News.

and the outside staying forming the sixteen flat sides of the tube itself. Across the thwartships partitions and across the inner wiring of the hoop-girders is stretched a strong network of ramie fibre fabric, which holds in place and takes the lift from the gas-bags. The gas-bags, one of which fits into each of the internal compartments, are cheese-shaped, except for the end ones, which are built to fit the egg-shaped ends, and each is separate from the others, so that if one is punctured or burst it does not affect the others. Outside the ramie fibre network, and separated from it by an air space formed by the depth of the girders, is an overcoat of heavy weather-proof material, the gas-bags thus being inside all the girder work and the visible casing being outside.

This air space was, of course, an accident in a way, and inseparable from such a system of construction, but it fills a very useful function, in that it reduces the risk of fire, for an incendiary bullet or a small incendiary grenade may penetrate the outer casing and never reach the gas-bag proper. Also, the air space acts as a blanket which keeps the gas within at a comparatively uniform temperature. Any sudden change in temperature has naturally a great effect on a large volume of gas, as every balloonist knows, which is one of the chief objections to the single-skin, single-gas-bag airship. A sudden contraction of gas—as when a balloon passes under a cloud on a sunny day—means a sudden descent

and throwing out ballast to maintain altitude. Contrariwise, sudden expansion, due to increased heat, means a sudden rise, and the release and wastage of gas to prevent the ship from rising too far.

Incidentally, it may be well to note here that various writers have made an elementary error in stating that to economise gas on a long journey the Germans have invented an arrangement by which instead of releasing and wasting gas on rising to a great height, or when there is a sudden rise in temperature, the superfluous gas is pumped out, compressed, and "bottled" for future use. The yarn was evidently started as a boast by some ingenious German, and has been swallowed by credulous Englishmen and Americans. It seems, however, to

be a basic physical fact that any bottle (steel bottles about ten feet long are used for storing compressed hydrogen) must weigh more than the weight which could be lifted by the amount of hydrogen which could be compressed into it. Consequently the re-bottling story may be regarded as pure fiction.

THE COMPARTMENT IDEA.

The idea of dividing a Zeppelin into compartments is precisely that of bulkheading a ship. Cross bracing of the hull is necessary to secure rigidity, and by making the cross bracing water-tight—or in this case gas-tight—safety against sudden sinking is also secured. Also, in an airship, the ends of the ship are relieved of the



Views of L77 after she had been brought down by the French gunners:
Officers examining the wreckage.

[Topical.



French aviators inspecting the remains of a propeller.

[Topical.



Part of the wrecked car of the airship.

[Topical.

excessive pressure when the ship rears up on her tail, or dives suddenly, the pressure in a Zeppelin being taken by the transverse bracing, where in a single-bag ship it would be all concentrated on one end of the bag.

The gas-bags in a Zeppelin are so arranged as to size that if two or three bags are punctured by a shell, and lose all their gas, the ship will still keep afloat, so long, of course, as the escaping gas does not catch fire. It is even said that by throwing overboard heavy articles, such as bombs, ammunition, guns, &c., the bare hull and the crew could be kept afloat by ten or twelve compartments out of the original eighteen.

It has been said that the modern Zeppelins are so designed that in extreme emergencies the whole of the engines can be jettisoned bodily, and we know from British official reports published early in April that a Zeppelin which was hit either by bombs from an aeroplane or by a shell from a gun dropped "machinery" of some sort. One assumes it was wireless apparatus, or spare engine parts. Also one knows that the big petrol tanks fitted for long distance raids are built to be jettisoned quickly by releasing a couple of straps. All this is with the idea of giving the crew a sporting chance of drifting ashore if brought down at sea, or of being helped into friendly territory by a favouring wind. The Germans leave as little as possible to luck.

SAFETY MEASURES.

The explanation of the plan of making the cars act as boats is that the early Zeppelins were experimented on Lake Constance from a floating shed which veered with the wind, so that the ships were floated in and out, always "head on" to whatever wind might be blowing. Judging from the fate of L 19 in the North Sea, and L 15 in the Thames, it appears that the gondolas failed to act, but in those cases it appears that the hull was badly smashed and overweighted the flotation of the boats, but if there was still enough gas in the hull for it to keep itself afloat in the air, though not enough to lift the gondolas as well, it is probable that the gondolas would keep themselves and their load afloat on the water.

Very elaborate and cleverly-designed machinery is fitted in Zeppelins to transfer gas from one gas-bag to another, and so to keep the ship trimmed fore and aft. If one gas-bag at one end is punctured and empties itself, naturally that end will sink, but it is possible if the hole is not too big for men to get inside that compartment and repair the hole, after which gas from the other compartments can be transferred to it, and the necessary proportion of lift restored, even though the total lift of the ship be reduced. The instruments used to indicate to the crew the exact amount and pressure of gas in each gas-bag are very accurate and delicate, and are excellent examples of German ingenuity.

ZEPPELIN DIMENSIONS.

From examination of the wreckage of LZ_{77} , which was brought down at Revigny, it has been possible to obtain a fairly good idea of the dimensions of the newer Zeppelins. There is no revolutionary change from the pre-war type, but undoubtedly the newer ships are somewhat bigger.

The figures have been arrived at by examining the main and transverse girders, their curves, and their calculated stress limits, compared with those of Z 8 brought down in France in August, 1914. The growth of the Zeppelins may be stated thus:--

That at any rate disposes of the stories from Swiss and Scandinavian sources about Zeppelins 400 yards long. The shape of the wrecked ship was, as previously stated, more that of a cigar than of a cylinder. The five motors were all of the familiar Maybach type, with a bore of 160 millimetres and a stroke of 170 millimetres (roughly 6½ in. by 7 in.), and giving 180 to 200 horse power each. so that the total horse-power may be put down at 1,000. The petrol consumption of these engines would be about 250 grammes per horse-power per hour, or 506 lbs. per hour for the whole power plant at full bore. The total oil consumption would be about 30 lbs. per hour. Therefore a ten-hour flight at full speed would consume 5,360 lbs. (about 2 tons 8 cwt.) of fuel and oil.

No airship would, presumably, venture to cross to England with less than 10 hours' fuel on board, so that this load limits very considerably the bomb-carrying capacity.

The bombs carried on the L 77 were estimated to weigh in all 3,300 lbs., or a ton and a half, and they ranged in size from 125-lb. bombs up to 250 lbs.

The crew were twenty-three in number, which seems unnecessarily large, though as the trip was a short one, being over French territory, it is probable that the ship carried extra men, for instructional purposes, and less fuel to make up for them.

On a long cruise, such as a raid over England, it is probable that twelve or fifteen really experienced men could run the ship quite well, but one may put the average crew at about 16.

Thence we may estimate a modern Zeppelin's load thus:—

| Total lifting capacity of gas-bags | 35 tons |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| Weight of ship and power plant Weight of 16 men at 10 stones each Petrol and oil for 10 hours, full speed Stores, machine-guns, and ammunition Bombs | 30 tons 1 ton 2½ tons ½ ton 1 ton |
| | 35 tons |

Possibly, by limiting the crew or reducing the fuel supply, it might be possible to cram another half ton of bombs on board, but it is unlikely that any more could be carried.

It may thus be seen that a single Zeppelin is not a very formidable weapon provided that adequate precautions are taken to attack her when she arrives, and it would take quite a considerable fleet to carry as much weight of high-explosives as an ordinary battery of heavy guns would pump into a village in the course of a day.

GENERAL CAPABILITIES.

It must be remembered that for all its speed and power the Zeppelin is still very much at the mercy of the weather, and that a fine clear night does not necessarily betoken a raid. Though there may be little wind on the ground, there may be a big wind aloft at 5,000 feet or so, and though it may be calm in England it may be blowing hard on the other side of the North Sea. Contrariwise, it may be calm in Germany and blowing hard in Great Britain—which is more often the case than not.



The result of a bomb dropped on suburban London.

[Walshams Ltd.



It was taken for granted in the early days of the war that if and when Zeppelins attacked England they would cross the North Sea against a west wind, so that if they were damaged or if their engines broke down they would be drifted safely back to Germany. This theory did not work out in practice, for when the British fleet cut off Germany from contact with the Atlantic it deprived the German air fleet of weather forecasts from the west. Consequently, the Germans could not tell what weather was coming up behind a west wind.

Several airships were wrecked in sudden changes in westerly winds, and the Germans have fought shy of raids in west winds ever since. On the other hand, the Germans have at their disposal continual weather informa-

tion ranging from Iceland, right round the Arctic Circle to the Russian frontier, and for a thousand miles east from the North Sea far into Russia, and thence down to the Black Sea and the Adriatic. As a result, they can always tell for at least ten or twelve hours ahead if any change is coming in from the north-west, north, east, or south-east.

A wind of over one hundred miles an hour would be a hurricane, and it would take ten hours for such a wind to get from the limits of the German area of information to the North Sea, so that if a violent change is signalled it is always possible for the meteorological bureau on shore to recall the airships by wireless before they are surprised by a storm.

That is why practically all the important Zeppelin

raids have been made when the weather has been setting steadily from the east. A few single ships have risked a dash at the English coast in a west wind, but they have only been lone-hand ventures.

THE HEIGHT QUESTION.

The top speed of a modern Zeppelin is supposed to be about seventy miles an hour, though some aeroplane pilots who have chased them unsuccessfully say it is more, and others who have caught them say it is less. In any case, the best Zeppelin is always slower than any really good aeroplane. Also, it is well to remember that while the world's record for altitude is held by a German

aeroplane, with 25,275 feet, the best on record for a Zeppelin is 10,000 feet. Any respectable aeroplane should be able to reach a height of 15,000 feet, and it is calculated that a Zeppelin could only reach that height by jettisoning all its ballast, all its guns and ammunition, all its fuel, and about half its crew as well. So that if chased up to such a height, either by aeroplanes or by anti-aircraft guns, a Zeppelin becomes innocuous. Not only so, but when it gets to such a height by such means it will lose much gas by expansion in the rarefied atmosphere, and when it wants to come down again the remaining gas will contract as it reaches the heavier air below. There will then be insufficient displacement of air to keep the ship afloat, and unless something else can be jettisoned

to lighten the ship the descent will become an uncontrollable fall.

A fully-loaded Zeppelin approaching the British coast would hardly get above 7,000 to 8,000 feet. But after using a ton or so of fuel and dropping all its bombs it might perhaps rise to 12,000 feet or so. At that height it should still be an easy mark for clever anti-aircraft gunners, and a still easier one for a pilot on a firstclass aeroplane fitted with a searchlight, which would enable him to keep the ship in view when she was lost by the searchlight on the groundfor one assumes these days that no airship will ever be so foolish as to cross an enemy's lines in daylight.

Taking it all round, the Germans have much reason


to be satisfied with the technical achievement of their airships, but they have to thank British conservatism as much as their own ingenuity for that success. If the Government of the past had realised the importance of adequate aerial defence, Great Britain would have had her own super-Zeppelins to meet German airships in fair fight, and she would have had aeroplanes properly equipped as "destroyers" to attack airships at night.



An observation balloon at work over a ruined farm in Belgium.

RETALIATION.

Mr. Churchill's promised "swarm of hornets" was no empty boast. He used the phrase to indicate what would happen if airships came to England in daylight—doubtless



The result of an incendiary bomb: A timber yard in the Eastern Counties burnt out during one of the earliest raids. $[Central\ News]$

remembering that all the best hornets go to bed at dusk. Nevertheless, if his policy had been properly backed up by his technical advisers, there would have been a flock of night-hawks also ready for Zeppelins at night.

That no such machines exist is one of the matters still to be put right by those who are agitating for aerial reform. The right machines and the right men can be got in the British Empire, and they will be got before present agitations cease. Meantime, no doubt, other airship raids will be made from Germany, and they will strengthen very materially the support accorded by the British public to the reform party.

When those reforms are carried through, and when the supply and construction of British aircraft are put in the hands of practical men who know their business, German airships are likely to find short shrift on the west of the North Sea.

Also, as certain new machines and new engines are developed, it is unlikely that German airships will be quite happy at home. An airship shed is an easy mark for a bomb dropper, and bomb-sighting apparatus for aeroplanes has now been produced which gives a degree of accuracy greater than that of a big gun at anything like its extreme range. That is to say, a heavy gun, firing at a range of say ten or twelve miles, will not get so near its mark, even when assisted by a "spotting" aeroplane, as an aeroplane bomb will, when dropped from 8,000 feet or so. And at 8,000 feet an aeroplane of ordinary size is moderately safe from being hit during the minute or two which it takes in reaching that height from its original 12,000 feet, and in regaining that height which is generally regarded as being quite safe from anti-aircraft

guns and absolutely out of range of machine-gun or rifle fire

When the time comes for aeroplanes fitted with such bomb sights to raid German territory, either from the sea or from ground near Germany itself won back by the Allies from the German army, German airship sheds will practically cease to exist.

It is, of course, possible that the ingenious German may then hide his airships in vast caverns dug in the sides of mountains, but even then he will only be able to bring his airships out at night, instead of, as at present, making the greater part of the journey across the North Sea in daylight, and only crossing the British coast in the dark.

Such aeroplanes can be procured before very long if an energetic policy is pursued by the Government; in fact, the beginnings of them actually exist to-day, and only need tackling as a problem in commercial production. When such fleets of aeroplanes are available German interference with British rest or work at night will cease, and Germany ingenuity will have to stretch itself to its utmost, and beyond, if it is to produce an airship which can overcome all the dangers which will beset it.

A YEAR'S ZEPPELIN RAIDS.

The first Zeppelin raid on this country was on January 19th, 1915, when Yarmouth and King's Lynn were visited. Two women, a boy, and a man were killed, nine people were injured, and no damage of military importance was done. It was a small beginning, but in point of military significance this first effective journey across the North Sea was typical of the raids which were to come after.

There was an interval of nearly three months, and the next attack by Zeppelins was on the Tyneside on April 14th, with only two people injured and none killed. From then until October the raids followed each other with fair regularity, until the total for 1915 amounted to nineteen separate raids. Lowestoft and the adjoining districts were raided on April 16th, Ipswich on the 29th, Southend on May 10th and 27th (raids which played a considerable part in stirring up the anti-German disorders of May, 1915), and Ramsgate on May 10th. All these raids only added six to the death-roll and eight to the list of injured. On May 31st, for the first time after months of threats, the German airships found their way to London. Henceforward only approximate details of the areas affected by the raids were allowed to be published, but this first attempt to reach London, which was supposed to be living in terror of a German invasion from the skies, only succeeded in gaining the outskirts of the London district. About ninety bombs were dropped, mostly incendiary, and the damage was not inconsiderable. Six civilians were murdered-two men, two women, a boy, and a small child.

There was an unimportant raid on the South-East Coast on June 4th, and two days later, on the East Coast, the worst that had yet been known. In this, twenty-four people lost their lives and forty were injured. It was followed by raids on some portion of the East or South-Eastern Coast and Counties on June 15th, August 9th, 12th, and 17th, and September 7th. In loss and injury to life all of these raids had much more serious results than any which had occurred before June 6th. The casualty roll for the year was mounting up.

The last two raids of the year were actually upon the London area. The first was upon the night of September 8th. In the Eastern Counties on the approach to London and in London itself there were 106 casualties-twenty killed and eighty-six injured. All were civilians with the exception of four soldiers—one killed and three injured. It was from this attack that, thanks to an interview in an American newspaper with Commander Mathy, who had been in charge of one of the Zeppelins, we were permitted to gain an impression of an air raid from the point of view of the raiders. Commander Mathy explained that strict orders had been given that great care was to be taken to avoid hitting St. Paul's, Westminster Abbey, the Houses of Parliament, and residential districts. and also protested that the Zeppelin crews were greatly distressed at the thought that non-combatants had suffered from their activities. He did not explain what possible precautions could be taken for preventing the Zeppelin crews from having any cause for distress, and the impression left by his remarks was of a not inhumane man endeavouring to put the best face on a task which, both from humane and military standpoints, was incapable of justification. The next raid upon the London area was upon October 13th, and in random slaughter it surpassed all previous air attacks on this country. The killed numbered 56 and the injured 114, and of these the only legitimate combatants were one or two soldiers who happened to be inside houses or passing through streets which bore the brunt of the raiders' bombs. The official report of the damage, issued by the Home Office, divided the areas which had suffered most severely into five; and the particular care which, according to Commander Mathy, was to be taken to avoid attacks on residential districts was singularly unapparent. The area on which the largest number of bombs was dropped, and in the quickest succession, was a London suburban

district containing no factories, no public buildings, and hardly any shops. The loss of life among civilians, including women and children, was here very great. The other four areas which were especially damaged were of business quarters, of residential flats and offices, a district in which an hotel and modern suite of business premises were the chief sufferers, and a residential and shopping thoroughfare in one of the poorer parts of London. Except for one chance shot, all the damage done by the many bombs was on property not connected in any way with the conduct of the war.

THE RAIDERS EXTEND THEIR RANGE OF OPERATIONS.


This was the last Zeppelin raid in 1915, and up to this time the ascertained total of casualties amounted to 177 killed and 384 injured. But the casualty list for this last attack on London was exceeded on January 31st, 1916, in much the most extensive air raid which had yet been carried out. Six or seven Zeppelins attacked the East Coast and turned their way inland towards the Midland Counties, Norfolk, Suffolk, Lincolnshire, Staffordshire, Leicestershire, and Derbyshire all being visited. The material damage was less than might have been expected, for the raiders were hampered by a slight mist, but the casualties were very heavy. The total was 184, made up of sixty-seven killed and 117 injured. More than two-thirds of these were women or childrenin exact figures, forty of the killed and seventy-two of the injured. The worst damage was done in Staffordshire, where several bombs were dropped in thickly-populated districts, and many people were murdered or maimed in their homes. The explosives used were of extreme violence, and some of the victims were so badly mutilated that their identification was made exceedingly difficult. The random nature of the destruction, and the inability to effect, except by an obvious accident, any damage which could possibly be construed as of military importance, were as clearly displayed in this raid as in the previous ones. The local details, with a mission room and its congregation bombarded here, a dwelling-house destroyed and all its inmates killed there, women killed in the street, or a whole family of five wiped out by a single bomb, provided some terrible examples of the wanton and haphazard murder of non-combatants which was now a recognised part of German warfare.

This raid in the Midlands created a profound stir in the country, and our air defences, or lack of them, became more bitterly criticised than ever. The raiders had not only reached some parts of the country which it had been generally supposed were secure, by virtue of their geographical position, from attack, but they had done so, it seemed, with the completest impunity. Some of the airships had obviously lost their bearings at times, and hovered uncertain of their next direction. They passed over some districts twice, and even returned to drop bombs for a second time on the same place. One arrived over a district in Norfolk at five o'clock in the evening, and remained, hovering about but unmolested, for threequarters of an hour, according to an account given by one who watched its arrival. Everywhere the raiders seemed to have come and gone as they pleased, and without meeting any effective interference, or, it seemed, interference of any kind at all, once they had reached the more inland districts.

The Germans had evidently increased both the number of their effective airships and the range of activity which they expected from them. The Zeppelin, however, still remained a fragile weapon, demanding its own favourable weather in order to carry out its exploits; and to the absence of suitable weather must be put down the cessation of Zeppelin raids for the next five weeks. The next attack, on March 5th, was carried out in the most unfavourable climatic conditions, from the Zeppelin's point of view, of any raid which had vet taken place. Though in all probability the raiders had left fine weather behind them on their own shores, they met with bitterly cold winds, and in some places a fall of snow, on this side of the North Sea. Three Zeppelins, however, carried out what the Germans would doubtless consider a successful raid, extending over eight counties, from Yorkshire to Kent, and adding a total of seventy killed and injured to the general casualty roll from air raids. (Nine women and children were among the killed and thirty among the injured.) At the end of March the high winds, snow, and rain of the past few weeks changed abruptly, and the first spell of calm spring weather arrived. The Germans made the immediate use of it which most people had expected they would make. On three successive nights their airships raided our shores—on March 20th the Eastern Counties, on April 1st the North-East Coast, and on April 2nd a discursive raid which reached Scotland for the first time and also revisited the Northern and South-Eastern Counties of England. The first two raids added fifty-nine killed and 166 injured to the casualty list; from the last there were some twenty killed or injured in Scotland, but the English counties seem to have escaped with nothing worse than a little material damage. Six Zeppelins took part in this last raid, three being devoted to Scotland, one to the North-East Coast of England, and two to the South-Eastern districts. It was during the March 31st raid that the L 15 was brought down off the mouth of the Thames, where she sank; thus providing the first blood-which was drawn with great satisfaction—for the much-discussed and criticised air defences of the country.

One interesting point which is concerned with these later and more ambitious air raids is the amazing fairy tales which were spun in the German wireless reports

concerning the results of them. To admit that the real result had been the murder of non-combatants and women and children, coupled with the battering to pieces of private property quite unconnected with any military operations, was, of course, not to be expected. But in addition to recording damage of military significance which was never achieved, the German reports even gave out that it had been achieved in towns which had never been remotely approached by the raiders. Thus, after the raid on the Midlands at the end of January, the German wireless informed the world that explosive and incendiary bombs had been dropped "on and near" the docks at Liverpool and Birkenhead, and "on iron foundries and smelting furnaces" in Manchester. The raiders had been far enough away from Manchester; from Liverpool they were still farther, and this fantastic version of their exploits could only have been intended for the consumption of the most credulous neutrals. In the same way the Germans claimed that after the raid of March 31st untold damage had been done to London, whereas no bombs at all were dropped in the London district. These tales may have been reported by the commanders of the Zeppelins, on whose statements there would be no check (and probably no very keen desire to impose one), or they may have been deliberate inventions. In either case, the German authorities must have failed to see that by pledging themselves to such amazing inaccuracies they were really taking away from themselves nearly everything that could be said in justification of the raids as a military operation. To intend military damage and do murder by accident is in any event a poor enough plea on behalf of the Zeppelin raids in view of their long recognised results. But what is the use of raising that plea at all if, by your own admission, you cannot tell to within fifty miles where and what you have been trying to hit? There is no room for intended military operations here. The haphazard slaughter of defenceless civilians is an overwhelming certainty, and the doing of military damage a sheer and almost negligible fluke



One of the newest type of German aeroplanes brought down in France.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

CHAPTER XV.

AEROPLANE DEVELOPMENT IN THE WAR.

BRITISH AND GERMAN AEROPLANES BEFORE THE WAR—GRADUAL SPECIALISATION OF FUNCTION—THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE VARIOUS TYPES—THE FOKKER—GROWTH IN ENGINE POWER.


LTHOUGH military people who were interested in aircraft had been discussing for a year or more before the war the various different types of aeroplanes which would be necessary for different operations in war, very little definite attempt had been made up to the outbreak of war, either by civilian aeroplane constructors or by Government experimental departments in any country, to evolve definite types of aeroplanes for definite work. Soldiers of various nations realised quite well that fast scouting machines would be needed for reconnaissance work, that armed-and possibly armoured-fighting machines would be needed to prevent enemy scouts from crossing their lines, and that big weight-lifting aeroplanes would be needed to carry large loads of bombs either to raid enemy territory or to blow up enemy ammunition depôts and lines of communication, such as railways and road bridges.

Sailors also discussed the needs of various types of aeroplanes for sea work. Some wanted small aeroplanes, which could be launched from the deck of a ship, either by their own power or by specially devised mechanical means; some wanted comparatively small aeroplanes, G3-VOL IV.

which could be hoisted overboard by a derrick and would get off the surface of the water by themselves. Others, again, wanted enormous flying boats, capable of cruising with a fleet on their own bottoms, and only leaving the water under full power when wanted for scouting work.


Then, again, in both Services, variants of these types were discussed specially fitted with wireless apparatus for the signalling of the effects of artillery fire, either to the fleet or to their own armies on land, and for the transmission of messages from scouting machines behind the enemy's lines, so that the scout's observations might be transmitted at once, which would prevent the loss of valuable information in case the machine were shot down after it had been on reconnaissance for some time.

About a month before war broke out the British Royal Flying Corps held a great concentration of all its existing squadrons—some five in number—on Salisbury Plain, and to this concentration were invited the Military Attachés of the various Embassies and Legations then in London. Prominent among them were the German and Austrian Attachés, who, to their credit be it said, were very charming gentlemen, and on excellent terms with our own officers. Therefore it is



Building the wings of a modern "battle-plane."

[Newspaper Illustrations.



Putting the finishing touches to a British aeroplane.

[Topical Press.

not disclosing any fact not already known in Germany to state that the maximum number of machines which it was then possible for the Royal Flying Corps to put into the air never exceeded thirty at a time, and that this number was made up of tractor biplanes of the B.E. 2 type, with 70-H.P. Renault engines; Henry and Maurice Farman "pusher" biplanes, with 80-H.P. Gnome and 70-H.P. Renault engines respectively, chiefly of French construction; a few tractor biplanes, built by A. V. Roe & Company Limited, of Manchester, and known as "Avros," with 80-H.P. Gnome engines; and also three or four Blériot monoplanes, also with 80-H.P. Gnomes. These represented the Empire's land-going aerial forces at the moment.

The horse power of the engines is worth noting, because these engines represented at that period the general opinion as to what was considered reasonable power for an aeroplane of war. Considerable interest was shown in a B.E. 2 fitted with wireless, though one imagines that the foreign attachés were not invited to inspect too closely the particular method of installing the apparatus.

Another interesting machine was an experimental biplane fitted with an Austro-Daimler motor of alleged 120 H.P. This was regarded as being extraordinary in the way of power, and the initiated gazed on it with something approaching awe. Yet another interesting machine was one which was a variation of the B.E. 2, known as the B.E. 2c. For this machine it was claimed that it was inherently stable or uncapsizable, and it was referred to in various papers as the "lifeboat of the air," or words to that effect.

These various little points are particularly emphasised because they show how much may be learned in a mere matter of eighteen months or so under the stress of actual warfare. Undoubtedly, so far as aviation is concerned, more progress has been produced by the war than would have been made in five years at the rate of progress prevailing during the early part of 1914, for at that period aviation was in a state perilously approaching stagnation, owing to lack of official encouragement to private enterprise in this country, and owing to lack of public interest, which might have produced progress in sporting aeroplanes even though aeroplanes of war were not produced.

A few weeks later, and just on the verge of war, the Royal Naval Air Service concentrated its seaplanes at Calshot, whence they assisted at the Naval Review, or mobilisation, at Spithead. The majority of the navy's machines were fitted with engines of about 100 H.P., and one actually had the enormous power of 130 H.P. The types were Shorts and Farmans, and there were also a couple of Sopwiths. All told, there were about twenty of them. These machines all performed very nicely in the fine weather prevailing during the review, and created quite a good impression on the various foreign Naval Attachés who were present. So much for the British machines at the outbreak of war.

THE GERMAN AEROPLANES.

The Germans had paid considerably more attention to the development of their aircraft, and consequently they had many more aeroplanes than the British, especially land machines. Many months before the outbreak of war it was known in this country that at the great camp at Döberitz alone (since famous as an internment camp) a matter of 200 aeroplanes, thoroughly up to date, were kept constantly ready for use. Each

of these machines was wheeled out of its shed once a day, and the engine was started up just to prove that it was in working order. This was the great central supply depôt of the German Flying Services, and whenever a new machine was required for one of the outlying air stations there was always a machine ready at Döberitz to be flown over to take its place. The whole arrangement was an excellent example of German thoroughness.

The standard German aeroplane of this period was a monoplane of the type known in this country as a Taube. These were very large machines, in which the wings were swept back towards the tips and the tips themselves turned up, so that their general appearance when viewed from below was that of a pigeon or "dove"—hence the name "Taube." The tails of these machines also resembled the tails of a bird much more than did the tails of any of the world's other machines. These machines already existed in hundreds in Germany, for it had been the practice of the German Government for some three years before the war to do everything possible to encourage German aircraft constructors to produce modern types of aeroplanes and engines. Handsome prizes were put up for competition by the Government, and the makers of the winning aeroplanes and engines received orders which had already put the German aircraft industry on a sound financial footing a long time before the war, so that when war actually broke out the German industry was able to produce aeroplanes in vast quantities. Some months before the war the German aircraft industry had begun to produce large tractor biplanes obviously copied initially from the British Avros and Sopwiths, but embodying many of the features of the Taube monoplane. German construction was always much heavier than that of the English makers, and many German makers used steel tube largely in preference to wood. The result was that the German machines were generally clumsier than the British, but their heaviness and clumsiness in themselves necessitated the use of bigger engines, and consequently the standard type German engine was already about 100 H.P. before the war, as against anything between 50 and 70 H.P. as used by the British and French aircraft constructors. This fact also gave the Germans an immense advantage at the beginning of the war, as their "jumping-off place," so to speak, was so much further advanced than that of the Allies.

The only respect in which the British held any real advantage was that some seven months before the war the Sopwith firm had produced a tiny single-seater biplane with an 80-H.P. Gnome engine, which was nicknamed the "tabloid" on account of its small size. This machine flew at what was then considered the colossal speed of something like 95 miles per hour, and yet was able to land quite slowly. Although the high speed had already been beaten by French machines, these could only be flown by particularly expert pilots, and were unable to climb to any height worth mentioning, whereas the little Sopwith did everything better than any machine which had ever existed before. Some months later the Bristol Company produced a small single-seater scout biplane, also with an 80-H.P. Gnome, which actually beat the first Sopwith in speed by some few miles an hour, and was its equal on most other points. Neither of these machines was ordered in quantities by the Services, but a few of them existed, and these gave their pilots a very distinct advantage over the Germans when war began, as did the two-



A Fokker aeroplane, brought down in France, on its way to the rear of the lines. $[Topical\ Press.]$



A German Albatross aeroplane brought down at Salonika by the French. $[\mathit{Central\ News}.$

seater 80-H.P. Avro, whose speed of 80 to 85 miles an hour was greater than that of the German Taubes. The French Flying Corps, although numerous, was equipped with Henry and Maurice Farman biplanes and Blériot monoplanes, except for some Caudron biplanes with 80-H.P. Gnome engines, and a certain number of Nieuport and Morane monoplanes. These machines were just about a match for the Germans, but all told were were nothing like so numerous. The Russians had a varied assortment of French aeroplanes, but, except in the skill and dash of their pilots, were in every other way inferior to the German aerial forces.

EARLY GERMAN TACTICS IN THE AIR.

The first accounts published of the early days of the war showed that the one thing which seemed to impress the British soldier most was the ubiquity of the German aeroplanes over the British lines throughout the retreat from Mons to Paris, and from then right up to the battle of Ypres. The British and French aviators complained that the Germans did not care about fighting them. It appeared afterwards that the German aviators had instructions not to fight, but to do their jobs so as to save themselves and their machines for future use. The Germans were employed either in pure scouting work, i.e., observing the positions of the Allies' troops, or in observing for their artillery. The German machines were apparently not fitted with wireless for one heard all sorts of different accounts of the methods employed by the German aviators in signalling to their artillery the position of the Allies' infantry and guns. Sometimes the signal was given by firing a coloured light from a pistol, sometimes by the dropping of some material which glistened in the sun, and sometimes by dropping smoke bombs, but in every case it was evident that without their aeroplanes the German artillery would never have done the execution they did during the Allies' retreat. It is likewise equally true that but for their few, but wonderfully-handled, aeroplanes the British army would have been almost totally destroyed during that retreat. There were not sufficient British aeroplanes to spot for the artillery, nor to drive the German artillery spotters out of the air, but the British aviators did succeed in observing the movements of the big German armies, as so they enabled the British army to avoid being surrounded and captured.

The types of aeroplanes in general use remained almost the same between the outbreak of war and the beginning of 1915. Occasionally newer and bigger types of German machines appeared, and the French and British armies also occasionally put experimental types of machines into the air. The first definite development among all the belligerents seems to have been the production of fighting machines for the specific purpose of driving off enemy aircraft. The early fighting in the air was done with any type of machine which happened to be handy, the passenger merely carrying a rifle, and in the single-seater machines the pilots fought with revolvers, though at a later stage, as the pilots became still more skilful, they discovered that it was possible to rig up a machine-gun and fly the machine with one hand while working the gun with the other. Bomb-dropping was not regarded as a serious part of an aviator's work, but rather as a sporting effort on the part of an individual. Thus the early bomb raids on Paris were made on the ordinary standardtype Taubes, and the bombs were apparently dropped overboard by hand. In just the same way the early

successful bomb raids on German airship sheds by British naval aviators were made on standard-type aeroplanes, and the bombs were simply hove overboard, or dropped by pulling a string, at the opportune moment.


THE "FIGHTING" AEROPLANE.

It is doubtful which country actually produced the first specially-designed fighting aeroplane, but various types quickly developed. The Germans appear to have had some idea of the biplane carrying a gun in front and the engine behind a year or so before the war, for the Ago people produced such a machine, but, for reasons which need not be explained here, it was not a success. The ordinary Henry Farman type of "pusher" biplane was tried with a machine-gun mounted in front a year or so before the war both by the French and British armies, but probably the first real gun-carrier of this species was the Vickers biplane, produced in December, 1913. This was merely an experiment, and it was only some months after the outbreak of war that the type was regularly adopted. It proved to be one of the most useful fighting machines ever produced, because, owing to the body-work projecting well in front of the wings, the gunner was able to fire the whole way round more than a half circle in front of himself, as well as directly upwards and almost directly downwards, and it was also possible to fit a second machine-gun to be operated by the pilot who sits behind the gunner. Similar machines were afterwards built with bigger engines by the Aircraft Manufacturing Company Limited, and the Royal Aircraft Factory, and this type is particularly hated by the Germans for reasons which will be stated later. The French developed early in 1915 a somewhat similar type of machine, designed by M. Voisin, who was the designer of the first successful European flying machine.


The German answer to these machines was a very large tractor biplane, carrying one machine-gun and gunner sitting immediately behind the engine, so that, although the gunner could not fire directly forwards, he could fire sideways and upwards and fairly well downwards. It also carried a second gunner seated behind the pilot, who also had a clear fire area sideways, upwards, and downwards to protect the machine against faster machines chasing it.

THE FRENCH AEROPLANES DE CHASSE.

It was some time before the French succeeded in bringing down one of these big biplanes, which were astonishingly fast for their size, and possessed enormous climbing power. When at last they did succeed in doing so, they found that the machine's excellent performance was produced by using a Mercédés engine of something approaching 200 H.P. This engine is officially rated at 160 H.P., but it actually gives much nearer 200 H.P. This indicates how the power used began to mount up. Finding that the Voisin and other machines were incapable of catching these big German machines, the French then produced a class of machine which they called "aeroplanes de chasse," or "chasers." were mostly small monoplanes, or tractor biplanes, carrying only one man and a machine-gun, and designed to have a speed of as near 100 miles per hour as possible. In some of them the machine-gun was fixed straight over the top of the engine and fired through the propeller. Some pilots fitted steel plates to their propellers in such a way as to deflect the bullets. Others merely allowed such bullets as happened to hit the propeller to punch



The interior of a French assembling shed, showing the tail of a captured Fokker. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



A close quarter view of a Fokker brought down by the French,

[Topical.

holes clean through it, and then fitted a new propeller on their return

Other machines, again, especially the biplanes, carried their machine-guns mounted so as to fire straight through a gap in the top plane, but of course such machines as the latter were limited as to the position from which they could attack another, being compelled in this way to attack from below. The other machines fired through their propellers, and attacked from any position in which the machine could be flown straight at the enemy, and the latter method has obvious advantages even over the German machines with two guns, which depend for their effectiveness on being able to overhaul the enemy machine and then turn off their straight path so as to bring a broadside to bear on it from both guns at once. These French "aeroplanes de chasse" were used extensively as escorts for bombardment squadrons, their duty being to drive off the enemy's fighting machines which were sent up to bar the progress of the bomb carriers. Seeing the success of the French in this line, the Germans then took to using machines of much the same class, and the best of these undoubtedly was the Fokker monoplane, about which so much has been heard in the Press. It may be well, therefore, to explain that the Fokker monoplane, which was offered to the British Government by its Dutch designer some two years before the war, was an uncapsizable or inherently stable machine, exceedingly badly built, and obviously unsafe to fly on that account. The principles involved in making it uncapsizable were already perfectly well known to most aeroplane designers in this country at the time, and therefore there was nothing to be gained by buying it. For this reason the naval officers who were sent to Germany to inspect this machine very wisely rejected it. Much as the official aerial policy of the past is open to criticism, in this particular case the officials involved, being themselves experienced aviators, did precisely the right thing.

THE FOKKER MONOPLANE.

The Fokker monoplane used in the war was quite another type of machine. So far from being uncapsizable, it is a very "tender" machine to fly, being in fact a very slightly altered copy of the French Morane monoplane, which existed even in its present form nearly two years before the war. The only practical difference Mijnheer Fokker made was to use steel tubing largely in construction, to fit a more powerful engine, and to lengthen the tail so as to give the rudder and elevator more control over the heavy engine in front. It is, therefore, very absurd to charge anybody in England with having neglected to purchase a German machine which never existed at all until after the war had been going on for a year or so.

The ordinary modern Fokker monoplane is fitted with a rotary engine of about 100 H.P., which is a copy of the French Gnome, but a certain number of these machines have been fitted with the 160-H.P. Mercédés engine, and so attain extraordinary speeds. These machines, however, can only be flown by a few picked pilots, who are regularly billed as "star turns" in the German communiqués. The ordinary Fokker monoplane which first appeared was considerably faster than the average British or French machine, and therefore scored heavily for a time, but further developments of the "pusher" type—to which reference has already been made—soon put an end to the dominance of the Fokker as such, the reason being that the Fokker, firing direct G3-VOL. IV."

through its propeller, can only be effective when heading direct for its victim; while in the "pusher" biplane, fitted with either one or two swivelling guns, it is possible to continue to pump a stream of bullets into the Fokker as it swerves aside to avoid a collision with the other machine.

The favourite Fokker method of attack is to fly straight at the tail of its victim, either rising rapidly from below or diving in a spiral from above, but the British Vickers and other "pushers" are so handy on their controls that they can spin round in little more than their own length, and are thus able to meet the approaching enemy head on instead of allowing him to get to his favourite position of attack under their tails, where it is impossible for him to be hit owing to the body-work or the tail planes getting between the defending gun and the attacking gun.

So much, then, for the regular types of fighting aeroplanes.

THE BOMB-DROPPING AEROPLANE.

A later development than the "aeroplane de chasse," "chaser," "destroyer," or "fighting aeroplane"—the terms are almost interchangeable—was the machine definitely designed for bomb-dropping, and known to the French as the "aeroplane de bombardement." Originally, as already explained, bomb-dropping was not regarded seriously, but somewhere about the beginning of 1915 it was proved beyond question that valuable work could be done by the bombardment of enemy stores, and by the destruction of important bridges on lines of communication. Several British officers won high distinction by their personal skill in bomb-dropping, even when using ordinary standard-type machines, and consequently the quick French mind soon saw the advantage of specialising on this form of attack.

The first machines set aside for the specific purpose of bomb-dropping by the French were the Voisin "pushers," which, although slow, were capable of lifting very considerable weights, and it became a regular practice before long for aviators to go up alone on these machines carrying a load of bombs instead of a passenger, and frequently only a rifle for self-defence instead of a machine-gun and ammunition, which would be necessary if the machine were intended for serious fighting. From this it was a natural transition to sending a number of machines out in flocks of perhaps a dozen machines at a time with an escort of "destroyers."


The development of this type of machine soon showed the need for still bigger engines, and many of them were built with 200 H.P.

MULTIPLE-ENGINED MACHINES.

As appetite comes with eating, so appetite for big engines comes with the use of big engines, and as a result, some time before Italy entered into the war, the Italian engineer Caproni produced a biplane with three separate engines, totalling something like 300 H.P. between them. This machine was somewhat novel in that it consisted practically of two tractor biplanes hand in hand. That is to say, it had two ordinary aeroplane bodies some little distance apart with the engines in front, and one long tail connecting the back ends of the bodies. In between these two bodies on the main plane was fitted a body similar to the ordinary "pusher" biplane with the engine at the back, so that the machine had two tractor screws and one pusher. It is only fair to say that this multiple-engine machine



An armoured French motor carrying a '75 gun for use against aircraft.



A new type of British aeroplane.

[Newspaper_Illustrations.

was not the first of the sort, because the Russian engineer Sikorsky had built, a year or two before the war, an enormous biplane with a single body projecting behind, and four engines of 100 H.P. each arranged to drive tractor screws, the engines being placed along the wings, two on each side of the body. This machine put up some quite respectable performances, regarded purely as an experiment; but although one hears quite a good deal about the Sikorsky machines in newspaper reports from the Eastern theatre of war, these big four-engined machines do not appear to have had any remarkable success under active service conditions. The Sikorsky machines to which the reports refer are probably single-engine tractor biplanes of more or less the usual type, for Sikorsky was known to be building this type before the war.

Quite early in 1915 the Germans also brought out a two-body biplane with either two or three engines, but apparently it was not much of a success, for after a few appearances on the Western front it vanished, and at the time of writing, pretty nearly a year later, it had not again put in an appearance.

It was the French who first made a genuine success of the twin-engined machine. This machine has been largely illustrated all over the world, and examples of it have been shot down and captured by the Germans, so that one is not giving away any secrets in describing the type.

It is built by the Caudron firm, who have always been noted for making machines which lift very big loads for their power, although they are not particularly fast. The Caudron Brothers went about their work by the very simple process of building a very large biplane to their standard pattern, putting the body of an ordinary pusher biplane into the middle, and fitting an engine a few feet out along each wing. The first machine had two 80-H.P. Gnomes; then two 90-H.P. Le Rhones were tried; then two 110-H.P. Le Rhones, and following them two 130-H.P. Anzanis. What power has been fitted since is best left unsaid, but this increase gives some idea of the way power is steadily piling up on weight-lifting aeroplanes. Nor is it giving away any State secrets to say that American aeroplane builders are constructing machines largely for various belligerent powers, and that American papers have already described and illustrated the scheme of certain big aeroplanes now being built in America with something like 1,000 H.P. each. However, to return to the Caudron. This machine showed remarkable ability to lift big weights and to climb to enormous altitudes, with the result that a number of highly-successful bomb-dropping raids have been made on this type. Although nothing like as fast as the fast Fokker monoplanes, these machines are built to climb very much higher, with the result that on several occasions Caudron pilots with a big load of bombs have progressed in comfort and safety for forty or fifty miles behind the German lines with a whole flock of German "destrovers" below them frantically endeavouring to reach them.

SIZE OR NUMBER P

It is outside the scope of this chapter to explain why every aeroplane has a definite height beyond which it cannot climb, but it will be evident to everyone that there is such a limit, just as there is a limit to the speed and a limit to the load which an aeroplane can carry. The height limit is influenced by the fact that the higher one gets the thinner the air

becomes, and therefore the less air the wings are able to "grasp" in order to obtain a lift, and the less air the engine can absorb in order to transform it into power. It is just as well to appreciate this fact, because it has a great deal to do with the effectiveness of different types of aeroplanes in war. An exceedingly fast machine may be utterly useless merely because it cannot climb to a height which makes it safe against anti-aircraft guns, whereas a very much slower machine may be much more useful on account of its climbing ability. This is particularly the case where bombardment machines are concerned, because a machine which can climb with a load to a matter of 14,000 or 15,000 feet has an excellent chance of travelling to its objective without ever being seen at all by watchers from the ground.

In considering the question of bombardment aeroplanes one very interesting question arises, on which the opinion of specialists is considerably divided. That is, whether it is better to use a few aeroplanes of very great size which carry a very big load of bombs, or to use a very much larger number of considerably smaller aeroplanes each carrying a smaller load? Naturally, the bigger aeroplanes with the big load entail less risk in losing men, but, on the other hand, if a larger number of aeroplanes are used there is a better prospect of getting a large proportion of the total amount of explosives to its objective. That is to say, if one aeroplane is carrying, say, 1,500 lbs. of bombs and it is shot down the whole effect of that 1,500 lbs. is lost, whereas if three aeroplanes were carrying 500 lbs. apiece and one of them was shot down there would still be a prospect of getting the other 1,000 lbs. to its destination. Moreover, if one big aeroplane appears over a town every anti-aircraft gun in the place is turned on to it, and its chances of being hit are very great, whereas if three different aeroplanes appear all at once the attention of the anti-aircraft gunners is distracted among them, and not only is there less chance of their all being brought down, but there is actually much less chance of any one of them being hit at all. Naturally, if one could send twenty aeroplanes carrying 2,000 lbs. of bombs apiece to destroy a place manufacturing munitions instead of sending twenty aeroplanes carrying 500 lbs. apiece, one would do so, but until the production of such enormous aeroplanes in such enormous quantities it seems that the use of smaller aeroplanes in large quantities is actually better policy.

HEIGHT AND SPEED.

As regards reconnaissance machines for scouting purposes only there is considerable diversity of type. In the earlier days of the war, before the development of anti-aircraft guns of great accuracy and gunners of great skill, it was generally considered fairly safe to fly in ordinary aeroplanes with a speed of between sixty and eighty miles per hour over the enemy lines at a height of between 6,000 and 8,000 feet. Then it was found that machine-gun fire was dangerous at 8,000 feet, and armoured seats became common. As antiaircraft guns developed it was found that anything under 10,000 feet was simple suicide, and consequently the demand increased for more powerful engines and aeroplanes which could climb to great heights, and were yet fast enough to stand a sporting chance of getting home against a strong wind if sent far over the enemy's lines. It must be remembered that if an aeroplane does eighty miles per hour, and gets out in a sixty miles per

hour wind blowing in the direction of the enemy's lines, it will travel towards the enemy country at 140 miles per hour. Consequently, in half-an-hour it will have reached a point seventy miles distant behind the enemy's lines. When it tries to get home again it will only make twenty miles per hour over the ground against the wind. Consequently it will take three and a half hours to get back over that seventy miles. Therefore, unless it is built to carry fuel for four hours' flying, it cannot make such a journey. It is a fact that a good many aeroplanes have been lost by some of the belligerents owing to an unfortunate omission in recognising this almost self-evident fact, and owing to aeroplanes being sent out with perhaps fuel for three hours' flying when the journey to be undertaken could not be done in less than four hours under the circumstances then existing. No pilot likes to carry more petrol than he needs, simply because every extra gallon of petrol means seven pounds extra weight, and consequently so many feet deducted from the maximum height to which he can rise to escape the enemy's guns. However, judging from the modern German aeroplanes at the beginning of 1916, reconnaissance machines are expected to do between eighty-five and one hundred miles per hour in still air, and to be able to climb to a height of at least 12,500 feet, carrying a pilot, passenger, fuel for five hours' flying, one or two machine-guns, and sundry paraphernalia in the way of cameras, lunch baskets, and personal equipment in the way of revolvers, field glasses, ammunition, map cases, first-aid surgical apparatus, and other oddments. It shows how much advance has been made since the beginning of the war when an aeroplane was considered fit for use if it was able to lift a pilot and passenger, armed only with revolvers, to a height of about 6,000 feet or even less, and to travel at anything between sixty and seventy-five miles per hour.

Naturally, aeroplanes at a height of over 10,000 feet do not afford their observers very detailed views of the country below, and this fact seems to have prompted the Germans to experiment with a type of aeroplane for the detail reconnaissance of the areas immediately behind the Allies' lines, for early in 1916 a machine appeared in Flanders which was known to the Royal Flying Corps as "Copper-belly," owing to the body being sheathed in some metal which appeared to be copper-coloured, though no one ever got sufficiently close to it to make quite sure whether the colour was due to some copper and aluminium alloy being used for the sheathing of the body or whether it was merely due to the rays of the setting sun shining on it from the west. At any rate, this machine used to appear from behind the German lines never at a greater height than 1,000 feet, and generally nearer 500 feet. It never came far over the British lines, but used to fly at a tremendous speed just over the French lines for a few miles and would then disappear over the German lines again. It was so low down that it was impossible to burst anti-aircraft shells at that low altitude, and apparently rifle fire had no effect on it owing to the metal sheathing of the body. So far as the wings were concerned, bullets would simply go straight through, without doing any serious harm. The idea is certainly one well worth developing, because from a matter of 500 feet or so a really proper photographic system would give the most minute details of the enemy's actual system of entrenchments.

"HANS" AND "FRITZ."

One peculiar feature of the latter part of 1915 was that the big German aeroplanes, with three men and two machine-guns on board, which were commonly known to the Royal Flying Corps as "Hans" and "Fritz," practically disappeared from the Western front, and German aeroplanes comparatively seldom appeared over the British lines. When the British reconnaissance machines went over the German lines they were immediately attacked by the small, fast Fokker monoplanes, which caused a very large number of casualties in a very small time. The inference to be drawn from this is comparatively simple, and it certainly is not that the big German aeroplanes had proved a failure, as some ill-informed critics argue. The real reason was that the Germans realised that a strong attack on the Allies' part on the Western front was improbable, and therefore it was only wasting their own machines to go scouting over the Allies' lines. Therefore, all that they need bother about was to prevent the Allies' aircraft from scouting over their

During the same period, however, the German forces, together with the Austrian and Bulgarians, were sweeping Serbia and Montenegro. Therefore it was very necessary for them to have their best and most reliable machines for reconnaissance work. It was necessary for fast machines to fly very far behind the enemy's lines so as to find out exactly in which direction he was retreating. Moreover, the country in these parts is so rugged that even behind the Germans' own lines landing grounds were very few and far between. Therefore, great capacity for long flight and great trustworthiness of the engines was desirable. Also, towards the end of the same period, the Russians began attacking heavily, and from then till well on in 1916 the Germans were busy reconnoitring behind the Russian front; in fact, German aeroplanes were frequently reported over 100 miles behind the fighting line, showing that the German fighting machines were habitually called upon to make journeys of 200 to 250 miles at a stretch in order to find out precisely where the Russians were massing their big armies for the attack. These operations on the Eastern front would thus withdraw from the West all the most reliable German aeroplanes, and this would account for practically the whole of the aerial defence of the German armies on the West being left to the little Fokker monoplanes, which are built entirely for speed and climb, and effect their object by carrying only one machine-gun, one man, and only enough fuel for a couple of hours' flying.

It is perhaps worthy of note that early in 1915, when some ill-advised people were claiming for the Royal Flying Corps the complete dominance of the air over the Western front, a very similar thing was happening, namely, that all the best German long-distance machines were being employed on the Eastern front, when the Russian armies were being pushed back from East Prussia, Russian Poland, and Galicia. But at that time there were no small German fighting machines, and consequently the withdrawal of the big machines meant the depletion of the Western front of practically all the useful German aeroplanes.

To sum up the whole argument, the tendency now among aircraft constructors, and among officers concerned with aircraft design, is to produce aeroplanes of bigger and bigger power, and to design the various types specifically for various jobs so as to avoid the type of machine which was described to me not long ago by a flying officer as "hung all over with different gadgets till it looked like a Christmas tree, and was no use for anything." This is an age of specialisation, and the aeroplane does not escape the tendency.



Lord Kitchener passing through the courtyard of the Seddil Bahr fortress during his visit of inspection to the Gallipoli front. The names of the party (reading from left to right) are: Colonel Watson, Lord Kitchener, the General in Command of the French forces in Gallipoli, and Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner for Egypt. Behind is Colonel Fitzgerald, military secretary to Lord Kitchener.


CHAPTER XVI.

THE EVACUATION OF GALLIPOLI.


THE EVACUATION OF ANZAC AND SUVLA—THE FEAT REPEATED AT HELLES—THE POLICY OF EVACUATION DISCUSSED—EXAMINATION OF GENERAL MONRO'S ARGUMENTS—LOSSES OF THE CAMPAIGN—THE CAMPAIGN REVIEWED.

N December 21st, 1915, the country learned that the Anzac positions in the Gallipoli Peninsula had been evacuated without loss of life and without fighting. It was generally known that the question of evacuation had been under discussion. Sir Ian Hamilton had been against it, but an indiscretion of Lord Ribblesdale in the House of Lords had let it out that his successor, General Monro, had strongly advised it. The views of Lord Kitchener, who had gone to the East to make a report, were not known, and the secret of the Government's intentions had been very well kept. In private discussions the arguments for and against evacuation had been eagerly canvassed. For evacuation it was urged that now that the Germans were in through communication with Constantinople they would pour munitions and heavy guns through to Turkey and drive us into the sea; against, it was argued that our trenches were now so solidly built that they might endure a bombardment, and that voluntary retirement would be as costly as a severe defeat. Some dwelt on the dangers of the winter on the peninsula, with its torrents of rain that

would flood the trenches, and its gales of wind that would make it impossible for the fleet to land supplies or reinforcements, or to approach sufficiently close in shore to bombard effectually the Turkish positions. Others argued that the hardships of winter would certainly be no worse than the burning heat of summer and the swarms of disease-bearing flies that it had bred; if we suffered during the winter, so would the Turks. Some dwelt on the humiliation of evacuation and the waste of the brave lives that had been spent in establishing ourselves in our positions; others asked why we should throw more lives away in an enterprise which promised no likelihood of success and threatened to end in a grave disaster. Some talked of our prestige in the East, which would be dangerously weakened by such a confession of failure as evacuation, especially if, as seemed likely, the withdrawal were attended by heavy losses. Others, on the other hand, agreed with Lord Milner, who, on October 14th, declared in the House of Lords that when he was told that it would be a terrible thing to abandon our Dardanelles adventure because this would have so bad an effect in Egypt, in India, upon our prestige in



On West Beach two days before the evacuation



Another scene at West Beach.

of great depression

the East, he could not help asking himself "whether it will not have a worse effect if we persist in that enterprise and it ends in complete disaster." These were the arguments heard everywhere in private conversation (for no public discussion was possible) in the autumn of 1915. The whole question was complicated by the surrender of King Ferdinand of Bulgaria to the Central Powers, by the desertion of his Ally by the King of Greece, and by the success of the enemy's campaign against Servia. Victory in Gallipoli would have prevented these difficulties and complications from ever arising. The failures of August, and the decision not to reinforce, not only made it impossible for us to win through in Gallipoli, but

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brought into existence a new cambased on paign Salonika which was in active rivalry with that of Gallipoli, and threatened to supersede it.

THE STORM IN NOVEMBER.

The story of the fighting in Gallipoli has already been brought down to the Battles of Anzac and Suvla Bay in August (Vol. III., Chap. XXXIV.). Between the engagements there described and the evacuation is a chronicle of dates which made some change in the comfort and welfare of the troops, but none in the military situation. On October 28th, H.M.S. Hythe, a mine-sweeper, was sunk. There was fighting with the Anzacs at the beginning of November, and in the middle a British submarine was sunk in the Sea of Marmora. The attempts of the

British submarines to keep up the attacks on the Turkish transports, successful as they were for a time, did not long persist after the Germans had supplied the Turks with obstructions (probably nets like those which were used with great effect by the British in the Straits of Dover and elsewhere) which were stretched across the narrowest parts of the Dardanelles. The late summer and autumn in Gallipoli and the sudden influx of population increased the always enormous numbers of flies, and soon after the fighting of August dysentery made attacks far more formidable than those of the Turks. The medical service had never been the strong side of

the Gallipoli campaign, partly because our quarters on the peninsula were too cramped, partly because we had not foreseen how slow our progress would be and the completeness of our dependence on the navy-which had enough to do as it was as father of the campaign in supplying munitions and supplies of food and in supporting our attacks, and doing the duty that ordinarily falls to the heavy guns behind the firing line, without having the part of mother and nurse put upon it. From April 23rd to the evacuation no fewer than 96,683 cases of sickness were admitted to hospital from Gallipoli. The Turks, as was afterwards learned, were in equally bad case, and the autumn, when both sides were suffering, was a period


and of inaction. It is not impossible Boz Burnu that had we had EJELME reinforcements that GULF OF XEROS would have enabled us to keep up our attacks we might even now have carried the Turkish positions. At the end of November came the first touch of winter. A gale of rain and snow came down from the north-east and flooded the SALI trenches. After the rain came snow. and after the snow frost, which froze the feet of the men in the trenches. In a single army corps there are said to have been more than six thousand cases of sickness after this storm, but again, as might be Ariburnu expected, the Turks ANZAC COVE suffered more Hell Spit severely than we. It was in this month-much the most depressing since the first land-Gaba Tene ing-that Lord Heights in Feet Kitchener visited Gallipoli, and it may be that his decision

> was influenced by the miserable conditions which he found. The situation at Suvla Bay was by far the worst. With the advent of the rains the Salt Lake began to fill up and the water to ooze out of the sandy soil of the trenches. a sore trial for new drafts.


"A newly-arrived draft has usually to join the rest in the trenches or firing line at once. The men know nothing of the realities of war and weather. Shells and bullets affect them as they affect everyone at first, and most people to the end. The sun strikes through them like X-rays. Dust fills their eyes and mouths. Flies cover their food and keep them irritated and sleepless. Excellent as supply generally is, ten to one they get little beyond biscuit and bully beef—




Piling combustibles round the stores at Suvia, which were set on fire immediately before the evacuation.



After the evacuation of Suvia: The "Cornwallis" firing at the Turks in the mountains. This ship was the last to leave Suvia Bay.



The burning stores at Suvia, photographed from the "Cornwallis."



The burning stores at 5 a.m. on the morning after the evacuation.

at all events, in the advanced trenches—with an occasional share in an onion or pot of jam. The diarrhœa, which is the invariable curse of all wars, begins to affect them. They grow weak and their spirits sink. In that condition they are probably called upon to resist or deliver an attack upon a tough race of semi-barbarous soldiers, famous at trench fighting for generations.

"Add to all this (what one cannot help noticing) that the fighting on our side has no such inspiring motive as a violent national hatred. If we were fighting Germans it might be different. But our men feel no special hatred towards the Turk. They have regarded him usually as a queer kind of friend and old ally. They recognise that hitherto he has fought 'cleanly,' and resorted to no inhuman tricks of gas or other torture. Of course they wish to defeat him, but they do not feel that savage animosity of revenge which inspires many of the Balkan States, for instance, in their wars.

"I may be quite wrong, of course, in reading the temper of our new drafts, but this was the view that forced itself on me in revisiting the long-familiar scenes upon the promontory south of Achi Baba in the last few days."*

As late as November 2nd, Mr. Asquith seemed to be still hopeful about the prospects of the expedition. On that date he defended it in Parliament, and maintained that though it had failed to break down the Turkish defence it was still doing great service in holding up an army of 200,000 Turks. He boldly declared that no one was more responsible for the initiation of the enterprise in the Dardanelles than he was himself. Lord Kitchener, when he left London for the Near East, is said on the whole to have been against evacuation. It was the increasing drain of sickness, the fear of a strong German concentration against our army in Gallipoli, but above all the competition of the new campaign on behalf of Servia, that turned the scale. By November 15th the decision to evacuate Anzac at any rate had probably been taken, for Mr. Churchill, on that date, made his elaborate defence of the Gallipoli campaign (Vol. III., 236-7), and announced his intention of joining the army in France.

In April, 1916, was published a long despatch by General Sir Charles Monro, who had succeeded General Hamilton in command. This despatch was in two parts, the first containing his reasons for advising the evacuation of Gallipoli, the second an account of how the retirement was effected. With the first section this chapter will deal later; but before entering on a discussion which is in many respects the thorniest of the war, it is convenient to describe how the evacuation was effected. In some ways its incidents are the most moving in the whole war.

THE EVACUATION OF ANZAC,

The order for the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac was given on December 8th. Already, towards the end of the previous month, General Monro had instructed General Birdwood to prepare a scheme of evacuation, so that all the details might be ready as soon as the sanction was given from home. Whether the scheme which was actually carried out was that of General Birdwood's has not been stated, but General Monro in his despatch speaks as though at least the central idea of the evacuation were his own. He points out that by all text-book principles and the lessons of military history the withdrawal should have been immediately preceded by feint attacks in the neighbourhood, which should distract the attention of the enemy from our designs. "But," writes General Monro, "when endeavouring to work out into concrete fact how such principles could be applied to the situation of our forces, I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from

* Mr. H. W. Nevinson.

the normal life which we were following both on sea and land. A feint which did not fully fulfil its purpose would have been worse than useless." It has been generally imagined that so amazing an operation as the withdrawal of a large army under the eyes of the enemy, whose guns commanded every place of embarkation, could only have been accomplished by the employment of some brilliant ruse the nature of which was being purposely kept secret until the end of the war. But if General Monro's words which we have quoted are to be taken at their surface meaning, it would seem that the only ruse employed was to behave as though nothing unusual was happening. The night of December 10th-20th was fixed for the final withdrawal, and for a week before men were being taken off. Fortunately, the weather, after the terrible storm in November, kept persistently fine. A New Zealand officer described in his diary the events from day to day as the troops were being withdrawn, and some of the entries are worth quoting in spite of their length, for they show as nothing else could the suppressed excitement of the time as the first lines became thinner and thinner:


"December 13th.—Evacuation of the position is now proceeding steadily, and we hear that 3,000 troops left last night. Weather to-day looks threatening, and it looks as if we were in for a storm. The landing is difficult enough, but the final evacuation will be a desperate business. The Anafarta plain already has a deserted appearance, and many of the guns have been already taken away. The Turks must surely know what is happening, and we live in the speculation of their attacking at any time. This evening all our stores were transported to Walker's Ridge, where we are to embark. Transport was partly by mule trains and partly by our own stretcher-bearers.

"DECEMBER 14TH.—Dull and threatening, but fortunately a wind was blowing. The final scene when our troops are withdrawn from Anzac will be very thrilling, and the estimated casualties are 6,000 to 10,000, for which number of wounded, we learnt later, preparations had been made in Lemnos. Many of our mounted troops have gone. The last Colonial troops to withdraw are to consist mainly of the old main body—Australians and New Zealanders. The first to land and the last to leave, they have played a glorious part.


"DECEMBER 15TH.—We expected to get orders to evacuate to-night, but none have come, and we hear we go out to-morrow night, the eve of the final retreat. It has been a very trying day, and to-morrow will not be less so. Our line is now precariously thin, and we have only a few cannon left, which now fire a great deal to compensate for the others. If the Turks attacked strongly nothing can save a disaster. Their artillery has hardly fired at all for two days, so perhaps they also are hatching a scheme. Our warships have been firing incessantly at Helles, so perhaps they think we are going to try another assault on Achi Baba. The weather still keeps fine, and I have never studied the sky with so much apprehension, for a spell of bad weather would absolutely stop all embarkation.

"December 16th.—Spent an uneventful but rather anxious night, as it seems impossible that the Turks don't realise what we are doing. So far the evacuation has gone without a hitch. To-day is again calm; the wind has subsided and it is quite calm. This morning there are four hospital ships quite close in, and several small storeships, but no transports. All evacuation, of course, is done under cover of darkness. The roads and sap seem deserted, and where we are accustomed to see hundreds of troops passing only small parties now come.


"DECEMBER 17TH—Still here, but at last have some definite orders. The final evacuation takes place on two nights, and we are to leave on the first of these. Let's hope it will be soon, as this suspense is very trying. The Turks are extraordinarily quiet, and there is nothing doing in any of the trenches. Our few—very few—remaining guns make a bold show, but the effect (to us) is very thin, and the blanks in the batteries are very noticeable to us, if not to the enemy. We hear that Cape Helles is not to be evacuated, so that the Turks will not be free of the invader when we have left.



GALLIPOLI AND THE NARROWS.



Stores at Suvia which were set on fire before the evacuation



A shell lands near the pier at Lancashire Landing on the day of the evacuation.



Guns leaving Suvia in broad daylight, but undetected by the Turks

. "December 18th.—Received orders to depart to-night at 6 o'clock. The whole position now seems absolutely deserted, and hardly a man or mule passes our dressing station. It is still fine and absolutely calm, and one could not wish for better weather for the grand finale. A few donkeys near us keep up a pathetic hee-hawing, as if they realised their imminent abandonment. The telephone wires offer a mute reproach to us, and the plain, which is now getting green, looks peaceful and beautiful.

"This afternoon for about two hours the Turks strafed our sector vigorously, and about fifty shells (mainly shrapnel) fell into Taylor's Hollow. Hardly a square yard in the hollow but received its bullet, but there was never a man there to serve as its host! Our aeroplanes have kept up all day, and at one time five were up simultaneously, and no hostile plane has dared to venture near our lines. To-night the garrison is reduced by fifty per cent, and to-morrow evening the remainder embark—or what is left of them. One of the most difficult of military operations has so far been carried out with tremendous success, but there are still 20,000 troops at Anzac, and to-night and to-morrow will be very critical.

"December 19th.—At 5-45 last night we silently left our camp, leaving our fires burning and the station fitted up to receive wounded—our own or Turkish—who may require aid to-morrow. Quietly we passed Chalk Hill (with the old Colonel's gravestone showing up in the moonlight), and proceeded to No. 2 Post, which has been the scene of so much slaughter during the last eight months. There we found about 500 others, who had orders to rendezvous there at 6 p.m.

"Without any delay the leading files entered the sap which leads to Walker's Pier. Not a word was spoken nor a match struck as we proceeded, rapidly and as silently as possible. One felt keyed up, and at any moment one feared to hear the sound of heavy rifle fire, which would indicate a sudden Turkish attack. We were halted for a short time just before we reached the mouth of the sap and heard several shells burst near the pier, but soon we again moved off.

"At last we reached the pier, and were loaded with wonderful despatch. The wharf was covered with sacking to dull the footsteps, and without a single casualty we were got safely on board and immediately afterwards moved out to sea.

"All this time not a shell was fired, although 'Beachy Bill' had dropped four near the pier when we were in the sap. Throughout the night 10,000 men were embarked, and only one was wounded by a stray bullet! It was a glorious feat. We had a splendid welcome, and supper was awaiting both men and officers. Half an hour later we left for Lemnos, and the last sight we had of Anzac was a huge bonfire burning on the beach near Walker's Ridge.

"Few of us will ever see it again. Over 8,000 New

Zealand and Australian dead lie buried there, and, although the object was never gained, it has been the scene of many deeds of heroism and has made the reputation of the Colonial soldier. Suvla Bay will always be one of the disasters in British history, and when one looks back on August 8th and knows that if the Suvla army had made good we should by this time have defeated Turkey, one feels a terrible disappointment and, alas! resentment.

"We got no sleep, and reached Mudros (Lemnos) at 3 a.m. and disembarked at 4-30. After a weary day—tramping here, there, and everywhere—we reached our camp at 4-30 p.m. The New Zealand Artillery dined us well, and we had a jolly evening varning together.

and we had a jolly evening yarning together.

"December 20th.—Slept long and deep, as we were terribly weary from the strain of the last few days. This morning got settled into our camp. The first of the Anzac' Diehards' arrived this afternoon, and great was our relief to hear that things had passed off even better than the most hopeful had anticipated. Indeed, we hear their only casualties were three sprained ankles!

"The final evacuation was admirably executed. At seven o'clock this morning the Turks furiously bombarded our trenches, and no man had been in them for over six hours. What a fitting testimony to the skill and secrecy of the retreat!


"At 5 p.m. the last of the Anzacs arrived in camp, and were cheered down the road lined with troops for nearly a mile. Very proud they looked as the men cheered, and none present will ever forget those strained, exhausted, but dauntless faces. General Birdwood must be a very proud man to-day. His troops are as full of fight as ever, and will yet win some great battle."

AT SUVLA.

At Suvla the evacuation was no less successfully accomplished. Numberless tricks were played to deceive the enemy. Parties of men were taken off at night and returned by day to make him think that we were preparing for a renewal of the attack. On the last day an ironic order was issued that the immemorial custom of our men showing themselves on the skyline should be observed, and for once a carelessness in exposure which has cost the army many thousands of valuable lives in the war became a military virtue. Clever as some of these stratagems were, their virtue depended entirely on the army. Only men of strong nerve could have kept up the game of bluff as the men both at Suvla Bay and at Anzac did for days together. There is a story of a party of Australians who on the last day played



Preparing for the evacuation at West Beach.



Stores at Lancashire Landing.

an ostentatious game of cricket, with the idea that the enemy might see them and have any suspicions of the permanence of our stay removed. It was said that the spirits of the army in October and November when sickness was at its worst had declined, but there was certainly no sign of any loss of moral in December, when the evacuation took place. On the other hand, there is not a little evidence that the enemy in the months of inaction that followed the fighting at Anzac and Suvla had suffered more than we, and was exceedingly despondent. There was a note of jubilation in their accounts of our departure, as though they were more relieved that we had gone than angry with themselves for letting us go so easily. Their stories of captured material were certainly false. At Anzac all that was left behind was four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4.7 naval gun, one anti-aircraft gun, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns, and these were all destroyed before we left. At Suvla every gun, vehicle, and animal was embarked. At both Anzac and Suvla huge bonfires were made of the stores that could not be carried away. The fires burned all through the night.

"In the morning at seven the Turks were evidently puzzled, but not realising the truth, they poured shells into the fire, with purpose obscure. By increasing light they also persistently shelled the empty beaches and Hill 10, where one of our batteries used to stand. Puzzled, they shelled partly by habit, but apparently none ventured out from the firing trenches, for we heard no mines explicing. Meantime our picket boats had searched the shores, but found no stragglers, not even an army doctor left behind. The Turkish guns then turned against the battleships, but wildly and without effect. Our ships answered with their great guns, keeping their smaller armament for the destruction of our own piers and harbours, so industriously built. At nine she turned and left the scene, passing westwards to an island harbour over the tranquil sunlit sea, and I think we are unlikely to land at Suvla again.

"The withdrawal of a large army under the enemy's nose, without loss, is a record of military and naval skill combined. More than ten years ago, combined military and naval manœuvres were held in Essex. I have reason to believe that many thousands of lives were saved on the peninsula by even the little practice then gained. One could mention names if names were allowed, but the whole army and navy engaged in the operation must share the honour. Besides, one must include the fortune which attends adventure. As it was, the movement was hurried forward by one day. It ended at nine yesterday morning. At nine to-day a south-west wind is raging, the sea roars upon our coast, and rain falls in a deluge. What if the decision had been delayed those few hours more?"

THE PROBLEM AT HELLES.

Even after the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac there were still some who hoped that we might keep our hold on the tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula at Helles, and it would, in fact, appear that there were some in the Cabinet who hesitated to assent to complete evacuation of ground that had been so hardly won. The orders for the withdrawal of the French troops on the peninsula had been given at the beginning of December, and by December 21st the French garrison on the peninsula had been reduced to 4,000 men. It is evident that with the French it was the complications at Salonika that turned the scale in favour of complete evacuation. Our own policy at this time was still undecided. It was arguable that even after Anzac and Suvla had been abandoned it might still be worth while to hold the Krithia line if only for the sake of compelling the Turks to keep a large army on the peninsula to watch an army which, when all was said, was a direct menace to the safety of the capital. On December 22nd, on the Krithia front,

there was performed a noble deed of valour which shines even in the heroic records of Gallipoli. "Lieutenent Albert Smith, of the East Lancashire Regiment," said a paragraph in the Gazette announcing that the Victoria Cross had been awarded to him, "was in the act of throwing a grenade when it slipped from his hand and fell to the bottom of the trench, close to several of our officers and men. He immediately shouted out a warning, and himself jumped clear and into safety; but, seeing that the officers and men were unable to get into cover, and knowing well that the grenade was due to explode, he returned without any hesitation and flung himself down on it. He was instantly killed by the explosion. His magnificent act of self-sacrifice undoubtedly saved many lives." There have been many brave deeds in this war, but none that more beautifully illuminates the phrase "a soldier and gentleman."


The orders for the evacuation of Helles came on December 28th. Evidently General Monro was not among those who had any doubts about the policy of withdrawal, and General Birdwood, as at Anzac, had already made very careful plans in anticipation of the order to evacuate. After the evacuation of Anzac there had been an increase in the number of the enemy's guns, and the landing beaches were kept continuously under bombardment. Moreover, the enemy's aeroplanes were bolder and more assiduous in their reconnaissances. As at Anzac, General Monro was against any attempt at a feint in order the cover the evacuation, and in his instructions he expressed the wish that the evacuation should be completed in one night, and that the troops should be withdrawn direct from the front trenches to the beach. It was agreed, moreover, at a council at which Admiral de Robeck was present, that the navy should refrain from any exceptional vigour in bombardment so long as the Turkish guns remained quiescent. The date of the evacuation was fixed for January 8th, or the first fine night after that date.

THE PLANS.

The evacuation of Helles was more difficult than that of Anzac, partly because it was the second attempt to hoodwink the Turks, but also because the beaches were more under observation. The precautions taken against Turkish attack if our withdrawal were discovered were therefore very elaborate. In addition to the three lines of defence that already existed, a fourth line was made from De Tott's Battery on the east to Gully Beach on the west of the peninsula. All four lines were carefully wired. Further, a number of defences were constructed to cover the embarkation beaches, the idea being that in case of attack they could be held by small garrisons sufficiently long to enable the main body to get away. A special embarkation staff was formed, under General Lawrence, commanding the Fifty-second Division, who was also in charge of the beach defences. It was arranged that as the withdrawing troops came within the lines of the beach defences they should pass under the command of General Lawrence, who conveyed his orders to them through a specially selected officer placed in charge at each beach.

On January 7th the Turks opened a bombardment on our trenches which is described as the most violent since the first landing, and the British Staff must have had serious misgivings whether the Turks might not have divined their intentions. The bombardment did considerable damage to the parapets of our trenches. Two Turkish mines were sprung, the Turkish trenches were seen to





Two views at Lancashire Landing.

be full of men, and it was thought that their officers were urging them to the attack. No attack, however, was delivered except very half-heartedly near Fusilier Bluff, and the events of the day give some support to a suspicion that the new troops which had been introduced since the fighting in August were of very inferior quality, or that the sickness of the autumn had spoilt their stomach for fighting. The British casualties during the day were 104 killed and wounded.

THE EVACUATION OF HELLES.

The next day, January 8th, opened fine. The disembarkation was to be made in three trips, the third trip consisting of the parties that had been left to hold the front trenches after the others had gone. The enemy's shelling, which had latterly been very heavy, was this day exceptionally light, perhaps, as is suggested, because our firm front on the previous day had convinced him that we had no intention of going yet. It was a dark night, and nothing could be seen of our doings from the Asiatic shore. Four piers were kept busy at W Beach and three at V Beach. The first trip was away by nine o'clock. By that time a fresh wind had sprung up from the south-west, and by eleven the rising sea had carried away one of the piers at W Beach. In spite of this misfortune the second trip was well under way by midnight. The Turks were still inactive. Our chief anxiety by now was a report brought by the Prince George about midnight that she had been struck by a torpedo, which had fortunately (she had 2,000 men on board) failed to explode. A German submarine was evidently in the neighbourhood, but it was unable to make use of the best chance that a submarine ever had. By three o'clock the embarkation was complete:-

"As the trawler drew off from the beach, in a rolling and pitching sea, flames began to appear on shore, which spread as the stores and explosives caught fire, until in half an hour a mighty conflagration was burning which lit up the cliffs far and near and told the tale of what had happened to the watchers in Asia.

"One glanced instinctively towards W Beach, where an even larger glow lit up the sky. As we drew opposite this beach it was a sea of fire from side to side. The distant popping of thousands of rounds of burning ammunition could be heard like the rolling of a hundred machine guns.

"Even as we watched a huge explosion rent the air. The flames towered high into the sky, and while one wondered at the beauty and terror of the spectacle another explosion of thrice the force of the previous one tore the beach and sky and darkness to pieces. For one terrific instant the air shook. A shower of wreckage shot up and fell pattering into the sea hundreds of yards from shore. A vast pillar of smoke climbed up from the blaze and hung menacingly over us, taking all kinds of sinister shapes in the unearthly glare. They say that ten tons of explosives went up in that appalling burst of infernal energy.

"It was a sight no one who saw it will ever forget. It was the death-throb of the expedition. With it the splendid hopes and enthusiasms of last summer went up into the air and fell into the sea. Far up the coast Gully Beach was shooting forth a red glare, which showed that the same work was being done there."

A famous bonfire of half-legendary history is said by the poets to have announced to Greece the glad news that Troy, on the opposite shore of the Dardanelles, near to Kum Kale, had fallen. These bonfires on Gallipoli announced to the world that Constantinople was not yet to fall. For the Turks they meant a deliverance from a campaign which had given Constantinople more anxiety than it had ever had since the Turks entered into possession. It meant, too, that their enemy had repeated under conditions of even greater difficulty the

feat that had excited such astonishment in December. They blazed away with guns and rifles into the flames, but it was already morning before they occupied our trenches. The only casualty in the evacuation was one man wounded.

THE CAUSES OF OUR SUCCESS.


Of all the operations of war none is more difficult than the embarkation of a large army in face of the enemy. Ordinarily, it is not to be accomplished without hard and dangerous fighting, even when the retreating army has the advantages of quays and all the apparatus of a port. Gallipoli was harbourless. Moreover, the enemy had had ample notice that we were at any rate thinking of withdrawal, and the evacuation of Anzac had told him under what conditions we should make the attempt. He knew that the attempt could only be made on a night that was dark and comparatively windless. It was wonderful that the first withdrawal should have been unmolested; but that the success should be repeated was almost incredible. It is not surprising that there were many in England who refused to believe that the Turks were as ignorant of our movements as they appeared to be, and one form that scepticism took was a slanderous rumour that the Turkish commanders had been bribed to let us go. There was not a shred of evidence for this gossip. But nothing is more likely than that the Turks were glad to see the last of us. It was in the highest degree inconvenient for them to have to keep a large army in Gallipoli. The Caucasus and Mesopotamia were both crying aloud for reinforcements, and if ever the project of an invasion of Egypt was to materialise it was necessary that the capital should be free of danger. However difficult the access to the capital might be by the way that General Hamilton had chosen, his success, as the Turks recognised, would have been fatal to Turkey. It would have impelled her to choose between Europe, where she might count on the assistance of German resources, and Asia; she could no longer straddle across the two continents. deliverance from such danger as this was far more valuable to her than any number of victories in Gallipoli, especially victories so costly as those of August. But even though Turkey, free to choose what she would have had, would have chosen the evacuation of Gallipoli by our troops before anything else, it is still inconceivable that if she had known that we were making our departure she would have made no attempt to inflict loss upon us. An attack would not have prevented our departure, for it is impossible when such a movement has begun suddenly to arrest it and decide not to continue. The alternatives for Turkey were our withdrawal without loss and with loss. And even if she grudged the loss of men to herself that would have been caused by a night attack, she might still have inflicted enormous damage upon us by artillery fire alone. Her gunners had all the ranges in Gallipoli, and could have shelled us almost as effectually by night as by day. One is therefore left with no alternative but to conclude that the Turks had no suspicion of our departure until they saw our blazing stores. Strange as this ignorance may seem, this supposition strains credulity far less than any other. Of all the armies in the world, none has ever exhibited the same combination of valour and endurance with dilatoriness and slovenness as the Turkish.

THE POLICY OF EVACUATION.

Whether the evacuation was as wise in its strategy as it was brilliant in execution is open to very grave



A general view of the French lines at Seddil Bahr.



The French depot at Seddil Bahr.

doubts. It was wise on two suppositions: first, that our troops could not have maintained themselves on Gallipoli through the winter, or would have suffered such losses as to cause a drain on our military resources out of all proportion to any prospect of military gain; and, secondly, that better use could be made of troops in some other campaign that on Gallipoli were being merely wasted.

It is now necessary to turn to the arguments advanced by General Monro for evacuation. He was instructed, first, to report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula; secondly, to express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the peninsula should be evacuated or another attempt made to carry it; and, thirdly, to give an estimate of the number of troops that would be required to carry the peninsula, to keep the Straits open, and to take Constantinople. His report on the military conditions that prevailed on the peninsula was exceedingly bad:—

"The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coastline had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our entrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather. No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive-whilst the Turks enjoyed full powers of observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer.

"Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the peninsula had suffered much from various causes.

"(a) It was not in the first place possible to withdraw them from the shell-swept area as is done when necessary in France, for every corner on the peninsula is exposed to hostile fire.

"(b) They were much enervated from the diseases which are endemic in that part of Europe in the summer.
"(c) In consequence of the losses which they had suffered in earlier battles, there was a very grave dearth of officers competent to take command of men.

"(d) In order to maintain the numbers needed to hold the front, the Territorial Divisions had been augmented by the attachment of Yeomanry and Mounted Brigades. Makeshifts of this nature very obviously did not tend to create efficiency."

The justice of this description of our position on the peninsula is above dispute, and the only respect in which it may convey a wrong impression is that it is not accompanied by any estimate of the state of the Turkish army. There is evidence that bad as our condition was, that of the Turks was rather worse, and, moreover, that their moral had suffered very greatly. General Monro may have thought, though the Report as published does not make him say it, that the establishment of through communications between Constantinople and the Central Powers would enable the enemy to mass so much artillery against our trenches as to make them untenable. It would have been interesting to read his estimate of the time that would be required before heavy guns could be brought up from Austria and placed in position. It seems certain, however, that though the artillery fire increased in violence towards the end of the year, none of the guns had been brought up from the Central Powers. Fresh supplies of shells had reached the Turks, but the new guns which troubled our troops at Helles just before the

evacuation were apparently those which were no longer required at Anzac and Suvla after the evacuation of our positions there.

GENERAL MONRO'S ARGUMENTS DISCUSSED.

The badness of our positions was not in itself a conclusive reason for evacuation, as General Monro himself would seem to have recognised, for he goes on to advance other arguments for the course which he was recommending. These arguments which he describes as "irrefutable in their conclusions"—were these:—

"(a) It was obvious that the Turks could hold us in front with a small force and prosecute their designs on Bagdad or Egypt, or both.

"(b) An advance from the positions we held could not be regarded as a reasonable military operation to expect.

"(c) Even had we been able to make an advance in the peninsula, our position would not have been ameliorated to any marked degree, and an advance on Constantinople was quite out of the question.

"(d) Since we could not hope to achieve any purpose by remaining on the peninsula, the appalling cost to the nation involved in consequence of embarking on an overseas expedition with no base available for the rapid transit of stores, supplies, and personnel made it urgent that we should divert the troops locked up on the peninsula to a more useful theatre.

"Since therefore I could see no military advantage in our continued occupation of positions on the peninsula, I telegraphed to your Lordship that in my opinion the evacuation of the peninsula should be taken in hand."

Doubtless these arguments in the Report as written were accompanied by detailed explanations which were cut out of the Report as published, but as they stand they hardly carry complete conviction. Was it so certain that the Turks could hold their positions with fewer men than we could hold ours? Sir Ian Hamilton, after the desperate fighting of August, estimated the total strength of the Turks at 130,000 against our 95,000. He asked for another 50,000 men, which were refused, but it may be doubted whether 145,000 stationed anywhere else would immobilise so many Turks as they would have done in Gallipoli. Where were they to be transferred? Egypt was in no danger, and to pile up the garrison there when no attack was threatened was to waste our numbers. At Salonika, again, there were no Turks, and until spring at any rate the arguments for keeping a large army there were political rather than military. His second argument that an advance from the positions that we held was not a reasonable operation to expect had more substance, but in any case the chances of success must largely depend on the number of men that we had to spare for a resumption of the offensive.

Without further explanation, it is certainly not obvious why, if the operations at Suvla and Anzac came so near to success, it would not have been possible to devise a further turning movement which would have given us at least an equal chance to that which we had just failed to improve in August. An enemy who was so lacking in vigilance as to allow us to escape altogether from the peninsula ought to have been particularly vulnerable to a surprise attack. General Monro's third argument that our position would not have been materially improved by success in the peninsula, and that an advance on Constantinople was in any case out of the question, would have been conclusive if it were substantiated, but it certainly does not carry the proof on its face. True, the Straits did not end at Maidos, but it does not seem unreasonable



A view of Seddil Bahr taken from the bridge of the River Clyde



Looking out to sea from Seddil Bahr, showing the River Clyde.

to suppose that with the Narrows in our possession the fleet could have won through the broader channel nearer to Constantinople, and at any rate made itself master of the Sea of Marmora. The forts on the European side dominate those on the Asiatic side of the Straits, and with Maidos and Achi Baba in our hands we could have forced the evacuation of the Asiatic forts, and obtained greater freedom of military movement in the direction of Constantinople. The Allies, dominant in the Sea of Marmora and the Black Sea should, one would think, have been in a position to interrupt communications between Europe and Asia, and though the defences of Constantinople on the sea side are still, even after the Dardanelles have been forced, by no means contemptible, the possession of the Sea of Marmora would have enabled the attack to turn the Chataldja lines which baffled the Bulgarians in the Balkan War. The capture of Constantinople would have been a tremendous military operation, and might. with our commitments in France, have been beyond our resources, but at any rate it should not have been impossible to establish something resembling a siege from the sea and to sever communications with Asia. That would have meant not only the defeat of Germany's Asiatic ambitions, but the downfall of Turkey's Asiatic Empire, and both our task in Mesopotamia and the Russian task in Armenia would have been much easier.

POPULAR NEGLECT OF THE EAST.

The deliberate opinion of General Monro, which presumably coincided with that of Lord Kitchener, is not lightly to be set aside, but if it is sound it means that the whole plan of operations in Gallipoli was based on fundamentally false ideas. Not only in his view was the plan of forcing the Straits by the fleet alone bad-about that there is hardly any room for difference of opinion—but the whole plan of capturing the Narrows was wrongly conceived, and every life lost in the fighting for Achi Baba and Sari Bair was sacrificed to bad strategy. One may reasonably hesitate to accept conclusions that would convict the military policy of the country in the East throughout the spring and summer of 1915 of folly. The military arguments advanced by General Monro were, it is to be suspected, not those which were really decisive for evacuation. Alone they would hardly have triumphed. They needed the makeweight of the Salonika entanglement, and perhaps of fears for the safety of Egypt-fears, as it turned out, that were without foundation. It must be remembered, too, that there had always been an undercurrent of opposition to our military enterprises in the East. It was thought by many that it was wise for us to confine our military efforts to France. People in England were slow to realise the enormous difficulties of forcing the German lines in France and Belgium. The East to them was not a "way round," but a mere dissipation of military effort on subsidiary objects. The subsequent history of the war was to modify this view very considerably. One of our prime political mistakes had been to fail to realise the place that her Balkan and Asiatic ambitions had in determining German policy. We overestimated the strength of the Western school of ambition in German counsels, and underestimated that of the Eastern. And this political error would seem to have had its counterpart in certain schools of British strategy which persistently underestimated the importance of the East. It is a remarkable fact that until Servia was attacked there was little or no sign that people as a whole had any sense of the place that the East occupied

in the scheme of the war. Yet Salonika, which was to keep an army of 200,000 men immobilised all through the winter and into the spring, was in a strategic sense only a ghost of the departed spirit of Gallipoli.

A GLORIOUS FAILURE.

The Gallipoli campaign was the greatest, if also the most glorious, failure in British military history. The British losses on land alone were 117,549. Of these, 1.745 officers and 26,455 of other ranks were killed, and in addition 353 officers and 10,901 men were returned as missing. That is to say, the campaign deducted from our war strength nearly 40,000 men. The numbers of wounded, many of whom were permanently lost to the army, and many more permanently disabled, amounted to over 78,000. And to these figures must be added nearly 100,000 cases of sickness. No separate British campaign has ever shown such figures. In the Crimean War and the South African War combined we had no more than 8,000 men killed in action, or one-fourth (if we count only one-quarter of the missing as dead) of those killed in less than half the time in Gallipoli. Not only was it the most costly single campaign (apart from France in this war) in our military history, but it is one of the few campaigns which ended in a complete blank, without our having anything whatever to show for it. The magnitude of the failure loomed all the greater by reason of the exceptional brilliance of some of its episodes. Except, perhaps, in some of the actions of the Peninsular War, the British army has no fighting to show comparable with that of the Lancashire Fusiliers on W Beach, of the Dublins, Hampshires and the Munster Fusiliers in the same landing, and of the Anzacs north of Gaba Tepe and at Sari Bair.

Why did a campaign which opened with such brilliant promise fail so lamentably? The popular explanation was that it was ill-conceived from the start, and General Monro's despatch on the evacuation seems to endorse that view. Yet if this explanation means that the idea of striking at Constantinople was bad, or that there was not very great ability shown in the planning of the attacks, it is unjust. If we had been quite free of commitments to France, and had had to choose a campaign on land which would suit our military power and enable us to play a great and worthy part in the war, perhaps this operation in Gallipoli would have been the one which had the greatest attraction for this country. Under these circumstances the capture of Constantinople would have been an operation well within our military power, and even as it was it seemed a very promising opportunity for co-operation between army and navy which no nation understood so well as this. Yet from the very beginning the history of this campaign is alternately illumined and disfigured by the contrast of brilliancy and ineptitude displayed side by side. The beginning of the operation was well timed, and there was real strategic genius in the conception of a blow at the heart of the Turkish Empire just when the balance of military interest was beginning to incline to the East. Side by side with this stroke of genius there appears the blunder of attempting to force the Dardanelles by the fleet alonean attempt which was in open disregard of the commonplaces of naval teaching. This naval reverse would have had less serious consequences if the attack by the army could have followed immediately. But the transports sent from Egypt with the landing force had been so carelessly loaded that, according to Mr. Nevinson, the earliest necessaries for landing had been stowed out of reach

at the bottom of the holds, and there was no choice but to send all back to be reladen at Alexandria. "Three precious weeks were thus lost through mere stupidity, such as any lady's maid packing for a week-end avoids. The delay, if it did not lose the campaign, lost hundreds of lives. For in the meantime the Turks, who had been strengthening the position since autumn, redoubled their fortifications, and our landing forces, late in any case, started with the discouragement of being later still."* This contrast of brilliancy and failure pursued us almost to the end, when the luck that had been persistently against us suddenly turned in our favour, and, combined with good management, enabled us to accomplish at quite negligible loss the difficult military operation of withdrawal—an operation the cost of which had been variously estimated beforehand at from fifteen to as much

*Mr. Nevinson in The Nation, April 29th.

as fifty per cent of the entire force. Anzac had its dark side at Suvla. Magnificent fighting and spirited regimental leading was sterilised by mismanagement in detail, or by sudden fits of inertia at the critical moment. No one responsible for the direction of the campaign can be wholly acquitted of blame, and least of all the management at home. Mr. Churchill justly said in November that "if there were any operations in the history of war which having been begun it was worth while to carry through with the utmost vigour and fury, with a consistent flow of reinforcements and an utter disregard of life, it was these." If energy and valour ran dry and lost themselves in the long waits, the fault was largely with the home authorities, who in the summer of 1915, apparently enamoured of the idea of the break through in France, neglected to supply promptly reinforcements of the right kind, and sacrificed the chance of making good the magnificent valour of Anzac to the offensive of Loos.



A general view taken from the bridge of the River Clyde, showing the French Lines. On the right is seen a road which was carried up to the vessel's side in order to facilitate transport. In the background is the ruined fortress of Seddil Bahr.

[All the illustrations to this chapter are from official photographs issued by the Press Bureau.]



Attested men signing on as willing to undertake munition work in their spare time.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XVII.

THE EXTENSION OF COMPULSION.

THE MARRIED MEN'S AGITATION—THE WORK OF THE TRIBUNALS—THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR—CRITICISM OF THE TRIBUNALS—THE POLITICAL SITUATION—THE SECRET SESSION—THE REJECTED BILL—"THE STRAIGHT THING."

Y the end of January, 1916, in addition to raising by voluntary means an army on the Continental scale, the State had compelled the service of every unattested unmarried man between the ages of 18 and 41 who could not prove his right to exemption or postponement, and had still to draw upon the twenty-six groups of married men who had attested under the Derby Scheme. It could, that is to say, without further legislation, use for the army the whole male population of military age except the unattested married, who numbered 651,000, and of whom, on the most generous estimates, some 300,000 might be available. Over 2,000 tribunals had been set up, and these, with the military representatives and advisory committees, were busily engaged in sifting appeals. It might well be thought that the country could rest awhile from consideration of the recruiting problem. Labour, which had reluctantly accepted the limited compulsion of the first Military Service Act as the only means of fulfilling the Prime Minister's pledge to the attested married men, was prepared vigorously to oppose any extension of the principle. Mr. Asquith himself was understood to have told a Labour deputation that no further measure of conscription would be passed so long as he remained Premier. The most ardent conscriptionist would have hesitated in the early spring to prophesy general com-H3-VOL. IV.

pulsion. Yet within four months a measure extending compulsion to the whole eligible manhood of the nation had been passed with less opposition in Parliament and the country than had greeted the first Bill.

THE MARRIED MEN'S AGITATION.

Many varied and even apparently conflicting factors went to bring about this remarkable change. Military necessity, which in ideal conditions should have been the sole determining consideration, played a relatively small part, for the country was given no means of gauging it. Not until the public mind was already thoroughly dissatisfied, for a host of minor reasons, with the compromise that had been reached in recruiting did the Government explain to a secret session of Parliament the military case for universal conscription. Of the causes which prepared the country for the step one of the most effectual was what came to be known as the "married men's agitation." The calling up on March 7th of the first of the married men came as a great surprise to many of those affected. Some had undoubtedly attested in the belief that they would never be wanted; some had been told by over-zealous recruiting officers that if they did not come they would be "fetched," and had expected their summons to the colours to be accompanied by the compulsion of their fellows. Many, again, felt that so



Reading the Proclamation calling up the first eight groups of married men.

[Topical Press.

long as a considerable number of single men were allowed, even under the Military Service Act, to remain in certified occupations the Prime Minister's pledge that the single should go first had not been fairly kept. Finally, to a great number, the separation allowance offered by the army, and the rigorous policy adopted by tribunals towards applicants for exemption, spelt domestic or commercial ruin.

It was from the first clear that some of these points would have to be met before the military harvest of the Derby Scheme could be fully gathered. But the married protesters would leave nothing to chance or delay. They formed themselves into associations—the Married Men's League was one, the Attested Married Men's Union another-with branches all over the country from Portsmouth to Perth, and developed a vigorous and effective, if scarcely dignified, campaign. The early days of March saw the movement in full swing. A mass meeting on Tower Hill, in London, on March 13th, protested against "married men with six children having their homes broken up while single young men in munition works earning £6 a week were able to laugh at them." A definite and drastic programme emerged. It was stated in full at a crowded meeting held in the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, on March 24th, and it varied little in other parts of the country. The meeting demanded (a) that the Government should fully redeem Mr. Asquith's pledge by proving to the satisfaction of the married men, before calling upon them to fight, that no available single man was left unenlisted; (b) that adequate financial provision should be made against domestic and business hardship; (c) that rejections on medical grounds should be carefully revised; (d) that the eligible unattested married men should be compelled to attest. The temper of the meeting may be judged by the fact that it also called hotly for the resignation of Lord Derby from the Directorship of Recruiting, on the ground that he had not kept faith with his married recruits.

"COMBING OUT" THE SINGLE.

The Government had already promised to deal with the first two of these demands. The Military Service Act had swept away the complex system of "starring" and "badging" which had been started at the taking of the Register and during the Derby Scheme, and had substituted a simple system of "certified occupations." On March 14th it was announced that, as a result of the deliberations of an Advisory Committee appointed to consider the matter, drastic changes had been made in the granting of these reservations. In deference to a widespread belief that single men were taking refuge in munition and similar works, it was decided that no man should be held to belong to a certified trade unless he had been in it before the Register was taken on August 15th, 1915. In addition, single men in certified trades were to be released for service up to the age of thirty, and in some cases forty-one; the exemption of those claiming to hold positions of responsibility and experience, such as managers and overlookers, was to be limited to married men over thirty; and several trades were removed entirely from the certified list. At the same time, in order to give this "combing out" process a chance, the warning to the second batch of married groups (aged twenty-seven to thirty-five), which was

expected at the end of March, was postponed until April 27th.

One important demand of the married protesters was thus met. There was, under the new regulations, less danger that single men would escape service than that such vital occupations as farming would be denuded of their labour before it could be replaced. Fear of this result, indeed, led to some sharp passages between Lord Derby and Lord Selborne, who, as President of the Board of Agriculture, considered that men were being recklessly removed from the land.

The Government's answer to the second demand of the

married recruitsfor adequate financial relief-did not become clear in detail till much later, but it was outlined by Mr. Long on March 20th. The Government would set aside a sum to be used to meet severe financial hardships due to enlistment. It would apply both to married and single recruits, past and future. At the same time, the Courts Emergency Powers Act would be extended so as to provide that no distraint for money payable under a contract, including a rent contract, entered into by a member of His Majesty's forces should be made except on application to a court, and that the court should stay execution if satisfied that inability to pay was directly or indirectly due to the war. The

DAIVIS & CMILLITARY

Interrupters attempting to gain entrance to a "National Convention" of the No-Conscription Fellowship at Devonshire House, Bishopsgate. [L.N.A.

position under this scheme of a man with a lease on his hands, whose income ceased on his enlistment, was therefore that if his dependants desired to remain in the house the State would contribute so much towards the rent; if they desired to move to a smaller house, but the landlord would not determine the lease, they could withhold the rent and the court would end the lease for them; and in the absence of the soldier they could not be proceeded against for any other contracts into which he had entered.

The full extent of the relief to be offered to help recruits to meet their liabilities was not published till April 26th. Mr. Asquith then announced that a Special Committee had been appointed to administer the fund which Mr. Long had promised should be set aside. The committee had obtained the agreement of the Treasury IL,*-VOL. IV.

to the application of the scheme to all men, married and single, who had joined or might join the forces. Assistance would be granted in respect of house or office rent, mortgage interest, instalment payments for furniture, &c., rates, taxes, insurance premiums, and school fees. The limit of assistance would be £104 per annum, and applications would be investigated locally by barristers appointed for the purpose. The decision thus tardily reached was a generous one. It had been come to only after a deplorably undignified Press and platform campaign which a little forethought might have avoided.

MORE COMPUL-SION DEMANDED.

While these pro-

visions were slowly emerging, the agitation of the married recruits was continued with undiminished vigour. The "combing out" of the single men was, they said, proceeding too slowly; the financial provision was not yet definite or adequate, and in any case should have been made law before the men affected by it were called Above all, compulsion must be extended to the unattested. This last argument was coupled, fantastically enough, with the quite incompatible demand that men who had attested under a misapprehension should be given facilities for being released from their oath. Perhaps the strangest item of the general confusion was that less than a month

before general compulsion was introduced Mr. Asquith yielded on this point. In a very sharp reply to a deputation of married recruits, which he received on April 12th, he pointed out that "but for some patent ground of exemption every single man was to be made available before the married men were called up." He added that "that was the full extent of the Government pledge, and it was being carried out by the most effective machinery that the wisdom of Parliament could devise." He promised, however, to find "some simple machinery, without legal formalities, by which a man who could show that he had been misled could be released." It would seem, therefore, that so late as this the introduction of general compulsion was not contemplated by the head of the Government.



Part of the crowd at a Married Men's Protest Meeting in Hyde Park against the employment of single men in munition works.



A show of hands in favour of the resolution passed at the Hyde Park meeting. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$

Not content with holding protest meetings, sending deputations to Ministers and petitioning the King, the protesting married men intervened directly in politics. At a bye-election in the Market Harborough division they induced Mr. Gibson Bowles to come forward as their particular candidate. Championship of the rights of the married took the form, in Mr. Bowles's case, of advocating general compulsion, and, coupled as it was with remarkably independent views on the conduct of the war, it failed to capture the electorate. The Government candidate, who was returned by a handsome majority, expressed full agreement with the married complainants on all points save that of further conscription. In a second bye-election, at Hyde, a candidate who should confine himself to putting forward the cause of the married was for a time spoken of, but on finding an opposition candidate already in the field who advocated a more vigorous prosecution of the war, coupled with removal of licensing restrictions, the married men entrusted their case to him. Here, again, the Government candidate, who, although no conscriptionist, gave them all reasonable support, was returned.

By this time the manifest intention of the Government to deal fairly, if tardily, with their legitimate claims had taken the force out of the movement. Never very discreet or well considered, it had some deplorable results. It seemed, for instance, at one time, as if an offer made by one organisation of the married to "track down' single "shirkers" and report them had the approval of the Director of Recruiting; and it is noteworthy that an illustration of a mass meeting protesting against their early call to the colours was widely republished in the German Press as evidence that Britain was war weary. That the bitterness and confusion which the agitation evolved contributed to reconciling public opinion to general conscription there can be no question. Lord Derby, in a letter read to a meeting of attested married men, held in the Albert Hall, London, pointed out that "when the Military Service Bill was before the House of Commons no attempt was made by any member of Parliament to insist on universal compulsion being introduced in order to redeem any pledge made during the recruiting campaign," and reminded the meeting that the passing of such a measure "would not help in the very least to secure the unmarried man." At the same time he confessed himself, as he had done before, in favour of compelling "every man, married or single, to play his part in the defence of the country," and, with the principle of voluntaryism already destroyed, a growing number, in face of the existing confusion, inclined towards his view.

TRIBUNALS AND HARD CASES.

Another and a stronger factor that contributed to swell the growing dissatisfaction with the existing compromise in recruiting lay in the published reports of the work of the tribunals. Day after day the Press contained accounts of men being taken for the army although medically rejected under the Derby scheme; of widows' sons compelled to serve in spite of the legislative protection afforded them; and of men in small businesses being forced to sacrifice their prospects when a fair interpretation of the law would have saved them. The work of the tribunals was to some extent misrepresented. In the first place, it was commonly forgotten that they dealt only with cases about which some doubt existed. Where a man lodged an obviously admissible plea for exemption or postponement his case was dealt with at once by the

military representative and his advisory committee, and thousands of appeals were so disposed of. Again, of the doubtful cases that reached the tribunals only the harder ones were as a rule reported. They made the most interesting news, and they were given undue prominence.

The composition of the tribunals was, however, unsatisfactory, and the Military Service Act, which gave them for the first time legal recognition, made no improvement in it. They were frequently composed, especially in rural districts, of men with no judicial experience, and were sometimes prone to let their personal views obscure the law. They were, moreover, in many cases subjected to undue pressure by military representatives, who at law had the right to appear only as advocates, but who sometimes took a share in the deliberations. The great majority of the two thousand and more tribunals that faced the enormous number of appeals lodged in the spring of 1916 did their work energetically and justly according to their lights; but more than enough "hard cases" were given publicity to convey a very different impression to the country.

THE MEDICAL REJECTS.

The interests of the men affected by the new Act were watched in Parliament by Sir John Simon and his supporters who had opposed its passing. Their first activities were on behalf of the men medically rejected under the Derby Scheme. The new Act included in its exemptions men who had offered themselves for enlistment and been rejected since August 14th, 1915. Meanwhile, however, the physical standard for enlistment had been split into several grades, varying, according to physique, from "general service" to "sedentary work," and the military authorities showed a tendency, as Sir John Simon put it, to take "anyone with two arms or two legs." Men who applied for the armlets to which rejects were entitled were told they must be re-examined. In some cases their rejection certificates were torn up, and they were enlisted in one or other of the new physical grades. Here and there over-zealous recruiting officers stated that the new Act made re-examination necessary, and even issued posters to that effect. This was, of course, a contravention of the Act, and Sir John Simon succeeded in having the threats and posters repudiated by the War Office, and in securing that where a man could prove rejection, or show that he had attested under a misapprehension, he should be exempt.

Much mischief had, however, already been done. In London a case by no means exceptional was that of a man whom one recruiting authority had refused to examine on the ground that it would be a waste of time, since he was almost blind in one eye and would soon lose the sight of the other, but who nevertheless was refused any postponement by the tribunal before which he came because he "might be useful for clerical work in the army." Mr. Snowden, in the House of Commons, cited cases from Manchester, St. Helens, Glossop, and other places where the army had taken men with grave physical defects, and even epilepsy. Indeed, the revelations under this head, had they represented the general practice, would have constituted an intolerable tyranny. Like other hard cases they received undue weight from the publicity given to them, but they contributed to raising an uneasy feeling that as a nation we had come to a sad pass if we had to swell our armed forces by such means.

Round the "widow's son" there centred a similar controversy. The Act made it a good ground for appeal that "serious hardship would ensue if a man



Recruits giving up their armlets, on being called to the icolours.

[Central News.



Attested men on a route march through London with a detachment of the National Guard. [Central Press.]

were called up for army service owing to his exceptional financial or business obligations or domestic position." Ministers had explained that the end of this clause was intended, where proper, to cover the son of a widow. Mr. Walter Long, President of the Local Government Board, in a circular of advice to tribunals which he issued on February 24th, gave some guidance on the interpretation of "serious domestic hardship" in this connection. It might, he said, be financial, or might arise where the widow had lost other sons in the war, or was gravely infirm. Here, as in other cases, the intention of the Act was disregarded by many tribunals, and additional material was provided both for the opponents of conscription and for those who considered that the limitation of it to single men was an injustice.

THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR.

But the strangest and most uncomfortable consequence of the introduction of conscription was the emergence, in his hundreds, of the conscientious objector and the failure to observe any consistent policy in dealing with him. The Derby Scheme had, of course, made no provision for him. Whatever other reasons a man might have for claiming exemption or postponement, it was to be supposed that if he voluntarily took the military oath he had no moral scruples against serving in the forces. The Military Service Act, however, made express provision for men having such scruples. The clause affecting them—the precise meaning of which was hotly disputed for long after the Act was passed—ran as follows:—

"An application may be made at any time before the appointed date to the Local Tribunal established under this Act by or in respect of any man for the issue to him of a certificate of exemption from the provisions of this Act on the ground of a conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant service; and the Local T ibunal, if they consider the grounds of the application established, shall grant such a certificate. Any certificate of exemption may be absolute, conditional, or temporary, as the authority by whom it was granted think lest suited to the case, and also, in the case of an application on conscientious grounds, may take the form of an exemption from combatant service only, or may be conditional on the applicant being engaged in some work which, in the opinion of the tribunal dealing with the case, is of national importance.'

It became amply clear before the passing of the Act that there were many conscientious objectors who would not take the military oath either for combatant or noncombatant service, and to whom such a "work of national importance" as the making of shells seemed a direct participation in the war to which they could not agree. The Quaker sect—the oldest associated with such views, and entitled by general consent to have them respected—was divided in its policy. Some of the most eminent of its members took up non-combatant work, and, attached to the Friends' Ambulance Corps, gave service of the first value. Others refused steadfastly to give any aid, direct or indirect, to the prosecution of the war. This, too, was the stand taken by the new associations of conscientious objectors which had come into being early in the war-the No-Conscription Fellowship, the League of Reconciliation, and others. Their quite logical objection to accepting the compromise of non-combatant service was well summed up in a statement issued by the Society of Friends in Lancashire and Cheshire at the end of March. They said: -- "We can see no moral difference between firing shells and handing them to be fired, between digging the trench and shooting from it. We cannot testify against all war H3.-VOL. IV.**

and be, body and soul, under the orders of the captains of war."

THE OBJECTORS AND THE TRIBUNALS.

It seemed that men who held this view, and held it sincerely, would secure total exemption under the clause of the Military Service Act which has been quoted. Military representatives and most tribunals, however, took a different view. They interpreted the Act to mean that the objector was entitled only to exemption from combatant service. They did not hesitate to tell him that they considered him lucky to secure even that; and in many cases they violently exceeded their functions in dealing with him. The Press teemed with unedifying reports of addresses by chairmen of tribunals to conscientious objectors on what Christ would have done under the circumstances; with accounts of men being refused exemption because they were not Christians; because they were only Christians and not Quakers or Christadelphians; or because they were Socialists as well as Christians. A stock form of cross-examination emerged which consisted in "posing" the objector with a quite irrelevant question as to "what he would do if the Germans were bayoneting his mother?" or leading him on, if he were guileless enough, from an affirmation that he would help the war in no way to an admission that he "would not even aid a wounded soldier who was in difficulties." Personal abuse of the objector by tribunals was all too common. The limit in this direction was probably reached on a northern tribunal, one of whose members—quoted later in the House of Commons—told a conscience pleader that he was "exploiting God to save his own skin, that he was a rank blasphemer, a coward and a cad, and nothing but a shivering mass of unwholesome fat."

Total exemption was rarely or never granted; and so gravely did many tribunals depart from the intention of the Act that the Local Government Board, which had been responsible for setting them up, felt it necessary on March 24th to issue a circular of advice advocating more discretion even at the expense of zeal. "In some cases at least," it said, "local tribunals in dealing with applications on ground of conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant service have seemed to be under the impression that the only form of exemption which could be given in such cases is an exemption from combatant duties only. If this is so, the tribunals have overlooked Section 2 (3) of the Act." The circular then quoted the passage on total exemption given above, and continued:—

"Some tribunals are alleged to have subjected applicants to a somewhat harsh cross-examination with respect to the grounds of their exemption. It is, of course, necessary that the tribunal should satisfy themselves of the bona fides of an applicant and of the precise grounds and nature of his objection; but it is desirable that enquiries should be made with tolerance and impartiality."

The circular also announced the appointment of a committee—known as the Pelham Committee—to decide what "work of national importance" could be undertaken by extreme objectors without entering the army even for non-combatant service. In the meantime, however, the War Office had created a Non-Combatant Corps in the army, which was to carry no weapons, but was to be used for digging, draining, road-making, and labour in general. To this corps most objectors who received any consideration at all were sent, and the Local Government Board's memorandum was



Passing a resolution at a meeting of the National Union of Attested Married Men on Tower Hill.

[Topical Press.]

generally disregarded. Protests were made in vain by Bishops, by eminent Quakers, and by members of Parliament, who, though not necessarily in sympathy with the views of the objectors, realised the inconsistency and injustice of setting aside the provisions of the Act and the regulations made by Government for carrying it out. The tribunals, influenced no doubt by the very considerable number of obviously spurious conscience pleas that came before them, continued to deal rigorously both with the just and the unjust, and in many cases abandoned all pretence of judging the objectors in favour of baiting them. The Pelham Committee did little, and did it very slowly. As late as May 10th the chairman of a Northern Tribunal complained that he had referred to it over 50 cases without result.

THE FATE OF THE STUBBORN.

In consequence, before the Act had been in operation a month, several "exemplary sentences" were passed on objectors who maintained their position to the end, and for whom no "alternative work of national importance" had been found. A Lancashire school teacher, whose good faith was at least clearly enough established to lead his education committee to keep open his post for him until he should return, was refused exemption on conscientious grounds, fined £2 as an absentee, handed to the military authorities, and sentenced by court martial to two years' penal servitude. The sentence was later commuted to imprisonment in detention barracks. A Cornish objector, for refusing

to obey orders, was sentenced by court martial to two years' hard labour at Wormwood Scrubbs. By the beginning of May, according to the figures compiled by a society which held a watching brief for the objectors, there had been six court martial sentences, including four of two years; ninety men were in military and fifteen in civil custody; thirteen had been released for health and other reasons, and two had joined the army after imprisonment.

The country cannot be said to have been greatly concerned at these results. Even the illustration on the front page of a pictorial journal of a conscientious objector, who was undergoing imprisonment for refusing to don uniform, strapped into a blanket and guarded by soldiers provoked only a few protests against its bad taste. Here and there a voice was raised against the persistence of so deplorable a state of affairs under a law expressly designed to make it impossible; but the view of the average man was probably accurately summed up by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons, when, twitted with having himself been a "conscientious objector" in another and very different war, he said:—

"The Government were entitled to ask that every citizen should contribute something towards helping the country. He had conscientious objectors in his own department, who were helping him to improve the conditions of the workers in the workshops. They would sooner be shot than fight, but they were doing valuable work, which was perfectly consistent with their consciences. Surely conscientious objectors could not object to assist in the R.A.M.C. Had he been recruited in the Boer War he would not have

hesitated for a moment to take part in helping to succour the wounded. What is there inconsistent in a man who objected to war doing his best to cure its wounds and repair its damage?"

LORD SELBORNE'S CRITICISM.

It was natural that many tribunals, especially with the constant inspiration of the military representatives, should tend to forget that they were appointed to weigh judicially the obligations of men to serve, and act rather as recruiting authorities. The tendency was marked, and met with much criticism, including several checks from official quarters. Thus the Local Government Board had to remind the tribunals that they must recognise the

"injury that might be done to industry and commerce if managers directing important businesses and clerks possessing technical knowledge were removed from their present employment." This admonition was made necessary by the too narrow view taken by many tribunals of the "national interest" safeguarded in the Act, as well as by their interpretation of "exceptional financial hardship through business obligations." The conflicting claims of two kinds of "national interest" was sharply emphasised by Lord Selborne, President of the Board of Agriculture, on March 14th:-

"'The policy of the Government had," he said, from the beginning been, and still was, that no single acre of land should go out of cultivation, that

flocks and herds should be kept up to the highest pitch possible, and that the output of food for man and beast should be increased by every possible human effort. . . . If there were two young men of military age running a farm one ought to go and the other stay at home; but there must be a farmer in charge of each farm, and the first thing the Government did under the Military Service Act was to place the farmer at the head of the list of exempted classes."

Despite these facts, many necessary farmers had been beguiled or threatened into attestation and refused exemption. Lord Selborne censured military representatives in this connection for acting not as counsel but as judges; for making "statements for which they had no authority


whatever," which were "absolutely mischievous, which Lord Kitchener would repudiate, and which could benefit no one except the Kaiser."

On the other hand, Major Lionel Rothschild, M.P., as the military representative on the City of London Tribunal, replied in the House of Commons to charges made against him and his fellows of exceeding their powers, and of "tricking men into the army by bullying and improper methods":—

"'He wished,' he said, 'to assert most emphatically that recruiting officers were instructed in every case to give every possible consideration to the men. The work was new and difficult, and, as a rule, the day was not long enough for the accumulation of work. Both the

military representativ s and the tribunals fully realised the important duties with which they were entrusted, and he was sure they were only too anxious to give ful! consideration to each case, and to give as ample relief as the exigencies of the situation would allow."

And Mr. Tennant, replying in the House on behalf of the War Office to similar charges, so far from admitting that tribunals had exceeded their authority in getting men for the army, stated that they had gone much beyond the intentions of the Government in the other direction, and were exempting men "right and left" from military service.



Lord Derby leaving the War Office.

[Photopress.

UNDERLYING CAUSES OF CONFUSION.

This view of the tribunals as reprehensibly generous was, of course, no more true than that which would have

them arbitrary tyrants. The existing confusion, dislocation, and hardship were due to causes far beyond their influence. We had now recruited by voluntary enlistment an army on the Continental scale. We were called upon to maintain, perhaps to increase it, and at the same time to keep our navy at full strength, to produce unlimited munitions for ourselves and for some of our Allies, and to keep our trade and agriculture going at a pitch which would enable us not only to finance the war but make enormous loans to our friends. It became increasingly clear that these conflicting claims could not all be met without a very great strain upon the nation. The action of the tribunals was not the cause of the hardships

attendant on that strain, but it was a very accurate reflex of the strain itself. We have said that they were ill fitted by their composition for judicial work, but had they been chosen with all the care and skill the State could command they could hardly have been expected to make infallible decisions on a problem whose conflicting factors the heads of the State themselves had not been able to reconcile. One thing was clear, that not even by spurring the tribunals to the maximum of vigour possible under the Act would the War Office get the number of men it said it must have with anything like the speed it considered necessary. Compulsion as applied to the remnant of the unmarried had failed, as its critics predicted, to produce for service the men expected of it. Volunteering was practically dead, and a great proportion of the men called up under the Act had good grounds for appeal, which congested the tribunals and choked the stream of recruits. Meanwhile, the country was distracted by the cry that thousands of single men were lurking in certified trades, and by the complaints of married recruits who foresaw ruin if the screw of the tribunals was not loosened

THE POLITICAL SITUATION.

The political situation reflected the general confusion. The Government was assailed in the House from different quarters for its tardiness in "combing out" the certified trades; for its complacence in the illegal acts of tribunals and military representatives; for its failure to produce a plan to meet the married men's liabilities; and for the confusion into which it had allowed the status of the conscientious objector to slip. In March the War Committees of both the chief political parties, generally spoken of as the "Ginger Groups," declared for general conscription, not less as a military necessity than as a means of clearing the air. The Cabinet intimated that it was examining all the figures available as to the supply of men for the army, and would make a statement as soon as possible. On April 13th Sir Edward Carson, on behalf of the Unionist War Committee, tabled the following motion :- --

"That the House is of opinion that the present system of recruiting is unfair in its incidence and inadequate to secure the men urgently needed in order to attain the objects which this country has put before itself in this war, and to fulfil our obligations to our Allies, and resolves that no further time should be lost in amending the Military Service Act so as to require as far as possible equal sacrifice from all men of military age by rendering all alike liable for military service during the present war."

Thus, a partial measure of compulsion having been passed on the ground that there was a considerable body of single "shirkers," a complete measure was now demanded on the quite different ground that there was no military logic in treating married and single men differently. The Prime Minister announced that he would make a statement of the Government's whole policy regarding the supply of men on April 19th—a week later and the House would in that connection have an opportunity of discussing the motion.

The week that followed was one of high political tension. The politicians and newspapers that were enamoured of conscription for its own sake notably the *Times* and the *Daily Mail*—clamoured for an "omnibus bill" as the only solution of the tangle. More pertinent criticism was directed to asking what was the ultimate size and what the functions that the Government designed for the British army. How many divisions did we propose to keep in the field, on

how many fronts were we to fight, and had any statesmanlike attempt been made to relate the claims upon the nation for men, ships, munitions, and money? The results of the Military Service Act had shown that not even by compulsion could any large yield be squeezed out of the remaining single men. Could more be hoped of the unattested married, who would presumably have greater liabilities and poorer physique? The working of the tribunals had amply shown how vain an ideal was real "equality of sacrifice." Would they come any nearer it with the additional appeals of married conscripts to face? Would the yield of men in any case be sufficient to compensate for the opposition of Labour to the extension of compulsion?

THE SECRET SESSION.

To the most important of these questions no answer had been given by the Government either to the country or to its representatives in Parliament. They were now, however, to be met. On April 19th Mr. Asquith told the House that he would defer his statement, as certain outstanding points had not been settled. Two days later he announced that Parliament would meet in secret session to hear the Cabinet justify their policy. The step was without precedent since reporters were first admitted to Parliament, and the most thorough precautions were taken to make it effectual. Heavy penalties were threatened to any person or newspaper that should divulge or even speculate upon what had occurred. The House sat in secret on two successive days, and at the close of the second an official report stated that Mr. Asquith had given particulars of the expansion of the army from the first days of the war, and had explained how many men the Government considered could be spared for enlistment consistently with the claims of the navy, munitions, trade, and other essential national services. He added that owing to the time that must be spent in sifting individual cases the flow of recruits had fallen short of that needed to "fulfil our proper military effort," and outlined his proposals to meet the situation.

It soon appeared that official Labour had been convinced, by the arguments adduced in the secret session, of the need of an overhauling of recruiting. Mr. G. J. Wardle, M.P., Acting Chairman of the Labour Party, wrote in the Railway Review of April 28th:—

"I want to make two categorical statements. The first is that there has been no enlargement of the demands of the army since Lord Kitchener and Mr. Asquith met the Labour Committee last September. I think that it is important, since in some quarters it is being alleged that the army is constantly increasing its demands and crying 'Give! give!' irrespective of the needs of the country and its previous commitments.

"The second is that the number required has all along been assented to by those responsible as being well within the mark of those who can be spared from industry without affecting in any degree the vital interests of the nation or reducing beyond our capacity the number of those engaged in necessary occupations. It is a question of releasing those who can be spared, and those only.

"I may add that there has never been, and there is not now, any question as to the absolute necessity of obtaining these numbers if this country is to fulfil its obligations to its Allies and take its full share in winning the war, and that the question of how to obtain them has all along been left entirely to the Government, with the exception of the pressure which has been applied by the Press referred to and a certain impatient number of politicians."

THE REJECTED BILL.

Despite an apparently complacent House, the Government still hesitated to complete the compulsory system.

Its proposals fell into two parts. The first put the screw more tightly on men who had already served or were liable to serve; the second proposed to give the unattested married men a chance to attest at the rate of 50,000 in the first four weeks, and 15,000 a week thereafter up to the number of 200,000. If this supply failed at any time compulsion would at once be introduced.

The first half of the proposal was embodied in a Bill introduced by Mr. Walter Long, on April 28th. It met with so hostile a reception from all sections of the House that it was for the time being withdrawn. The clauses that provoked most bitter comment were those which provided that time-expired men should be forced to remain in the army till the end of the war, and that those who had been discharged, if of military age, should be re-enlisted. Mr. Long explained that those among the latter who had settled down in business for themselves would have the same right of appeal to tribunals as had the conscripts under the Derby Scheme. Sir Edward Carson, Mr. Stephen Walsh, and Mr. Leif Jones, speaking from widely different standpoints, regarded the compulsory re-enlistment of these men as an intolerable proposal. The Bill further proposed to deny to Territorials the right to remain in the unit in which they enlisted; to reduce the time in which a reserved man might seek a new situation from two months to two weeks: to utilise in the workshops men fit only for home service; to take into the army every fit youth who reached the age of eighteen; and to overhaul the medical rejections granted since August 14th, 1915. Viewed by itself, it seemed a means of maintaining the army by penalising just the men who deserved well of the State and by a reckless breaking of promises to others. In that light the House looked upon it, and compulsionists joined hands with anti-compulsionists in unrelieved condemnation

"THE STRAIGHT THING."

A notable speech was made by Mr. Stephen Walsh, Labour member for the Ince Division, who protested against "any further temporising," and appealed to the Government to "let us have the straight thing." Mr. Asquith, in withdrawing the Bill, reminded the House that it was part only of the whole plan, and hoped that members would be reconciled to it when it was no longer divorced from its context.

In the next few days the atmosphere was one of crisis; and it seemed not improbable that the Government would be forced to resign. The charges and countercharges of intrigue and conspiracy among Ministers with which public opinion was occupied throughout this

deplorable approach to a great decision were one of the least creditable features in our demeanour in the war. Mr. Asquith, however, met the House with confidence on May 2nd, and announced his intention of introducing next day a measure of general compulsion. At the same time he made public part of the statement on recruiting which he had already delivered to the secret session. The country was now informed that the army had grown in the course of the war to forty-two Regular and twenty-eight Territorial Divisions. These, with the twelve Divisions contributed by the Dominions, represented an Imperial effort, excluding India, of over 5,000,000 men. For the maintenance of our part of these armies we needed 200,000 of the men still unattested, in addition to those provided for in the Bill which had been withdrawn. The Government were convinced that these men could be spared without detriment to essential industries. He recognised the objection of the House to dealing with the problem piecemeal, and invited its assent to a general measure. He added:---

"There is an immense advantage in getting rid of piecemeal treatment, to which so much objection is taken, and the sense of temporary injustice and inequality which that mode of treatment is apt to engender. The speeches made last Thursday, particularly from the Labour benches, encouraged the belief that there is a general desire to settle the whole matter, with all the controversy and heated feeling it has produced, once and for all, and to get it finally out of the way at the earliest moment. It is our earnest hope that this will be the effect of the Bill we intend to introduce."

The new Military Service Bill, which was introduced next day, contained all the provisions, outlined above, which had met with so hostile a reception from the House when embodied in a separate measure, and in addition a simple clause extending compulsion to all men of eligible age in the same terms as it had been applied to single men in the previous Act. It was evident that the Government could count on the backing of Labour in the House, and the Bill seemed likely to meet even less opposition numerically than had the last Act. We had thus arrived, by a wearisome succession of manœuvres and compromises at a complete system of conscription. A general desire to be quit of a question that seemed to produce interminable complexities and innumerable bitternesses contributed more than anything to reconciling the country to the final step. It remained to be seen whether this "clearing of the ground" would indeed give the nation a rest from disputes on the vexatious question of recruiting.



German prisoners at work on the harbour at a French port

[Central_News.



A group of German prisoners taken by the Russians.

[Central News.



Donnington Hall.

[Sport and General.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PRISONERS OF WAR.

LEGAL STANDING OF PRISONERS—CHANGED ATTITUDE TOWARDS CIVILIANS—BRITISH AND GERMAN PRACTICE—
TREATMENT OF BRITISH PRISONERS IN GERMANY—RELIEF MEASURES AND AMERICAN INSPECTION OF GERMAN CAMPS—THE TYPHUS EPIDEMIC AT WITTENBERG.


RISONERS of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not in that of individuals or corps who captured them. They must be humanely treated." This is the general principle laid down at the beginning of the Hague Rules which are concerned with prisoners of war and their treatment. It embodies the general sentiment of the times, and its application is, of course, no longer at the discretion of any civilised belligerent State. The sentiment is, however, of more recent growth and recognition than might be supposed. "Lex nulla capto parcit aut poenam impedit" is the earliest ruling on the subject, and one which survived as a working basis right into the seventeenth century. Only the hope of ransom, the chivalry of some individual captor, or the occasionally successful mediation of ecclesiastical authorities could avert a straightforward reading of the maxim, and the consigning of prisoners to the galleys, to be kept there even after the end of the war, was a sufficiently recognised practice in seventeenth century warfare to make it necessary, when England and Spain wished to abandon it, for a special agreement to be made

to that effect between the two belligerents. In the next century special agreements for the duration of particular wars, and imposing a more humane attitude towards prisoners, became the usual course, and the modern practice may be said to have been emerging. Such agreements were not, of course, binding upon any Governments save those that were parties to them, but the "Usages of War on Land," as construed by the German General Staff, asserts, it is interesting to note, that the first real step towards the modern conception of war captivity was taken by Frederick the Great and Benjamin Franklin, in Article 24 of the "Treaty of Friendship," signed between Prussia and the United States in 1785. But whatever may have been the beginning of the outlook now embodied in the Hague Rules concerning prisoners, no belligerent to-day dare give it anything but complete theoretical support. The tremendous size of the armies engaged in the present war, and the great number of prisoners that has been taken, have somet mes put unusual difficulties in the way of carrying out the strict letter of the rules-and, unfortunately, in some German camps there is evidence of a positive disinclination



German civilians on their way to an internment camp

[Topical Press.



The detention campulat Frith Hill, Surrey, in the first weeks of the war, when the prisoners were still under canvas. [Topical Press.]

to overcome those difficulties—but at least no responsible authorities have ever admitted or attempted to justify a real departure from the recognised attitude. The German "Usages of War on Land," which has been mentioned, is not usually regarded as a work inculcating a very scrupulous regard for what most people had hoped was an international law of warfare. It counsels the officers who study it against "excessive humanitarian notions," remarking that certain severities are a necessary part of war, and that "the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them." But it recognises without qualification that "the doctrine of war captivity is entirely altered, and the position of prisoners has become assimilated to that of the wounded

and the sick." In view of its source the following passage is of considerable interest:—

"The State regards them (prisoners of war) as persons who have simply done their duty and obeyed the commands of their superiors, and in consequence views their captivity not as penal but merely as precautionary. It, therefore, follows that the object of war captivity is simply to prevent thè captives from taking any further part in the war, and that the State can, in fact, do everything which appears necessary for securing the captives, but nothing beyond that. The captives have, therefore, to submit to all those restrictions and inconveniences which the purpose of securing them necessitates; they can be collectively involved in a common suffering if some individuals among them have

provoked sterner treatment; but, on the other hand, they are protected against unjustifiable severities, ill-treatment, and unworthy handling; | they do, indeed, lose their freedom but not their rights; war captivity is, in other words, no longer an act of grace on the part of the victor but a right of the defenceless."*

The interpretation is a correct one of the present standing of prisoners of war, and it is worth bearing in mind in view of those cases where it has been anything but applied as regards the treatment of British prisoners in Germany, and where Clough's modernised version of the Sixth Commandment—


"Thou shalt not kill, but need'st not strive Officiously to keep alive"—


seems to have been the basis of the accepted practice. But the acknowledgment of a principle, however much it may be departed from in practice, is never entirely without value, particularly where so ill-defined a thing as the conduct of war is in question. The worst horrors of the Wittenberg Camp during the typhus epidemic are less of a crime against civilisation than the sinking of the *Lusitania* or any other merchantman, because the German authorities have never attempted to argue that

they were defensible or constituted an attitude which must henceforward be embodied in international law.

CIVILIAN PRISONERS OF

In one important direction the present war has established a very considerable change of opinion, not as regards the treatment of prisoners of war but in the definition of those who are liable to be treated as prisoners. Enemy civilian subjects residing in or passing through the country of a belligerent State at the outbreak of war were generally regarded throughout the nineteenth century as entitled to their liberty during good be haviour, or in the absence of special individual circumstances which made their detention justifiable in order





Interned German civilians arriving with their luggage) at (Southend. [Tobical]

^{* &}quot;The German War Book," translated by Professor J. II. Morgan.



German prisoners being marched to the Frith Hill Detention Camp.

[Topical.



Prisoners at Frith Hill drawing blankets, &c., from stores.

[L.N.A.

either leave France altogether or remove themselves south of the Loire. Their collective imprisonment was not contemplated. Napoleon's conception and treatment of prisoners is one of the darkest aspects of that great soldier's conduct of war. But even Napoleon, when he ordered the arrest of all British subjects in France and the Italian Republic, did so as an alleged legitimate reprisal for the capture of French merchantmen before the declaration of war; and the British civilians who shared the officers' detention quarters at Verdun—and on their return left behind them bills to tradesmen which are owing to this day—were thrown into captivity not as a legal consequence of their enemy nationality, but as a return of one illegality for another. The present


war has witnessed a rather profound change of front on the question of enemy subjects domiciled in belligerent countries, and if to-day's practice is to be taken as a guide their future standing in international law will be very little different from that of the combatant belligerent taken prisoner in the ordinary course of military operations. There is, of course, a good deal to be said for this point of view which could not have been said a century ago. Wars have no longer the least resemblance to dynastic struggles, and are very truly warfare between the peoples of the belligerent countries. Every male between eighteen and forty-five is a potential soldier, and to decree their expulsion is to present the enemy with so many possible

recruits. On the other hand, modern warfare is so inextricably bound up with maintained and rapid communication, by railway or telegraph—both of which can be disorganised with comparative ease—and the value of enemy spies within the confines of a country is so tremendously increased, that to allow large numbers of possibly hostile individuals their liberty may not unreasonably be regarded as menacing the safety of the State. A less worthy stimulus to the harsher measures than had hitherto been considered allowable is supplied by the pressure of public opinion under the influence of the passion and resentment engendered by war. But with wars so very national and popular as the present war, these feelings inevitably gain more weight than previously.

BRITISH TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS.

It can hardly be said that any definite policy existed in this country as to the internment of enemy civilians—what policy there is grew up gradually under the pressure of circumstances. By the beginning of 1915 rather less than a third of the German enemy subjects in this country had been interned. This third was of men only—there were no women or children in the British internment camps. From some sections of the Press and public opinion there were occasional rather passionate complaints about the number of enemy subjects who were still at liberty, and after the anti-German riots which followed the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the first use of poisonous gas, and other evidences of German brutality, the complaints became

louder than ever. Shortly afterwards a tightening of the supervision and internment of enemy civilians was begun, but simultaneously arrangements were also made for the extensive repatriation of women and children and men over military age. Internment camps exclusively for civilian prisoners were established at Queensferry, near Chester, and at the Isle of Man. Civilians were also interned on boats at Southend and Portsmouth. In general their conditions were the same as those of the German naval and military prisoners, with the difference that those civilians who were able to afford to pay for the privilege were permitted better accommodation and food at their own expense. The ordinary rations issued free of charge to interned civilians



The arrival of a batch of German prisoners at an English railway station. [Topical.

were the same as those issued to the combatant prisoners of war:—

Bread, 1 lb. 8 ozs., or biscuits, 1 lb.

Meat, fresh or frozen, 8 ozs., or pressed, 4 ozs.

Tea, ½ oz., or coffee, 1 oz.

Salt, ½ oz.

Sugar, 2 ozs.

Condensed milk, ½ tin (1 lb.).

Fresh vegetables, 8 ozs.


Pepper, ½ oz.

2 ozs. cheese to be allowed as an alternative for 1 oz.

butter or margarine.


2 ozs. of pear, beans, lentils, or rice.

Each place of internment was provided with a canteen where tobacco and other small luxuries could be purchased.



A photograph taken at the Ruhleben camp for interned British civilians. [Cer

[Central News.



Another view in the Ruhleben camp.

Photopiess.

Clothing was supplied to those who needed it free of charge, and every interned prisoner was allowed to write two letters a week, in English or German (subject to censorship), an allowance which, in cases of demonstrated need, could be indefinitely extended. No limit was placed upon the number of letters which a man could receive. To the sanitary arrangements of the camps and the general health of the prisoners the best tribute is the fact that up to the beginning of December, 1915—that is, covering the period when the camps might be supposed to be least well equipped and organised, as a result of the sudden way in which they had been called into existence—there were only five deaths from natural

causes-three from some form of heart disease, one from dropsy, and one from typhoid contracted before the prisoner's arrival in camp.

The internment quarters at Queensferry were established in a large engineering works of modern design which had been awaiting a tenant for some years. It was divided into a dozen wards, each containing between one hundred and two hundredmen. Bathing accommodation. a hospital, and a large open space for exercise were, of course. provided. The chief difficulty at the camp, at the time that it was visited by two inspecting delegates from the International Red Cross Committee, seems to have arisen from the different classes of civilians who were interned together. This difficulty, which does not

A chess match at Ruhleben.

arise in the case of military prisoners, is inevitable in a civilian camp, where the fact that a prisoner is unable to pay for greater privacy and the opportunity to mix with other prisoners of his own social standing by no means proves that he is not, on a full consideration of his case, entitled to the extra privileges. It is an awkward problem for the commandant of such a camp, for on the one hand he would have complaints from interned enemy subjects of most reputable antecedents who objected to the presence of obvious undesirables of their own nationality; and, on the other, be pestered by applicants who claimed that they were officers in the reserve, and as such entitled to the special treatment accorded to officers, when they were rather obviously nothing of the kind.

CIVILIANS INTERNED ON SHIPS.

At Southend the two vessels which were originally given over to interned civilians were the Royal Edward afterwards sunk in the Mediterranean while on transport work-and the Saxonia. The news that civilians were interned on boats seems to have annoyed public opinion in Germany more than any other detail of their treatment possibly because the mere mention of boats in connection with prisoners raised, in the popular imagination, some picture of the hulks of older days and their horrors. As

a matter of fact the prisoners on the boats at Southend had, if anything, less to complain about than those at the Queensferry camp, because the social grievance which has been mentioned more easily remedied on board ship. On board the Royal Edward, where, at the time of the inspection by the Red Cross delegates, there were 1,320 prisoners, the interned men were divided into three classes, each class having as its quarters that part of the vessel designed for the use of the first, second, or third class of ordinary passengers. The first-class prisoners paid for part of their own food, and were at liberty to engage servants from the third class. The second and third class received free of charge

rations on the scale that has been given, and to prisoners in the third class

[Photopress.

free clothing was issued when needed. On the Saxonia there were about 1,200 prisoners, all of the third class. At Portsmouth there were some 2,000 prisoners interned

on the Ascania and Manitoba. These, again, were divided into three classes. The Red Cross delegates, though they were pressed to do so by the British Government, did not visit the large camp at the Isle of Man, where at the time-before the increased restrictions on aliens of May and June, 1915, had been put into operation—there were about 4,500 prisoners. Mr. Chandler Hale, an official of the United States Embassy, visited the Isle of Man in November, 1914, and gave a very appreciative report



British soldiers in the big prisoners' camp at Döberitz. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



Dinner-time at Döberitz.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

on the camp. His visit was primarily concerned with the unfortunate riot which had just taken place, in which five of the prisoners' lives had been lost. His report upon general conditions at the camp and on the responsibility and origins of the disorder was as follows:—

"Three thousand three hundred non-belligerent enemy aliens are interned at Douglas, consisting of 2,000 Germans and 1,300 Austrians and Hungarians. The camp is now somewhat crowded, but the authorities will transfer 1,000 men to another camp at Peel, on the other side of the island, as soon as accommodations there are ready for them-probably in a few weeks. At present 500 are housed in two large comfortable buildings, where each man has a bunk with mattress and three blankets. Other and similar huts are being erected for the rest of the prisoners who are now living in tents, each of which has a raised wooden flooring. The dietary is excellent. Breakfast, I pint porridge, 11 ozs. syrup, 1 pint tea with sugar and milk, 8 ozs. bread and ½ oz. margarine. Supper, 1 pint tea with sugar and milk, ½ oz. margarine and 8 ozs. bread. Dinner, 20 ozs. potatoes, 4 ozs. bread, a green vegetable every other day and meat in the following rotation: Sunday, 11b. roast beef; Monday, stew; Tuesday, 6 to 8 ozs. sausages; Wednesday, scouce made of meat, potatoes, and vegetables; Thursday, stew; Friday, sausages; Saturday, scouce. The men have their meals in a large glass-roofed, steam-heated, and electric-lighted building, where 1,600 can eat at a time. The latrines and washing facilities are ample and very good, and are kept clean; there is hot and cold running water. As compared with Ruhleben or any other camp that I have visited in either country, conditions are very good. The riot started, it is alleged, as the result of bad potatoes. The authorities admit that one shipment proved worm-eaten, and they were rejected after a few days. On the 18th November the men declared a hunger strike at dinner. The following day they ate their dinner without any complaint, and immediately after the withdrawal of the guards from the rooms the prisoners suddenly, and evidently by prearrangement, started in to break up the tables, chairs, crockery, and everything they could lay their hands on. Upon the appearance of the guards, the rioters charged them, armed with table legs and chairs. guards fired one volley in the air, but it had no effect. Finally, and in self-protection, they fired a second round which resulted in the death of four Germans and one Austrian, and the wounding of nineteen others. I talked freely with the wounded and also with many others, and gathered that the prisoners were in the wrong and had only themselves to blame. One of the most intelligent men I talked with, a German, said that a considerable percentage of the men were a bad lot gathered in from the East of London, with several agitators amongst them who preached discontent and insubordination, which was really the direct cause for the trouble. I am satisfied this was so, as I saw the whole camp and every detail connected with it, and have nothing but commendation for its entire organisation and the kindly treatment accorded the prisoners by the Commandant and his subordinates."

GERMAN TREATMENT OF BRITISH CIVILIANS.

The Germans say that their policy of interning British civilians was only entered upon as a retaliatory measure for the internment of German subjects in this country. In October, 1914, the United States Government, in a memorandum suggesting that as far as possible alien enemies detained by war should be allowed their liberty, stated: "There are very few English prisoners in Germany who have been placed in prison or in prison camps—about three hundred. The German Government is informed that a great number of German civilian prisoners—over 6,000 -are in prison camps in England." Any English who were at liberty in Germany were, of course, under police supervision. And whether the idea of interning them was suggested by the British practice or not, when once it was taken up by the German Government the proportion of civilian prisoners in the two countries was speedily altered. On the 6th November, 1914, an order for the general detention of all British males between the ages of seventeen and fifty-five was issued. This order, according to the American Ambassador at Berlin, was occasioned by the pressure of German public opinion, which had readily accepted the most outrageous stories about the treatment of German civilians in Great Britain and the conditions obtaining in the internment camps. As a result of the operation of this order, by March of the next year the American Embassy was reporting that "almost all British subjects are interned in Germany" as against less than one-third of the Germans in Great Britain.

THE RUHLEBEN CAMP.

British civilian prisoners in Germany found their way into several camps, but the most important and best known of the civilian internment camps was at Ruhleben. a trotting course and training establishment on the outskirts of Berlin. An Englishman, writing on the condition of the camp at the end of 1914, complained bitterly of the poor accommodation and harsh treatment of the prisoners, who then numbered between four and five thousand, rather more than a thousand being British seamen. "The outstanding feature of this camp," maintained the writer, "is the fact that all our hardships are purposely and artificially made." It is an extreme accusation, and perhaps chiefly valuable as an indication of the frame of mind produced in civilians by an imprisonment which they regarded as essentially unjust; very similar complaints were made by some of the Germans interned in England. But, even allowing for the fact that confinement could never be made acceptable to men who considered that it was essentially unnecessary and unjust. there is little doubt that the early conditions at Ruhleben left plenty of very legitimate room for improvement: The mixing together of men of all classes and types was, again, a source of grievance and poor discipline. At the end of February, 1915, Mr. Gerard, the American Ambassador at Berlin, reported that out of the 4,273 men then interned at Ruhleben, approximately 2,000 were "in the greatest destitution." Mr. Gerard outlined a scheme of relief for these men which necessitated a weekly distribution of some 10,000 marks. Each recipient of relief signed a receipt form, on which he promised "to repay the amount received to the Chancellor of the Exchequer of His Britannic Majesty's Government when he shall be in such a position as will enable him to do so." About the same time a change was made in the conduct of the camp, the prisoners being given a greater share in the control of their own domestic affairs. Thenceforward, a great improvement in the conditions and amenities of the camp took place. Baron von Taube, in addressing a meeting of the Camp Committee, likened the management of the camp to the administration of a town of 10,000 inhabitants, and the comparison was taken up with such thoroughness on both sides that by October, 1915, the administration of the little community was entirely in the hands of the prisoners themselves. There were no guards inside the barracks, and all internal arrangements, including discipline, were in the hands of the camp and barrack captains. There were difficulties still, largely over the question of the camp fatigues, but, compared with the best of the combatant prisoners' camps, Ruhleben provided comfortable and even luxurious quarters. This was the point in the mind of Mr. Gerard when he wrote, concerning the advantages which, by the end of 1915, had been secured by the Ruhleben civilian



German prisoners at Frith Hill returning to the camp after a morning's work collecting timber. [Central News.



British prisoners at work in Germany.

[Alfieri Picture Service.

prisoners:—"The captured British soldiers who have been fighting in the trenches are compelled to do work in work camps, are often not properly clothed, do not receive an allowance from the British taxpayer of five marks a week, cannot buy food at less than cost price, nor go to a sanatorium (at the expense of the British taxpayer) when sick, have not the benefit of expert dental and optical treatment, have no public libraries, lectures, schools, debates, or camp newspapers, have not seven tennis courts, three football fields, athletic games, cricket, golf, and hockey, are not amused by dramas, comic operas, and kinema shows, and, above all, are not paid extra wages for doing their own work to make themselves comfortable." But with all these added amenities a prison camp still remains a prison, and to civilians used to a comfortable standard of living the life at Ruhleben could not easily be made anything but just tolerable. As time went on, a considerable number of the Ruhleben prisoners were exchanged or allowed to return to England.

GERMAN COMBATANT PRISONERS IN ENGLAND.

For the rank and file of German combatant prisoners taken by this country camps were established at Frith Hill, Surrey; Handforth, Cheshire; Shrewsbury and Dorchester. A general detention camp was also formed at the Alexandra Palace, London. The scale of rations for these camps and the general conduct of them were on the same lines as the third-class civilian camps which have already been mentioned. No serious complaints were ever raised about the administration of these camps, or any question made of the British Government's complete fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the Hague Conventions.

The chief places of internment for enemy officers were at Duffryn Aled, near Denbigh, and at Donnington Hall, Leicestershire. At both places the enemy officers were given all the privileges appropriate to their rank indeed, some sections of opinion in this country (not very well informed on the accepted practice in such matters) have considered that the German officers got rather more than they were entitled to, particularly at Donnington Hall. For the first months of the war the British Government gave to enemy military and naval officer prisoners half the pay of their corresponding ranks in the British infantry. This was supplemented by a free allowance of food, and the only necessity for which the officer prisoners were responsible was clothing. The Hague Conventions lay it down that a captured officer may receive the full pay of his equivalent rank in his captor's army. The British Government offered to make this increased allowance provided that the practice was also adopted by the Germans in their treatment of our officer prisoners. The German authorities not only took no advantage of this offer, but also failed to reciprocate the British existing arrangement of half pay with free rations. British officer prisoners in Germany were paid only sixty marks a months if subalterns, the rate rising to 100 marks for any higher ranks. A very heavy deduction was made for messing, in spite of the fact that German officers in England were paid at a higher rate and provided with free rations. At the end of seven months' unacknowledged generosity the British Government, therefore, dropped the scale of pay for officer prisoners to one based on the German practice, and insisted that henceforward the prisoners should meet the cost of their own rations and messing, though no attempt was made to recover from the officers concerned the difference in respect of pay and rations issued before the new arrangement came into force.

The only other point of interest in connection with the British treatment of combatant prisoners during the earlier part of the war is concerned with the somewhat unfortunate decision to make a special class of prisoners of the officers and crews captured from German submarines. The first inhumanities of the submarine "blockade" were received with widespread indignation in this country, and a fairly general feeling was roused that the men who were captured in what was presumably an attempt to sink without warning defenceless merchantmen were not entitled to be considered as ordinary prisoners of war. Yielding to the expressions of this opinion, the British authorities decided to place thirty-nine men captured on German submarines in confinement apart from the ordinary prisoners of war. The only result was that, as a measure of reprisal, the German Government at once selected thirty-nine British officers for similar imprisonment -that is to say, under barrack arrest, with, in some cases, solitary confinement. After a month or so of negotiations carried on through the American Embassies, the British Government agreed to return the thirty-nine submarine prisoners to the ordinary officers' and men's internment camps, and the thirty-nine British hostages in Germany were shortly after accorded similar treatment.

BRITISH COMBATANT PRISONERS IN GERMANY.

The lot of British prisoners of war in Germany has varied considerably in different camps. It would be a mistake to suppose that their treatment has been uniformly harsh, and that at every camp they have been subjected to unnecessary or deliberate hardship. Some of the worst treatment that they received undoubtedly occurred on their journey from the front to their place of internment. Details of Major Vandeleur's experiences, during his journey as a prisoner to the camp at Crefeld, have been mentioned in an earlier chapter (Vol. II., Chap. XXXV.). The German authorities found Major Vandeleur's statement of sufficient importance to issue a reply to it. The reply was not very convincing, as it consisted in the main of an attempt to prove that the maker of the charges was a thoroughly intransigent and prejudiced prisoner, making general charges which he knew would be difficult to refute. While protesting against the assertion that British prisoners had received worse treatment than the French, the official German statement managed to supply rather convincing corroboratory evidence of such treatment. The German troops, it explained, "respected the French on the whole as honourable and decent opponents, whereas the English mercenaries had, in their eyes, adopted a cunning method of warfare from the very beginning, and when taken prisoners bore themselves with an insolent and provocative mien." It would not be very difficult to discover from this bland admission alone the undoubted fact that British prisoners did meet with ill-treatment of various kinds at the hands of subordinate German officials and troops. The same impression may also be derived from the remark, "The soldiers of the English standing paid army . . . have usually learnt nothing, and are fit for no particular employment outside the care of horses and farm work; they are, besides, frequently lazy, arrogant, and obstinate."

A good example of the official German attitude towards British prisoners is provided by the reluctance of the German Government to comply fully with the requirements



German prisoners at work in an English wood.

[Central News.



German prisoners returning from a country walk under escort near Dorchester.

[Topical Press.

of Article XIV. of the annex to the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the laws and customs of land warfare. This article is as follows:--

"A Bureau for information relative to prisoners of war is instituted on the commencement of hostilities in each of the belligerent States, and, when necessary, in the neutral countries on whose territory belligerents have been received. This Bureau is intended to answer all enquiries about prisoners of war, and is furnished by the various services concerned with all the information necessary to make out an individual return of every prisoner of war. It is kept informed of internments and changes, also of admissions to hospitals and of deaths, of releases on parole, of exchanges, of escapes, as well as other particulars, to enable it to keep from day to day an individual return for each prisoner of war. The Bureau must enter on this return the regi-

mental number. the name and forename, age, place of origin, corps, wounds, date and place of capture, of internment, of wounds, and of death, as well as any special obser-Each vations. return shall be forwarded to the Government of the other belligerent after the conclusion of peace.


" It is also the duty of the Information Bureau to receive and collect all objects of personal use, valuables, letters, &c., found on the battlefields, or left by prisoners who have been liberated on parole, exchanged, or have escaped or died in hospital or ambulance, and to transmit them to those interested."

The value of such an information bureau is obvious, and similar organisations were set up during several wars in the

last half of the nineteenth century—notably the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, and the Franco-German War. In the Russo-Japanese War both sides established information bureaux. Within a week of the outbreak of the present war the British Government's Prisoners of War Bureau was in working order in London. The German Government followed suit, but from the beginning its lists were by no means so carefully compiled as the British. Sir Edward Grey protested, through the United States Embassy, that no indication was given whether the prisoners in German hands were wounded or not, and that the regimental numbers of the rank and file were missing, an omission which, coupled with the frequent mis-spelling of men's names, made it difficult to identify

the prisoners. Nor would personal enquiries from enemy subjects be directly answered by the Berlin Bureau, though many such enquiries from German private individuals were being dealt with by the British organisation. The German reply to these complaints, which was ultimately transmitted in March, 1915, was somewhat enlightening. The use of greater care in the making out of the lists and of "a form similar to the British form would extraordinarily delay the typing of the lists, which would be entirely undesirable, as in the humane interest it is endeavoured that the information reach the relatives as quickly as possible. The British procedure, which requires incomparably more time, may well be possible with the pro-

portionately small number of prisoners held in England, but it is quite impractical with the large number of prisoners in Gerwhich many, amounts thus far to more than 700,000, and is augmented almost daily by several thousands.' The evident desire to carry out an admitted obligation with the very minimum of trouble and the final boast, are not without significance



German prisoners at work near Aldershot.

[Topical.

REPORTS OF ILL-TREATMENT.

One German claim (made in August, 1915) was that Germany and Austria had taken a round two million of prisoners on all fronts, of whom 330,000 were French, British, and Belgian. The total is certainly exaggerated, but the prisoners taken by the two Central Powers

during the first year of war seems to have been between one and a half and two millions, the truth lying nearer the lower figure. By far the greater number of these were Russians, taken in the first spring campaign on the Eastern front. As a result of the first two and a half months of war—a period which includes, of course, the great drive forward to Paris and the defeat, with very heavy losses, of the Russians at Tannenburg—the total of combatant prisoners of war interned in Germany amounted to just a trifle under 300,000. Of these, about 150,000 were French, but the British, officers and men all told, were only 9,000.

In the first months of the war 3,000 of the British rank and file were imprisoned at Döberitz, some fifteen



British Red-Cross soldiers, exchanged with Germany, arriving in London. $[Central\ News.]$



German prisoners, exchanged for British troops in Germany, setting out for the Continent. [Topical.

miles from Berlin, in a canvas camp, containing in all 9,000 Russian, French, and British prisoners. An American citizen, who paid a visit to the camp in the autumn of 1914, described these prisoners as "9,000 very miserable and gave an account of very unsatisfactory conditions. In reply to this report the German Government protested that the visit from which it proceeded was made before the camp had been got into working order; and an inspector from the American Embassy, who paid a later visit, reported the camp as on the whole well equipped and administered. But whatever efforts may have been made by German officials to carry out their obligations in some of the camps, in others the conditions were for several months open to considerable criticism. Complaints from various sources were constantly being considered by the British Foreign Office and transmitted to the American Embassy for investigation.

It was obviously necessary that some steps should be taken to improve the condition of British prisoners in Germany. The first was an arrangement whereby the United States authorities in Germany undertook to administer a fund for the benefit of British prisoners. All through the long negotiations over the question of prisoners of war the United States officials, both in England and Germany, showed the greatest willingness to assist in securing proper treatment for prisoners, and to remedy any abuses of the legal practice. Besides administering financial relief to the British prisoners in Germany, they also contributed large quantities of clothing. By the Hague Conventions there certainly should have been no need for such a distribution, for it is laid down that prisoners of war shall be treated, as regards clothing, on the same footing as the troops that captured them. According to the British practice a supply of "first-class clothing" was kept in each camp, and men who needed them were provided free of charge with coats, trousers, overcoats, boots, shirts, and underclothing. The official German statement of the way in which prisoners were treated also mentioned a similar practice. But there is very little doubt that British prisoners were in some cases even deprived of the overcoats that they were wearing when captured; and the best indication of whether the German Government's announced practice was fulfilled at every camp is provided by the fact that during the first eight months of the war the American officials distributed to British prisoners 7,220 greatcoats, 2,635 jackets, 2,004 pairs of trousers, 790 pairs of boots, 2,990 shirts, 2,989 pairs of drawers, 642 waistcoats, 1,908 pairs of socks, and many other articles.

THE INSPECTION OF GERMAN CAMPS.

Of still greater value was the scheme, finally agreed to by the German Government, for the systematic inspection of the prison camps in Germany by representatives of the American Embassy. The British Government had been willing to permit a similar inspection of the British camps, but it was only after considerable delay that the German authorities consented to the proposal. Their consent was gained in March, and ten representatives from the American diplomats or consuls in Germany were at once appointed to carry out the inspections.

Another humane arrangement, which was ultimately agreed upon by the belligerent Powers, was the return of disabled prisoners and the exchange of medical corps troops. The first batch of exchanged R.A.M.C. men reached England at the end of June, and the first pathetic party—over—300—of—maimed combatant troops who

had been released as "totally incapacitated for further military service" passed through Holland at the end of the second August of the war. They had spent some days at the collecting station for disabled prisoners which the Germans had established at Aix-la-Chapelle, and all agreed that there, at any rate, they had been treated extraordinarily well. The original arrangement between the British and German Governments was for a monthly return of prisoners, but in October this was altered to an exchange at the beginning of every alternate month. Still later an arrangement was concluded whereby sick prisoners might be treated as convalescents in Switzerland.

Thanks largely to the inspections by American officials, the condition of the ordinary prisoners in Germany made considerable improvement. There were a very large number of camps in which British prisoners, military or civilian, were interned—in August, 1915, no less than 85, according to a return by the German Government. The reports on the camps visited have been published by the British Government as White Papers.* They are sober, neutralminded documents, and most of them indicate satisfaction with the administration of the camps, with the conditions under which inspection of them was permitted, and the readiness of the commandants to listen to legitimate complaints. The reports of some particular camps, however, for all their guarded official terms, reveal wide room for improvement. Of eight or ten men at the Wahn Camp who were allowed to speak with him without being overhead by the German officials, Mr. Michelson, the American Consul at Cologne, wrote in April, 1915, that "they complained impressively that they were perpetually hungry." This appears to have been one of the camps where British soldiers had reason to complain of differential treatment as compared with prisoners of other nationalities. The commandant, on being questioned by Mr. Michelson on this point, made the old, significant reply that "the British were a surly, taciturn lot . . . and quite unwilling to work." Mr. Michelson's own impression was that the temper of the British prisoners was "not sour, although it is earnest." He added: "The French prisoners looked in better physical condition than the British. The British did not look like well-nourished men."

A later visit, in April, by the American inspectors to this camp, revealed an improvement, and all the British prisoners had then been separated from those of other nationalities. They included a British second lieutenant (who had been promoted from the ranks since his capture), who said that he preferred to remain where he was and not to be transferred to an officers' camp. Another camp, of which frequent complaints had been received by the British Foreign office, was the "working camp" at Süder Zollhaus. About 500 British prisoners were interned there, and the report of the American officials confirmed the impression that conditions were by no means satisfactory. The British prisoners were reported as being badly clothed, poorly shod, and without adequatemedical attendance; and it was pointed out that though they were treated in the camp hospital it was not right that sick men should be kept in a working camp at all. The new commandant of the camp had only been in charge for a week, and explained that he had not yet had time to effect an improvement in the conditions. In contrast to these unsatisfactory camps might be

^{*} Miscellaneous No. 11, 1915; No. 14, 1915; No. 15, 1915; and No. 19, 1915.

mentioned the excellent conduct of the three hospitals at Cologne, in which British prisoners were treated, and of the Roman Catholic monastery at Werl, in which eighty-nine Allied officers were interned.

THE WITTENBERG HORRORS.

Reporting in May, 1915, on the results of the inspections, Mr. Gerard mentioned that in nine of the camps no inspection had been possible on account of the typhus which had been present. These camps were at Altdamm, Schneidemuhl, Gardelegen, Wittenberg, Zerbst, Sagan, Cassel, Langensalza, and Chemnitz. conditions at one of these uninspected camps-Wittenberg—are now known to have been an unforgivable scandal. Fortunately there is good reason for supposing that the horrors perpetrated at the Wittenberg camp during the typhus epidemic were never approached at any other of the stricken camps, and were due to the cowardice and savagery of one set of The administration of the camp was an officials. atrociously bad one, even after the typhus epidemic had been got under control. The careful, judicious terms of the American reports on the condition of prisoners have been mentioned. But when, in October, 1914, an American representative was allowed to go inside the Wittenberg camp, he summed up his report in the following words:--

"My whole impression of the camp authorities at Wittenberg was utterly unlike that which I have received in every other camp I have visited in Germany. Instead of regarding their charges as honourable prisoners of war, it appeared to me that the men were regarded as criminals for whom a régime of fear alone would suffice to keep in obedience. All evidence of kindly and humane feeling between the authorities and the prisoners was lacking, and in no other camp have I found signs of fear on the part of the prisoners that what they might say to me would result in suffering for them afterwards."

Following on this report of a colleague, Mr. Gerard himself visited the camp. His impression was that it was "even more unfavourable" than he had been led to expect, and he confirmed the news that savage dogs had been turned into the camp at night, and that the camp authorities, when remonstrated with on this point, had maintained that the dogs were "absolutely necessary" in order to protect the German sentries! Prisoners with whom Mr. Gerard spoke said that there had been an improvement in the camp during the past few months, but that the conditions during the typhus epidemic had been "indescribably bad."

Just how appalling those conditions had been it was only possible for the British Government to state authoritatively when three British R.A.M.C. officers, who had worked at Wittenberg through the worst of the typhus outbreak, returned to this country after long and unwarranted delay by the German authorities. Briefly, the conditions arose from the fact that when the typhus broke out all the German officials deserted the camp, and left the prisoners to take care of themselves. There were at least 15,000 Russian, French, and British prisoners in the camp at the time of the outbreak in December, 1914. Their clothing was inadequate, their food bad and insufficient, their accommodation much too small

for their numbers. Soap was only issued to them at long intervals, and in rations of one cupful to a room of 120 men—and personal cleanliness was one of the first conditions if the typhus was to be prevented from spreading. The disease seems to have begun with the Russian prisoners, and, so far from attempting to confine the epidemic to them, every British prisoner, by the camp regulations, was compelled to have one French and one Russian to share his mattress with him. As soon as the typhus broke out in December, the whole German staff, military and medical, deserted the camp until the following August. The only exceptions were one visit from Dr. Aschenbach, who had been placed in charge of the medical arrangements, and who returned for one very rapid visit, attired in protective clothing, with a mask and rubber gloves; and a visit from a young man, who came merely to take bacteriological specimens for research work at Magdeburg. During these eight months the only communication with the camp guards outside was through directions shouted over the barbed wire. All supplies for the camp were pushed in by a chute, and the food for the hospital and medical officers passed in on a trolley over about twenty yards of rail. It was not until February that the German authorities even sent any English doctors to look after their stricken fellow-countrymen. Then six R.A.M.C. officers, who had been detained at Halle, were despatched to the Wittenberg camp. No reason for their mission was vouchsafed, and they were first informed of the existence of typhus by the guard of the train which took them to Wittenberg. These officers were Major Fry, Major Priestley, Captain Sutcliffe, Captain Field, Captain Vidal, and Captain Lauder. Only the last three lived to tell the tale of their fearful experience—the others died of typhus at the camp. Captain Lauder also contracted the disease, but was fortunate enough to recover. A full description of this terrible camp, including the fearful state of the sick men as discovered by the British doctors on their arrival, was published by the British Government in April, 1916. Thanks to the heroic efforts of the surviving R.A.M.C. officers and of their dead colleagues, a considerable improvement was effected by the late spring, and the last English typhus case occurred in the middle of May.

This shocking story of cowardice and brutality on the part of the German authorities of the Wittenberg Camp was denounced in the German Press as an "obvious invention," but no very convincing evidence has ever been produced to show on what points the British account was misinformed. Certainly towards the end of the typhus epidemic it was possible for the British medical officers to have their requests for supplies listened to with greater attention. But this does not make the earlier conditions. or the continued desertion of the camp, any less disgraceful and inhuman. The Germans have asserted that the American inspectors reported on the camp administration with more or less satisfaction in their later visits-but as the camp was not visited at all until several weeks after the typhus had been stamped out, and even then the opinion of the inspectors (as already quoted) was that the camp was the worst they had ever seen, it is not easy to see how pleas of this kind will help to lift any of the everlasting disgrace of Wittenberg from the shoulders of the German Government and people.



The remains of a captured German trench near Ypres.

[Official Photograph—Central News.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE WINTER OF 1915-1916.

GENERAL JOFFRE AND THE HIGHER COMMAND IN FRANCE—THE RESIGNATION OF SIR JOHN FRENCH—THE SECOND WINTER
IN THE WEST—THE DEPARTURE OF THE INDIAN TROOPS—THE LINES IN THE EAST—BEGINNING OF THE TRENCHWAR IN RUSSIA

Europe and Asia has led us away from the two main campaigns on the Western and the Russian fronts. In the spring of 1916 the interest of the war was to revert very violently to the West, where it had begun eighteen months before. But between the Battle of Loos and the long-drawn-out battle in front of Verdun there were no decisive actions of any kind either in France or Russia. Much, however, was happening, and, though it was not spectacular, it was the time when the endurance of the troops and the prescience of generalship were most severely tested.

The Battle of Loos and the French attack in Champagne (Vol. III., Chapters XXV. and XXVI.) were both fairly substantial victories for the Allies, but were none the less disappointing in their results. The Allies had undoubtedly hoped to break through the German lines, and though they made a considerable impression upon them, it was certainly not worth the I3-VOL. IV.

great expenditure of life. There is some reason to think that the project of attack met with some military opposition in France, and that there was also in the French Government a fairly influential section which shared its views. Whether as the result of the disappointments of the autumn of 1915, or more probably for reasons connected with the Balkans campaign, some changes were made in the higher organisation of the French command. In the late autumn General Gallieni, who had succeeded M. Millerand as Minister of War, drafted a report, in which after reciting a pre-war Decree (October, 1913) that it was the duty of the Government alone to settle the political objects of a war, to indicate the principal field of operations, and to distribute the resources of the country, went on to say that experience in the war proved that "unity of direction was only to be assured by the presence at the head of all our armies of one chief, who should be responsible for military operations strictly so-called," and submitted to the President the draft of certain



Distributing letters to French soldiers in a snow-covered reserve trench. $[Central\ News.]$



Serving out soup to French troops in the reserve trenches.

Decrees which were signed by him on December 3rd. These were as follow:—

"I. Article I.—The command of the national armies, with the exception of the active forces in theatres of operations under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Colonies under the General Commanding-in-Chief of the land and sea forces of North Africa and the General acting as Resident General and Commissioner of the French Republic in Morocco, is entrusted to a General of Division who bears the title of Commander-in-Chief of the French armies.

"Article 2.—Decrees will be issued later giving instructions regulating the conditions and applications of the present Decree.

"2. General Joffre, Commander-in-Chief of the armies in

the north-east, is appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French armies."

The effect of this Decree was to make General Joffre responsible for the higher command of the French army at Salonika, as well as in France, and a few days later a further Decree published appointing General Castelnau as his Chief of Staff. The inner meaning of these appointments was much debated in France, though very little enlightenment resulted. read in Clearly, connection with the Decree of 1913 quoted by General Gallieni, the new Decrees concentrate the direction of military policy in France and make it more independent of political control, but it remained doubtful whether the political control that was disliked had been exercised over the French military operations in France or in the

West Roosebeke o Bixschoote מייווי. 11/1/2 11111 enstraete Pilkelm's Zonn'èbeke Brielei 'YPRÉS min o Ghelirvelt hisch St.Eloi Hollebeke Kisteelhoek Ministration In 5///// o Korte Million Wytschaete W///// omines Messines ر بن WARNETÓN

The Environs of Ypres.

Balkans, and, in the latter case, whether General Joffre and General Castelnau favoured or disliked the new French commitments at Salonika (see, however, page 51).

THE BATTLE OF LOOS.

The French published a detailed and reasoned account of the attack in Champagne (embodied in the account already given in this History) towards the end of 1915, but the corresponding British account of the Battle of Loos did not appear until the following May. On the whole it confirmed the disappointments which had followed the earlier narratives of the battle. The view

already mentioned (Vol. III., page 275) that the gas which the British employed for the first time in this battle rather hindered than assisted the attack is supported. The gas on our extreme left near the La Bassée Canal moved so slowly that it held up the advance of the Second Division, and, drifting northwards, put many of our men out of action. It was more successful at the southern end of our line towards Loos, but even here it occasionally drifted back on our lines, causing loss and confusion. Heavy, again, as the artillery bombardment was, there were many points along our line, as at Neuve Chapelle, where it failed to break

the wire entangleespecially ments. on the left of our attack, and on the German trenches in front of Hulluch, where the gas also drifted back on our lines. The failure of the reserves to support the rapid success gained towards Loos and Hill 70, which did more than any other single cause to sterilise the initial victory, pointed either to bad staff work or to grave faults in the divisional commands, and is not further elucidated in the official narrative, but suggested the moral that it is easier to increase the size of an army than to secure its skilful direction, and that the rapid development of the muscular system of an army may outstrip the development of its brain, and even to some extent prejudice it. And the same moral is suggested by the details of the attacks and counter-

attacks in the later stages of the battle, in which the valour and spirit of the rank and file and of the regimental officers are much more in evidence than a well-directed general plan. The details of the battle confirmed the opinion that some had held ever since the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in the spring, that the problem of the break through on the Western front, if it was not insoluble, had advanced very little nearer to solution since the spring. Winter was too near now to permit any thought of a renewal of the general attack; but whereas during the winter of 1914 the idea of a general offensive in the spring sustained all hopes, there was no eagerness of

anticipation in the winter of 1915. On the German side, too, there was a change of feeling. They had been confident in the first winter of their power to resist an attack in the spring, otherwise they would not have risked an ambitious offensive against Russia and Servia. The winter of 1915 found them much less sanguine. Neuve Chapelle, Loos, and the Champagne battles had not broken their lines, but had certainly given them a bad shaking. Both sides had suffered a disillusionment in their hopes.

THE RESIGNATION OF SIR JOHN FRENCH.

On December 14th Sir John French resigned his command of the British army in France, and came to

charge of the Home Army. He was succeeded in France by Sir Douglas Haig, who had been his chief lieutenant from the beginning of the war, and with whom his personal relations had always been those of extreme cordiality. Sir John French had not fulfilled all the hopes that were entertained by his warmest admirers when he was first appointed to the command in France. It seemed then possible that his South African experience might enable him to employ tactics that were new to Europe, and would have a far greater effect on the course of the war than the small numbers of his army could warranted. have Students o f military history remembered how useful our unfortunate war with the

In a water-logged British trench.

[Photopress.

American colonies had been to us in the struggle with Napoleon which followed. There had been a close resemblance between the Boer tactics and those of the American colonists in the War of Independence; their sharpshooters had taught us the value of musketry; and if in the Peninsular War we were almost invariably able to defeat superior numbers of the French infantry, then at the height of its reputation, the chief reason was that our American experience had taught us tactics which enabled us to reduce the depth of our lines and to maintain with inferior numbers an equal volume and a greater extension of fire. It seemed at least possible that this experience might be repeated in Europe. So indeed it

might have been had the war taken a form in which free manœuvre in the open field was possible. As it was, the British army had hardly landed when it found itself assailed by overwhelming numbers on the flank of the defeated French armies. Only the most desperate measures could have recovered its freedom. It might, for example, instead of falling back with the French army, have retired to the coast and re-appeared on the Belgian flank of the German army; there would then have been an excellent chance for the successful employment of South African tactics, and if the French left, deprived of the support of the British on its flank, could have escaped encirclement Sir John French in independent command in Flanders might have rendered even greater

services to the cause than he in fact did. The attempt to force the German positions on the northern bank of the Aisne was clearly waste effort, and it would have been far preferable if the British army had made its movement into Flanders in September, immediately after the Marne, instead of in October. Antwerp and the Belgian coast would almost certainly have been saved. These hopes may have been in General French's mind, and their disappointment may have had some effect on his military policy, which in its later stages seemed to tend towards dulness. But all this must for the present remain pure speculation. Sir John French did some brilliant things in France. His management of the retreat from Mons will become a classic example

of the most difficult operation in war, and his transference of the British army from the Aisne to Flanders, though it began too late to secure its chief objects, showed great strategic insight. His defence of Ypres, again, inflicted on the Germans the severest tactical defeat in the first year of the war. But when once the campaign had settled down into trench warfare, the chances of distinction for the peculiar tactical abilities of General French were gone. He was a cavalry officer. Freedom of manœuvre was the very essence of his military thinking, and when this was denied him he became the ordinary competent general, no more. Other qualities were now required—powers of organisation, knowledge of men and skill in

managing them, and patient elaboration of a new system of tactics adapted to the new and unfamiliar conditions. General French was not destitute of these gifts, but they were not his strong points. The plan of Neuve Chapelle and Loos, though thoroughly competent, was not distinguished, and the execution showed that General French was not always well served by his staff. Yet it is difficult to over-estimate the services that he rendered to the Allied cause in its time of greatest danger, and popular appreciation has paid him less than his due.

In his farewell address to the troops Sir John French expressed his "heartfelt sorrow in parting with you before the campaign in which we have so long been engaged together has been brought to a victorious conclusion.'

Shortly after his return to England, Sir William Robertson, who had been General French's Chief of Staff in France, was appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, a position which made him the person mainly responsible for the direction of our military plans. By an Order in Council, issued in January, he was made responsible for issuing the orders of the Government in regard to military operations. Sir William Robertson had risen from the ranks.

THE SECOND WINTER.

The second winter campaign on the western front was in its general features very like the first. There may have been rather less wet weather, and the worst cold came towards the end of the winter. The state of our trenches

had been improved, and away from the firing line there was a considerable degree of comfort, and even a certain amount of social amusement. The chief characteristic of all the soldiers' letters, even where they are describing the troubles of their life in their trenches, was their irrepressible cheerfulness. A sergeant, whose leg was horribly mauled by a trench mortar as he stood thigh deep in water, and a surgeon who came to amputate his leg, splashing up to the neck in wet mud, holding his instruments over his head to keep them dry, did the operation then and there in the water. "I hope," wrote the man to his wife that same night from hospital, "this will find you in the pink, as it finds me." He went on


to say that he had had an "accident," which had taken off one of his legs. But the youngsters will like to play with my wooden leg." The Germans as a rule held the higher and the drier ground, though not invariably. "How deep is it with you?" shouted a German soldier from behind a pile of sandbags. "Up to our blooming knees," answered a corporal, who was trying to keep his bombs dry under a tarpaulin from which the rain streamed into the chalky water where he stood. "So? You are lucky fellows. We are up to our belts in it." At one point of the line—somewhere north of Ypres—the conditions were so bad that when the rains were at their worst both Germans and English mounted their parapets to escape the wet, and gazed at each other.

> There was however, no Christmas fellowship between the two armies, as there had been opposite the Saxon lines in the previous winter. It had been forbidden; but since the gas attacks and the sinking of the Lusitania the personal feeling of the army entirely changed, and even if no orders had been issued it is more than doubtful whether the men would have had the will to make friends on the second Christmas Day.



Ypres has been called a naval battle, by which is meant that the chief interest of it was that success or failure meant for us the retention or failure of our control of the Channel Narrows. and all that that may have meant for our sea-power. The second winter saw our defences at

Ypres very seriously contracted from what they had been a year before. This was the result of the gas attacks of the spring, and of the general attack which followed at almost every point in the arc. There was an unsuccessful gas attack by the Germans on the Ypres salient on December 19th, and there was serious fighting at two points in February, on the northern side of the salient near Het Sas and Steenstraete, the original direction of the gas attacks; the other on the south side of the salient. On February 14th, between the railway and canal which connect Ypres and Comines, the enemy carried our front trenches on a front of 600 yards. It was an important success, for we could not afford to lose ground on either



Dinner time in one of the French trenches. Central Press.



Northumberland Fusiliers after an attack (on the German lines. Some of the British troops are wearing German helmets which they have taken as trophies. The rest have on the steel splinter-proof helmets which were served out to British troops during the winter campaign.

[Central Press.]



British troops on the way back from the trenches.

[Central Press.

side of the salient, and least of all on the south side, where the enemy's wedge had been driven in very far. The ground was recovered with interest at the beginning of March. The very heavy fighting which took place at St. Eloi at the end of March falls just outside the winter.

THE ARRAS REGION.

South of the Lys, and over the ground of the Battle of Loos, the British front remained unchanged through the winter. The most important event in this section of the front was the departure of the Indian troops about Christmas time. They had done excellent work, but the climate had prevented them from doing themselves full justice, and they were never suited by the trench war. The Prince of Wales gave them a suitable message from the King at a parade just before they departed. Two months before the King had revisited the front, and took the opportunity of issuing an appropriately spirited Order of the Day addressed to the French armies. But the French themselves were soon to leave this district. In the course of the winter, as the British army grew in numbers, it extended its occupation of the front further and further south, until before the end of the winter it had reached the Somme. The French continued to hold as an enclave the ground near Arras which they had won so hardly from the Germans in the early summer, but in the early spring they gave up this also to the British. district was, after Ypres, perhaps the most disturbed in the whole line, and the French had much hard fighting, especially as winter was setting in. The only change in the front between La Bassée and Loos was a slight gain near the Hohenzollern Redoubt, captured in the early stages of the Battle of Loos, lost, and re-captured twice over in the later months. In the middle of March a number of mines were exploded under some rising ground held by the Germans near the fort, and the explosion was followed by a bombing attack. Twelve thousand bombs were thrown in the course of the day.

THE TRENCH WAR IN RUSSIA.


The German advance into Russia had come to an end in the autumn of 1915. It might almost be said to have died a natural death, for there was a gradual slowing down of progress and a slow but perceptible stiffening on the Russian side until things came to a stop. Probably the Germans would not have gone on so long but that everything, with them, was waiting on Hindenburg's pounce from Wilna on the Russian Central Armies retreating in the narrow space between the Wilna-Minsk road and the Pripet Marshes on the south. Hindenburg came near success, then failed, and with his failure all the steam went out of the German attack, and the advance was allowed gently to die away. It was said that there were voices on the German General Staff which urged that the pursuit should still be pressed to Petrograd, or to Kieff, or to some other of the great places of Russia, but it is doubtful whether the report is worth believing. The Germans had carried the pursuit so far in the hope of destroying the main Russian armies. They had lost their chance, and were not likely to have one so good again; the winter was approaching, and every mile of advance meant another mile of communications to be established and preserved. The Germans stopped where they were, and dug themselves in for the winter.

The position which they had obtained was not as favourable as they could have wished. It would have suited them to put behind their lines the railway 13**--VOL. IV.

which runs north and south from Riga through the Pripet Marshes to Rowno, and which would have been of the utmost value to them throughout the winter. They had succeeded in gaining only part of it. In the north the attacks which they had made at point after point between Riga and Dwinsk, and to the south of Dwinsk, had failed to secure them the line of the River Dwina and the railway which runs along its northern bank. Riga, through which, if they could have taken it, they might have accumulated sea-borne supplies in the autumn for their northern army, remained in Russian hands, and they were faced with the prospect of a winter in which, after their sea-bases of Libau and Windau were frozen up, they would have to bring all their supplies overland from East Prussia. From Dwinsk to Wilna, and thence about half-way to the Pripet Marshes, they had the coveted railway at their backs, but for a long stretch north and south of the Pripet and through the centre of the marsh region it served the Russian lines, and enabled them to keep up the connection between the two sections into which the marshlands divided their armies. The Germans probably did not feel the lack of these sections of railway very seriously themselves, for they were laying light railways and timber roadways with tremendous industry all the time that they were moving forward, but they felt it unfortunate that when Russia was already showing signs of a coming revival of strength they should not be able to deprive her of some of the most important of her few lines of support.

The previous winter had already shown that for modern armies the construction of trench lines over three hundred miles and more presents no terrors. The winter of 1915-16 showed that a war of positions could be established with equal ease over a front of six or seven hundred miles, part of which lay in a country of marsh and stream, where a continuous line was scarcely possible. The Germans were not, however, content to settle down for the winter without a last attempt to cross to the northern bank of the Dwina. At the beginning of November, they drove the Russians back over the river at selected points and then concentrated their attack on a six-mile stretch of the northern bank. Some of their pontoon bridges were almost across before the Russian artillery broke them down. The attempt failed, like all its predecessors, and the Russians were soon back in their own positions. They followed up their success a little later by a vigorous offensive near Riga, and entered on the winter with their positions slightly improved. The winter came early on the Riga front, and with great severity, and the Germans were caught without supplies of winter garments. About this time two German aviators who came to ground behind the Russian lines were found in their machine, unwounded and uninjured, frozen to death.

It soon became clear that the Germans and Austrians were hard at work building up entrenched systems like those of the Western front, connecting up the different sections by field railways and multiplying all the means of communication in the rear of their armies. The construction of the entrenched lines in itself presented some difficulties which were much greater than the Germans had met with elsewhere. In the marsh region, for instance, not only had they no easily defensible line over long distances of country but their trench lines, in a country of bog and flood and wandering streams, were liable to be completely wiped out by nature—we may compare the Yser section of the Western front—and defence rested rather on large numbers of strong points—villages, blockhouses,



THE AUSTRO-GERMAN WINTER LINE ON THE EASTERN FRONT.

and the like—than on a continuous fortified line. In many ways, in regard to the character of the fighting as of the country, the warfare of the marshes presented some features quite distinct from that on other fronts. The grimness of nature, which made it impossible that this area should be the scene of the embittered and possibly decisive fighting which took place on either side of it, perhaps imparted to the troops a touch of human feeling which was rarely to be found elsewhere. An American who visited the Pinsk region and watched the shelling of a party of Russians wrote:—

"This particular band, it must be explained, was only fired upon because they had strayed away out beyond their own lines in what the Germans considered a provocatory and challenging manner. As long as the Russians stick close to home they are, in general, not molested.

"The Pinsk sector is an interesting exception to the general rule that the modern battlefield is absolutely empty, that you can't see any soldiers. As a matter of fact, this part of the front simply swarms with soldiers, and you can watch both Germans and Russians going calmly about their work with no thought of danger or cover. The swamps, that stretch far as eye can see, are broken towards the horizon by clumps and longer strips of woods, indicating islands of solid ground, and running along the edges of these woods you see, through the powerful telescope, the Russian positions. They are apparently no different from the German main lines—trenches, breastworks of mudbags, barbed wire entanglements 10 and 20 rows deep.

"It is a curious sensation to be able to watch the Russians at work, putting out more barbed wire, building blockhouses, dragging logs and sleighs over the frozen swamps, doing everything that the Germans are doing.

The patient watchers know many of these far-off Russians by sight and have given some of them names, those who particularly appeal to them as 'characters,' and take the keenest personal interest in their activities, and know all the intimate domesticities of the Russian lines."*

Of his visit to the same spot by night the writer gives a picture which is oddly in contrast with the unwearying vigilance, the raiding and bombing, of the Western front:—

"At last this strange battlefield looked normal, lifeless. Brilliant moonlight is not conducive to patrolling enterprises, particularly over brilliant snow. No fire flashed at the muzzles of cannon; no shot from either Germans or Russians violated the truce of this silent Russian night. Correspondents were confirmed in their impression that Pinsk must be an ideal rest-cure for those fortunate enough to be 'fighting' here. The full moon made calcium rockets and searchlights superfluous.

"The silver ribbon of the Pina, with miles of barbed wire lining its banks, showing dark against the snow, backed by miles of dark field fortifications (thrown up by human moles, and bristling with unseen machine guns); two silver streams stretching eastward—the eccentric Strumen River that flows through the swamps into the Pina, stays with it for half a mile, then flows off into the swamps again; the seemingly endless expanse of ice and snow, cut by long lagoons, by strips of meadowland, some with dark outlines of haystacks still standing (for there is a friendly rivalry between German and Russian patrols to beat one another to these haystacks between the lines on dark nights and set fire to them); the thatched huts of a little village, nearer the Russian than the German lines: the miles of dams, piers, waggon, and foot bridges stretching over the frozen swamps; more miles of wire entanglements criss-crossing it in all directions, and then the dark dots of small fortified mud islands and blockhouses this was war on the Pinsk front at night."

GUERILLA WARFARE.

The nature of the country, however, both on the Pripet swamps and at some other points, gave the Russian

horsemen many chances of slipping through the German lines, taking his advanced posts from the rear, harassing his convoys, and impeding his methodical organisation of his positions. This warfare was carried on by the little paths and tracks in the marshes, with which the Russians were much better acquainted than the enemy. "These guerillas," wrote the correspondent of the Russkaia l'iedomosti, "must rise up swiftly and unexpectedly and disappear just as quickly; they must be acquainted with every detail of the neighbourhood, and the habits of the enemy. They have to act secretly and seize the propitious occasion, concerting their strokes in spite of all the obstacles separating them one from another." The most remarkable incident of this kind took place at the end of November, 1915, when a raiding party penetrated nearly two miles behind the German front and seized and carried off the German General commanding the Eighty-second Division, together with his staff. One of those who took part in the raid thus describes its execution:-

"We were led by a native of those parts, and succeeded in passing the cordon of the German sentinels, following the line of a swamp which seemed absolutely impassable. Two or three times we found ourselves near to the enemy's outposts, but the deep darkness saved us. It was an autumn night, and raining; a terrible night. We came out on to a little path. Fires glittered in front of us—the village of P——. We went round it through fields and hedges. Our aim was to get into Nevel, where we had been told the divisional staff was. We halted at the foot of a crucifix by the roadside, a quarter of a mile from Nevel, to take counsel. We decided to send the main body towards the village of Garynitchi, whence help might be sent to the Germans, whilst the others were to advance straight towards the house through the garden. I was among the latter.

"We went forward in the dense darkness. I was already inside the garden with a few comrades, when a shout in German resounded near us, followed by a revolver shot. We rushed to the house, where two windows were lit up, and entered the hall. The sentry dozing at the door had not time to open his mouth.

"I opened the first door I came to. A soldier was sitting at a table, on which stood a lamp and a telephone. He was holding the receiver to his ear and did not turn round when we entered. At this moment an irritable voice shouted out from behind another door 'Wer da?' ('Who's that?') At the same moment rifle shots rang out and hand grenades went off around the house. Three of us hurled ourselves at the door and wrenched it open. It was a little room, lit by a lamp. In the middle stood a German officer, advanced in years and half dressed. (Afterwards we discovered that he was the General commanding the division.) He was so taken aback that he made not the slightest resistance.

the slightest resistance.

"Just then some other comrades entered the house shouting 'Hurry up there! Reinforcements are coming up!' We dashed out into the garden, bearing the General with us. Outside there three other superior officers and several subalterns were brought along. Meanwhile the fusillade continued. We began our retreat, and an hour later we repassed through the German lines with our prisoners."*

A more ambitious venture took place on the Russian northern wing, where a force of Don Cossacks penetrated fifty miles behind the German lines and returned five days later after destroying three convoys. It is not impossible to assess the precise military importance of these worrying tactics—any more than of the perpetual bombing work in the West—but they undoubtedly helped to distract the Germans from their work of organising their positions, and to give the Russians the breathing space to recover

their strength, which at this time was their most urgent need.

Raiding tactics in the centre; on the flanks, from time to time, larger enterprises. Both on the north and the south of the line the German position was unsatisfactory: on the north because the summer campaign had left the Dwina and its strong places still in Russian hands; on the south because the advancing armies had failed to occupy a considerable part of the "Wolhynian triangle" of fortresses and railways, or to seize the last strip of Galicia to which the Russians had clung after the capture of Lemberg in the summer of 1915. The Germans made spasmodic efforts to improve their ground. The attempt to cross the Dwina was one of them; not long

afterwards, on their southern front, they attacked the Russians at Czartorvsk, on the River Styr. Throughout the winter they showed nervousness in this quarter. Their chief base was at Kowel, an important railway junction, from which lines ran north-east and south-east to their front, but the iunctions of these lines with the transmarsh railway were held by the Russians—the fortress of Rowno was one of them-and the Germans were perpetually afraid that a Russian attack in force would compel them to abandon Kowel. The fighting was inconclusive, and left the positions pretty much what they had been.

During December the Russians prepared the largest offensive of the winter months. They attacked in

force on three sections of the southern front: the Styr, the Strypa (which runs down through Eastern Galicia to the Dniester), and from the Bessarabian border towards Czernowitz, the capital of Bukowina. On this front the Russian army which General Ivanoff commanded had for months had the better of the exchanges with the enemy, and there were many good reasons for an attempt to make progress at this time. The Austrian line between the Dniester and the Pruth stood on the very border of Bessarabia, and rested its right flank on the Roumanian frontier. Thus a kind of sally port was opened on to Russian territory. It was not at all unlikely that the German plans contemplated an offensive here, in the hope

that the sight of Austro-German troops invading Russian territory under the very eyes of Roumania would at least clinch her neutrality, if it did not actually turn the balance towards something much more favourable to Germany.

THE RUSSIAN PLAN.


The Russians aimed at pushing back the Austrian lines behind the Pruth and Dniester, so as to envelop Czernowitz from both north and south, and compel its abandonment. With such a success they might have waited for the developments of the spring with easier minds. The fighting which followed was, according to a Russian officer who took part in it, "some of the bloodiest on record."

trians attacked and counter-attacked in dense formation. Some novelties in warfare were employed. The Russians used shields which were pushed forward on rollers; the Austrians discharged poisonous gas from the mouth of a tunnel which they had bored through a hill. But no substantial change of position followed. Alike on the Styr, the Strypa, and in Bukowina, the Russians made progress here and there. From the Bessarabian border they approached threateningly towards Czernowitz. but the obstacles were too strong. The attacks died down and left the city in Austrian hands.

Russians and Aus-

It was clear that on the Russian front, too, things had come to the trench - war pure and simple, and an advance of a few

hundred yards here and there was only to be gained at the cost of a great battle. Yet the result was not discouraging to the Russians; it was much that they should be able to attack at all on such a scale, with a generous supply of guns and shells, after the disasters of the summer. Nor was their offensive a failure because Czernowitz still stood. The Russians had cause to expect and to fear a German attack on the Roumanian border, and it was distinctly to their advantage if they now anticipated such a movement, and inflicted on the enemy such heavy losses as to dislocate his plans. In this war sweeping victories in the field were often not to be won, and commanders had to rest content if they could



A detachment of Austrian prisoners taken by the Russians. $[Topical\ Press]$

anticipate the intentions of the enemy and inflict such loss of material and life on him as would postpone his coming onslaught.

Similar reasons will probably explain the heavy fighting which, soon after the beginning of the German offensive at Verdun, in the early months of 1916, broke out in the lake-country between Dwinsk and Wilna. The scale of the Verdun fighting made it clear that Hindenburg could not immediately undertake any big enterprise between Riga and the Pripet, nor could he expect large reinforcements if he were hard pressed. The Russians chose the moment for an attack in the country north-west

of Wilna into which Hindenburg had penetrated in the last stage of the summer campaign. Attacks and counterattacks, lasting for some time, ended like the Bukowina fighting of the winter: small gains and losses, heavy casualty lists, and the main line little changed. But again, even in such indecisive fighting, there was more encouragement for the Russians than for the Germans. When Warsaw fell, Germany had hoped that the Russians would think of peace. She had hoped to settle with Russia by a crushing blow at Wilna. Now she had the evidence that, as one of her own writers had said, Russia had recovered with "astounding rapidity."



Russian infantry crossing a stream on a hastily-built bridge.

Photopress.



German reserves of transports passing through a village near Verdun.

[Photopress.



A German regiment off to the Trenches at the Verdun front.

[Photopress.



A view of Verdun.

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CHAPTER XX.

THE ATTACK ON VERDUN.

THE PROBLEM OF THE GERMAN STAFF—EAST OR WEST?—REASONS FOR DECISION TO ATTACK VERDUN—THE OPENING OF THE ATTACK—EARLY FRENCH DEFEATS—CAPTURE OF DOUAUMONT—A GREAT RALLY—GENERAL PÉTAIN—END OF THE FIRST STAGE.

HE problems confronting the German General Staff at the turn of the year were exceedingly grave. The plans prepared with exceeding care with which Germany had begun the war were that she should throw her whole weight against France, trusting to Austria to keep Russia occupied until the decisive defeat of France released the German armies in the west and enabled them to turn against Russia. These plans broke down, partly owing to the failure of Austria and the unexpected invasion of East Prussia, partly owing to the skill of General Joffre's strategy and the fine resistance of General Castelnau at Nancy, and partly owing to the intervention of England and the fine quality of her old professional army. The revised German plans were directed against England and Russia. Against France there was not a single general German offensive movement from the beginning of the first winter almost to the end of the second. Against Russia the operations begun by Hindenburg in the winter were taken up on a most comprehensive scale in the spring of 1915 and continued up to the end of the summer. But great as were the German efforts against Russia, England was

now recognised as the main adversary. The great aim of Germany had been to secure possession of the Straits of Dover, and to make the sea communications between England and France unusable. At the same time she dragged Turkey into the war, partly, if not mainly, in order to make difficulties for England in the East. Russian campaign did not realise all the hopes of its framers, and the campaign against England definitely failed. At the beginning of the second winter the British army had grown so large that the forces against Germany in the West were as great as they had been at the beginning of the war, and in a much more aggressive mood. Russia, too, was recovering from her losses, and had begun in conjunction with the English in Mesopotamia a very menacing campaign against Turkey. Italy was engaging a large Austrian army, and the occupation of Salonika by the French and English, though it gave very little prospect of an early offensive, prevented Bulgaria from giving any assistance to the Central Powers and ensured the neutrality of Greece and Roumania.

In which direction was Germany now to turn her main efforts? She had tried forcing a decision against



In one of the deserted streets of Verdun after the civil population had been ordered out of the bombarded town. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$




Another view in the bombarded quarter of Verdun.

Newspaper Illustrations.

France and against Russia in turn, she had failed signally against England, and her Eastern schemes were not working satisfactorily. Every way that she looked she saw a need. Which should she attempt to satisfy first? From which side was the danger most pressing? One thing was clear. She could not afford to wait until the enemy's plans unfolded themselves. If ever she was tempted to fall back on the defensive and content herself with defeating the attacks made on the positions she held on the enemy's territory, she must have put away the temptation almost at once. At least two of her enemies, and these the most dangerous, could wait almost indefinitely. It was always possible that they might decline the offensive in Europe, and content themselves with completing the conquest of Germany's colonial possessions and of Turkey, which Germany regarded as her potential India. Besides, there was the blockade, which, though not enough in itself to reduce Germany to submission, was felt as at the least a very grave inconvenience, and was inflicting privation on the poor. More-

over, the offensive was so much a part of the German military creed that its cessation was almost equivalent to a defeat. It was an advertisement to her own people that the war could not possibly be won, and that meant a loss of prestige such as the Government could not bring itself to face. For these and many other reasons the General Staff was vinced that the policy of the offensive, though it had failed so far to bring the war to a satisfactory state, must be continued.



Verdun to Nancy.

EAST OR WEST P

The new plans must have been long and anxiously debated, and it is likely enough that the eastern and western schools of strategy had both their partisans in the counsels. For an early offensive against Russia it would be argued that it was dangerous to wait until she had recovered from the blows of the year previous; that she was a country with enormous resources, and that the only way of defeating her was to strike before she had had time to develop them; that the German victories over her in the preceding year had been gained not so much by superior strategy or more determined valour but by the sheer lack of equipment of the Russian soldiers; that this was a fault that time could cure and would cure, and that it was obvious policy to anticipate time; that Russia had many vulnerable spots; and that Napoleon, whose failure had given rise to the legend of Russian invincibility, had brought about his defeats by sheer bad management. As for the plans that might be adopted, the only difficulty was to choose. In the north Petrograd was within striking distance, and there was not only the seat of Government

but the Putiloff Works, the chief Russian arsenal. Was it not desirable to strike in this direction, if only to deprive the British submarines of a base? Admiral Jellicoe, in addressing some Russian visitors to the Grand Fleet, had spoken of the time when the navies of the two countries might fight side by side in the Baltic. Was not that a really serious danger? Germany might fight on two fronts, or even on three, but if a fourth front were added in the Baltic the outlook was indeed serious. If Germany lost the command of the Baltic would she not require a large army in the north to provide against the danger of sudden descents, and would not the flanks of her defensive positions in Courland, which she had so hardly won, be always in danger of being turned? If this danger could be safely overlooked, was it desirable to disregard the Russian menace to Turkey? What would it profit Germany if she defeated France and found Russia in possession of Asiatic Turkey, and even Constantinople itself? That was a peril which might best be averted by decisive action in Southern Russia. A drive through

> to Kieff was, by comparison with what had been accomplished last year, not a very ambitious scheme. and it would give Germany possession of some of the richest corn-growing land in Europe. and if the victory were pressed bring her out on the Black Sea, the control of which would stop Russia's campaign against Turkey, if her defeats in Europe had not already done Besides, there was Roumania to be There considered. a powerful party in the country

that favoured intervention on the side of the Entente, and the only sure way to stop its agitation and to bring Roumania into the war on the side of Germany was to interpose between her and Russia. If Roumania came in on the side of the Entente, Bulgaria would be ruined, and Germany's Balkan schemes would be killed.

Such, it may be supposed, were the arguments that would be advanced in favour of the Russian offensive. On the other hand, the views which before the war began were almost unquestioned military orthodoxy in Germany would urge the supreme importance of a decision in the West. If only the war in the West were disposed of, Russia would present no difficulties. She was dangerous in war only because her Western Allies supplied her with the money and munitions that she lacked. Without Allies. Russia would soon succumb, and at the worst it would be possible to make an accommodation with her. With Allies on her side, it was almost impossible to reach a definite conclusion in Russia. Besides, the danger in the West was growing. In September the Western Allies had shaken the defences of Germany; no risks could be safely run, for a serious reverse on the West—for example,



Civilian inhabitants' of Verdun packing up their belongings in order to comply with the military order commanding them to leave the town.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



Troops and civilian refugees on one of the roads behind Verdun. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$


the fall of Lille-would force Germany to abandon her campaign in Russia, if she had begun one, and hurry reinforcements to the West front. It was true the prospects of the West were not of an easy victory. It had to be acknowledged that the British army, however great its deficiencies in other respects, was unrivalled on the defence. A repetition of the attacks on Ypres was certainly very disagreeable. Perhaps that could be avoided. The coast road might be the most direct road to victory on the West, but it was certainly the hardest. But if the Allies on the West were to be hindered from co-operation, it was not necessary to defeat the British fleet at sea, even if it were possible, or even to drive the British army into the sea. It would serve the purpose if the French defence could be broken down, for if there were no powerful French army in the field the British could do nothing on land. She certainly could not conduct a campaign in France entirely on her own resources. The defeat of the French meant inevitably that England must retire from the war on land. Nor was the defeat of France out of the question. The natural way to Paris, after all, was by the East; whatever military advantage there was in the route through Belgium had already been secured. Even if they failed to win through to Paris, they might inflict such losses on the French as to make them incapable of further effort in the war. The French losses had been enormous, and her resources in men were less than those of the other Allies. A serious breach in her lines, even though it were repaired, and a further bleeding would go far to make the West secure. And then Germany might turn against Russia with both hands free, and secure her position once and for all in the East. Even granting that the main political hopes of Germany were in the East, the best way of securing them was in the West.

It is not to be supposed that these arguments were ever advanced on any single occasion, or that the German War Councils were at any one time so sharply divided between the eastern and western factions. But that these opposing tendencies existed, that at the beginning of the war the western school was dominant, that in the second year it gave place to the eastern, which in its turn, at the beginning of the spring of 1916, had to yield to the western school again, these are undeniable facts; and the only room for doubt is whether this oscillation between the East and the West represented the permanent views of rival factions in the War Councils, or whether they merely reflected the current needs of German strategy. If there were opposing factions they must have come into sharp collision when the decision was reached to open the 1916 campaign with an offensive against France. Nor indeed is it certain that the triumph of the western school of action was complete and unequivocal. On the contrary, there is some reason to suspect that the policy decided upon was in the nature of a compromise. No movement against Russia was possible until the second half of April at the earliest; the Battle of the Dunajec, which decided the fate of Galicia in the previous year, had been fought in the first week of May. And if the choice had fallen on a campaign against the Riga end of the Russian lines, the offensive would have been delayed by the state of the ground for another two or three weeks. that is, until the middle of May. It may well be that the decision of the German Staff was to cram both offensives into 1916, to begin early on the West, and to finish there in time to deal a series of heavy blows against Russia before the next winter set in. Certain it is that the offensive movement in France began exceptionally early. The gas attack on Vpres which marked the beginning

of the German operations on the West in 1915 was made in May, but the offensive against the French armies in the following year began before the winter was half over, in the middle of February. It is tempting to conclude that the German programme for the year was a very full one, and that when the attacks on the French began the Germans were still hopeful that they might be brought to an early conclusion in time to allow of the resumption of active operations against Russia before the winter. And this suspicion is confirmed by the curious manner in which the Germans announced the beginning of their operations against the French. Their object clearly was to minimise the importance of the operations that were beginning. They may, of course, have wished to deceive the French, who, however, had the evidence of their own eyes, and would hardly depend on the German bulletins for their information of what was happening or likely to happen. But the more probable explanation is that when the attacks began the German Staff was still undecided as to its policy, and wished to keep open the alternative of a Russian campaign. They probably felt fairly confident of winning through, but they could not be certain; and it was preferable that they should not advertise their intentions beforehand, for that would be to commit themselves beyond possibility of retreat either to a successful break-through or (if they gave up the attacks) to an open acknowledgment of failure. To this same frame of mind is probably also to be attributed the remarkable inaccuracies of the German bulletins throughout the whole of the operations against the French. The Germans are too wise to tell falsehoods if there is a chance of their being immediately exposed; and the undoubted exaggerations of their early successes against the French betrayed a feverish anxiety to anticipate the march of events. The opposition to the offensive in France would doubtless make the most of the uncertainty of obtaining decisive results; and hence the eagerness of the General Staff, when once this offensive had been decided upon, to produce evidence that the decisive results were being obtained.

WHY VERDUN WAS SELECTED.

All through the winter the Germans had been testing the strength of the Allied front in France. Note has already in the last chapter been taken of the various local offensives against the British front. Against the French the German attacks had been much more persistent and widespread. All through October and November there was heavy fighting on the Vimy Ridge (then held by the French) between Givenchy-en-Gohelle and Neuville St. Vaast, and towards the end of January they gained a footing in the first line French trenches near Neuville St. Vaast, though they were afterwards expelled. These attacks continued into February, but the net changes as a result of this fighting were negligible. The Germans also made a spirited attack in February near the Somme marshes, at the junction of the British and French lines, but though they gained ground and more than a thousand prisoners they were not able to use it for a further advance. The object of these offensives was evidently to encourage the French into thinking that a German offensive was intended in Flanders. There were similar feints made in Alsace, near Hartmansweilerkopf, in January and February, and rumours were put about that an attempt was to be made on Belfort by Mackensen. Shells were dropped from long range into Belfort and also into Nancy. The Germans, however, had decided to make their main attack on the French centre, where since the cessation



THE COUNTRY ROUND VERDUN.

of the counter-attacks in Champagne in the late autumn (Vol. III., page 288) the front had been exceptionally quiet. The exact point selected for the attack was Verdun.

Verdun was selected for very definite reasons. The first was its distance from the British concentration in the west. The Germans had disliked exceedingly the combination in the previous autumn of a British offensive in Artois and a French offensive in Champagne. By attacking on the French right centre they hoped to draw off the French troops from Champagne and to make co-operation impossible between the Allied armies on the two sides of the great German salient in Western France. They expected that the British would precipitate their attack in Flanders as soon as the French got into difficulties at Verdun, and with this in mind they had heavily reinforced their lines near Ypres. A British reconnaissance against the Wytschaete Ridge on the south east of the Ypres salient found the German trenches full of troops; and it would seem probable that at one time the Germans hoped that by holding the British in Artois and engaging the French at Verdun they might be able to break through their weakened centre in Champagne. In any case, it was an advantage to engage the French line at the end further from the British. Secondly, the ground in Flanders is much heavier and wetter than in the east, and therefore the Germans hoped by attacking at Verdun to have the advantage of drier ground early. Thirdly, although in their first offensive against France they put the main strength on the west wing, the Germans had also planned a joint encircling movement from the east, and the importance which they attached to this eastern movement is shown by the fact that the Crown Prince, with a brilliant staff, was in command of it. It was involved in the defeat of the western movement on the Marne, and the obstinate resistance of General Castelnau at Nancy and the heavy losses of the Bavarians in their attacks on Fort Troyon, one of the fortifications on the Meuse Heights, also contributed to its failure. But it was natural that the Germans after the failure of the attempt to reach Paris through Belgium should turn sooner or later to the eastern gate. All this time the Germans had kept their hold on St. Mihiel, at the southern end of the Meuse Heights. An experienced American observer, the late Mr. Richard Harding Davis, in an account written in January of a visit to the French lines in the Southern Woevre, near St. Mihiel, expressed his surprise that the Germans should continue to hold this salient.

"You expected to see an isolated hill, a promontory, some position of such strategic value as would explain why for St. Mihiel the lives of thousands of Germans had been thrown like dice upon a board. But except for the obstinacy of the German mind, or, upon the part of the Crown Prince, the lack of it, I could find no explanation. Why the German wants to hold St. Mihiel, why he ever tried to hold it, why if it so pleases him he should not continue to hold it until his whole line is driven across the border, is difficult to understand. For him it is certainly an expensive position. It lengthens his lines of communication and increases his need of transport. It eats up men, cats up rations, eats up priceless ammunition, and it leads to nowhere, enfilades no position, threatens no one. It is like an ill-mannered boy sticking out his tongue. And as ineffective.

"The physical aspect of St. Mihiel is a broad sweep of

"The physical aspect of St. Mihiel is a broad sweep of meadow land cut in half by the Meuse flooding her banks and the houses of the Ferme Mont Meuse. On each side of the salient are the French. Across the battleground of St. Mihiel I could see their trenches facing those in which we stood. For, at St. Mihiel, instead of having the line of the enemy only in front, the German has it facing him and on both flanks. Speaking not as a military strategist but

merely as a partisan, if any German commander wants that kind of a position I would certainly make him a present of it."

The reasons for holding St. Mihiel became intelligible after the attack on Verdun had begun. St. Mihiel was the door ajar across the Meuse, and if German attacks on Verdun had succeeded it would have been used to turn the right of the French lines in Champagne and separate their centre from the right wing in Lorraine and Alsace. In attacking Verdun the Germans were proceeding on a very deliberate plan. They hoped to revive the eastern half of their original strategy against France which the Crown Prince had never had a chance to put to the test. Should this eastern break-through fail, the Germans hoped at any rate to cripple any joint Allied offensive that might be projected, and they could always say that their object had been merely to get rid of an awkward salient in the French lines.

THE COUNTRY ROUND VERDUN.

And the choice of Verdun was probably the soundest that the Germans, if they were minded to revive the offensive against the French lines, could have made. Had the eastern route been followed on the first invasion of France, it would have been sounder still, for in that case it is almost certain that Verdun would have shared the fate of the Belgian fortresses, and with much more serious results to France. As it was, the French had time to adopt the lessons learnt by the fall of the Belgian fortresses. and the whole plan of the defences had been modified within the last twelve months preceding the attack. The cupola forts had all been dismantled, and though their masonry made them the strongest positions in the lines the artillery was not concentrated behind armour to be the target of bombardment, but was artfully concealed, and regained its mobility. The greater part of the defences at Verdun consisted of elaborate earthworks of the kind advocated by the English school of fortification (see Vol. I., page 26, and Appendix, page 128). The remodelling of the Verdun fortifications was the work of General Sarrail, now in command at Salonika. In the mid-winter of 1016, when the German attacks on Verdun began, General Gouraud was in local command in Champagne, General Pétain in command of the French reserves behind the lines in Champagne, and either General Humbert or General Herr at Verdun itself. The French lines had been pushed out on the north side of Verdun to the length of a radius of twelve miles. East of the Meuse they extended from Brabant through Haumont and Herbebois to Fromezey, near Etain, there turning south and running through Fresnes in front of Eparges to the Meuse Heights, concaving round the German salient at St. Mihiel to the positions in the Southern Woevre. West of the Meuse the northern defences ran opposite Consenvoye, through Malancourt and Montfaucon Wood to the French positions in the Argonne. The Meuse separates the Verdun defences into two well-marked compartments. The ground on both sides of the river is generally high, with precipitous cliffs, but sometimes there is a belt of flat land on the river banks. This feature is particularly marked in the loop of the river opposite Champneuville, where the hills recede some little distance from the river, and the river tends to spread itself out in marshes. On this section the stream has been canalised, the canal being on the east bank and the railway from the north following the line of the hills on the west bank. The topography of the Verdun district is by no means easy in its detail. A



French troops waiting in reserve on the outskirts of Verdun. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations,$



Another photograph of troops held in reserve for the fighting on the Meuse sector. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$

feature of the landscape is the rounded hills, usually wooded, which seem scattered about without system. But it is perhaps possible to reduce the chaos to some sort of order. One notices in the first place the lines of hills that overlook the river from both banks, rising steeply like the sides of a house, and, further behind, sloping away gently upwards like a gabled roof. One such gable is at Beaumont, sloping down to the river at Samogneux. Another is Louvemont, coming down to the river by the Côte du Poivre at Vacherauville and Bras. Another, still more important, is Douaumont, which comes out on the river at Belleville, the site of one of the old forts at Verdun, and yet a fourth starts at Damloup and gradually converges to Belleville. Away to the east, and overlooking the plain of the Woevre, Beaumont, Douaumont, Damloup, are the gable walls of the long ridge which forms the Heights of the Meuse and runs right down to St. Mihiel. It was from this side that the main attacks came in the second month of the war. West of the Meuse the country is not dissimilar in character, rising gradually to the Heights of the Argonne. A little brook called the Forges comes down from Malancourt into the Meuse at the north end of the Chapneuville loop. On the south side of its valley are two hills, the Mort Homme and the Côte de l'Oie, with Cumières half way between them and a little nearer to the river. Further south is the Charny Ridge, which runs in a general direction of north-east, and is in alignment with the Douaumont Ridge on the other side of the river. Roughly, then, we may speak of three main lines of defences in front of Verdun. There is the line Forges Brook to Samogneux and Beaumont, the line from Mort Homme to Louvemont, and a third line running on the west bank to Charny and east of the Meuse continuing on to the Douaumont Ridge. Immediately in front of Verdun is the line of hills, beginning with Belleville, which carried the ancient forts. Dotted in between these hills are numerous woods, which were to play an exceedingly important part both in the attack and the defence.

THE OPENING OF THE ATTACK.

The German attack began on February 21st, at seven in the morning, with a bombardment heavier than had yet been seen in the war. Never before had so many guns been employed on so narrow a front, for the whole fire was concentrated on the area between Consenvoye and Herbebois, which is not more than eight miles wide. These tactics were in no way original. First employed by the British at Neuve Chapelle, improved on by the Germans at Gorlice, and by the French again in their operations in Champagne in the autumn, they were now raised to a yet higher degree of power and intensity at Verdun. The bombardment, though of unheard-of intensity, was also prolonged. The Allies had shown a fondness for attacks in the morning, but the Germans kept up their bombardment all through the day until late in the afternoon before launching their infantry. The Allies in the autumn, it is true, had kept up their bombardment for days together before attacking, and may therefore have expended more ammunition in all. But the German principle seems to have been to keep up their bombardment at maximum intensity as long as possible without losing their chance of effecting a surprise, and of gathering results before reinforcements could be brought up. To both these objects they attached the greatest importance, and therefore they opened their bombardment suddenly without preliminary warning, and delivered their attack late in the afternoon before darkness had given the enemy a chance to recover from the shock and prepare himself for a renewal of the bombardment in the morning. The Germans, again imitating the British practice, also launched an air attack against the communications of Verdun, giving particular attention to the railway junctions of Revigny. The air attack, however, was a failure. At Revigny not only was a squadron of the enemy's aeroplanes defeated by the defence, but a Zeppelin airship, the L 77, was brought down by a motor-gun crew.

The infantry attack introduced an important modification in the tactics, and showed that the Germans were not so foolishly reckless of their own lives as they are generally represented to be. Instead of letting loose whole battalions at once, they sent out small reconnoitring parties of twelve or fifteen men before each line of attack. Their duty was to note the effect of the bombardment, and discover whether the barbed-wire entanglements had been properly destroyed. In this way they must have saved many lives, for the worst losses in attack always take place where masses of advancing infantry are held up in the open before a stretch of wire which the bombardment has missed. In this case the bombardment had done its work very effectually. Another difference from the usual tactics of attack was the extremely cautious and deliberate manner in which the Germans set to work with their infantry. The first few hours of the Loos attack had given some support to the view that the success or failure of a break-through might be settled very rapidly. If, for example, the divisions that rushed over Hill 70 could have been supported adequately, we might conceivably have been in Lens by nightfall. The German view, however, seems to have been that the advantages of very rapid initial advance are more than outweighed by the drawbacks, of which not the least is the difficulty which the supports have of finding their way through a labyrinth of unfamiliar entrenchments when the first line has pushed its advance very far ahead. On the first day at Verdun the Germans were content to effect a lodgment in the first-line trenches, and here and there to seize the communication trenches leading to the second line. By five or six o'clock in February it is growing dark, and in the dark the Germans were able to consolidate their positions for the further advance on the following day. The whole scheme of attack bore evidence of very careful thinking out.

THE SECOND DAY.

By nightfall the Germans had effected a lodgment in the Haumont Wood, the Caures Wood, and Herbebois, the three points on which they had concentrated their fire. The number of men in the French lines was not yet great, and it by no means seemed improbable that the French should recover their positions by counterattack. On the following day, however, the bombardment began with fresh vigour. The main object now was to create a barrier of fire round the places where the Germans meant to push their advance, and the bombardment, which on the previous day had been limited to a narrow front, now extended along the whole northern front from Malancourt almost to Etain. The chief difficulty, as may be imagined with the German and French troops so close to each other as they now were, was to give the German infantry artillery support. The heavy artillery apparently confined its efforts to preventing fresh supplies of ammunition from reaching the French defence, and the direct support to the attack was given by machine guns only. The German attacks do not as yet seem to have been made in masses. Rather did they "filter ' into the woods. Quite early in the forenoon the Germans



Preparing for a gas attack in the Verdun trenches.

[Central News.



German prisoners taken by the French in a counter-attack during the Verdun fighting. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



The Fort of Vaux at the end of March

[French Official Photo.

had reached the southern edge of the Haumont Wood, and were threatening Haumont village. The regiment holding the village was now completely cut off from its supports by the barrier of artillery fire. The Germans, however, did not attempt to rush the village by frontal attacks, but used the cover of the woods and the protection of the "dongas" which furrowed the flanks of the hillsides to develop an encircling attack. By five in the afternoon they were in Haumont village, where the French were prepared to make a desperate resistance. Here the "flame-throwers" were found most useful by the Germans, for they threw fire into the cellars of the houses and forced those who were inside to choose between being burnt if they stood their ground or being killed by the machinegun fire which the Germans kept up on all the exits. The colonel and his staff commanding at Haumont were among those who chose the second alternative, and the colonel at any rate came through unscathed. Haumont was now definitely lost, and the Germans were using their positions in the Haumont Wood to develop an attack against the Caures Wood to the east and against Brabant on the banks of the river. The possession of a wood is valuableto the attack, because under its cover preparations for attack can be made and launched suddenly against the desired point. By nightfall the Germans were in possession of the greater part of the Caures Wood, as well as Haumont. Brabant, Beaumont, and most of Herbebois, however, were still held by the French.

THE EVACUATION OF SAMOGNEUX.

On February 23rd the French made a vigorous counterattack on the Caures Wood, which recovered much of the ground in it that had been lost on the previous day, after a very gallant struggle by the Chasseurs, under Colonel Driant.* And the gains of Caures were supported by a

very successful defence of Herbebois, where the Germans lost very heavily in a number of ineffectual attacks. Unfortunately, Brabant could not be held owing to the attacks of the Germans from the Haumont Wood, which threatened to cut off the garrison completely, and considerable danger of encirclement from the Bois Wavrille also threatened the defenders of Herbebois. Very sullenly, and under angry protests, the victors of Herbebois fell back across the Ornes road to the Chaumes Wood. Fortunately, the French artillery were able to prevent the Germans from debouching from Wavrille, and by nightfall on the third day the French were still holding the line Samogneux, Caures Wood (south end), Beaumont, and Ornes. Everything now depended on Samogneux.

Samogneux, however, could not be held, or at any rate was not. There would seem to have been a certain amount of confusion in these early days, as was perhaps inevitable against attacks of such violence. A remarkable story was published in the Paris Liberté, describing an incident in the defence of Samogneux, which if it is accurate suggests that there was some vacillation in the policy of the defence, and that orders and counter-orders must have succeeded each other in a somewhat perplexing fashion.

"On the morning of 23rd February, after a terrible bombardment, the order was given to evacuate Samogneux. but seeing the manœuvre the Germans launched a furious attack and managed to isolate two companies of infantry who were in some ruined houses and had no time to retreat. These soldiers had as leader a young captain, who coolly organised the resistance and determined to die rather than surrender. Happily the position was a good one, the Germans attacking being exposed to the fire of machineguns, and the French were able to take shelter in cellars from the bombardment. Twice the Germans attempted to rush the position. Both times they were repulsed, but the number of the defenders grew less and the ammunition failed, and the captain, seeing the Germans determined to make a third attack, which must end in annihilation of the little band, resolved to send an orderly to carry a message to the colonel of the regiment saying he would attack the

^{*} Some accounts make Colonel Driant lead this counterattack, but he seems to have perished in the fighting on the day before. If he led the counter-attack, it must have been on the previous day, and its success very short-lived.



One of the reserve stores of shells for the French artillery defending Verdun. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$



The ruins of one of the minor fixed forts on the outskirts of Verdun. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$

enemy at three o'clock, but hoped he would be relieved before. If not, nothing remained but to die for his country

"The two following hours were agonising. At five minutes before three the captain called his men together and told them the fateful hour approached when they must play their last card. If help arrived in time there was a chance of being saved; if not, it was certain death. 'At least,' he said, 'show the Boches how French soldiers die.'

"At the hour fixed he gave the order to attack. The Germans, disconcerted by this offensive, thought they were beaten, and by their hestitation saved the brave Frenchmen. Before the Germans were ready to make a counterattack the regiment so long waited for, led by the intrepid orderly, dashed up and joined the two companies which were on the point of yielding. Alas! many valiant soldiers failed to answer the roll-call, but their comrades had dearly avenged them. When night fell the field of battle was heaped with the corpses of the enemy."

THE CAPTURE OF DOUAUMONT.

On the fourth day, however, the evacuation of Samogneux was complete, and that necessitated a retreat all along the line to the Côte de Talou, Côte du Poivre, Louvemont, Bois des Fosses line. The Bois des Fosses was lost during the day. This and the next day, Friday, the 25th, were terrible days for the defence. On the evening of Friday the main line of defence on the right bank of the river began at Bras, Vacherauville having been evacuated earlier in the day. Champneuville, however, still continued to be held, though it was surrounded on all sides except that leading across the river to the French positions on the west bank, which were still intact. The summit of Poivre Hill, too, had been lost, as well as the Louvemont Ridge. Early on Saturday the situation grew worse for the Germans, after heavy fighting, succeeded in storming the Douaumont Fort. There had also been an extensive evacuation of territory to the east, and all the positions in advance of the main line of the Meuse Heights on this side were abandoned. The situation was now exceedingly grave. Had the Germans kept on at this rate of advance they would have been in Verdun by the end of the month.

The German enthusiasm over the capture of Douaumont Fort knew no bounds. It infected the official accounts. " East of the Meuse, in the presence of the Kaiser, important progress was made along the battle front. Our brave troops," said the German Headquarters' Report of Saturday, February 26th, "gained possession of the heights south-west of Louvemont, of the village of Louvemont, and of a group of fortifications to the east of it. Influenced by the old strong desire to advance, the Brandenburg regiments broke through to the village and strongly fortified position of Douaumont, which they captured by storm. The enemy resistance on the Woevre collapsed on the entire front to the sector of Marcheville, south of the main road from Metz to Paris. Our troops are closely pursuing the retreating enemy." The Kaiser sent a telegram of rejoicing. "I rejoice greatly," he said, "at the new great proof of Brandenburgian faithfulness unto death which Brandenburg's sons have displayed in their irresistible onslaught against the strongest fortress of the enemy." After exercising the greatest restraint all the week in their comments, following the official cue that the object of the German attacks were merely the rectification of an awkward salient, the German newspapers on Saturday afternoon gave way to unrestrained jubiliation. Mr. Asquith had just made his speech on the destruction of the military domination of Prussia, and the newspapers were full of "the contrast between words and deeds, between programme and achievement," and of "the hollowness and hopelessness of the pronouncements of the English Government." "With unbroken offensive spirit," said a semi-official telegram from Berlin, "and irresistible violence, an important part of the fortifications of Verdun has been won with unexampled speed." There were great rejoicings in the German towns, such as had not been seen since the fall of Warsaw; and, indeed, to have advanced at an average rate of a mile a day for a whole week against the lines which the French had been fortifying for more than a year, and to have reached at the end of it a commanding position little more than five and a half miles from Verdun itself, was an achievement of which the Germans might justly be proud.

THE FRENCH RALLY.

And now, just as the rejoicings in Berlin were beginning to gather volume, there occurred the most sudden and dramatic turns of fortune in the whole war. An hour after the Germans had carried the fort, the French counter-attacked. The Germans had lost terribly in the assaults of the morning. It was a frontal attack, and the cautious methods of the early days of the week had now been completely abandoned by the Germans, who, inflamed with the thought that they were in front of the last obstacle between them and Verdun, the fall of which they were persuaded would bring the end of the war in sight, flung away their lives wholesale, with a devotion that their infantry had not displayed on the West since the assaults on Ypres in the first autumn of the war. By noon the crest of the hill was theirs. But then came the French counter-attack, which was directed not so much against the front of the fort as against its flanks. The French stemmed the advance of the Germans down the slopes of the Douaumont plateau, and drove them back into the fort. Strong columns, advancing from the direction of Bras and the Côte de Froide Terre, worked up round Thiaumont Farm. It was perhaps the most terrible struggle that had yet taken place in the war. Something of its madness and hatred of these losses survives in a letter which appeared in the Figaro from a soldier who fought on the hillside on this most critical of days:-

"Despite the horror of it, despite the ceaseless flow of blood, one wants to see. One's soul wants to feed on the sight of the brute Boches falling. I stopped on the ground for hours, and when I closed my eyes I saw the whole picture again. The guns are firing at 200 and 300 yards, and shrapnel is exploding with a crash, scything them down. Our men hold their ground; our machine-guns keep to their work, and yet they advance.


"Near me, as I lie in the mud, there is a giant wrapped

"Near me, as I lie in the mud, there is a giant wrapped in one of our uniforms with a steel helmet on his head. He seems to be dead, he is so absolutely still. At a given moment the Boches are quite close to us. Despite the noise of the guns one can hear their oaths and their shouts as they strike. Then the giant next to me jumps up, and with a voice like a stentor shouts 'Hier da! Hier da!' Mechanically some of us get up. (My wound, which had been dressed, left me free and I had forgotten.) I was unarmed, and so I struck him with my steel helmet and he dropped, with his head broken. An officer who was passing sees the incident and takes off the man's coat. Below is a German uniform. Where had the spy come from and how had he got there?

"But the Boches are returning again massed to the assault, and they are being killed in bulk. It makes one think that in declaring war the Kaiser had sworn the destruction of his race, and he would have shown good taste in doing so. Their gunfire is slackening now, and ours redoubles. The fort has gone, and if under its ruins there are left a few guns and gunners the bulk of the guns are firing from outside. The machine-guns are coming up and getting in position, and our men are moving on in numerous waves. I find a rifle belonging to a comrade who



French staff officers and journalists watching the fighting from one of the Verdun forts on March 4th. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.]$



A German regiment answering the roll-call after returning from the attack on Verdun. [Photopress.]

has fallen, and join the Chasseurs with the fifty cartridges that I have left. What a fight it is, and what troops! From time to time a man falls, rises, shoots, runs, shoots again, keeps on firing, fights with his bayonet, and then, worn out, falls, to be trampled on without raising a cry. The storm of fire continues. Everything is on fire—the wood near by, the village of Douaumont, Verdun, the front of Bezonvaux, and the back of Thiaumont. There is fire everywhere. The acrid smell of carbonic acid and blood catches at our throats, but the battle goes on.

"They are brave, but one of our men is worth two of theirs, especially in hand-to-hand fighting. They bend and fall back, and the sound of the song they sing to order, 'Heil dir im Siegerkranz,' only reaches us in hiccoughs. Our reinforcements continue to arrive. We are the masters. Our officers, with wonderful coolness, control the ardour of the troops. The infantry action is over. By its tirs debarrage the artillery is holding that of the enemy, and we keep awaiting the fresh order for action in silence."

It was thought at first that the French would be able to re-capture Douaumont, and with it the Brandenburgers who still held out in it. But at no time were their communications with the main body cut, and though the French reports spoke of their being "encircled," the ring never clasped behind. Douaumont Fort remained in German hands, a peninsula jutting out on to the plateau. The Germans, however, after the check of Saturday, did not abandon their efforts. The next few days a furious struggle went on for the possession of the village of Douaumont, which lies about half a mile north-west of the fort. They succeeded in carrying the village, but were unable to retain it. On the other side of Douaumont they penetrated into the Caillette Wood, but here, too, they were unable to retain their positions. German object in these tactics is clear enough. They had advanced from the north in a wedge, of which the point was at Douaumont Fort. Here the wedge stuck, and not all the pressure from the base could drive it further. It became necessary if there was to be any advance beyond Douaumont to free the wedge from the lateral pressure. Hence the attacks on Caillette and Douaumont village. When these failed, it was obvious that the original plan of attack had definitely failed. The wedge had been driven in, but it had completely lost its power of further penetration, and (if the metaphor may be continued) all attempts to split the heart of the oak by agitating the wedge sideways were unavailing. Clearly, nothing more was to be made out of this plan. Either the attack on Verdun had to be abandoned with a German force precariously occupying a somewhat dangerous salient on the Douaumont plateau, or the operations must acquire a greater extension, and new attacks must be made from the flanks west of the Meuse and east of the Meuse Heights. The war councils of the Germans at this juncture must have been exceedingly interesting, but we are never likely to have authentic information of the form taken by the debates, though one imagines that they may well have been heated. What is certain is that the decision taken was to continue the attack from other points. Those-and there must, one would think, have been some—who had been opposed to the Verdun enterprise from the first must now have had their objections confirmed.

COMMENTS ON THE FIGHTING.

The first phase of the action was now over. It had ended, after a good opening, with a bitter disappointment for the Germans, and even the most sanguine advocates of the attempt to break the French lines at Verdun must

have entered upon the second phase with grave misgivings.

And here the narrative may pause in the hope of obtaining, before proceeding to the second phase, a general view of what now promised to be the greatest battle of the war on the West. It began with some ingenious German variations of the familiar tactics of attack variations evidently designed, as far as was possible, to minimise the expenditure of life. It developed into what at one time promised to be a rapid and easy capture of the great French place of arms, and in their eagerness to grasp the prize the Germans committed themselves to a terribly costly frontal attack, which failed at the very moment when success seemed certain, and forced them to begin what they must have been anxious to avoid. a series of extensive enveloping movements against the flanks. Several interesting questions present themselves, and though they cannot on our present knowledge be definitely answered, the temptation to seek an answer can hardly be resisted. At the least, it may be useful to state the difficulties.

First, how far was the German attack a surprise to the French? All the positive statements are that there was no surprise, and that the French knew that the Germans were making preparations for a great attack, or at the least that an attack on Verdun was not unlikely. No Government or Headquarters' Staff that had a great reputation to keep up would ever admit that it had been taken by surprise, and therefore we need not interpret the French statements too literally. But if the defenders of Verdun really knew what was coming, and when it was to come, the arrangements to meet the threatened attack might certainly have been improved. It is true that the first lines of trenches can always be carried by an enemy who is willing to mass sufficient men opposite the part of a line which he wishes to force, but such a success need not be more than temporary. The Germans were bringing up heavy reinforcements to meet the Allied attack of autumn, 1915, fairly early in the afternoon of the day on which it was begun, and one would have thought that, in spite of the "curtain of fire" which the Germans drew down between the northernmost French positions and the main defences of Verdun, stronger reinforcements might have been got to the front by at any rate the second day of the attack if they had really known that the attack was coming and in what strength it was being made. As it was, though the defenders, notably in Herbebois, put up a strong defence, it was not till the third day that a counter-attack was attempted in the Caures Wood, and even that was not in sufficient strength to affect very materially the fortunes of the battle. One is driven, therefore, to the conclusion that there was an element of surprise in the German attack, and that though the French may have known that it was probable, they were either ignorant of when it was likely or else completely under-estimated its strength and the vigour with which it would be delivered. Except on these suppositions, the successes of the attack in the first three days and the absence of vigorous countermeasures are not very easy to comprehend.

Secondly, to what causes are we to ascribe the failure of the defence later in the week, when there were all the indications of a rapid French collapse? The usual view of the battle is that the French in abandoning their outer works were acting on a preconceived plan, but the theory bears a somewhat suspicious resemblance to the theory of the previous summer which explained each fresh retirement of the Russians as a design to "lure


the enemy on." It is a little difficult to follow the reasons for the retirement of the French lines in the middle of the week, especially as by then one would have imagined that there must have been ample time to bring up strong reinforcements. One would have thought that the German advance though Brabant and Samogneux might have been made very dangerous with the French positions on the west bank of the river still intact. It is not very obvious either why, if Champneuville could be held with the assistance of the French troops on the west bank, Brabant and Samogneux should not have been held longer than they were. The explanation may be in the lay of the land, but on the other hand there is some slight evidence of confusion and vacillation at this time. It appeared from a statement published in the Matin in May, on what seemed to be official authority, that there were many rumours in circulation in Paris about the state of affairs at Verdun at this time which it was deemed worth while to contradict. The statement runs:-

"At no time during the Battle of Verdun has the High Command given orders for the retirement of the French troops on the left bank of the Meuse. On the contrary, as early as the morning of February 23rd General Langle de Cary issued orders to the troops on the right bank that the occupation of all points, even where outflanked, and of all 'islands' (isolated points), even those completely surrounded, must be maintained at all costs. There was only one password—'Hold on.'

"On the evening of the 24th General Joffre ordered the troops to stand firm on the front between the Meuse and Woevre, and by using every means available he ordered General Castelnau to proceed to Verdun. On the morning of the 25th General Castelnau confirmed by telephone to General Herr that in obedience to orders received from General Joffre the position on the right bank of the Meuse must be held, cost what it might. The same evening General Joffre sent General Pétain these orders: 'I yesterday ordered the troops to hold the left bank of the Meuse north of Verdun. Any general giving orders for retirement will be court-martialled.'"


It is certainly curious that General Joffre should have issued these orders. But, on the other hand, no other explanation may be necessary than the seriousness of the situation on Friday and Saturday. Undoubtedly, the position of the French armies was more serious at Verdun on those two days than it had been at any time since the Battle of Charleroi and the defeat at Morhange in Lorraine in the first month of the war.

The sudden improvement in the situation on Saturday afternoon was no doubt primarily due to the arrival of fresh troops at Verdun. But quite as important a cause may have been the arrival of General Pétain upon the scene. General Pétain was undoubtedly the hero of the defence. There is no certain evidence where he was in the early days of the attack, but certain it is that from the moment when we first hear of him in active command at Verdun the fortunes of the French began to improve.



President Poincaré inspecting reserve troops in the Meuse sector a few days before the German offensive against Verdun was begun.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]



A view from the French first-line trenches on the Verdun front. In the background a French shell is seen bursting over the German lines. [French Official Photograph.]

CHAPTER XXI.

THE ATTACK ON VERDUN.

(Continued.)

THE BEGINNING OF THE FLANK ATTACKS—THE FIGHTING AT VAUX—THE GERMAN ADVANCE ON THE LEFT BANK OF THE MEUSE—THE STRUGGLE FOR MORT HOMME—THE RENEWED FIGHTING AT DOUAUMONT—SUMMARY OF RESULTS.

T has been explained in the last chapter how the German advance in the direction of Douaumont was brought to a standstill. The Germans had attacked in the first instance on a very narrow front, and it had narrowed to a wedge a. it proceeded. To attempt to push the wedge further would only have broken the point. Nor was it possible to widen the front on the original plan of attack. The French were still in possession of their positions on the west bank, and kept up a galling fire on the German right flank. The loop of the Meuse was impassable for troops owing to the converging fire from Cumières and Bras, and not only were the Germans unable to deploy their right towards the river and so obtain a wider front, but they found themselves menaced by a formidable French pressure towards the rear of Douaumont, in the direction of Houdromont. They therefore, having failed to pierce the French centre, reluctantly decided to attempt a turning movement against the French wings, in the hope by these means either to find a new avenue of approach to Verdun or to loosen the French hold on their K3-VOL. IV.

flanks, and so enable the wedge to be pushed forward again.

The ideal way of attaining this object would have been by an advance across the Woevre, and they had already forced the French to draw in all their advanced posts in the Woevre and to fall back on the Heights of the Meuse, which rise sheer like a wall on the west side of the Woevre plain. The Germans at the end of the first week of the attack evidently had in their mind the familiar enveloping tactics which were to drive the defenders of Verdun into the arms of another army ready to enfold them from the south. If the French had been demoralised, as the Germans thought on the Saturday morning on which Douaumont was taken, this plan might conceivably have worked. But the new vigour which the French defence now took on vetoed it. Against determined opposition there could be no thought of winning the plateau from the plain of the Woevre. The Woevre at this time of the year is deep in mud, and it was impossible to move troops rapidly across it, or to bring up the heavy guns on this side. Moreover, though the French




Interrogating German prisoners taken on the Verdun front.

[French Official Photograph.



French officers examining a machine-gun captured from the Germans. [French Official Photograph.



West of the Meuse: A bird's-eye view.

in falling back to the Heights from their positions in the plain had sacrificed many hard-won gains, there was one to which they held fast. This was Les Eparges, a commanding bastion half-way between the northern French defences of Verdun and St. Mihiel. There was a half-hearted attack on Les Eparges towards the end of April, but the turning movement against the extreme right French flank was never formidable. The flank was too well secured by the line of the Meuse Heights.

THE ATTACKS ON VAUX.

The principal fighting on this flank was in the direction of Vaux, village and fort, both of which lie to the south-east of Douaumont, and make a shoulder of the Douaumont plateau towards the Woevre. The other shoulder, lying slightly north of east of Douaumont Fort, is Hardaumont.* The attacks on Vaux were very persistent, and in all the general assaults Vaux was usually the extreme left of the German efforts. The most dangerous attack was that in the second week of March. Vaux had been under fire from the beginning of the attack, but M. Gabriel, the Mayor, stayed in the village until the 29th, living in a cellar with his wife and three officials. The Germans were well round on the south side of Vaux, attacking Eix, which at one time was actually in their possession. A week later Fresnes, between Manheulles and Eparges, was carried, but this was the limit of the advance on the south side of Vaux. Meanwhile, there had been heavy fighting at Vaux itself. The first infantry attack, made on March 3rd, was repelled with heavy losses. A more determined attack followed five days later, and was directed against the French lines between Vaux and Douaumont. Hardaumont fell after obstinate fighting, and on the following day (March 9th) the official German report announced that both the village and the fort of Vaux had been carried. "To the east of the river," ran the report, "in order to shorten the connections between our positions to the south of Douaumont and the lines

in the Woevre district, the village and the armoured fort of Vaux, with numerous adjoining fortified positions of the enemy, were captured in a glorious night-attack, after thorough artillery preparation, by the Posen Reserve Regiments Nos. 6 and 12, under the leadership of the commander of the Ninth Reserve Division of Infantry, General von Guretzky-Cornitz." Despite the detail, the report was grossly inaccurate. Vaux Fort remained in the hands of the French, and though Vaux village was entered by the enemy, he was quickly expelled. mistake can hardly have been made by pure accident, nor can it be supposed that the Germans would put out a false statement which they knew would be instantly The explanation of these repeated inaccontradicted. curacies is rather a psychological one. They show the Headquarters Staff in a mood of impatience, anxious to quicken the march of events, and confusing, as men will, their own desires with accomplished facts. These attacks on Vaux were very costly to the Germans; the word "glorious" used in German reports always means that the casualties were very heavy. The result of three days' heavy fighting was that the French lost Hardaumont, but held the ravine between Vaux and Douaumont.

THE COUNTRY WEST OF THE MEUSE.

The attacks on Vaux were renewed later, but mean-while there had been terrible fighting on the west bank of the Meuse, and it is now time to make our way across the river to the new field of battle of which nothing as yet has been seen. The general line of the crests on the Verdun plateau is not due east and west, but rather from south-west to north-east. Consequently, the high ground on the west bank is always somewhat more to the south than its continuation on the east bank. Thus, for example, the series of heights on the east bank on which stood the positions of Consenvoye and Brabant, which were the first to feel the German attack, are continued on the west bank through Forges, Bethincourt, and Malancourt. The heights of Mort Homme, again, run north-easterly towards Samogneux. Avocourt, Esnes,

^{*} To be distinguished from Houdromont on the west side. K_3 *-VOL. IV.



On the outskirts of the village of Vaux.

[French Official Photograph.



A French artillery observation post: Looking out over the German lines in the Verdun region. $[French\ Official\ Photograph.$

and Chattancourt have as their continuation on the east bank the Côte du Talou and the Côte du Poivre on the west, and the Douaumont Ridge on the east bank is continued on the west by the Montzéville and Charny Ridge. It will be seen that in order to bring themselves level on the west bank with the position which they had already won on the east by capturing the Douaumont plateau, the Germans would have to capture not one but three successive positions—first, Forges to Malancourt; second, Mort Homme; and thirdly, Chattancourt. And even at Chattancourt they would be level not with the Douaumont Ridge but with the Côte du Poivre, and to reach the western extension across the river of the French positions on Douaumont they would need at least to gain a footing on the Charny Ridge. That the Germans, after establishing themselves on Douaumont, which is the dominating hill on the east bank, should begin the whole task over again on the west bank under circumstances far more difficult is sufficient proof not only that the first attack had worked itself to a standstill, but also that the German position on Douaumont was regarded as dangerous to the holders.

Opposite Brabant the Meuse is joined by a stream which takes its name from the village of Forges. The stream comes down a narrow valley which runs all the way from Malancourt to the Meuse, and on the north side of this valley are the heights which formed the extreme northern extension of the defences of Verdun west of the Meuse. The distance from Malancourt to the Meuse will be about eight miles. At Malancourt there is a very extensive wood, which closes the end of the Forges Valley and stretches away on the south side through the Avocourt Wood as far as Avocourt village. At the foot of these wooded slopes in which the Forges brook rises is the village of Haucourt, flanked on the north side by Hill 285, and on the south by Hill 287 and the commanding mass of Hill 304. East of Hill 304, and separated from it by a narrow ravine, is Dead Man Hill, or Mort Homme, a group of hills of which Hill 295 and Hill 285 are the chief summits, and below Mort Homme, in the valley of the Forges, is the village of Bethincourt. On the south side of the Forges Brook the Mort Homme is continued by two wooded ridges, known as the Bois des Corbeaux (Crows' Wood) and the Cumières Wood, as far as the Côte de l'Oie (Goose Hill), which overlooks the village of Regneville, on the west bank of the Meuse, opposite Samogneux. Over against Goose Hill and on the far side of Forges village is the Forges Wood, which covers the west bank of the Meuse opposite Consenvoye. The ridge north of the Forges Valley from Malancourt to the Bois des Forges made the first line of the French defence on the west bank of the Meuse. The ridge on the south side of Forges Brook, comprising Hill 304, Dead Man, Crows' Wood, and Goose Hill, made the second line.

THE CAPTURE OF GOOSE HILL.

The capture of Forges Wood gave the Germans comparatively little trouble, and was complete by the end of the first week in March. Again they followed their usual tactics of concentrating a very violent artillery fire on a narrow front, and the whole of the French line north of the Forges Brook east of Bethincourt fell into their hands. Regneville and the marshy land where the Forges Brook joins the Meuse, which in March was running very high, were also lost, and the Germans also claimed the capture of fifty-eight officers and more than 3,000 men, besides cannon and war material. It was a considerable success, and it did not end there, for

the Germans crossed the Forges Valley and effected a lodgment in Crows' Wood. The possession of this wood was extremely important, for its cover enabled the Germans to effect concentration of men and artillery which threatened the security of Goose Hill. The evacuation of these positions by the French can hardly have been voluntary, and it was perhaps unwise of their commentators to pretend that they were of no military importance. They were, on the contrary, of the highest importance. The Germans stated that the object of their attacks was "to improve the connection with our new lines on the right bank of the Meuse, on the southern slopes of the Talou Hill, on the Poivre Ridge, and the Douaumont positions." The occupation of Regneville and Crows' Wood did not contribute much to that object, for though Regneville joined up the German lines at Samogneux with the ground now gained west of the river, the enemy on this bank was still far enough away from the Douaumont plateau. So long as Dead Man and Cumières remained in the hands of the French it was impossible to give any assistance in the operations from the west bank of the river. The Germans, however, had begun well, and at this time they certainly had no conception of the trouble they were going to have before the Dead Man Hill would be theirs.

On March 8th, the French delivered a strong counterattack against the German positions in Crows' Wood, and recovered most of the ground which they had lost in it. The Germans, however, retained their hold on the eastern end, and after an unsuccessful attack on March 9th they again gained possession of most of the wood on the 10th. On this day, if they had not already done so, the French also lost control of Goose Hill, and their position on the west bank now ran from Bethincourt, through Crows' Wood and Cumières Wood, to Cumières village. The Germans, however, found it impossible to advance up the Meuse owing to the obstinate resistance which the French positions on Mort Homme enabled them to keep up on the southern fringes of Cumières Wood. They were not anxious to deliver a formal attack on Mort Homme, and their first idea evidently was that a narrow turning movement on the east by Vaux and on the west through Forges would give them the results that they desired. The obstinate resistance of the French in the direction of Cumières, and the heavy losses incurred in the attack on Vaux, already mentioned, undeceived them. They now saw that if they were to get any benefit from the turning movement on the west the scope of the operations would have to be greatly extended. Unable to debouch from Crows' Wood, they turned their attention to the Bethincourt side of Mort Homme. On March 14th they secured a footing in the French lines, between Bethincourt and Mort Homme, and on the following day they delivered their first formal attack on Mort Homme. The Germans claimed that this attack gave them possession of Mort Homme, which ever afterwards they spoke of as in their possession. In fact, they do not seem to have done more than gain a somewhat precarious hold on the lower slopes of the hill. A day or two later they gained possession of one of the summits-295-of Mort Homme, but the whole hill was not to be theirs until more than a month later. The first attack on Mort Homme was followed by another on Vaux, which had no better success than the first.

THE FIGHTING IN AVOCOURT WOOD.

The Germans accordingly extended their turning movement still further to the west. They had come to




A store of big shells behind the Verdun front

[French Official Photograph.



Another reservoir of shells for the French artillery. $[French\ Official\ Photograph.$



From Mort Homme to Vaux.

a standstill on the west bank, much as they had done on the east bank, and just as they crossed the river in the hope of releasing their wedge so now they began an attack on the section of the French front west of Bethincourt, which up to now they had left alone. The drawback to the tactics of overwhelming artillery concentration on a very narrow front were now becoming apparent. It certainly enabled the attack to drive a wedge into the enemy's lines, but against elaborately fortified defences like those of the French at Verdun the attack tended to jam very soon, owing to the resistance of the enemy's positions on his flank. The new attack began on March 20th. The French lines through Malancourt made a great salient, running from the Cheppy Wood on the west and curving round through Malancourt, in front of Haucourt, to the western slopes of Hill 304. A fresh division was brought up, and a very violent attack, accompanied by jets of flaming liquid, was delivered on the sector between Avocourt and Malancourt. It failed to break the French line, but the eastern end of Malancourt Wood was entered, and next day the attackers "filtered through" into the Avocourt Wood. From cover of the wood the Germans began to bombard Esnes. The Germans claimed in this attack, which was carried through by Bavarians and Wurtemburg Landwehr, to have captured over 2,500 French prisoners, in addition to thirty-two officers. The French, however, continued to hold on to Malancourt and Haucourt, and with Hill 304 in their hands it was impossible for the Germans to force through so narrow a gap. The German attacks on Malancourt were continued to the end of the month, but without gaining further success, and were particularly violent on the front about three-quarters of a mile wide between Haucourt and Malancourt. At the end of the month the French recovered a considerable portion of the south-eastern corner of Avocourt Wood, but the Germans, on the other hand, got a footing on the outskirts of Malancourt. The beginning of April was marked by renewed efforts of the Germans all along the front. They entered Malancourt on April 1st, on April 7th were in K3**-VOL. IV.

Haucourt, and on the following day effected a lodgment in the trenches near Bethincourt. In consequence, the French found it necessary to abandon Bethincourt. The salient was now gone, and there were no French troops north of the Forges Brook. Moreover, the two ends of their second line south of the brook, the Avocourt Wood on the west and Goose Hill on the east, were in German hands. Of the two principal summits of the Mort Homme group of hills, 265 was still German and 295 French. Hill 304 remained wholly French.

These successes were by no means unimportant, and they had been won by very hard fighting. But the Germans must have been terribly disappointed by the slowness of their progress. It had taken them from the beginning of March to the end of the first week in April to reduce the first French line on the west bank and to gain the two ends of their second line. All their calculations had been disappointed. They had thought that the capture of Goose Hill alone would enable them to use the Meuse avenue of approach, and they found themselves still held up by the obstinate French resistance on Mort Homme. Driven to a further turning movement, they fought for nearly a fortnight on the Malancourt and Haucourt front, only to find that advance in this direction too was barred by Hill 304, and that the breach they had made in the French defences at this end was far too narrow to allow them to get round. The quarrels on the Headquarters Staff at this time must have been very lively. It is probable that there was a faction which objected to the Verdun enterprise altogether, and as the operations lengthened, and the demands on the other fronts for men and munitions became more exacting, its criticism of the whole business would grow more and more strong. In addition, there is some evidence of divided counsels and of successive disappointments in the operations on the west bank of the Meuse. It must be remembered that in attacking west of the Meuse the hope of the enemy was not so much to find a way round to Verdun as to enable them to drive their wedge at Douaumont further. A glance at the map will show



General Cadorna on a visit to the Verdun front

[French Official Photograph.



General Cadorna and (behind) General Joffre inspecting French troops in the Verdun region.

[French Official Photograph.

that at Haucourt and Malancourt, and even on Hill 265 of the Mort Homme, they were much further from Verdun than they were at Douaumont Fort. At Vaux the Germans were nearer still, for the breaking of the defences at this point meant that only one line remained between them and Verdun itself, namely, the Côte de Froide Terre and the Belleville Ridge, three-quarters of a mile from the town

While these operations were in progress on the west bank of the Meuse the Germans did not abandon their efforts between Douaumont and Vaux. There was a heavy attack on Vaux on March 17th, which coincided in time with the German occupation of Hill 265; and, again, the first week in April, which saw the Germans in possession of Malancourt and Haucourt, also saw very determined German attacks near Vaux. The eastern part of Vaux village had been in possession of the Germans since March 9th, but on March 31st they carried the western end, and on the following day penetrated the Caillette Wood. A vigorous counter-attack by the French on April 2nd enabled them to recover the western end of Vaux, and to drive the enemy back to the northern fringes of the wood.

THE FIGHTING IN APRIL.

The next month saw no new development. There was an attack which was not pressed on Les Eparges on April 19th, but for the rest the Germans were content to ring the changes on the old themes. On April 9th the French still held, though precariously, the southern bank of the Forges Brook between Bethincourt and Haucourt. A month later they had lost this bank, and their line ran in front of Hill 287 and Hill 304 to Mort Homme, where the Germans held the 265 summit and the French the 295. The Germans, on April 11th, captured a trench on Hill 295, only to lose it again; and later the French began to work their way round the two flanks of Hill 265. East of Mort Homme the Germans, at the beginning of April, had a salient in the Caurettes Wood; a month later, as a result of fighting at the end of April, this salient had been reduced in size. Cumières Wood still remained, at any rate on its southern edges, in the possession of the French, and Cumières still prevented the Germans from using the valley of the Meuse. The east banks of the river, between the Côte du Talou and Bras, were still at the end of the first week of May a no man's land, and further east the French still held on obstinately to the lower slopes of the Côte du Poivre, although the Germans during the month had been at some trouble to clear the district. The French salient, which followed the direction of the Pepper Hill ridge towards Houdromont, was the cause of much anxiety to the Germans, for it enabled the French to threaten their flank on Douaumont. In the middle of April two Saxon divisions attacked the French positions on this salient about half a mile south of Houdromont Farm, and captured more than a thousand French prisoners; but no permanent advantage resulted, and by the end of the month the French were again extending their lines in this direction. Slow but steady progress was also made by the French south of Douaumont, and on May 3rd they gained some 500 yards of German trenches south-east of Douaumont Fort. The German wedge in the ravine between Douaumont and Vaux still held its position, but could not be driven further. In so far as the month saw any change it was (except on the extreme left) to the advantage of the French, and this must have been the greater disappointment to the Germans, as

the first general attack on Verdun took place on April 9th, and at this time they were evidently full of hope that their long and costly preparations were about to yield them some positive results besides barren gains of ground. At the beginning of May the attacks seemed to have been brought to a standstill, and it was very generally imagined in this country that the Germans would not persist further in an enterprise which was so uncertain in its event and so ruinous to their chances of success in other fields. The Germans must have repeatedly discussed whether it was not wiser to abandon an enterprise which had disappointed their expectations so grievously, but the view which regarded the west as the side from which danger was most to be feared prevailed. Moreover, the longer the attacks lasted the more difficult it became to discontinue them without an open confession of failure that would have been hardly less disastrous than a decisive defeat in the field.

THE FIGHTING ON MORT HOMME.

Accordingly, the Germans decided to redouble their efforts, and, despairing of accomplishing decisive results at Vaux, they once more turned to Mort Homme. Hill 304, which was the key to Mort Homme on the west, was subjected to a fierce bombardment with shells of heavy calibre and asphyxiating gas. At the same time a concentrated bombardment was opened of the French lines on the Cumières side of Mort Homme. The bombardment completely destroyed the French trenches on the northern slopes of Hill 304; indeed, it almost seemed as though Hill 304 was to share the fate of Hill 60, near Ypres, and to disappear entirely in the storm of shells. But though the French were driven away from the northern slopes of 304, their own artillery kept up so fine a reply that the Germans could not launch an infantry attack except in the neighbourhood of Hill 287, where they were repulsed at the point of the bayonet. The Germans continued their attack on the following day, and "the heroic Pomeranian Regiment" effected a lodgment on Hill 304, and even, according to the German account, pushed forward towards the summit. The use of the word "heroic" in the German report here, as usually where it was employed, doubtless meant that very few survived; dead heroes are more numerous than living. The Germans also claimed the capture of forty officers and 1,280 unwounded men. But whatever ground was won it was not permanently retained. Nor was a German attack later on Hill 287 more successful. Meanwhile, there had been heavy fighting near Thiaumont Farm, south-west of Douaumont Fort, but here, too, the Germans, after winning early successes, were counter-attacked and compelled to relinquish most of their gains. For ten days the fighting smouldered, springing up into flame now in the Vaux ravine, where the Germans had a wedge in the French lines; now between Douaumont and the Côte du Poivre, where the French had a wedge in the German lines towards Houdromont; now south of Douaumont, near the Thiaumont Farm; and again, west of the Meuse, on the slopes of 287 and 304, on 295 and the Caurettes Wood, and in front of Cumières. No decisive result was reached, nor could it even be said that one side or the other had the advantage. If the Germans made slight gains near Mort Homme, thesewere counterbalanced by French gains towards Houdromont.

On Saturday, May 20th, the crisis came. The bombardment of Mort Homme, which had been growing




A train of motor transport wagons on the road to the Verdun front. [French Official Photograph.



A main road on the outskirts of Verdun.

[French Official Photograph.



The stages of the attack.

[After a German map (corrected).

in intensity for thirty-six hours, reached its height about noon on Saturday, and shortly afterwards the Germans began their infantry attack. Whether the French were on the crest of the hill at this time is somewhat doubtful; it had been for weeks under artillery fire, and it is doubtful whether anything could have lived through it. More probably the French defence was just below the crest on the south side, with its wings extended round the flanks of the hill towards Hill 265. It was on these flanks that the German attack was directed. On the north-east side the attack failed completely, but on the other flank it was more successful. It swept not over the crest but round the side of the hill, and threatening the rear of the defenders forced them to retire. Had the summit of Hill 304 been still held by the French this manœuvre should not have been possible; but the bombardments of the last fortnight had probably wrecked the French gun positions on the summit and made of the whole hill a tumbled mass of craters. As a result of these attacks the French lost control of the summit of Hill 295, as they had previously done of 265, and Mort Homme was no longer part of the defence. But neither did it pass into the hands of the enemy. The summit was tenable by neither side, and as the French held the lower slopes on the south side both attackers and defenders had to keep it under constant bombardment-the attackers lest the French should seize the summit again and launch an attack from it, and the French to prevent the Germans from doing the same and mounting guns upon it.

THE RECAPTURE AND LOSS OF DOUAUMONT.

No fewer than five divisions were used by the Germans in these attacks on Mort Homme, and the heavy concentration of troops on the west bank inspired General Pétain with the hope that he might break the German centre at Douaumont and so make all the enemy's gains on the west of no account. For the main hope of the Germans in beginning these attacks


on the west bank had been to secure their right flank on the Douaumont plateau, and in particular to eject the French from their positions on the Côte du Poivre by opening up a line of attack through Vacherauville. General Nivelle, who was in command of the defence of Verdun (General Pétain having been appointed to the general command of the French army in Champagne), had for many days been preparing his counterstroke. The blow fell on the Sunday after the Saturday on which the French had been driven off Mort Homme, when the Germans were still exhausted with their effort.

"The artillery preparation of the attack began on Sunday. The heaviest of the French new artillery directed the main stream of high explosives upon the Fort of Douaumont, the defences of which had to a certain extent been restored by the enemy. At the moment chosen for the assault, half-past four, the French guns lengthened their fuses, prepared to accompany the infantry in its dash towards the German lines, and increased the density of the shell curtain cutting off the German advanced lines from their supports.

"Douaumont is one of those positions which exacts respect. Just as the Germans, when they stormed upon it in February, devoted to its capture the pick of Prussia's troops, so the French brought into action against it some of the finest fighters of France, who had been undergoing a stiff preparation in the rear for some time past. They broke from their trenches, singing the 'Marseillaise,' and dashed up the slopes of Hill 388 filled with the spirit of victory.


"They met with a resistance worthy of their steel. The French lines to the south were only about 350 yards distant from the entrance to the fort, but, despite the fury of the preliminary bombardment, the German defence remained formidable, and it was half-past five before the first triumphant Frenchmen reached the fort from the southern and western glacis.

"An hour to cover 350 yards seems slow going, but the feature of the assault was the remarkable rapidity with which it was effected. Before the fort itself the Germans had dug themselves deep in two lines of trenches, on the defence of which their engineers had lavished science and material. On the centre the first line



A 155 mm. gun In position on the Verdun front.

[French Official Photograph.



A 220 mm. howitzer in position on the Verdun front. [French Official Photograph.



Staff officers inspecting trenches on the Verdun front.

[French Official Photograph.

of these trenches was reached inside a quarter of an hour. The occupants were bayoneted or made prisoners, and the trench line 'cleaned up' in about half an hour. Wave after wave of men, without waiting almost to take breath, streamed out towards the second line of the trenches of the enemy. Here the resistance was more serious.

"Twice the assailants were driven back from the tangled destruction of barbed wire before this second position. Then the waiting French reinforcements were ordered out. They went at the German line with a dash that carried all before it, and moved on up to the fort itself, where by this time the admirably co-ordinated movement from west, south, and east was converging. The troops from the west and the south—that is, from Thiaumont Farm and the southern slopes of Hill 388, which bears Fort Douaumont—reached their objective about the same time. The columns from the east had met with stronger resistance, and their advance from the Caillette Wood had been delayed.

It looked at one moment as though the whole position would be surrounded, so rapid was progress made by the Western and Southern Advance. Indeed, many of the defenders of the main point of the fort were cut off from the west before they were able to retire. They were caught between the flanking and frontal attacks.

"The fort itself was ruined, but its garrison put up a determined defence in every corner and cellar of the position. With bayonet and grenade the French drove the enemy back towards the north-eastern corner, where the Germans made a successful stand."*

At this moment the Germans were actually in a worse position before Douaumont than they had been

* The Times Paris Correspondent.

at the end of the first week of the attack. True, they had just, after two months' terrible fighting, driven the French off Mort Homme, but this was an empty victory; Douaumont was lost. The victory of General Nivelle had undone the work of two months, and the Germans must have been furious with disappointment. Two fresh Bavarian Divisions were at once thrown into the attack, while a strong body of Germans still held out in the north-eastern corner of the fort. The Bavarians fought with the reckless enthusiasm that distinguished them in the war, and made them ideal leaders of a forlorn hope. After the French had been in possession of the fort for two days their hold on it was relaxed, mainly by the driving in of their wings, which uncovered the fort to attack from the flanks. But they held on to the plateau of Douaumont, not far from the fort; and though the prospects for the French were less brilliant after the Germans had recaptured Douaumont, they were incomparably better than anyone would have thought possible had he been told in the first week of the attack that the German efforts to capture Verdun would continue for three months and more.

THE LOSSES IN THE FIGHTING.

Here the narrative of the attack must pause, for though the capture of Mort Homme failed to give the results for which the Germans had hoped it does definitely mark the end of the second phase of the



the French soldiers are brought back from the trenches: Alighting from a motor wagon on returning from the firing line at Verdun.

[French Official Photograph.]



Serving out soup to the troops in the Meuse sector. [French Official Photograph.

attack. The first phase, described in the last chapter, ended with the German failure to advance beyond the Douaumont Fort. The second phase comprises the German attempts to turn the two flanks. The attempt on the east, through Vaux, had broken down completely; the attempt west of the Meuse had driven the French from most of their second line of defence. These were not brilliant results for three months' fighting of such intense bitterness, and though the French army felt the strain severely neither it nor the French people ever doubted the result. There is nothing in the military history of any country that excels in its splendid obstinacy the French resistance at Verdun.

In these first three months the Germans employed at least thirty-five divisions, or 700,000 men, against Verdun; that is to say, broadly speaking, one-third of their whole forces in the west were directed against a front which cannot have exceeded twenty miles in width; another third was ranged against the British, and the remaining third was along the rest of the frontier. With the doubtful exception of two Bavarian Divisions said to have been withdrawn from reserve near Arras, there is no evidence of any weakening of the forces opposing the British; and apart from the taking over of a portion of the French lines mentioned in the last chapter but one (page 231), the chief service of the British army to the defence of Verdun was that it pinned down a large part of the German army of the west which otherwise might have been employed against Verdun, or in making dangerous attacks against weakened portions of the French line. The continued inactivity of the British army at this time was a great disappointment to many Englishmen, but it had its reasons, and the French command was in the fullest sympathy with them.

The losses during this fighting were undoubtedly exaggerated by contemporary estimate. Desperate as it was, it must be remembered that it took place on a very narrow front, and the fact that it was all visible made the carnage seem greater than in battles with a wider extension. Moreover, though the proportion of

killed is greater under artillery, it is the bullet after all, whether from rifle or machine-gun, which makes the longest casualty lists. Nor again should we attribute to the German commanders reckless extravagance of lives in their armies; on the contrary, there is some sign that they had thought out their tactics carefully with the single idea of saving the lives of their men as far as possible. But when all these allowances have been made, it still remains probable that the Verdun operations used up human life at a faster rate than any operations of the war, with the exception of the first attacks on Ypres, and possibly of some of the Russian battles. Colonel Feyler, a Swis, critic, who as a neutral has good sources of information about the enemy, declares that the losses in some of the German attacks were carried to a point which no troops, however good, will stand. He quotes the case of a German unit "which attacked from the first brilliantly, was withdrawn from the front and re-formed, then returned to action, and fought with equal gallantry a second time. It was again withdrawn and re-formed, and then sent into action once more; but on this third occasion a great difference was noticed, and the troops showed a strong repugnance to leaving their trenches at all." He makes the further statement, obtained from Germany (by means which he does not disclose), that "a fairly large number of men have been court-martialled and imprisoned for refusing to advance on Verdun. The Flanders battle of October, 1914, produced the same frame of mind."

Colonel Feyler's estimate of the German casualties at Verdun in the three months is 300,000 men; more conservative estimates have put them at 250,000, which is not greatly in excess of the numbers who fell in Flanders in a very much shorter time in the autumn of 1914. In spite of the number of French prisoners taken (which on the German figures mounted up to 50,000), there is reason to believe that the French casualties were considerably less than the Germans, though the difference is probably much less than is commonly supposed.




The British transport "Norseman" sunk near Salonika

[Central News.



Admiral de Robeck and Commodore Keyes questioning officers on board the "Norseman" soon after she had grounded.

[Central News.]



The forepart of the torpedoed "Sussex" waiting to be repaired in a British harbour.

[Photopress.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE SUBMARINE WAR AND THE AMERICAN ULTIMATUM.

THE SUBMARINE WAR IN THE SUMMER OF 1915: TRANSFERENCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN—THE "ANCONA" CASE—GERMANY AND ARMED MERCHANT VESSELS—A NEW AND INTENSIFIED CAMPAIGN—THE "SUSSEX" AND OTHER CASES—AMERICAN ULTIMATUM AND THE RESULT.

ERMANY'S submarine campaign against merchant shipping was, from her point of view, a promising experiment, the success of which was always threatened from two sides. It aimed originally at cutting off the British Isles from overseas supplies. At the beginning of 1915 Admiral von Tirpitz had declared "We can torpedo every British or Allied ship that approaches British or Scottish ports, and thereby cut off the greater part of Great Britain's imports of food-stuffs." In the first place, therefore, the Germans had to reckon with the counter-measures of the British Admiralty. But the more effectual these counter-measures became, the more difficult became the task and the greater was the risk run by the German submarines; the greater the pressure on them, therefore, to make their campaign successful by a reckless and ruthless use of their weapon.

It was, however, impossible that they should so act without great injury to neutral interests, and the second obstacle in the way of their success was precisely the possibility that their policy would eventually bring the United States—for the United States was almost the only neutral that counted in this matter—into the war against them.

This is really an epitome of the submarine war. The work of the British Admiralty was so effectual that

Germany was driven to extend the range of her campaign. Now and again she would give a pledge to submit to certain restrictions. But restrictions meant failure in her main object, therefore her pledges were broken. She discovered that the merchant shipping of the world was much more one than she had supposed, and that, while she succeeded in destroying a small percentage of British shipping, she was only making more valuable the services performed by large numbers of neutral vessels for the Allies. Her naval staff pressed therefore for indiscriminate warfare on shipping, both belligerent and neutral, as being the only means of dealing a really serious—as they hoped, a deadly—blow at England. And this brought them back to the old dilemma, towards which they had been steadily drifting since the opening of the campaign in February, 1915—whether they would not have to face the question of war with the United States and any other neutral Powers which might be caught by so infectious an example, and what answer they should make to the question when a final answer could no longer be avoided.

THE FIRST CONCESSIONS.

Each of the chief phases of the German campaign has been heralded by confident prophecies from the naval chiefs and closed by some form of concession or surrender,

accompanied by the admission that the prospects of success had always been over-estimated. The first period of six months in 1915—having shown results that Captain Persius, the most sober of the German naval critics, had described as "very modest"-was followed by certain concessions to the United States which arose out of the sinking of the Lusitania. These concessions, which have been discussed in detail in an earlier chapter (Vol. III., Chap. XXI.), may be briefly summarised here, so as to make clear the course of German policy in the autumn of 1915 and the spring of 1916. Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, stated that his instructions from Berlin were that "liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without ensuring the safety of the lives of non-combatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." This was a very limited undertaking, but the text of the pledge as issued by the German Foreign Secretary was even less satisfactory, for it said only that "opportunity for the safety of the passengers and crew" would be given—a much more disputable phrase than that of Count Bernstorff. None of these promises applied to other vessels than liners, and even liners might be sunk with all on board if they tried—that is to say, if the Germans chose to say that they tried-to escape or to offer resistance.

THE MEDITERRANEAN.

Little hampered by this pledge, but much more by the British counter-war about the Narrow Seas, Germany decided to transfer the centre of her submarine activity in the winter of 1915 to the Mediterranean. She had a number of good reasons for this. The dangers were much less. The Mediterranean was comparatively free from the anti-submarine devices with which the North Sea and adjacent waters swarmed, nor was it practicable that the British Admiralty should be able to repeat its measures on an equal scale. The Mediterranean was, of course, the special province of France and Italy, so far as naval forces were concerned, and something would undoubtedly be done by them; how much, the Germans were prepared to discover by putting matters to the test. Then again, the Mediterranean, with its long coast-lines and its many islands, presented great opportunities for the planting of submarine bases. The coast of Asia Minor (or of Greece) could not be policed like that of Scotland or of Ireland.

Most of all, Germany would draw advantage from the presence of her ally Austria in the Mediterranean. Austria at least had submitted to no restrictions under American pressure, and there was no reason why, if Austria had not enough submarines of her own, Germany should not lend her some for the time being. It is true that a campaign against Allied shipping in the Mediterranean was an extension of the original objects of Von Tirpitz's policy, though many British ships might be attacked there while trading between home ports and the East. But the extension was deliberate. Von Tirpitz was more and more hardening in the conviction that it was not possible to discriminate between liners and freight-ships; between British and neutrals; between ships in one sea and ships in another. Liners can be converted; neutrals will carry goods where it pays them; routes can be changed. He was coming to believe that all free shipping, wherever it could be got at, must be treated as a reserve which would be used more and more, as time went on (and as more ships were sunk), for the benefit of the Allies, and especially of England. The warfare

in the Mediterranean was only a stage on the way to the full programme of indiscriminate attack which he was to press forward in the coming spring.

THE "ANCONA."

At the end of October it was known that German submarines had passed through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean. On November 7th, a large Italian liner, the Ancona, bound from Naples to New York, was sunk between Sardinia and the African coast. She had nearly 600 souls on board, of whom a number were Americans. On the appearance of the submarine, an Austrian boat, the Ancona attempted to escape, and was pursued and shelled. A panic broke out on board. After a short time the captain of the Ancona stopped his engines, and the submarine, approaching, gave a short period of respite for the escape of the passengers and The evidence was that nevertheless she continued to fire shells, although there was a conflict of view as to whether she was firing at the liner or round and about her, apparently with the object of quickening the movements of the panic-stricken crowd. What is not disputed is that eventually, there still being many persons on board the ship, the submarine discharged a torpedo at her and disappeared, leaving her to sink.

The Austrian Admiralty defended this atrocity, which was as gross as any in the whole of the submarine war, on the not unfamiliar plea of military necessity. "After some fifty minutes the U boat was obliged to submerge before a quickly approaching vessel, and she torpedoed the steamer, which, after a further forty-five minutes sank." Nearly 200 lives were lost. Thus, according to the Austrian Government, the position was not that a ship must only be sunk if the safety of non-combatants had been secured, but that non-combatants would only be saved if the attacking submarine were not "obliged" to sink their ship by the approach of some other vessel.

The Austrian Government had not at this time accepted the conditions of the German pledge of September, but the case of the Ancona illustrates the ease with which either Germany or Austria could fulfil the letter while evading the spirit of all such undertakings as that to give "opportunity for the safety of passengers and crew." What is an "opportunity?" The Austrian Admiralty officially declared that "ample time and means" were allowed by the submarine for saving those on board the Ancona, and that only the negligence of the passengers and the commander of the crew led to loss of life. Similar excuses might easily have been discovered for every occasion. The truth was that any formula which would satisfy the demands of humanity and of international law would have very seriously diminished the destructive effects of the submarine warfare. This had, in effect, been President Wilson's contention in his first Note, when he said that it was "practically impossible" to use submarines in the war of commerce without violating the rules of humanity.

THE AMERICAN PROTEST.

Mr. Wilson took up the case of the Ancona, and addressed the offending Government with that additional touch of severity which he appeared to reserve for Austria, and of which an earlier manifestation had been given in the demand for the recall of Dr. Dumba, the Austrian Ambassador at Washington. Mr. Wilson curtly cited his conclusions as to the facts of the attack, which, he said, were based on "reliable information," but without giving the evidence in detail. He went on to assume

that Austria had acted in full knowledge of the documents that had passed in the recent controversy with Germany:

"The Austro-Hungarian Government had been advised through the correspondence which had passed between the United States and Germany of the attitude of the Government of the United States as to the use of submarines in attacking vessels of commerce, and of the acquiescence of Germany in that attitude. Yet, with full knowledge on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government of the views of the Government of the United States, as expressed in no uncertain terms to the Ally of Austria-Hungary, the commander of the submarine which attacked the Ancona failed to put in a place of safety the crew and passengers of the vessel which he purposed to destroy, because, it is presumed, of the impossibility of taking it into port as a prize of war.

" The Government of the United States considers that the commander violated the principles of international law and humanity by shelling and torpedoing the Ancona before the persons aboard had been put in a place of safety or even given sufficient time to leave the vessel. The conduct of the commander can only be characterised as a wanton slaughter of defenceless noncombatants, since at the time when the vessel was shelled and torpedoed she was not, it appears, resisting or attempting to escape, and no other reason is sufficient excuse for such an attack, not even the possibility of rescue."

Mr. Wilson asked that Austria should denounce the sinking of the Ancona as "illegal and indefensible," and should punish the officer responsible. The Austrian Govern-

ment, in its reply, bettered anything that Germany herself had done in the way of frivolous procrastination. It demanded, in effect, that Mr. Wilson should treat the whole question as though it had no history. He must set out his evidence; he must present the judicial arguments for his demands; he must understand that the Austrian Government "in no way possesses a knowledge of all the correspondence" between the United States and Germany; he must tabulate the "individual legal maxims" which the submarine commander was supposed to have violated, and so on. Austria was only "in principle prepared to enter into an exchange of opinion."

To the fulfilment of all these formalities the Austrian diplomatists would no doubt have been entitled in any

of the controversies of peace. But her object now was merely to use the formalities in order to gain time for further outrages. It was already mid-December, and the case of the *Ancona* had been followed by others almost as bad. Mr. Wilson declined to accept the Austrian invitation to a prolonged discussion. He replied briefly pointing out that the submarine commander admitted he had torpedoed the *Ancona* while passengers were still on board, and remarking that he saw no necessity to furnish other evidence or to discuss the accepted principles of law and of humanity. The Austrian Government promptly surrendered. Its final note is an interesting example of the cynical manner in which both Germany and



The Kaiser and Von Tirpitz on board a German man-of-war. $[Record\ Press.]$

during the submarine controversies, and of their contempt for the public opinion of the world. The Austrian Admiralty had officially explained that the submarine commander torpedoed the Ancona because another vessel, possibly hostile, had appeared on the scene; the Austrian Foreign Office now declared that the commander had decided, after waiting forty-five minutes, to torpedo the Ancona "in such a manner that it ought to remain afloat for a still longer time, in order to give sufficient opportunity for the people still on board to save themselves." How ever, for his errors in misjudgment, whatever they were. he should be punished:-

Austria treated the

questions raised

"While fully appreciating the attitude of the commander,

who had in view the rescue of the passengers and crew, the Austro-Hungarian naval authorities concluded that he apparently neglected to take sufficiently into consideration the panic among the passengers, which rendered disembarkation more difficult, and the spirit of the regulations that Austro-Hungarian naval officers should refuse assistance to no one in distress, even if they are enemies. The officer was therefore punished for violating the instructions embodied in the rules in force for such cases."

THE MEDITERRANEAN PLEDGE.

The supposed punishment of the officer on such grounds would have been a poor victory for the United States had it not been accompanied by a declaration of Austria's assent to the principle that "enemy private vessels"

should not be destroyed until those on board had been placed in a position of safety. Everything, of course, depended on the way in which this pledge was carried out, but in theory at any rate it was an advance on the German pledge of the autumn, which referred only to passenger ships.

About the same time Germany gave a like undertaking, for the sinking of the Ancona had been followed by a number of incidents, also in the Mediterranean, which had led Mr. Wilson to ask Austria's allies whether they agreed with her declarations as to submarine warfare in the Mediterranean. The worst of these incidents was the sinking of the Persia, which took place at the end of December. The Persia was a P. & O. boat of 8,000 tons, sailing between London and Bombay. She was torpedoed without warning some forty miles from the eastern end of Crete, and sank in five minutes. Over 300 lives were lost. No submarine was seen and no periscope. But one of the officers of the ship reported that he saw the wake of the torpedo. It was thus impossible to bring the outrage home to either Austria or Germany if both chose to deny it. This advantage was so obvious, and so many attacks were made by submarines which were not themselves seen at all, that it is not unfair to assume that commanders were ordered, wherever possible, to attack without coming to the surface in order that they might not be identified. Other large boats which were destroyed about this time, by either a German or an Austrian submarine, were the Japanese liner Yasaka Maru, the Geelong (P. & O.), and the Glengyle (Glen line). No warning was given to the Ville de la Ciotat (Messageries Maritimes), with which a number of women and children were lost, nor to the Clan Macfarlane, whose experiences may be cited as a decisive comment on the suggestion that the safety of non-combatants was assured, provided that they had time to get into their

"Six boats in all were launched, and they contained all the crew, both Europeans and Lascars. They were tied together, one behind the other, and for three days they remained in company, battling with a mountainous sea. Although each man's rations consisted of only half a biscuit and half a dipper of water twice a day, no one lost his spirits. The hardships they were suffering, however, began to tell on the Lascars.

"On January 2nd, owing to the very heavy sea, two of the boats broke away and drifted apart, and were never seen again. Two days later, on January 4th, Captain Swanston's boat, which had already lost two men through exposure, also broke loose and drifted away.

"The three remaining boats, half filled with water, and

"The three remaining boats, half filled with water, and with their occupants nearly dead from exposure and starvation, drifted about helplessly for three more long days and nights—the longest in the lives of any of the men—tossed hither and hither by a raging sea which never abated. Eleven more Lascars had by this time died, while the survivors were in an utter state of collapse, and gave up all hope of ever seeing land again."

THE GERMAN UNDERTAKING.

At the beginning of January, 1916, Germany made certain statements with regard to her policy in the Mediterranean, which, though not promises in form, were doubtless intended to be taken as such. Count Bernstorff stated that "from the beginning instructions had been issued to German submarine commanders in the Mediterranean that they must warn merchant ships, and must not sink them until the passengers and crew had been 'accorded safety.'" Since no one had had any reason to suppose that such instructions had ever been given, as certainly they had not been acted on, Count Bernstorff was taken as having given an undertaking, like that of

Austria, that "merchant ships," and not liners only, should be warned first and those on board "accorded safety." Germany's position at the new year was therefore this: the campaign had done England a good deal of damage, but it showed no sign of exercising decisive pressure on her, and at the same time the German Government had assented to certain restrictions on its conduct which, if carried out in practice, would certainly go far—apart from the activity of the British navy—to make the ultimate success of the campaign impossible. This was the situation which Admiral von Tirpitz, the author of the submarine policy, now set himself to remedy.

SIGNS OF THE SPRING CAMPAIGN.

Early in 1916 reports began to circulate that Germany, being now in possession of new and more powerful submarines, meditated a great extension of her warfare. Confirmation came at the beginning of February, when she presented a Note to the neutral Powers declaring that England and her Allies had been arming their merchant vessels, ostensibly for defence against submarines but really for attack. If merchantmen were really armed for defence only, said this ingenuous Note, they would not fire until they had first been attacked. "The German Government considers any warlike activity on the part of enemy merchant vessels to be contrary to international law." From orders of the British Admiralty it was to be perceived "that these armed vessels are not to await any warlike action by German submarines, but to attack them at once." The conclusion was that after March 1st the German submarines would be instructed to treat all armed merchantmen as warships, and destroy them without warning.

The logic of the Note had little interest for England, which was only concerned to observe that Germany apparently meant to free herself from the restrictions to which, under pressure from the United States, she had nominally submitted. From the beginning of the campaign her submarines had torpedoed British ships without warning, and this was the reason why the arming of merchantmen had been increased, if that had in fact been done. If now Germany said that "since you arm your merchantmen we shall sink them at sight," the reason was that, having promised to warn both liners and "enemy private ships," she found that her activities would be seriously crippled. What would be the position of a submarine which warned an armed merchantman that it was about to be sunk? The contention of the German Note that a merchantman must not fire until it had been torpedoed was not likely to commend itself to the victim, and Germany therefore resolved the puzzle by announcing her intention to destroy without warning all armed merchantmen, that is to say, all those whom she believed, or chose to say she believed, to be armed. Count Bernstorff made his usual effort to soften the rigour of the threat for American ears. A merchant ship would not be destroyed, he said, unless the Germans "knew positively" that it was armed. This was, of course, mere words. Germany had not only alleged that the Lusitania was armed, but had produced sworn evidence, which was false, to prove that assertion. What she sought now was a pretext under which she might make unrestrained war on Allied shipping. This had been found, and Von Tirpitz had apparently a free hand.

THE RESIGNATION OF VON TIRPITZ.

A surprise followed, for at the beginning of March Von Tirpitz resigned. The causes of his resignation were not officially announced, and the course of events which led up to it can only be conjectured. But there is an explanation which is supported by a great deal of evidence, and is consistent both with the facts of the spring campaign and with the reply which was finally made by Germany to the American ultimatum. Von Tirpitz's object had always been to deal a serious blow at England by means of the submarine. He had so far failed, and he had seen his chances of success diminished when the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor, fearful of bringing more enemies into the field, had yielded to American pressure and agreed to restrict the activities of the submarine. Von Tirpitz, it is probable, argued thus: "There is no hope of striking England down so long as we agree to warn her merchant ships, of whatever kind, since all

of them, in one measure or another, help to sustain her; nor can we make any distinction between England and her Allies; nor, finally, can we even spare neutrals, for, as between the two great belligerent leagues, neutral shipping is almost exclusively at the service of the alliance of which England is the backbone." But, it would be objected by the Chancellor, this means inevitably a breach with the United States, followed by war, and who knows what other neutrals will go with her. Von Tirpitz's reply would be that what mattered was to bring England down, that only by his policy could this be done, and that by comparison even the open hostility of the United States should be accepted. It is quite likely that, so far as the chance of success against England was concerned, Von Tirpitz was correct. What the chance amounted to, and whether it was worth the price which he was prepared to pay, was a question for the Germans to settle among themselves. The decision, whatever it was, resulted in his resignation.

against neutral ships." One of the most important German newspapers declared its admiration for Von Tirpitz, although it "might not be possible to go the whole length with the man and his system." Most significant of all, immediately after his resignation, the National Liberal, Conservative, and Centre parties of the Reichstag all tabled resolutions demanding unrestricted submarine warfare; the National Liberals, in particular, asked that the Government should not enter into any agreement with other Powers which might limit the employment of the submarine.

All these utterances are consistent with the supposition

All these utterances are consistent with the supposition that Von Tirpitz resigned because the German Government would not push the submarine war to the point of an open breach with neutrals. The semi-official

> statement that his resignation would not mean any change in naval policy proved, roughly, to be true. Not only was a ruthless and indiscriminate war embarked on against British and allied shipping, including even passenger boats, but neutral ships were attacked with a severity hitherto unknown. Whether the attacks on neutrals were made by the orders of the Naval Staff in defiance of the decision reached by the Imperial Government, as is quite possible, or whether, as is equally likely, the Imperial Government was willing to profit by the destruction of neutral ships up to the point when it had decided to yield to the United States, it is impossible to say. But it is at least highly probable that the outcome of the new campaign had been already debated in February, and that Von Tirpitz had resigned when he knew that his opponents had carried the day, and that they would rather, if the crisis came, have peace with neutrals than insist on the unrestrained submarine warfare to which alone he could look to save his already diminished reputation.



Admiral von Capelle, who succeeded Von Tirpitz, photographed in the court-yard of the German Admiralty.

[Central News.]

GERMANS AND THE RESIGNATION.


How, then, does such a hypothesis square with the evidence? A semi-official Berlin telegram stated that

"in the choice of Admiral von Tirpitz's successor one sees a guarantee that as regards the methods of naval warfare no change will take place. Admiral von Capelle has worked with Admiral von Tirpitz, and his assumption of office means, therefore, the unaltered prosecution of the approved naval policy of the late Minister. It especially means that the submarine war will be prosecuted on the lines made known to neutrals in the well-known Memorandum"

On the other hand, a similar Berlin message said that in some quarters it was believed that the resignation was "connected with the Emperor's decision not to extend submarine warfare beyond the limits announced to neutrals in the memorandum and not to direct it

ATTACKS ON DUTCH SHIPPING.

The campaign opened with a series of incidents which appeared to indicate that neutrals were to be systematically attacked. On March 16th the *Tubantia*, a Dutch liner of about 14,000 tons, belonging to the Royal Dutch Lloyd Company, and bound from Amsterdam to Buenos Ayres, was sunk in the North Sea. A few days later the *Palembang*, a Rotterdam–Lloyd boat of nearly 7,000 tons, was destroyed while on her way from Rotterdam to Java. On April 7th the Dutch vessel *Eemdijk* was torpedoed while on her voyage from Baltimore to Rotterdam. The course pursued by the German Government, when questioned concerning these events, indicated that the tactics now being followed were those already foreshadowed in the Mediterranean campaign; the submarine sought to do its work without



The hospital ship "Anglia" which sank in the Channel after striking a mine in November, 1915, with considerable loss of life. The three photographs show successive stages in the sinking of the vessel.

[Central News.]

being identified, and the German Government then denied responsibility. Its methods in the case of the *Tubantia* are an interesting exercise in tortuousness.

Some of the officers of the Tubantia swore that they had seen the wake of the torpedo. The German Government then issued a statement which asserted simply that since the Tubantia had not been sunk in the "war-zone" (as fixed more than twelve months before) it could not have been a German submarine which had sunk her. Unfortunately for Germany, fragments of metal found in three of the Tubantia's boats were shown to be pieces of a bronze torpedo such as is only used in the German navy and, further, is only made in a certain German factory. These facts being brought to its notice, the German Government was forced finally to admit that the fragments " belonged to a German torpedo carried by a certain German submarine," but it added that "the commander of the submarine declares that this torpedo was not launched on March 16th against the Tubantia, but on March 6th against a British warship, but that it missed its aim." The suggestion was that the British retrieved this errant torpedo and fired it into a great Dutch liner in order to make the Dutch think that Germany was the author of the outrage. Provided that she could attain her immediate object, there was nothing of falsehood or chicanery that Germany was not prepared to use.

Germany regulated the severity of her submarine policy towards neutrals according to their size. She would only have sunk an American ship by a genuine accident. She did not wish to alienate Holland, whose hostility would have had serious consequences for her. So, though she sunk Dutch ships, she went to great pains in seeking to evade responsibility. Such smaller Powers as Denmark and Norway she treated with less ceremony. The Norwegian steamer Koning was torpedoed in the Channel without warning; the crew of the Norwegian Norne were picked up, almost destitute of clothing, in their boats, and had been given only ten minutes to leave the ship; the Danish boat Skodsborg was sunk at sight near Great Yarmouth; the crew of another Danish boat, the Pröven, almost perished of exhaustion before they were picked up:

"There was a gale with a heavy sea, and the schooner's crew asked the commander of the submarine to tow them in a direction where sailing-ships had been seen. Although there was no sign of any other vessel in the district, he peremptorily refused, leaving the men in their small boat to what looked at the time, owing to the weather, to be certain death. Fortunately the weather improved, but the seven men drifted about for three days and two nights before being picked up, when they were completely exhausted."

Spain, which had hitherto been treated lightly, now came within the range, as when the *Santanderino* was sunk and four of the crew were drowned. Instances could be multiplied, but these will suffice. The plans of the German Admiralty had clearly no relation to any question of contraband being carried in neutral bottoms. The object was to reduce the amount of neutral shipping, without regard to the character of the vessels or the safety of those on board, as a definite part of the new war on the supplies of England and the Allies. No other explanation will meet all the facts.

ATTACKS ON ALLIED SHIPPING.


Meanwhile, a furious war was being waged against the shipping of the Allies. But for occasional exceptions, due possibly to an individual submarine officer or the special circumstances of the moment, it was waged with complete disregard of any promises which Germany had made. The French liner Pctria, carrying 900 passengers, was attacked without warning, but contrived to escape. The Manchester Engineer had no warning. Neither had the British steamer Zent, with which nearly fifty lives were lost, nor the British India steamer Chantala, nor the P. & O. boat Simla, in both of which non-combatants were killed by the explosion of the torpedo. Occasionally the crew were allowed to get into their boats, but with a dubious chance of safety. The survivors of the Inverlyn were thirty-five hours in an open boat, and had weathered a heavy gale. The men of the Industry were cast adrift in the Atlantic, 120 miles from the nearest land, and the crew of the French boat Bernadette 150 miles from shore.

Unhampered by any scruple or restriction, the Germans were much more successful than before in their campaign of destruction. That was inevitable, at any rate until the British Admiralty took their measure, or the United States intervened decisively. In one week in April thirty-one ships (eight of them neutrals), of a gross tonnage of 85,000, were sunk. The Germans claimed officially that during March eighty "enemy merchantmen" were destroyed. An incomplete list showed that during March twenty-four neutral boats were sunk: thirteen Norwegian, five Danish, three Dutch, two Spanish, and one Swedish. (In Norway it was said that during the war German submarines had destroyed ninety-six Norwegian ships and seventy Norwegian lives.)


THE SUSSEX.

Most monstrous of all was the attack on the Channel passenger boat Sussex (1,353 tons), which was torpedoed in the afternoon of March 24th. About eighty passengers were killed or wounded. The Sussex was struck in the bow, part of which was torn away, but it was found possible to tow her to Boulogne. The United States was directly interested, for, as in the case of the Ancona, the Persia, the Patria, and other steamers attacked without warning, there were Americans on board. The outrage was so flagrant that the German Government, foreseeing trouble, set to work at once to show that a German submarine was not responsible. The explanation betrayed no less than the usual clumsiness and indifference to the reception with which it might meet. Germany admitted that one of her submarines had torpedoed a ship on March 24th in the region where the Sussex was attacked. But the submarine commander, it seemed, had drawn a sketch of this ship, and it was quite unlike a newspaper photograph of the Sussex which the German Admiralty had before it. Hence the two ships could not be the same; indeed, the submarine commander had "concluded that the long, black craft, without flag, with a grey smokestack and low, grey superstructure, was a naval mine-layer of the new Arabis class."

There was no difficulty of disposing of these poor evasions. The time and the place were the same; it was admitted that the mythical ship "of the new Arabis class" was struck in the bow, as was the Sussex; the French had in their possession thirteen fragments of the torpedo, and a day or two after the outrage they captured—and contrary to the usual custom announced it—a German submarine, from the evidence of whose crew they were able, they said, to give the name of the officer who sank the Sussex, and the full route which he had covered. The German Government eventually abandoned their contention, but, after their manner, explained that certain



President Wilson addressing Congress on the German submarine issue. $[Topical\ Press.]$



A popular German postcard issued to commemorate the sinking of the "Lusitania." $[Topical\ Press.$

alterations made to the Sussex since the taking of the "newspaper photograph" had prevented them from recognising that it was no other than the Sussex which had been torpedoed.

THE AMERICAN ULTIMATUM.

The United States thus found that Germany had torn up her pledges, and was sparing the non-combatants neither of belligerent nor of neutral, giving warning neither to freight-ships nor to liners, or, if she did, taking no care to put those on board in a place of safety. Mr. Wilson had secured his ground some time before in the Senate and the House of Representatives by forcing what was, in effect, a vote on his general policy with regard to Germany, and he had, after immense efforts by the German and Bryanite sections of opinion, secured a victory. He now, after addressing Congress in joint session, sent Germany an Ultimatum. In this Note he denounced the attack on the Sussex as "one of the most terrible examples of the inhumanity of the submarine warfare as waged by the commanders of German vessels," but, he added, that it was only one instance of the "deliberate method and spirit" in which Germany had conducted her campaign. Then, reminding Germany of her many promises and of the way in which she had persistently evaded or violated them, he demanded the immediate repudiation and abandonment of her present methods:

"In pursuit of this policy of submarine warfare against its enemy's trade, so announced and begun despite the solemn protest of the United States Government, the Imperial Government's submarine commanders have practised a procedure of such reckless destruction as made it more and more clear during recent months that the Imperial Government has found no way to impose upon them such restrictions as it had hoped and promised. The Imperial Government has repeatedly and solemnly assured the United States Government that passenger ships, at least, would not be thus treated, and yet it has repeatedly allowed its submarine commanders to disregard these assurances with impunity. Even in February of this year it announced that it regarded armed merchantmen in enemy possession as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries and would treat them as warships, while it bound itself, at least implicitly, to warn unarmed vessels and guarantee the lives of their passengers and crews, but their submarine commanders have freely disregarded even this restriction.

"Neutral ships, even neutral ships en route from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed, just as hostile ships, in steadily increasing number. Attacked merchantmen have sometimes been warned and challenged to surrender before being fired on or torpedoed, sometimes the most scanty security has been granted to their passengers and crews of being allowed to enter boats before the ship was sunk, but repeatedly no warning has been given, and not even refuge in boats was granted to passengers on board. Great ships like the Lusitania and the Arabic, and pure passenger ships like the Sussex, have been attacked without any warning, often before they were aware they were in the presence of an armed enemy ship, and the life of noncombatants, passengers and crews, was indiscriminately destroyed in a manner which the Government of the United States could only regard as wanton and lacking every justification. Indeed, no sort of limit was set to the further indiscriminate destruction of merchantmen of every kind and nationality outside the waters which the Imperial Government has been pleased to indicate as within the war zone. The list of Americans who lost their lives on the vessels thus attacked and destroyed has increased month by month until the terrible number of the victims has risen to hundreds.

"The United States Government has adopted a very patient attitude, and at every stage of this painful experience of tragedy upon tragedy has striven to be guided by well-considered regard for the extraordinary circumstances of an unexampled war, and to allow itself to be directed by

feelings of sincerest friendship for the people and Government of Germany. It has accepted the successive explanations and assurances of the Imperial Government as naturally made in full sincerity and good faith, and has desired not to abandon the hope that it would be possible for the Imperial Government to regulate and supervise the actions of the commanders of its naval forces in a way which will bring their conduct into consonance with the recognised principles of humanity embodied in international law. It has made every concession to the new circumstances for which no precedents exist, and was willing to wait till the facts were unmistakable and susceptible of only one explanation. It owes it now to the just appreciation of its own rights to declare to the Imperial Government that this moment has arrived.


"To its pain, it has become clear to it that the standpoint which it adopted from the beginning is inevitably right-namely, that the employment of submarines for the destruction of enemy trade is of necessity, owing to the character of the ships employed and the methods of attack which their use involves, completely irreconcilable with the principles of humanity, with the long-existing, undisputed rights of neutrals, and with the sacred privileges of noncombatants. If it is still the intention of the Imperial Government to wage further war mercilessly and indiscriminately with submarines against merchantmen without respect for what the Government of the United States must regard as the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the generally recognised dictates of humanity, the United States Government will be finally forced to conclusion that there is only one course it can take. If the Imperial Government should not now, without delay, proclaim and make effective renunciation of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and cargo ships, the United States Government can have no other choice than to break off completely diplomatic relations with the German Government."

ADMIRAL AND CHANCELLOR.


A statement made about this time for American consumption, by Admiral von Holtzendorff, the Chief of the German Naval Staff, is interesting in its clumsy mingling of threats and denials of what was everywhere known to be the truth. "Give us five more months," he said, "and you will see what we can do to British commerce." If the United States insisted on a rupture, Germany would be able to torpedo everything without distinction. She had spared "hundreds of thousands of tons of enemy vessels "out of consideration for America. It was an "impossibility" that the Sussex should have been torpedoed by a German boat. Germany had kept "in every point" to her agreement to warn the crews and passengers of "auxiliary cruisers" (presumably liners). Germany had no intention—" and besides, we have never done it "-of torpedoing neutral ships without warning and search. The German Chancellor, when he came to address the General Committee of the Reichstag in secret sitting a few weeks later, took a very different tone. The value of the submarine campaign, he said, had been greatly over-estimated: "Our naval experts no longer believe in the probability of reducing England to starvation and ruin by submarines." A rupture with the United States would be a "grave peril," and might lead to a breach with other neutrals also. The Government had decided, therefore, to yield with a qualification:

[&]quot;I repeat: The Imperial Government have weighted every factor, and are convinced of the necessity for avoiding a breach with America. These are the hard facts of the present situation.

[&]quot;We have worded a reply such as may reserve future liberty of action. If the situation changes, we may cancel our concession to America and resume unrestricted submarine operations, but for the present we must overcome our feelings."



A view of the stern of the "Appam" as she lay in a United States port flying the German flag. $[Topical\ Press.]$



Part of the harbour of Zeebrugge used by the Germans as a submarine base.
[Topical Press.

This version of the Chancellor's speech at the secret sitting accords with the text of the German answer to the Ultimatum. Much of this document was occupied with a denial of the American charges, and with peevish complaints about America's lack of sympathy for Germany and her failure to persuade the Allies to relax the severity of their blockade. Then came a concession and a condition:—

"If, nevertheless, the German Government resolves on the utmost possible concession, the deciding factors are, on the one hand, the friendship between both the two Germanic nations, which has lasted for more than a century, and, on the other hand, consideration of the terrible fate with which the extension and prolongation of this cruel and bloody war threaten the whole of civilised humanity. The consciousness of its strength has permitted the German Government twice during the last few months to declare openly before the whole world its readiness for a peace which would guarantee Germany's vital interests. The German Government thereby declared that it was not its fault if peace was still longer withheld from the peoples of Europe. With all the stronger justification can the German Government declare that it would be an act which could never be vindicated in the eyes of humanity or of history to allow after 21 months of war a controversy which has arisen out of submarine warfare to assume a development which would seriously menace the peace between the German and American people.

"So far as the German Government is concerned, it will prevent such a development taking place, and will at the same time do its utmost to make possible as long as the war still lasts the limitation of warfare to the fighting forces. This embraces as its object the freedom of the seas, on which subject the German Government believes itself at one to-day with the Government of the United States

"Germany, guided by this idea, notifies the United States Government that the German naval forces have received the following order:—

"'In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchantmen recognised by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without the saving of human lives unless the ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.'

"But neutrals cannot expect that Germany shall for the sake of neutral interests restrict the use of her effective weapon if the enemy is permitted to apply at will methods of warfare violating international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the United States Government does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the United States Government has repeatedly declared that it is determined to restore the freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it is violated.

Accordingly, the German Government is confident that in consequence of the new orders issued to her naval forces, the United States Government will now consider all impediments removed which may have been in the way of mutual co-operation towards the restoration of the freedom of the seas, and does not doubt that the United States Government will now demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law as laid down in the Notes of the United States to Great Britain of December 28th, 1914, and November 5th, 1915.

"Should the steps taken by the United States Government not attain the object of having the laws of humanity followed by all the belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve for itself complete liberty of decision."

The concession was grudging, and it was real and substantial only if the new orders were to be carried out in the letter and the spirit. There was, of course, ample opportunity for evasion. "The saving of human lives" is ambiguous and—an old question this—who is to judge when a ship "attempts to escape or offer resistance?"

More important, was the whole concession intended to be conditional on the United States getting satisfaction for Germany from England? It most certainly left Germany free, even if she now put her undertaking into force, to repudiate it when she chose on the ground that the condition attached to it had not been fulfilled. Mr. Wilson might, therefore, have treated the Note as a refusal of his demands but he decided to take it as an acceptance, and formally to record it as an absolute and unconditional abandonment of Germany's "present methods." In his final Note he said:—

"The Note of the Imperial Government has received the careful consideration of the Government of the United States. It is especially noted as indicating the purpose of the Imperial Government for the future that it is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operation of the war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of belligerents, and has determined to impose upon all its commanders at sea the limitations recognised by the rules of international law upon which the Government of the United States had insisted throughout the months which have elapsed since the Imperial Government announced on February 4th, 1915, its submarine policy now happily abandoned.

"The Government of the United States has been constantly guided and restrained by motives of friendship in its patient efforts to bring to an amicable settlement the critical questions arising out of that policy. Accepting the Imperial Government's declaration of the abandonment of a policy which so seriously menaced the good relations of the two countries, the Government of the United States will rely upon the scrupulous execution henceforth of that declaration.

"The now altered policy of the Imperial Government is such as to remove the principal danger to the interruption of the good relations existing between the United States and Germany.

"The Government of the United States feels it necessary to state that it takes for granted that Germany does not intend to imply that the maintenance of the newly-announced policy is in any way contingent upon the course or result of diplomatic negotiations between the Government of the United States and any other belligerent Government, notwithstanding the fact that certain passages in the Imperial Government's Note of the 4th inst. might appear to be susceptible of that construction.

"In order, however, to avoid any possible misunderstanding, the Government of the United States notifies the Imperial Government that it cannot for a moment entertain, much less discuss, the suggestion that respect by the German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way, or in the slightest degree, be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government as affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. The responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative."


The position was now, apparently, that Germany intended to keep her submarine campaign within certain bounds, but with two qualifications. First, if she thought at any time that she stood to gain by a return to the most indiscriminate and ruthless warfare, she would return to it. Secondly, no one could say how far she would actually carry out in good faith her latest undertaking.

Some incidents of the spring campaign in which British merchantmen were handled with great skill and resolution against attacking submarines should not go unrecorded. The Liverpool steamer *Duendes* was pursued and shelled for over two hours, but escaped by skilful manœuvring. The London collier *Wandle*, a boat of only 889 tons, was attacked when two hours out from Newcastle. She carried a small gun, which had not before been used. On this occasion she used it to such purpose that after six shots the submarine withdrew. The *Clan Lindsay* was attacked in the Bay of Biscay by a big submarine, which rapidly overhauled her, but disappeared after

the Clan boat had put in two shots. Another Clan liner, the *Macfadyen* was attacked twice on the same day. About 4 a.m. on May 2nd a submarine opened fire on her, but the *Clan Macfadyen*'s gunners returned the fire so accurately that soon the enemy was seen to dive—hit, some believed, by the ninth shot. Three hours later another submarine fired a torpedo, which passed within a few yards of the stern of the *Macfadyen*.

Some other incidents of this period belong more properly to the history of the naval campaign. One of these was the sinking by submarines of the naval boarding steamer *Tara*, some of whose crew were carried off into the desert on the borders of Western Egypt by

the Bedouins, and were afterwards rescued by British armoured motor cars. Another was the episode of the Appam, which was thought at first to have been captured by a submarine, but was found to have been seized by a raiding cruiser, the Möwe, which sent her under a prize crew to an American port. But the case of the Portugal may appropriately be mentioned in a chapter which includes the sinking of the Ancona, the Persia, and the Sussex. The Portugal was a Russian hospital ship in the Black Sea, bearing the distinctive signs of her character. A submarine torpedoed her in broad daylight, at close quarters, destroying about 120 lives, including many doctors and nurses.



The P. and O. Liner "Persia," which was torpedoed in the Mediterranean and sank off Crete. $[Central\ News.]$



Mr. McKenna addressing a great "War Savings" Campaign! meeting at the Guildhall.

[Newspaper Illustrations.]

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE THIRD WAR BUDGET.

The 1915-16 balance sheet—new budget for £502,000,000—£151,000,000 from new or increased taxes—£86,000,000 from excess profits duty—new forms of war loan securities.

HEN the national accounts for the year ended March, 1916, were balanced it was found that the revenue had been underestimated by £31,752,824, and the expenditure over-estimated by £30,746,000. In a time of peace this would have been unpardonable blundering, but in the circumstances it was not open to serious attack. Nobody foresaw that in a time of gigantic national expenditure the country would have the appearance of being on the crest of a wave of prosperity. Nobody could tell, either, for months ahead, what expenditure would be laid upon us by new developments in the war, such as we had already experienced in the more lavish use of high-explosives and in the despatch of subsidiary expeditions. More important still, the Government could only form a very rough estimate of the advances we should have to make to our Allies and Dominions. As a matter of fact the advances were £107,000,000 below the estimate, although we spent £76,000,000 of that money on another purpose which had not been provided for, namely, the purchase of American securities to meet the Government's liabilities on contracts and to

keep exchange down to a reasonable rate. A good proportion of those securities were still in hand at the close of the financial year.

REVENUE AND DEBT.

The actual revenue in 1915–16 was £336,766,824 and the expenditure £1,559,158,377. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in his Budget speech, dealing in round figures, stated that our position was as under:—

| | £ |
|---------------------|----------------|
| Debt before the war | 651,000,000 |
| Added in 1914-15 | 458,000,000 |
| Added in 1915-16 | 1,031,000,000 |
| Total | (2,140,000,000 |

These figures, however, require some explanation. In the first place the addition to the debt in 1915–16 was the net amount after carrying out the conversions which were permitted in connection with the $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent war loan, and in the second the total of £2,140,000,000 included £368,000,000 which had been advanced to our Allies and Dominions as loans.

The year's revenue was satisfactory in every respect except as regards the excess profits duty. The yield of this new import in the first year was estimated at £6,000,000, but this was on the assumption that the amounts due would be readily ascertained, and they were not at all readily ascertained. The amount actually collected was only £140,000, and two months after the financial year closed the total was less than £3,000,000. There was no reason to suppose that the ultimate yield had been much miscalculated, but its collection required a great deal more time than the Treasury officials had anticipated.

The daily rate of expenditure from April 1st to June 30th, 1915, was £2,700,000. From July 1st to 17th it was £3,000,000, from July 18th to September 11th rather over £3,500,000, from September 12th to November 6th £4,350,000, from November 7th to February 19th, 1916, between £4,300,000 and £4,400,000 (after adding to the actual expenditure in that period liabilities due to the Bank of England in respect of advances to other Powers which had not yet been repaid), and from April 1st to May 20th £4,820,000. The cost of the army, navy, and munitions, over and above the normal expenditure, which is about £200,000, has been about £2,800,000 a day.

The extent of the obligations which we have taken upon ourselves may be gauged from the following statement which the Chancellor of the Exchequer made in presenting his second Budget for 1915-16:—

"We have, first of all, kept, and we have to keep, an impregnable and inviolable navy. We have, in the second place, paid for, and we continue to pay for, an army which has increased from a few thousands to an army which runs into millions. Thirdly, we are finding by loan to our great Dominions part of the expenditure of the contingents that they are bringing into the line of battle. Fourthly, as regards India, we are paying the whole of the burden of the Indian contingents, except the normal peace expenditure. Fifthly, we have advanced to our Allies such sums as it is estimated would keep and maintain in the field three millions of their soldiers. That is the sum we have been lending them—I cannot say how long—because one does not know what future demands will be made or how demands will grow or diminish."

The Votes of Credit authorising war expenditure in 1915–16 amounted to £1,420,000,000, making the total since the outbreak of the war £1,782,000,000. The House of Commons also voted in February a sum of £300,000,000 for 1916–17, and on May 23rd £300,000,000 more, to carry on the war until about the beginning of August. This made a total authorised by the House of Commons, in eleven votes, of £2,382,000,000 to cover two years' war expenditure.

TAX INCREASES UNDER 1916 BUDGET.

The Budget of 1916 was introduced as early as the 4th of April. It was recognised everywhere that taxation would have to be increased so much so that, despite the new law giving powers to check forestalling, there was forestalling in table commodities which was estimated to have amounted to £7,000,000. If there had been no other reason for imposing extra taxation the Government would have found an imperative one in the fact that if the war went on until April, 1917, the National Debt would have reached such dimensions that interest upon it, with a substantial sinking fund, would require no less than £145,000,000. Mr. McKenna asked for power to levy £502,000,000, or £165,233.176 more than the actual revenue of the fiscal year just ended. The significance of these figures will be seen when it is

stated that in 1913-14, the last complete year before the war, a revenue of £198,242,897 not only met the national expenditure, which had just been heavily increased, but left a surplus of £749,928. The difference between the two sums, less the amount required for interest, represents the extent to which we have been paying for the war as we went on.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer was obliged to make a further stiff addition to the income-tax, but he did not confine himself either to this or to other existing sources of taxation. With the double object of checking railway travelling during the war and raising revenue, he proposed a graduated tax on railway tickets, but there were so many objections to this that it had to be dropped almost immediately. A more daring and, as it turned out, more serviceable proposition was to put a tax on matches, which it was obvious were being wastefully used. Ever since Mr. Lowe's experiment, successive Chancellors had fought shy of a match tax, but Mr. McKenna carried it quite easily, the opposition subsiding after a few days, as the result of a conference which he had with the manufacturers. It does not follow, of course, that he would have had the same success if he had submitted his proposal in a time of peace.

The amusements tax broke ground which was entirely new. In the early days of the war most people were disinclined to go to entertainments as much as they had done, but this feeling wore off, and for the last year or so it had been clear that enormous sums were being spent on attendances at picture palaces, music halls, and theatres, but especially the first. In a time of war, when the Exchequer needed every penny it could get, this was obviously a fair field of taxation, and the country readily acquiesced in a scale of taxes which ranged from a halfpenny on a twopenny seat to 1s. on a 12s. 6d. seat, and 1s. for every 1os. or part of 1os. over that. The tax came into actual operation on the 15th May, and worked quite smoothly.

The excess profits tax was also increased. Under the first Act a firm were allowed a surplus of £200 over their ascertained standard profit, and 50 per cent of the remainder was taken as taxation. Mr. McKenna now asked for power to demand 60 per cent of the surplus, and, further, in dealing with "controlled establishments"—that is, war munition firms—to tax them under either the Munitions Act or the Finance Act, whichever gave him the larger sum.

INCOME-TAX INCREASES.

The Supplementary Budget of 1915 had provided for a further increase in the income-tax in 1916–17, but this was insufficient, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to raise £43.500,000 more from that source, making the total expected for the year, including super-tax proceeds, no less than £195,000,000. No change was made in the statutory allowances, but new scales were set up, the effect, in comparison with the actual rates in the pound for 1915–16, being as shown in the following table:—

INCOMES WHOLLY EARNED. Rate for Rate for

| 1916–17. | 1915-16 |
|--------------------------|---------|
| s. d. | s. d. |
| Up to £500 2 3 | 1 98 |
| £501 to £1,000 2 6 | 1 93 |
| £1,001 to £1,500 3 0 | 2 13 |
| £1,501 to £2,000 | 2 4 3 |
| £2,001 to £2,500 4 4 | 2 9 3 |
| $f_{2,501}$ and over 5 0 | 3 0 |

INCOMES WHOLLY UNEARNED.*

| | | e for | Rate | |
|------------------|-----|-------|-------|----------------|
| | | | 1915 | |
| | | | S. | |
| Up to £300 | 3 | O | 2 | 4 🕏 |
| £301 to £500 | 3 | 6 | 2 | $9\frac{3}{5}$ |
| £501 to £1,000 | . 4 | O | 3 | O |
| £1,001 to £2,000 | 4 | 6 | 3 | o |
| £2,000 and over | 5 | O | 3 | O |

It is perhaps necessary to explain that the two scales are not to be taken separately where a person has both earned and unearned income. If he has a total income say of £1,000, half earned and half unearned, he has to pay on the £1,000 scale, the total required from him being £162 Ios. On the other hand, if a person's income just exceeds a point at which the scale advances he is entitled to pay on the lower scale if he is willing to surrender the whole of the excess. He will naturally do this, as in some cases it will be considerably cheaper to pay 20s. in the pound on the excess than to go on the higher scale.

It is interesting to see how the successive war-time increases in the income-tax have affected individuals.

EARNED INCOMES. For For For 1915–16 1914-15 (2nd Budget.) (2nd Budget.) £ s. d. £ s. d. On £131 ... Nil. 0 19 9 "£161 .. o 1 o .. 3 13 9 .. 4 12 3 " £200 ·· 7 4 0 .. 16 4 0 .. 2 0 0 .. 9 0 0 " £300 ·· 7 0 0 .. 20 5 0 36 o o .. 45 0 " £500 .. 17 10 0 .. 56 14 o .. "£700 .. 31 10 0 .. " £1,000 . 50 0 0 .. 90 0 0 .. " £2,000 . 133 6 8 .. 240 0 0 .. 366 13 4 "£3,000. 250 0 0 .. 450 0 0 .. 750 0 0 UNEARNED INCOMES. Nil. .. ı 6 4 .. On [131 ... " £161 ... o 1 4 .. 4 18 4 .. 6 3 0 2 13 4 .. 9 12 0 .. 9 6 8 .. 21 12 0 .. " £200 .. 12 0 0 " £300 .. 27 0 0 27 4 5 ... 56 0 0 .. " £500 ·· "£700 .. 52 10 0 .. 94 10 0 .. 126 0 0 " £1,000 . 83 6 8 .. 150 0 0 .. 200 0 0

Weekly wage-earners had not in fact been taxed under the second Finance Act of 1915–16, unless they were in receipt of unearned income, but income-tax was now to be collected from them, and at the enhanced rate. The super-tax was not touched, but as it begins with a 5s. rate, instead of 3s. 6d., it is in effect more severe. The new taxes proposed are indicated in the following table, showing the extra amounts which the Chancellor budgeted for:—

| | £ |
|---|--------------|
| Income Tax additions | 43,500,000 |
| Excess profits duty | 86,000,000 |
| Amusements Tax | 5,000,000 |
| Railway Tickets Tax | 3,000,000 |
| Sugar $(\frac{1}{2}d. \text{ per lb. added to } Tax)$ | 7,000,000 |
| Cocoa (raised from 11d. to 6d. per lb.) | |
| and Coffee and Chicory raised from | |
| 3d. to 6d | 1,650,000 |
| Matches Tax (4d. per 1,000) | 2,000,000 |
| Mineral Waters, &c. (4d. or 8d. per | |
| gallon) | 2,000,000 |
| Motor-cars and Motor-cycles (licence | |
| duty doubled or trebled) | 800,000 |
| Total | £150,950,000 |

^{*}But see Appendix to this volume for some detailed changes in these rates made in Committee.

The final Budget figures came out thus:-

| Estimated expenditure in year to March | |
|--|----------------|
| 31st, 1917 (£266,341,623 more than | £ |
| in 1915–16) | 1,825,500,000 |
| Estimated revenue (£165,233,176 more | |
| than was received in 1915-16) | 502,000,000 |
| _ | |
| Deficit to be met by loans | £1,323,500,000 |

Deducting from the revenue the £3,000,000 which the railway tax was expected to produce, the deficit to be met by loans became £1,326,500,000.

LOANS-LARGE AND SMALL.

We may now turn to the methods by which the Government have financed the war, apart from taxation. No previous British Government has had to raise anything like the enormous amounts which this war has required. The unlimited loan which was asked for in July, 1915, was rightly considered a great success from a spectacular point of view, and it was not unimportant at that time to demonstrate the financial power of the United Kingdom by raising a loan of such proportions that the world could not fail to notice it. The Government, however, were not disposed to continue on the same lines, and the financial world seems to have agreed with them that it was preferable to finance the war as long as possible by the issue of short-dated securities. These securities are liked much better than permanent loans, as they leave the bankers and financiers with more liquid assets. It is understood that many American and other exporters have invested part of their balances in these securities for short terms, and in the absence of the usual supply of commercial bills they have been found very convenient by many people who had floating balances which they wished to employ profitably. The result has been that they have been taken up in sufficient amount to meet all the Government's needs.

It will be seen from the following summary of the proceeds of loans received in 1915–16 that the $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent Loan, big as it was, fell a long way short of the Government's requirements in the fiscal year:—

| | £ |
|---|----------------|
| Treasury Bills | 488,818,000 |
| $-3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent War Loan (last instalment) | 35,798,000 |
| $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent War Loan | 592,345,180 |
| 5 per cent Exchequer Bonds | 153,689,000 |
| American Loan | 50,820,023 |
| Ways and Means Advances | 19,896,500 |
| Total Loans | 1,341,366,703 |
| Less net debt paid off | 16,098,181 |
| Net | 11.325.268.522 |

TREASURY BILLS, WAR EXPENDITURE CERTIFICATES, AND EXCHEQUER BONDS.

In the earlier period of the war the Treasury followed its peace-time practice of offering bills to the market in blocks of £15,000,000 or so and accepting the best terms that were obtainable by tender. When the war became more costly, however, this system became inapplicable; it would have required an issue every week, and it might have led to undesirable practices. The Treasury met the position by fixing the rate of discount which it was prepared to allow and offering the bills day by day over the counter of the Bank of England. In March, 1916, it was decided that the 5 per cent discount rate should only be given for twelve months' bills, the rate for three months being 4½ and for six and

^{1.3.*-}VOL. IV.



Mr. Lloyd George addressing a meeting of munition workers.

[Topical.

nine months $4\frac{3}{4}$ per cent. In June, however, 5 per cent was again allowed all round.

The Government would have greatly preferred to raise the money required by Exchequer bonds running for five years, and from December, 1915, an attempt was made to push these among the middle classes by offering them in amounts ranging from £100 to £5,000 at 5 per cent interest, payable half-yearly. In order to attract foreign money, of which there was a considerable amount in London banks, it was announced that the bonds would be free from all British taxes, present or future, if it was shown, in the manner directed by the Treasury, that they were in the beneficial ownership of persons who were not domiciled or ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom. The effort did not succeed to the extent that was desired, but it was far from being a failure. It would have been regrettable, indeed, if it had not been made. On the 1st of June the issue was closed, and it was then found that it had yielded £73,491,000 since the 1st of April. A new issue was immediately put out at the same rate of interest, but giving the investor a choice between bonds maturing on October 5th, 1919, or two years after that. This had the advantage of meeting the views of those who wanted to place their money for a shorter period than the original bonds were for, and it also served two other purposes—the first (which was effected by altering the interest dates) being that it spread the work of the Bank of England's staff more evenly over the year, and the second that it gave new maturity dates, which made for the convenience of the Treasury. In order to

increase the attractiveness of the bonds it was announced that, subject to the consent of Parliament, the interest on them, and on the earlier 5 per cent issue also, would be paid without any tax deduction. This was a decided relief to persons of small means, who were not liable to income-tax, or not to as much as 5s. in the pound, but it did not prevent others from having to pay afterwards.


On the 3rd June an entirely new form of security, called War Expenditure Certificates, was put on the market. These differed little from the old Treasury bills, except that the certificates, which were for amounts of £1,000, £5,000, or £10,000, were to run for two years, which meant, of course, that they were expected, as far as they went, to tide over the period of the war. They were issued at a rate of discount fixed by the Treasury, and liable to variation at any time. A beginning was made with a discount of 10 per cent, which in interest terms was equal to a little more than $5\frac{1}{4}$ per cent, as the holder could get more than an extra $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent by re-investing the discount, which was taken off in advance.

"MOBILISING" OF DOLLAR SECURITIES.

We have already mentioned the expenditure upon American securities in the fiscal year 1915–16. The process went on in the following months, and was the subject of a debate in Parliament on the 29th May. Nothing in the whole financial history of the war is more interesting than this trafficking in American stocks and bonds. There were three possible methods of

paying for the immense supplies of munitions, food, and raw materials of industries which we drew from the United States. The first was by exports—but that failed us, as the balance of trade went very largely in favour of America. The second possible method was to ship a great amount of gold, but there were limits to what we could do in that way, and even from the American point of view it was not desirable. We sent as much bullion as the circumstances required, but it was necessary to supplement it by sending securities which the American people were likely to appreciate. Fortunately, we had very considerable holdings of American railway stocks, and the Government asked for these, offering to buy most of them and to accept

others on loan, in order that they might be used as collateral security. For some months this system of meeting our liabilities and rectifying exchange met with complete success. It was unfortunate, no doubt, that we thus deprived ourselves of great financial interests in the United States, but there was no help for it. In his speech in Parliament on the 20th May the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated that the Government had been able to preserve a substantial balance in New York to meet their liabilities, but for the last few weeks the flow of securities, which at one time had the character of a torrent, had been little more than a trickle. He did not think the supply was exhausted, but a great many holders of stock had been negligent, inert, or



M. Bark, the Russian Finance Minister, buys a flag in aid of the Servian Relief Fund while on a visit to London. [L.N.A.

shy, and these needed a spur. As a first application of the spur he proposed—and Parliament accepted the motion—that an additional tax of 2s. in the pound, making 7s. in all, should be imposed upon the income from securities which were withheld from the Government. "If this fails," he said, "I will go as far as is necessary, even if I have to make the tax 20s. in the pound." But it did not fail. On the contrary, the announcement that the motion would be submitted to Parliament increased the flow of securities sixfold before the matter was even brought forward, and the movement continued afterwards.

USE OF SMALL SAVINGS.

The Government made several attempts to induce the working classes to save and invest their money in war issues. It cannot be said that the effort has been a conspicuous success, but the amount secured has not been inconsiderable. The first attempt was in the form of War Loan Vouchers for small amounts, which were issued through the Post Office at the time the big $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent loan was floated and were continued for some months afterwards. In January, 1916, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stated in Parliament that the number of vouchers sold was, in round figures, as follows:—5s., 1,501,000; 10s., 421,000; £1, 827,000; total value, £1,413,000. The number of £5 scrip certificates sold

was 798,220, and their value was £3,991,100. Other subscriptions to the War Loan through the Post Office amounted to £30,642,000 and through the Trustee Savings Banks to £3,840,000.

At the end of January, 1916, a new plan was put forward by the National Organising Committee for War Savings. It had been found that working people did not understand, and did not care for, investments which fluctuated in value, and they did not wish to deprive themselves of the right of withdrawing their loans if the need arose. The Committee endeavoured to meet them on both points. They were invited to take up 15s. 6d. War Savings Certificates on the condition that if the Government had the use of the money for

five years they would redeem the certificates at £1 each, without deduction for income-tax, which meant that 5 per cent compound interest would be given. Provision was also made for withdrawals, but in these cases no interest was to be paid for a period of less than a year. After a year the amount repayable increased at the rate of a penny a month, so that in two years from the date of the investment it was 16s. 9d. If a person could not raise 15s. 6d. at once he could get a war saving stamp card containing thirty-one spaces for sixpenny stamps and accumulate the money in that way. A little later an arrangement was made



The Prime Minister addressing a great Trade Union Conference on the need for national and personal economy.

[L.N.A.



A view of the Trade Union delegates to the meeting.

[L.N.A.



War thrift for school children: Mrs. McKenna presenting bank books, each with a shilling deposit in it, to school children at Walton-on-the-Hill. [Sport and General.

by which those who were not so near the poverty line could get certificates for £12 or £25, the prices of these being £9 6s. and £19 7s. 6d. respectively. The benefit of these arrangements was at first confined to persons whose incomes did not exceed £300 a year, but eventually the limit was removed. The result of this effort up to the end of April was that 2,568,733 certificates were issued, and by June 3rd this number was increased to 3,889,225.

Another innovation which took effect at the beginning of the year 1916 was to offer 5 per cent Exchequer bonds, through the Post Offices, for sums as small as £5, £20, and £50. In common with those issued through the banks, they were repayable at par on the 1st December, 1920, and they carried the same privilege of conversion into any future loan. Foreigners were not to be liable to income-tax on the interest they received, but British subjects living abroad, who in law were only temporarily absent, were refused that privilege. Some Anglo-Indians and others complained afterwards that they had invested their money under a misapprehension, and at the time of writing it was understood that a concession to persons circumstanced as they were was in contemplation. To those who were afraid of the risk of holding bonds the Post Office offered to act as custodian, and also to sell the securities when desired on easy commission terms. The terms of these bonds were not affected by the change made in the larger ones at the beginning of June. The yield of the Exchequer bonds issued through the Post Office up to the end of April was £18,700,000 (on 566,000

applications), and in May this was increased to £22,600,000 (on 690,000 applications).

With regard to the interest paid on the larger amounts, it is necessary to bear in mind that a substantial part of it is liable to an income-tax ranging from 3s. to 5s. in the pound, so that the Government are not really paying as much as they appear to be. An exception must be made, however, in the case of the bankers and financiers, who are taxed on profits, not on receipts.

FRENCH EXPENDITURE AND TAXES.

The French and British Governments have acted in close collaboration in financial as in military matters, and each has been able to give valuable assistance to the other: Thus, as M. Ribot, the French Minister of Finance, put it, Great Britain has opened the credits which France required to enable her to make payments in England, and France has used her gold to help to keep exchange right, particularly in the United States. On the 18th May, 1916, M. Ribot introduced a Bill in the French Parliament demanding a vote on account of £315,654,080 for the third quarter of the year, making the total voted since the war began £2,180,000,000. It appeared that the average monthly expenditure in 1915 was £74,720,000, and that in the first three quarters of 1916 the average per month was expected to be close upon £104,000,000. A Loan of Victory, as it was called, had been raised just before, and it was officially stated that the subscriptions amounted to £605,200,000. The price having been below par, the amount actually

raised was £529,720,000, of which £471,512,000 was fresh money or National Defence bonds which had been subscribed for during the war and converted into this loan.

Up to May no war taxes had been imposed, but M. Ribot then proposed taxes from which he expected to get £36,280,000. Of this, £11,000,000 was to be obtained by doubling the State's share of land taxation licences and £2,400,000 by raising the income-tax. A suggestion was also made about this time that, following the example of Great Britain in "mobilising" dollar securities, France should undertake a great scheme of borrowing the securities of neutral countries held by her own people. M. Edmond Théry estimated that these had amounted to £500,000,000, and that three-quarters of that amount was still available.


GERMANY AND AUSTRIA.

The German Empire's pre-war debt was £250,000,000 and that of the German States about £750,000,000. The first War Loan, issued in September, 1914, produced £223,000,000; the second, issued in February, 1915, £450,000,000; the third, issued in August, 1915, over £600,000,000 (nominally); and the fourth, issued in March, about £530,000,000. The Government has piled up an enormous paper edifice, which it will be difficult to deal with at the close of the war, but for the present the system seems to answer, except that foreign exchange has gone badly against the country, and adds another to the difficulties of conducting foreign trade which the British fleet has created.

Little has been done in the way of levying war taxes, and that little has excited much opposition. In May it was announced that a compromise had been effected, although the Socialists had not accepted it.

Prussia and Saxony were opposed to any direct Imperial taxes, and to conciliate them a clause was added to the Government Bill then under consideration stating that the revenue from the war-tax was intended exclusively to diminish the Imperial debt, as far as it was not needed by the Budget of 1916 to compensate for the deficit in other revenue. The new direct taxes were only to be levied once. There was a tax on capital which had increased, or had not suffered a loss, of more than 10 per cent, a tax of slightly over a penny on every exchange of goods, a tax on tobacco, a tax on bills of lading, and a post and telegraph tax, which, however, "must be removed, if the Reichstag demands it, at the end of the second business year after the conclusion of peace." The aggregate yield was not expected to be very large, and the effort looked very small indeed compared with what Great Britain had

Little news as to Austria's war finance has come through, but that is perhaps partly due to the fact that nobody took much interest in it. The subscription list to the fourth Austrian War Loan was due to close on May 15th. It was a 5½ per cent issue, offered at 93 per cent, or in reality 92½, as the bankers gave subscribers their commission of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. One remarkable feature about it, which in substance had been copied from the Germans, was that the Austro-Hungarian and the War Loan Banks offered to advance 75 per cent of the nominal amounts subscribed and to charge only 5 per cent on the loans. As the Vienna Neue Freie Presse put it, this actually enabled a subscriber to make a profit. Certainly he had a liability to pay up some day, but in the meantime he could pocket 1 per cent on three times the amount of cash he had provided, besides getting a high rate of interest on his own money.



A class for training women munition workers.

[Photopress.

CHAPTER XXIV.

WOMEN'S WORK IN THE WAR.

THE WORK OF MEDICAL WOMEN—HEROISM AND ADVENTURES IN SERBIA—COURAGE AND RESOURCE OF NURSES IN FIELD SERVICE—THE REPLACEMENT OF MEN IN COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY—PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS—ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITATIONS—THE WAGES PROBLEM—WOMEN'S PHILANTHROPIC WORK IN THE WAR.


THE Prussian conception of war, with its enormous armies and utilisation of the most terrible destructive forces created by scientists and engineers, led to many changes in civil as well as in military life, and one of the most remarkable was the collapse, under pressure of unparalleled national exigency, of nearly all the remaining defences of social tradition against the professional, commercial, and industrial activities of women. A movement which had been germinating slowly, in an environment not altogether congenial, was suddenly forced into astonishing growth and fruition.

In previous wars only a few women, who volunteered to nurse the sick and wounded, could take an active part; but in the conflict of whole nations into which the great war soon developed, women no longer remained passive spectators, but co-operated with men in a manner which finally turned their participation into a decisive factor of the war. The number required to succour the wounded and sick was multiplied tenfold; the service of medical women in warfare was officially recognised for the first time; and in workshops and factories all over the kingdom there was to be seen a multitude of women and girls producing munitions for the men in

the field. When the War Office call for men began to grow more insistent, from the middle of 1915, obstacle after obstacle which had barred the entrance of women into particular trades was overborne. The prejudice of employers against women labour was killed by inexorable necessity, and the acquiescence of trade unions, whose members feared that their own economic position would be undermined, was won by a combination of guarantees, promises, and appeals to patriotism. Before the spring of 1916, when the transformation was virtually complete, women had given proof, in a hundred different spheres, of initiative, organising capacity, adaptability, mechanical skill, and wide diversity of talent.

THE WOMEN'S HOSPITALS.

The story of the achievements of women doctors and nurses in the war will be a fount of inspiration in the future to those workers in the feminist movement who are specially concerned with advancement in the professions. In order to assess the work of women doctors at its true value it is necessary to remember that it was not until 1892 that the British Medical Association decided to admit women to its membership. Even when the opposition of medical men was worn



Women gardeners in the hot houses at Windsor

[Central News.



Women cab-cleaners at work in a London garage.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

down, after a contest extending over thirty years, there remained deeply rooted in the minds of many people such a stubborn mistrust of women doctors that up to the beginning of the war their ministrations were limited almost entirely to children and adult patients of their own sex. This mistrust was evidently shared by the British Army Medical Service, which declined offers of help from medical women until the fame of their work for Allied Governments changed the attitude of the official mind. In succeeding months the brilliant work in surgery as well as in medicine accelerated a striking change in public sentiment. The women doctors who remained at home seized every opportunity of public service, and many took over the work of medical men who volunteered for war service. They helped to carry on private practices, were appointed to posts in hospitals and public health departments, and in one case the duties of a county medical officer of health were cheerfully added to the supervision of a large sanatorium. These extensions of activity, and particularly the heroic exploits of the doctors and nurses who went out to Servia, touched the public imagination, established confidence in the competence of medical women, and attracted a rapidly-growing number of girl students to the medical schools.

There is a touch of ironic justice in the circumstance that one of the organisers of the first military hospital to be established, equipped, and staffed by women should be Dr. Louisa Garrett Anderson, whose mother, by the exercise of much pertinacity and ingenuity, succeeded, in spite of many obstacles, in gaining the first licence issued to a woman by any medical society in Great Britain. Dr. Louisa Anderson was associated with Dr. Flora Murray in this enterprise, and the hospital, with 100 beds, was opened in September, 1914, in palatial apartments of Claridge's Hotel in Paris. It was recognised by the French Government, and the excellence of its administration, the skill of its surgeons, and the high percentage of recoveries evoked generous praise, both from French and British visitors. After a time the British Army Medical Service invited the organisation which was known as the Women's Hospital Corps to set up a hospital of 200 beds at Wimereux, and administer it under the War Office. The enterprise and resource displayed in this institution so deeply impressed the authorities that at the end of February, 1915, the corps was asked to undertake the organisation and entire charge of a hospital of 520 beds in Endell Street, London. The staff consisted of fourteen doctors, thirty-six nursing sisters, and eighty women orderlies, besides the administrative section, and in this undertaking the high standard of efficiency reached in France was more than maintained.

Other enterprises, which called forth high courage and devotion to duty up to the point of self-sacrifice, were projected and carried through to an adventurous finish by Dr. Inglis, of the Scottish Federation of the National Union of Women Suffrage Societies, and by Mrs. St. Clair Stobart, who was a lay organiser. Mrs. Stobart went to Antwerp in September, 1914, a few days after the departure of the Women's Hospital Corps to France, and in October, after eighteen hours in the bombardment zone, with burning houses all round the hospital, the staff succeeded in carrying their patients into motor omnibuses and escaping over the Bridge of Boats just twenty minutes before the Belgians blew it up. After a period of arduous work in France, Mrs. Stobart organised another unit for service in Servia.

Meanwhile, Dr. Inglis, on behalf of the Scottish Federation, had travelled widely in Great Britain, appealing for funds so successfully that by January, 1916, a sum of £82,000 had been subscribed, principally by women, for the support of the Scottish Women's Hospitals. The work was opened in the autumn of 1914, when Dr. Alice Hutchison, who saw field service in the Balkan War, went with ten nurses to take charge of a fever annexe to a Belgian hospital in Calais, and the death-rate among her patients was lower than in any other typhoid hospital in the town.

The first complete hospital unit, composed of doctors, nurses, orderlies, and administrative staff, with X-Ray apparatus, motor ambulances and women drivers, and full equipment for a hospital of 100 beds (later increased to 200), established itself in December, 1914, in the dilapidated Abbey of Royaumont, near Chantilly, in France. The conversion of the building, with hardly any outside help, into an up-to-date hospital, was a triumph of the "push and go" spirit. Following the recognition of the institution by the French Government as an auxiliary hospital, a second unit, subscribed for by Girton and Newnham students, opened a 200-bed hospital, in tents, at Troyes, under the direct control of the French Army Medical Service. Dr. Frances Ivens, of Liverpool, was in charge at Royaumont, and Dr. Louise M'Ilroy, of Glasgow, and Dr. Laura Sandeman, of Aberdeen, were head surgeon and physician respectively at Troyes, where Mrs. Harley, sister of Viscount French, was the administrator. The work at Troyes was so noteworthy that by order of the French War Office the unit was included with their expeditionary force to Salonika.

HEROISM AND SELF-SACRIFICE.

The plans for the work in Servia were greatly extended when an urgent cry for help went up from the country after the outbreak of typhus and small-pox. The first unit reached Servia in charge of Dr. Soltau (who was later relieved by Dr. Inglis) at the beginning of 1915, and immediately assumed responsibility for a hospital of 250 beds at Kragujevatz. Shortly afterwards Dr. Soltau opened a typhus hospital, and five more doctors and twenty nurses were sent out to reinforce her staff. Dr. Hutchison took out the second unit in April, and on the way they nursed British wounded for a fortnight at Malta, where an unexpected number of Dardanelles casualties had arrived. At the end of their journey the women set up a hospital at Valjevo. Subsequently other hospitals were staffed, and after the fall of Belgrade one of the units took charge of a dressing station with 600 beds at Kragujevatz, where they dealt with 5,000 cases a week. Finally, two of the units, together with Mrs. Stobart's party, retreated through the Montenegrin mountains, and Dr. Inglis and Dr. Hutchison, with their staffs, were taken prisoners of war.

The experiences which preceded this grim climax were of a kind which only the stoutest-hearted women could endure. Their work at times was in a veritable charnel house. At the height of the epidemic both soldiers and civil population were dying by the thousand, half the Servian doctors had sacrificed their lives, and in the native hospitals, where patients lay in suffering crowds, the nursing staffs were inadequate and equipment and disinfectants were lacking. The Scottish Women's units, together with ambulance parties sent out by the British and American Red Cross, fought the disease



Women 'bus conductors taking their first lesson in their duties.

[L.N.A.



The staff of cooks for a large military hospital.

[L.N.A.

desperately and successfully, but the visitation did not spare the rescuers. Many nurses and women orderlies were stricken with typhoid or typhus, and several, including Mrs. Percy Dearmer and Miss Neil-Fraser, the well-known golfer, were left in honoured Servian graves. Lady Paget, who with a band of devoted American women, was nursing typhus cases at Uskub, survived a severe attack of the disease.

The escaping women who made for the coast of Montenegro were ill-equipped for exposure to the storms of the high mountain regions they had to traverse. They trekked for days, single-file, along a narrow precipitous path, over passes which reach an altitude of between seven and eight thousand feet, and

not infrequently pack ponies slipped and fell into the gorges beneath. The weary travellers waded through streams, struggled against fierce blizzards, and slept in the snow with scanty covering. They were halffrozen and faint from lack of food. but after six weeks of such trials they won through to Scutari, whence they tramped for two more days to San Giovanni di Medua, and so to Italy and London, where Bond Street was startled by the spectacle of a ragged and mudstained band of women enjoying the most glorious shopping day of their lives.

IN AN AUSTRIAN PRISON.

In some respects the fate of the units of Dr. Inglis and Dr. Hutchison was worse than that of the women

who escaped the clutches of the enemy, for loss of liberty and indignities were added to the sufferings of cold and privation. They remained at Krushevatz, whither they had retreated before the invading armies, until the town was bombarded and captured. Their hospital equipment was seized by the Germans, who refused all privileges to which they, as Red Cross workers, were entitled, and ordered their arrest and transportation to Hungary. Dr. Hutchison's party of thirty had to travel in cattle trucks, exposed, even at night, to bitter weather, and to beg for scraps of food at the stations. At Karevara, they were crowded for two months in two small rooms, where they slept

on straw, their health was undermined by bad food, and at times some of the officers were guilty of unpardonable severity and rudeness. This ruthless treatment came to an end when they were removed to Vienna, where they enjoyed considerable freedom and found the civilian population kindly disposed. Here they met the members of the unit of Dr. Inglis, who had been treated less harshly during their internment, and within a few days arrangements were made for the return of all the women, including several parties of Red Cross nurses.

Notwithstanding the entreaties of her husband and also of her staff, Lady Paget refused to abandon her patients when the Bulgarians were approaching Uskub.

> 'I am going to stay here and take care of these poor men," she said. "It is useless to try to make me leave. I simply must stay." Her staff, together with Drs. S. H. Osborne and C. E. Fox, from the United States, and Dr. Catharine Travis. from Canada, elected to remain with her, and the Bulgarians permitted them to continue their work.

The activity of the Scottish Women's Hospital was not ended by the breakup in Servia, and Dr. Blair, who with another unit had reached Salonika on their way to Servia, travelled, at the beginning of 1916, to Ajaccio in Corsica, where they opened a hospital for Servian refugees. The good work at Royaumont and with the French Expeditionary Force at Salonika was also



Women ambulance attendants and drivers at a London County Council Ambulance Station. [Central News.

continued. Apart from the organised units, women doctors worked in the ordinary military services in Great Britain, France, Belgium, Egypt, and Montenegro, and Dr. Florence Stoney, who was with Mrs. Stobart in Antwerp and France, afterwards took charge of the X-Ray department of a military hospital of 900 beds at Fulham.

In all wars since the Crimean, when the noble tradition of British nursing was founded, women have distinguished themselves by the services they have rendered to the sick and wounded, but no record of nursing in previous wars can be compared to that of which the first page was written in August, 1914.




Women's hospital work in Servia: Nurses of Mrs. St. Clair Stobart's staff attending to patients at a wayside dispensary at Kragujevatz. [Topical.



Women agricultural workers filling a watering cart,

[Central News.



A ploughing competition for women workers on the land.

[Central News.

EXPERIENCES OF THE NURSES.

Within two or three days of the declaration of war hundreds of trained nurses were ready to leave comfortable posts at home for the hazards of duty in Belgium and France. The Army Nursing Service, with its small permanent staff and large reserve; the Territorial Force Nursing Service, in which 3,000 hospital nurses had enrolled since the scheme was initiated by Miss Haldane in 1907; and the nurses of the British Red Cross Society were quickly mobilised. The enrolment of additional volunteers and the organisation of training classes by hospital authorities, education committees, and the Red Cross, enabled the supply of fully-trained or assistant nurses to keep pace with the growing need, and within six months many thousand women were ministering to the sick and wounded in military and auxiliary hospitals at home and abroad.

The character of the work and the physical and nervous tax upon the nurses varied widely. In the home hospitals there were days and nights of strenuous work, when large numbers of wounded arrived suddenly, followed by quiescent periods in which the daily routine differed little from that in a civil hospital. At the great base hospitals abroad exhausting toil was more continuous in the periods of fighting, especially in the first two or three months of the war, while the medical service was being strengthened and adapted to cope with an almost overwhelming task. The work of many of the nurses who were nearer the firing line demanded nerves of steel, physical endurance which could defy fatigue, and a capacity to face unflinchingly life stripped of all artificiality and convention. In letters and a few diaries are to be found vivid little descriptions which help the reader to picture the daily life of these women. In the military uncertainty of the first few weeks rumours and counter-rumours of intended destination circulated daily among the nurses who were awaiting

orders at the French ports. Staffs were told off to points near the front, only to be intercepted at wayside stations and sent back to the base, because of some new movement of the enemy. Hospitals were hurriedly established and as hastily evacuated, but in the journeyings to and fro there came opportunities of emergency service which severely tested the skill and resource of the purses.

When the tide of battle turned at the Marne, settled plans could be made by the Army Medical Service and the Red Cross, and soon all the nurses were distributed, some for the base and clearing hospitals, others for more dangerous work near the front. The confusion was subsiding, but it was still necessary to send many wounded to the base in cattle trucks, with straw for beds. At the advanced dressing stations nurses met the trains, often in the night, clambered over the sides of the trucks and hurriedly applied dressings to wounds which were full of dirt and already gangrenous. In the dim light of lamps they picked out the dying, or cases which required immediate operation, and these were borne away by orderlies to the hospital building.

One Sunday a small staff dealt with 1,175 cases, working from seven o'clock in the morning until evening, in an atmosphere made fœtid by the stench from wounds. Two of the nurses were asked to accompany the train to the base, and all through the night they climbed from truck to truck at the stopping places to try to alleviate the sufferings of the men. They travelled back all the next day, arrived at the dressing station at two o'clock on the Tuesday morning, and at six o'clock were ready for duty again. During the journey they obtained only brief snatches of sleep, and fared on a ration of bread and jam, washed down by tea made with engine boiler water. When the wounded were sent down in passenger carriages the nurses became

experts at "clawing along the footboards" in the darkness while the train was moving. Then came one of the new ambulance trains and visits to the railhead, where wounded were loaded up at night from ambulance convoys, while the sky a few miles away was aglow with star shells and searchlights over the trenches.

IN THE BOMBARDMENT ZONE.

The experience of the nurse from whose diary this typical picture is drawn was widened by a transfer to a field ambulance during the British attacks in the spring of 1915. Inside the building the nurses and orderlies struggled hour after hour with an unending

stream of wounded. who were passed in on stretchers, lying in mud-soaked clothes, and often saturated with blood from the terrible shell wounds. Outwards went another stream of the movable cases. their wounds dressed -no time for gangrene to develop now - and everything done that was possible to make the train journey comfortable. Other nurses were helping the surgeons, whose tense faces, pale with fatigue, were bent over the operating tables for days and nights with hardly a break. Added to the nerve strain of the work itself was the distraction of indescribable noise out side-motor waggons and traction engines, the ceaseless clatter of horses' hoofs on the cobble road, the march of relief troops singing ragtime, and above

it all the incessant thunder of artillery. On the top of this ordeal came a day when the German shells began to drop in the garden of the hospital, and the wounded were carried to a safe retreat while the bombardment was raging.

In a hospital centre in Belgium, in the early period of the war, a small staff nursed a thousand serious cases in a hundred beds in five weeks—the operating theatre going for four days and nights continuously—while a well-known woman novelist helped in the kitchen with Belgian Nuns, and Madame Curie operated her X-Ray apparatus by means of a dynamo linked up to a motor car engine. With a shortage of equipment the nurses "worked miracles of improvisation."

Invaluable work for the Belgian wounded was accomplished by the fearless women members of the famous ambulance organised by Dr. Hector Munro and Lady Dorothie Feilding. They ran many risks in the firing line during the first onslaught of the Germans, and later two of them established a dressing station in a half-demolished village near the trenches. "Only two women with real courage," wrote one who watched their work, "could have slept night after night in that empty house, in a ruined and deserted village, with no sound to be heard but the rain and the wind, the splutter of mitrailleuse, and the shriek of the shells."

A number of the Red Cross nurses who went out

the state of the s

A competitor at the ploughing competition held by the Cornwall War Agricultural Committee. $[Central\ News.]$

Servia were to made prisoners by the Austrians, and after suffering hardships similar to those endured by Dr. Hutchison's party, they arrived at Zurich, wearing blouses and skirts made from blankets, and shoes patched with leather from their handbags. Nurse Florence Clifton, who was shot through the lungs during the Servian retreat, arrived at the same time. An attack of pneumonia followed the wound, and while suffering from this double affliction she was conveyed to Austria in a bullock waggon.

The task of the nurses in the big base hospitals, although without the excitement and adventure of field work, was at times exhausting to the last degree, and many broke down under the strain. To all who went

out may be applied the comment of a surgeon on the "magnificent service" of his own nurses. "They rose to the emergency," he said, "as only Englishwomen can, and there is not one of those unfortunate men who will not remember with gratitude their sympathy and their skill." Well deserved were the new orders of R.R.C. (Royal Red Cross) and A.R.R.C. (Associate) which were founded in November, 1915, for bestowal upon nurses who distinguished themselves in war service.

IN OFFICE AND WORKSHOP.

The organisation of women for commercial and industrial work which was directly or indirectly associated

with the war was longer delayed in Great Britain than in either France or Germany. In fact, women's labour never was organised for war purposes in the German sense of that word. An attempt was made in the spring of 1915 by means of a special register which was superimposed on the ordinary work of the Labour Exchanges, but the department was apparently snowed under by the task, and it was announced several months afterwards that only two thousand offers of service had been accepted out of about eighty thousand. Processions of women marched through London and demanded that the Government should tell them how they could serve their country according to their

capacity, but other forces, stronger than official direction, were coming into play, and the modest register scheme was soon left far in the background by the swift movement of events —the cumulative effect of enlistments, the dramatic development of the munitions question, and the drainage of men from the great majority of occupations by the Derby scheme and compulsion for single men.

Gradually was realised that transformations of far-reaching character were inevitable, and that women and girls who could adapt themselves to new forms of manual labour within the space of a few days or weeks were required by the hundred thousand. The process was worked out not by direct Government organisation,

although much help was given by the Board of Trade, the Board of Agriculture, and the Home Office, but in the traditional English way, with friction and delays at the beginning, but with increasing efficiency and clearness of purpose as the gravity of the national task was revealed.

Through this period girls and women of all classes displayed a spirit of eager patriotism, and it was not reluctance on their part which retarded the full use of the nation's productive resources. When the Glasgow Corporation asked for women transguards early in 1915 they received twelve thousand applications, and the numbers were typical. As the months went on observers noted an enormous increase in the number of women

workers in offices, shops, and warehouses. There was hardly a calling to which women and girls had not penetrated by the end of 1915. The work done was not uniformly good, but in the majority of cases in which the results were not altogether pleasing to the employer •the fault could be traced to insufficient training for the particular occupation.

The only calling into which women did not appear to be very eager to enter was agriculture. It is true that many young women of leisure took advantage of special facilities for training at the agricultural colleges and institutes, and at Lady Derby's farm at Knowsley, but for the hard work on the land there

Turning a plough at the end of a furrow. [Central News.

were comparatively few candidates until the spring of 1916, when the Board of Agriculture issued an appeal, based on patriotic grounds, for a volunteer army of 400,000 women for agricultural work. Armlets and a uniform were offered as inducements. public meetings were held, a houseto-house canvass was organised in rural districts, and many thousand women enrolled in a few weeks. The weakness of the scheme was the absence of any guarantee of fair wages. The women were to be left to bargain with the farmers, to whom the war had brought a considerable measure of prosperity and who were well able to pay liberal wages. It was freely admitted that without guarantees the position of these women workers would not compare favourably

with that of munition workers in the best of the controlled establishments.

SUPPLYING THE SHELLS.

At the beginning of 1916 scores of thousands were engaged on munitions work of one kind or another in Great Britain, and arrangements were then being made for the employment of another hundred thousand in the new national projectile factories.

In certain quarters there was a disposition to magnify women's achievements in disparagement of men's, and the public was informed that for 30s. a week women and girls were doubling the output attained by men before the war, but the particular class of work was not specified. In



Training women in munition work.

Photopress.

some departments, where women's deftness of touch was a factor that counted, output was undoubtedly largely increased, but taking the whole field of munitions work it can be said that the degree of success varied considerably, and no good purpose was served by making extravagant claims for women's work. It can also be said that a comparatively small proportion received an average weekly wage of anything like 30s.

On the whole, the women workers were exemplary timekeepers, eager to excel, and swift in learning the essentials of their new tasks. Their fitness or capacity was not unlimited, and in operations which required a high degree of technical skill, or the exercise of great physical strength, they could not replace men. Many of them showed, however, that given equal opportunities with men in the technological schools they would be capable of performing the most skilled work, and indeed the range of their activity was extended considerably in the factories as practical experience was gained. When certain alterations were made in some of the machines it was found that tasks which had been in the "doubtful" category could be undertaken satisfactorily by women.

The entrance of women into industries which had been exclusively occupied by men was not achieved without controversy, which centred mainly round questions of wages and conditions. In some trades agreements were entered into between employers and the unions with the object of safeguarding the positions of the men who joined the forces, and of preventing

depreciation of wages standards. Many of the women tramguards, for instance, were paid the same wages as the men they released, and those who enlisted received a guarantee that their places would be kept open. Mr. J. H. Thomas, M.P., stated in July, 1915, that he had secured a guarantee from one of the heads of the Government that men would be reinstated on discharge from the army, and that women's labour would not be used to reduce the status of any grade. The companies, however, did not bind themselves to dispense with women workers after the war.

Cases of this kind were exceptional, so far as wages were concerned, and the general tendency was definitely to employ women at the lowest wages that could be bargained for, notwithstanding Mr. Lloyd George's pronouncement in July, 1915, that a woman "should be paid exactly the same price as a man for any piece of work she turned out," and this tendency was strengthened by the zeal which led so many of the women to undertake national work without much regard to pay or conditions. Mr. Lloyd George saw that it was difficult to adjust time rates to women's productive capacity when they were called upon hurriedly to take up new work without adequate training, but he intimated that in controlled establishments a fair time rate would be fixed.

THE MINIMUM WAGE.

It was more than half a year before this promise was redeemed, and meanwhile evidence drawn from a

variety of sources was published to show that large numbers of women were being paid little better than sweated wages. A widespread demand arose for a legal minimum rate of f1 per week for the standard time worked by men, and it was announced in February, 1916, that the Ministry of Munitions was about to issue a decree making this minimum obligatory in controlled establishments. The appeals of Mr. Lloyd George and other members of the Government that this minimum should be established voluntarily had been ignored by many firms, and thousands of women were working for threepence an hour, or 15s. for a sixty-hour week. It was also alleged that by slightly altering the character of certain classes of work it was possible to describe them as new classes, and so to evade the provision of the Munitions Act, which laid it down that women on piece-work should be paid the rates applicable to men's labour.


In the miscellaneous employments women were sometimes well paid and worked reasonable hours. In others they toiled hard for wretched pay, and the indecision of some of the trade unions on the question of admitting the women to membership buttressed the position of employers who did not scruple to increase their profits by the sweated labour of patriotic women workers.

It was also shown that in many works women and girls were employed inordinately long hours, that in some trades which were dangerous to health the full legal maximum period of work was insisted upon, and that in consequence there was reason to apprehend serious effects on physique. A Committee appointed by the Government to investigate the effect of fatigue and cognate questions confirmed the belief that radical reforms were needed in many establishments, and they advocated a general adoption of the system of "welfare" organisations by firms employing women.

These matters have some bearing on such questions as the social and industrial effects of the vast extension of women's work, but it is too early yet to form any definite opinion as to what those effects will be. It may presently appear that the low environment of some classes of work has had a coarsening influence, but on the other hand there is definite evidence that the presence of women in workshops, as in offices, has had a steadying and refining effect on men. Broadly, it may be assumed that the association will be advantageous to both. The mixing of women of different classes as "mates" in the workshop will certainly modify relationships in social life, and many women of the comfortably-off classes learned in a few months more of the conditions of existence and solid virtues, as well as the defects, of their poorer fellow workers than years of study of economics would have taught them.

PHILANTHROPIC EFFORT.

Apart from the professional and industrial activities of women, a vast amount of philanthropic effort was organised for the production of comforts for soldiers, sailors, and prisoners of war, so that it could be said of very few women indeed that they took no part at all in the conflict. The Committee set up by the Queen in the autumn of 1914 to provide relief workshops for the many thousands of women who were then unemployed was a model of what such an organisation should be. The Queen called to her aid practical tradeunion women like Miss Mary Macarthur and Miss Margaret Bondfield. Training classes, as well as workshops, were instituted, and avenues of new employment were thereby opened up when the call for women's labour went abroad and the absorption into new industries began.



The beginning of a German gas attack on the Russian front as photographed from a Russian aeroplane. Great clouds of gas are seen rolling towards the Russian trenches, while behind them are the German troops, in three lines, massed ready for the attack. From the long shadows cast by the men the time is apparently early morning or late evening.

[Central News.]

CHAPTER XXV.

THE THIRD SIX MONTHS—A SYNOPSIS.

HE correlation of the different events on the various and far-flung fronts of the war has already been undertaken for the first twelve months of the struggle in Chapters XXII. of Volume II. and VIII. of Volume III. The same convenient comparison of principal happenings and developments during the third six months may now be entered upon. This period includes little of advantage to the Allied cause; the gradual arrest of the Austro-German advance into Russia is completed within its limits, but for the first month Hindenburg's hammer blows fall more heavily than ever on the Eastern front. The blunders of Allied diplomacy are paid for in the entry of Bulgaria into the war on the side of the Central Powers; Servia and Montenegro are overwhelmed, and the half-hearted attempts at their rescue present most disheartening examples of indecision and the difficulties which come in its train. The failure to advance in Gallipoli, and the ultimate evacuation of all the dearlybought positions on the Peninsula, complete one of the most hopeful, but ultimately unfortunate, chapters of the war. The maintained effectiveness of the British naval blockade and the partially successful offensive on the Western front at the end of September are the

only bright spots, after the resistance finally offered by Russia to the Austro-German attacks. For the rest, the third six months of the war sees the Central Powers at the very top of the second wind which they gained after the frustration, during the first six months, of their original plans of campaign.

THE THIRTEENTH MONTH.

This is a month in which the important events are at the two extremes of the European theatre. The Western front is quiet. But on the East the swift climax of the German attack is told in the fall of Ivangrod, of Warsaw, of Kovno, and of Brest-Litovsk. Riga the Germans fail to reach, and their squadrons which attempt to lend naval support to the land campaign are defeated in the Gulf of Riga. The end of the month sees the beginning of the renewed Austro-German offensive in the South. At the other end of Europe the battles of Anzac and Suvla were taking place, and the last opportunity of making a brilliant success of the Gallipoli campaign was disappearing in the worst and most luckless defeat a British army has ever suffered.

German submarines are extremely active towards the

end of the month, and the tonnage of vessels sunk during one week reaches the highest figure yet recorded. The torpedoing of the *Arabic*, without warning, off the

warfare is provided by the sinking of the British troop transport Royal Edward in the Ægean Sea, with the loss of some thousand lives.

THE THIRTEENTH MONTH.

| | WEST | FRONT. | | Italy | | | | |
|----------|---|---------|---|----------------------------------|--|---------------|--|--|
| DATE. | | | RUSSIAN FRONTS. | AND THE | Turkey. | Colonial. | NAVAL. | Home Politics. |
| | British. | FRENCH. | | BALKANS. | | | | |
| Aug. 1—3 | | : | Russian retreat continues. Ivangrod cap- tured (Vol. III., 81). | | | · | | |
| " 5 | | | Fall of Warsaw (Vol. III., 81). | | | | | |
| ,, 6–12 | | | | | Battle of Auzac and Suvla defeat (Vol. III., 361). | | | |
| " 8 | | | | | | | German fleet defeated in Gulf of Riga (Vol. III., 255) | |
| " 9 | Successful British trench fighting at Hooge. | | | | | | | |
| ,, 12 | | | | | | | Zeppelin raid on East Coast (Vol. IV., 167) | |
| ,, 14 | | | | | | | Troopship Royal Edward torpedoed, 1,000 lives lost. | |
| ,, 15 | | | | | | | | National Register taken (Vol. III., 336). |
| ,, 17 | | | Kovno e a p - tured (Vol. III. 252). | | | | Zeppelins raid Eastern counties (Vol. IV., 167). | |
| ,, 19 | | | Novo Georgie- wsk captured (Vol. III., 251). | | | | Arabic tor- pedoed (Vol. III., 229). | |
| ,, 20 | | | | Italy declares war on Turkey. | | | | Minister of Munitions an- nounces 5 3 5 "controlled es- tablishments." |
| ,, 21 | | | | | | | Cotton declared contraband by Gt. Britain and France (Vol. III., 240). | |
| ,, 25 | | | Fall of Brest Litovsk (Vol. III., 253). | | | | | |

south coast of Ireland on August 19th brings the submarines' record for that week up to 80,175 tons. A more legitimate but unfortunate example of submarine

At home the chief interest is in the question of the recruiting and the vigorous discussion of the principles of voluntary and compulsory service. The National

Register Forms are distributed, filled in and collected; and in spite of somewhat specific assurances from Government spokesmen that the taking of the Register

is not intended as a prelude to compulsory military service, the general feeling during the month is that it will result in some drastic change in our recruiting methods.

THE FOURTEENTH MONTH.

| WEST FRONT. | | RUSSIAN | i | | | | Номе | |
|-------------|--|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DATE. | British. | FRENCH. | FRONTS. | BALKANS. | TURKEY. | Coloniai | Navai | Politics. |
| Sept. 2 | ' | | Fighting on Dvina. | | | · | , | |
| 4 . | | | ļ. | | | | Allan liner Hesperian tor- pedoed with- out warning (Vol. III., 119). | |
| 5 | | | ı | ! ; [| | Rising on Indian N.W. frontier put down. | ! | |
| 7 | | | Russian recovery in Galicia (Vol. III., 261). | - | | | Bombardment of Belgian coast by Brit- ish squadron. | |
| ., 8 | | | : | | | | Serious air raid on London and Eastern counties, 106 casualties (Vol. IV., 167). | |
| ., 13 | ! ! ! | | ' : ! | | | | | Mr. Lloyd George's "pre- face" on mili- tary situation published. |
| 15 | | | Pinsk occupied by Germans (Vol. III., 267). | | | | | Lord Kitchener notes "signs that the Ger- mans have al- most shot their bolt on Russian front." |
| " I9 | | : | | General mobilisation of Bulgarian Army (Vol. IV., 9). | | | : | |
| n 23···· | | | | General mobilisation of Greek Army. (Vol. IV., 11.) | | | | |
| ,, 25-27 | British take Loos and oc- cupy Hulluch Quarries (Vol. | Offensive. French advance in Champagne and capture Souchez (Vol. III., 279). | | | | | | |
| " 28 | | | | | Capture of Kut-el-Amara (Vol. III., 351). | | | Recruiting question to the fore: Premier and Lord Kitchener receive trade union delegates (Vol. IV., 73). |

THE FIFTEENTH MONTH.

| | | WEST FRONT. | | Russian | Russian | | | | |
|------|-------------|--|---|--|---|---|---|--|---|
| Da: | re. | British. | FRENCH. | FRONTS. | BALKANS. | BELGIUM. | Turkey. | Navai,. | Politics. |
| Oct. | 1 | | French advance north of Mesnil, in Champagne. | | | | | | Great anxiety about Balkan situation. |
| ,, | 3 | German counter-attack retakes most of Hohenzollern Redoubt (Vol. III., 277). | Champagner | | | | | | |
| ,, | 4 | | | | Russian ulti- matum to Bul- garia demand- ing breach with Central Powers. | | | | |
| ,, | 5 | | | | Resignation of Greek Premier, M. Venizelos (Vol. IV., 13). | | | | Lord Derby ap pointed Direc- tor-General o Recruiting |
| ,, | 6 | | French capture of village of Tahure. | | New Austro- German inva- sion of Servia begins (Vol. IV., 17). Allied troops land at Sa- lonika. | | | | (Vol. IV., 74). |
| ,, | | German counter-attacks on new British positions repulsed. | | | 10.1.1.u. | | | | |
| | 11 | | | | Crossing of Danube com- pleted (Vol. IV., Chap. II.). Bulgarian in- vasion of Ser- | | | | |
| ,, | 12 | | | | via begins. | Execution of Miss Edith Cavell (Vol. IV., 11) | : - - | | |
| ,, | 13 | British recapture most of Hohenzollern Redoubt. | | | | , | | Zeppelin raid on L on d on, 170 casualties (Vol. IV., 167). | |
| ,, | 15 | | Heavy fighting for Hartmanns- weilerkopf be- gins. | | Great Britain declares war on Bulgaria. | | | | |
| ,, | 16 17-20 | | | Successful | France declares war on Bul- garia. Bulgarians cut | | Sir C. C. Munro | British sub- marines active in Baltic. | Lord Derby's |
| ,, | -, - | | | Russian at- tacks south of Pripet on the | Salonika-Nish railway. Italy declares war on Bulgaria. Bulgaria take Veles (Vol. IV., chap. II.). | | appointed to command of Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in suc- cession to Sir Ian Hamilton | | recruiting scheme an nounced (Vol IV., 75). Sir Edward Carson resign (Vol. IV., 47) |
| ,, | 23 | | | | | | (Vol IV., 56). | British sub- marine sinks German cruiser in Baltic. | |
| | 24 | | | | | Austrian air raid on Venice. | | | Recruiting can vass begin (Vol. IV., 76). |
| ,, | 28 | | | | | | | | French Cabine resigns, Briand Ministry formed |

THE FOURTEENTH MONTH.

In the first days of the month the renewed German offensive against the south of the Russian line is successful; but it soon turns to a very considerable

launches his bold and remarkable stroke against the Russian army round Vilna; but though the town falls into German hands the army escapes into safety, and a position of great danger is retrieved. Hence-

THE SIXTEENTH MONTH.

| | West 1 | Front. | RUSSIAN | <u> </u> | | | | |
|----------|----------|------------|--|---|---|------------------------|---|--|
| DATE. | BRITISH. | FRENCH. | FRONTS. | Bai,kans. | TURKEY. | ITALY | NAVAL. | Politics. |
| Nov. 2 | _ | | Successful Russian at- tacks on Strypa. Guerilla war- fare develops in marshes (Vol. IV., 233). | | | | | Groups" open for enlistments (Vol. IV., 76). |
| ,, 6 | | | | Nish taken: break-up of Servian army begins (Vol. IV., 25). | Lord Kitchener leaves England on visit to Near East, and to inspect Gallipoli positions and report on proposed evacuation (Vol. IV., 55). | | | |
| 7 | | | | M. Skouloudis a p p o i n t e d Greek Premier | | | Incona tor- pedoed (Vol. IV., 270). | · |
| ,, 10 | | | | | | | | New Vote of Credit for £400,000,000. |
| ,, 12 | | | | | | | | Mr. Churchill resigns. |
| ,, 14 | | | ! | | | Air raid on Verona. | | |
| ,, 17 | | | | | | | | Franco-British War Council in Paris, |
| ,, 20 | | | | Allied pressure on Greece. Lord Kitchener interviews Greek King and Premier (Vol. IV., 55). | | | | |
| ,, 22-24 | | | | | Battle of Ctesiphon (Vol IV., 135). | | | |
| ,, 28 | | | | German Head- quarters an- nounce the close of cam- paign against Servian army (Vol. IV., 41). | | | | |

defeat for the Austro-German forces, who, by September 12th, have lost 40,000 in prisoners alone in the fighting near Tarnopol and Trembovla. In the North the climax of the long advance approaches. Hindenburg

forward the great German offensive on the Eastern front had come to an end, though the fact was not yet generally apparent. Mr. Lloyd George, in a preface (which attracted much attention and criticism) to his

collected speeches on the war, wrote about this time of the Russian armies as a spent force in the war; but Lord Kitchener's statement, made a few days later, that there were signs that the Germans had "almost shot their bolt" against the Russians proved to be a been hoped for, and such advances as were made cost terribly highly in casualties. But a much greater success was missed by very little, and there is no doubt that the lively alarm into which the Germans were thrown by the British attack would have been

THE SEVENTEENTH MONTH.

| | WEST | FRONT. | RUSSIAN | | | | | Номе |
|-----------------|--|---|---------|---|---|-----------|--|---|
| DATE. | BRITISH. | FRENCH. | FRONTS. | BALKANS, | TURKEY. | COLONIAL. | NAVAL. | Politics |
| Dec. 3 | | General Joffre a p p o i n t e d Commander-in-Chief of all French armies (Vol. IV., 227). | | Bulgarian attack on Anglo- French force begins (Vol. IV., 33). | | | | ı |
| " 6 | | | | Austrian invasion of Montenegro begins. | | | | |
| 7 | | | | Anglo - French withdrawal on Macedonian front continues | | | | |
| " 8 | | | | | Evacuation of Suvla and Anzac ordered (Vol. IV., 184). | | | |
| ,, 12 | | | ٠ | Complete Allied withdrawal from Macedonia (Vol. IV., 35). | | | | Group system recruiting closes (Vol. IV., 83). |
| ,, 14 | General Sir Douglas Haig succeeds Sir John French in British com- mand (Vol. IV. 228). | | | | | | | |
| ,, 20 | · | | | | Evacuation of Suvla and Anzac completed. | | Russian fleet b o m b a r d s Varna. | Groups 2—5 called up (Vol. IV., 84). |
| ,, 21-22- 28 | | Heavy fighting on Hartmanns- weilerkopf. | | | | | | |
| ,, 24-25 | | | | | Heavy fighting at Siege of Kut. | | | |
| ,, 28 | | | | | | | | Cabinet crisis on recruiting returns. Compulsion Bill decided on. (Vol. IV., 89). |
| ,, 30 | | | • | | | | H.M.S. Natal blows up in harbour. | ! |

much more accurate reading of the situation, though at the time it seemed a singularly daring surmise.

At the end of the month, with the British advance at Loos and the larger French victories in Champagne, arrives the long-expected Allied offensive in the West. It did not achieve the important results which had thoroughly justified had that attack been followed up with anything like the certainty and ability with which it had been launched.

The greatest anxiety was now beginning to be felt about the position in the Balkans and the probable opening of the threatened Austro-German invasion of



After the French advance in Champagne of September 1915: Clearing up the captured trenches.

[Sport and General.



British troops on the Western front photographed in their new splinter-proof steel helmet. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.$

Servia. The general mobilisation of the Bulgarian army about the middle of the month increased that anxiety, but Anglo-French diplomacy in the Balkans remained as unfortunately directed as ever. In home politics the question of recruiting, and the best way of

the demands of the military authorities, and the advocates of compulsion were loud in their demand for conscription. A Zeppelin raid, with very heavy casualties, on London and the Eastern counties was one of the chief incidents of the month.

THE EIGHTEENTH MONTH.

| | WEST | FRONT. | RUSSIAN | Balkan | | | | Номе |
|--------|--------------------------------|---|--|---|---|--|-------|--|
| DATE. | Britisii. | FRENCH. | FRONTS. | FRONTS. | COLONIAL. | Turkey. | Naval | POLITICS. |
| Jan. I | | | | | Capture of Jaunde, Cameroons. (Vol. IV., 70). | : | | |
| ,, 4 | | | | | | | | "Derby Re- port" published. Sir J. Simon's resignation an- nounced. |
| ,, 5 | | | | | | | | Compulsory Military Ser- vice Bill intro- duced (Vol. IV. 89). |
| " 6 | | | Russian attempted offensive on Southern front (Vol. IV., 234). | | | Kut Relief Force sets out. | | National Labour Confer- ence condemns Compulsion Bill (Vol. IV., 92). |
| ., 8 | | German at- tacks on Hart- mannsweiler- kopf. | | | | Helles evacuated (Vol. IV., | | |
| ,, 9 | | | | | · | British capture of Turkish position at Sheik-Saad. | | |
| ,, 10 | | | | Austrians take Mt. Lovtchen (Vol. IV., 63). | ! : | | | • |
| ,, 13 | | | | Capture of Cetinje. | | | | |
| | Trench fighting near Givenchy. | | | | | | | |
| ,, 19 | | | | | | British relief force 23 miles from Kut. | | |
| ,, 23 | : | | | : | | Fighting on Western frontier of Egypt. | | • • |
| ,, 27 | | | | : | | Russian advance at Melashkert, in | | |
| | | | | | | Caucasus (Vol. IV., Chap. XI.) | | |

using the information yielded by the National Register in order to further recruiting, continued to be the topic of the hour. It was quite clear that the voluntary system, as hitherto understood, was ceasing to supply

THE FIFTEENTH MONTH.

The story of the fifteenth month of the war is the melancholy story of the consequences which proceeded from the failure to press the Gallipoli campaign to a successful

issue and from the bungling of Allied diplomacy in the Balkans. The Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria demanding a break with the Central Powers is followed, within a day or two, by the new invasion of Servia; and as soon as the Austro-German armies have crossed the river frontiers the Bulgarian forces join in the attack. The success of the joint attacks is swift and immediate, and the beginning of the landing of an Anglo-French army at Salonika is no more than the faintest promise of help. The general feeling of disgust at the failure of the Allied Governments to gauge and prepare for the situation in the Balkans is reflected in Great Britain by the resignation of Sir Edward Carson, and in France by the formation of the new Ministry, with M. Briand as Premier.

While the overwhelming of Servia was running its tragic course abroad, at home some sort of a temporary settlement of the recruiting problem was being thrashed out, with the new appointment of Lord Derby as Director of Recruiting and the establishment of the "group system" of deferred enlistments. As a last trying out of the "voluntary" system on organised lines, the canvass of all eligible men and the general details of the group scheme were hastily conceived and left much to be desired; and with the arrival of the Prime Minister's famous "pledge" to married men it was evident that the advocates of compulsion had gained an important strategical advantage.

Among the incidents of the month which, while having no immediate effect on the progress of the war, yet caused a deep impression at home and abroad, were the execution of Miss Cavell in Brussels and another, and even more disastrous, Zeppelin raid on London.

THE SIXTEENTH MONTH.

The main significance of this month is still in the Balkans. By the end of it the overrunning of Servia is complete, and such parts of the Servian army as have been able to extricate themselves are engaged in one of the most tragic flights of history. The position of the Allied forces advancing from Salonika into Macedonia remains embarrassed by the pro-German tendencies of the Greek Court and General Staff, and considerable pressure has to be applied before even the neutrality of the Greek Government is assured. Lord Kitchener leaves England in order to visit the Gallipoli positions, and as a result of his inspection Sir Charles Munro's earlier recommendation that the Peninsula should be evacuated is accepted. In Mesopotamia the promising dash upon Bagdad comes to an end in the Battle of Ctesiphon and the subsequent British retreat upon Kut. In home affairs the prosecution throughout the month of the recruiting canvass and enlistments for the groups, and the resignation of Mr. Winston Churchill from the Cabinet, are the principal features.

THE SEVENTEENTH MONTH.

The month opens with two definite set-backs to the Allied forces. General Townshend's army is closely invested in Kut, whither it had retreated after the

Battle of Ctesiphon; and the Anglo-French forces operating in Macedonia, with Salonika as their base, decide to fall back on Greek territory. The Austrians, having finished with Servia, begin their invasion of Montenegro. And the last chapter in the ill-starred Gallipoli campaign is begun by the withdrawal—fortunately with astonishing success—from the Suvla and Anzac positions. The military and diplomatic misfortunes of the past three months are worked out to their end with the close of the year.

The now familiar domestic background to those difficulties reaches a fresh stage with the closing of the group enlistments. The question of whether the number of unattested single men is "negligible" enough to satisfy the terms of the Prime Minister's pledge and make a Compulsory Military Service Bill unnecessary is promptly debated throughout the Press and country. In the absence of any official returns from the canvass attestation figures the discussion is not very helpful; and the quarrel between the supporters of the voluntary system and the compulsionists is reflected immediately after Christmas in the Cabinet crisis which follows the delivery of Lord Derby's report into the hands of the Government. But the figures, such as they are, and the strength of the compulsionist movement carry the day, and the Cabinet's decision to introduce a Compulsory Military Service Bill for the unattested single men is the last event of the year 1915. Upon this decision Sir John Simon resigns from the Cabinet. 1

THE EIGHTEENTH MONTH.

The last month of the third half-year of the war opens, therefore, with the introduction into the House of Commons of a Bill imposing compulsory military service abroad as one of the obligations of British citizenship. The strategical necessity and wisdom of this departure had received extraordinarily little consideration; but at least it was a rough and ready proof of the country's determination to prosecute the war with the utmost vigour of which it was capable, and may, therefore, be given a small place among the more encouraging events with which the New Year began. It is true that this eighteenth month of the war had still to accomplish the crushing of Montenegro and the evacuation from the remaining British positions at the toe of the Gallipoli Peninsula. But elsewhere the month's news was good. With the fall of Jaunde the conquest of Cameroon was complete. The renewed Russian offensive on the Styr, the Strypa, and towards Czernowitz, though it made little actual headway, at any rate proved that the Russian forces were well organised and equipped, and that with them rested the initiative. And on another and very promising front the troops of our Russian Allies were pressing forward on the vigorous and well-timed offensive which shortly afterwards was to result in the fall of Erzerum and Trebizond. Though the first five months covered by this synopsis had little of encouragement to offer, the concluding month was not without its accomplishments and, still more satisfactory, its definite promise for the



General Cadorna in London: Lord Kitchener photographed on Charing Cross Station with the Italian Commander-in-Chief. [L.N.A.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS CRITICS

THE DRAWBACKS OF A COALITION—THE CHARGES OF UNPREPAREDNESS—LORD HALDANE'S DEFENCE—THE DEFECTS OF GOVERNMENT BY COMMITTEE—THE PARIS CONFERENCES—THE DEFECTS IN THE AIR SERVICE—THE BY-ELECTIONS.

OME notice has been taken in former chapters of this work of the chief currents of popular opinion during the war (Vol. II., 286, 293), and the circumstances that led to the establishment of the Munitions Department and of compulsory military service have been described in the several chapters dealing with home politics. It may now be useful, as we approach the end of the period of transition between the early failures and what the majority of Englishmen were convinced would be a decisive victory, to gather together a number of criticisms which were made from time to time on the Government's conduct of the war, and to estimate their value. Some of these criticisms were quasi-political in character, and reflected political prejudices that existed before the war; and these need not detain us. The attacks, for example, on the Free Trade system of the country, though they had already attained some measure of success by this time, had hardly reached a stage at which their history could even begin to be written. But apart from these questions, a great deal of the agitation that stirred the country had no M₃-VOI. IV.

other object in view than the more efficient prosecution of the war and the earlier attainment of victory. This criticism took several forms. Sometimes it attacked the Government in general terms for its unpreparedness for war. Or, again, it accused the Government of inefficient organisation for the control of the war, and in particular, found fault with its strategy. Or, lastly, it attacked some particular department of the Government, the War Office, the Admiralty, and especially the administration of the air services.

The prime fact in what may be called the domestic politics of the war was that the Government was a Coalition Government. The main reason for its formation was that, as the magnitude of the war became apparent, the Liberals, who had been continuously in power since 1906, doubted their ability to carry on the war unassisted without producing internal dissensions which would weaken us in the face of the enemy. The results were not by any means wholly good. His Majesty's Opposition is as much a part of the Government of the country as the Government itself. It ensures a steady stream of



An Allied Conference in Paris: The British Ambassador in Paris, Mr. Asquith, and Sir Edward Grey leaving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Central News.



Labour and the Munitions Act: A meeting of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers in London, held to decide what steps should be taken to secure some amendment in the Act and its administration.

[Newspaper Illustrations.

criticism, responsible and restrained because those who make it know that if they establish their points they may have themselves to take over the Government of the country. But the first consequence of a Coalition Government is to suppress the official Opposition as an instrument of government. There is no opposition from men capable themselves of forming a Government; it is driven even from Parliament, which tends to become a mere court for the legal registration of the decrees of the Executive; and it takes refuge in the newspapers, or in societies, or in the street. The wonder under these circumstances was not that the opposition was sometimes ill-informed and indiscreet, but that it was on the whole so sincere in its motives, and did on the whole far more good than

THE CHARGE OF UNPREPAREDNESS.

There is no such thing as preparedness for war in general. The nation's duty is to be prepared for the particular war which the foreign policy of the country compels us to undertake. By this standard we were clearly unprepared. Success in a war with Germany required an army of millions, and there is little doubt that had we had such an army in August, 1914, the war would probably never have taken place, or if it had would have been over much sooner. The Liberal Government was accordingly accused, as the Conservative Government was after the Boer War, of not having the army of its policy; and as people after the war had begun ceased to

Lord Kitchener and Sir Edward Grey in Paris for the Allied Conference. $[Topical\ Press.]$

discuss the policy of it but assumed it to have been inevitable, the critics of the Government fastened on the disparity between our policy and our military preparations, and the more malignant of them jumped to the conclusion that our insufficient preparations were due to the presence of a pro-German party in the Government. Of all those who suffered under these charges, the most prominent was Lord Haldane. He had been War Secretary for many years, and he had also appeared before the country as one of the chief advocates of friendship with Germany, and had confessed to his admiration of the German spirit. The two facts were maliciously connected. A speech by Lord Haldane at the National Liberal Club in July,

1915, is the longest and best-argued defence of the Government against the general charge of unpreparedness for the war.

"There had been some criticism of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and in dealing with this he declared that they had to consider more than the case of invasion in an isolated war with Germany. They refused to look on the question as if it was only one of home defence. They realised that other nations were creating great navies, and they realised that they would have closely and carefully to consider what part we might bear if we were drawn into a Continental war. There were three alternatives before the Committee—our existing highly-trained professional army, with behind it expansion in the shape of a Territorial army and a compulsorily trained home-defence army, short-trained but under no

obligation to go abroad. The experts on the Committee would not look at that plan.

"The third alternative, to which he gave his mind very closely, was the question of raising a Continental army of two million men two years' trained. There was a fatal difficulty in the way. To have raised an army like that, even if they could have got the nation to assent to it, would have taken a generation. The great armies of the Continent had taken two generations to build up, and how could we have built up such an army in a generation, or even ten or fifteen years? It would have been too late unless we could have got such an army into existence at once, for before we had it we should have been in a situation of extraordinary peril, because our professional army would have begun to disappear. Before we could have got the army into an efficient state. the enemy would have chosen some reason for attacking us. At that time the armies Russia and France were not organised

as they are to-day, and we should all have been at the mercy of the German army. Now, perhaps, you will realise why I felt it incumbent upon myself to do all I could to make friendly speeches. I knew something of Germany—I knew the perils of the situation—where the powder magazine was—and I was most anxious that that most unjust and untrue suspicion should be got out of the minds of the only party in Germany that mattered—the Centre Party, which held the scales. It was not to be.

"The war party dominated them, and the moment it dominated them I did not trouble my head about France or Belgium. I said we were fighting for our lives, and I never had the smallest doubt about the imperative necessity of our taking part in the war. . . At any rate, you see why the Committee of Imperial Defence chose as its principle



The declaration of Mr. Pemberton Billing's return as Independent candidate at the East Herts. election. [Topical] Press.



Announcing the return of the Coalition candidate at the Wimbledon election. $[Topical\ Press.]$

a great navy and a highly organised expeditionary force, with the expansion of a national Territorial army behind it, which should be able to lend assistance if it were required to the national army on the Continent."

LORD HALDANE'S DEFENCE.

This speech will always be a classic in any history of the war. What it amounts to is this—that it was impossible for this country to make certain adequate preparations for a Continental war without bringing down upon itself the very danger which it had wished to avoid, and that, therefore, it was necessary to speak the enemy fair, and also to conceal from our own people the nature of the danger. The explanation did not make a very

favourable impression, but it was quite sincere, and it was a testimony to its quality that criticism of Lord Haldane fastened on charges of pro-Germanism that were unworthy, or on details of Lord Haldane's career as a military reformer which ignored the really solid achievement of Lord Haldane in the creation of the Territorial force. In a remarkable speech delivered in June, 1916, Lord French seized an opportunity of paying a glowing testimony to Lord Haldane's services to the army in the creation of this force.

The fatal flaw in Lord Haldane's argument was in the passage where he dwelt on the difficulty of raising in a generation an army after the Continental model. If this could not be done in a generation of peace, what

hope was there that it could be done in time of war in a year—which was the task that Lord Kitchener was called upon to perform? The whole argument really rests on the assumption, which was not justified by the facts of this war, that our regular army, with the Territorials, would be sufficient to turn the scale. The military advisers of the Government, if the Government's military policy before the war represented their real opinions—and if it did not, it was their duty to resign—were responsible for this assumption, and cannot therefore be acquitted of a great miscalculation of the military equation in Europe. They never expected that France would suffer such grave defeats at the outset of

the war, and their notion evidently was that France would maintain her own with the help of Russia, while we should turn the scale by an attack on the German flank in Belgium. Yet every Power in Europe was guilty of similar miscalculations, Germany amongst the rest. Lord Kitchener, it should be added, never indulged these illusions. At bottom the charge of unpreparedness, in so far as the Government, not its military advisers, were responsible for it, fines down to one of lack of confidence in the judgment of the people. Lord Roberts' campaign for compulsory service may have been right or wrong—these matters, trespassing as they do on the political domain, are beyond the scope of this work—but it was not open to the imputation that it disbelieved

in the permeability of the popular mind to reasoned argument, and Lord Roberts' reputation steadily mounted during the war in consequence.

Besides these two alternative military policies - Lord Roberts's and Lord Haldane's — there was, it is true, a third, and that was to decline to entangle ourselves in Continental military adventures, and to wage our war on Germany by sea with such a peninsular campaign as could be found within the power of our regular army. Mr. Gibson Bowles was almost the only man in the country who seriously argued this point of view, and his magazinethe Candid Review —contained perhaps the most original writing on the military and naval problems of the war. Mr. Bowles even fought an election



M. Briand in London:

[Photopress.

campaign—in Market Harborough—on this view, but it hardly percolated to the minds of the electors. At any rate, he was badly beaten.

For the most part, however, criticism left the period before the war alone, and dealt with the Government's alleged maladministration after the war had begun. These complaints took many different forms, not always quite consistent with each other. Some blamed the Government for its slowness in adapting its military measures to the constantly changing circumstances of war. This complaint was just, and the main heads of the count have been amply illustrated in the course of the narrative of our dealings with Servia and of the Gallipoli campaign. It

was urged against the Government, again, that a Cabinet of twenty-two members was far too large for dealing with the practical conduct of the war, that what was wanted was a much smaller body, capable of making rapid decisions and free from the vice of compromise, which nearly always infects the work of a large committee. These criticisms raise in another form the old question of whether or no democracy is able to govern an Empire. For democracy, if it be the rule of the many, necessarily implies much deliberation and balancing of opinions one against the other, and these processes, however valuable and necessary in drafting legislation the validity of which must depend very largely on securing a measure of general consent, do not make for success in war. Of two courses in war,

either if decided upon promptly and carried out with vigour will lead to better results than a combination of the two or than the ideally better policy whose execution is delayed. Another set of complaints, which are to some extent inconsistent with the demand for a smaller Executive, fastened on the secretive methods of the Government and on the censorship of news, which, on the scale on which it was carried out in this war, was quite new in the history of the country.

SIR EDWARD CARSON'S INDICTMENT.

Much the fullest statement of the case against the Government's conduct of the war was made by Sir Edward Carson in the House of Commons, on November 2nd, 1915. Sir Edward Carson had just resigned as a protest

against our failure to give adequate assistance to Servia, and his speech was delivered at a time when the popular mood in regard to the war had reached its lowest depression. The first shock for the country in the conduct of the war was, he said, the terrible revelation of the absence of munitions. This has already been discussed at length in former chapters of this work, and Sir Edward Carson did not further discuss it in his speech except to make it the foundation for a deliberate expression of his opinion that "a Cabinet however useful in times of peace as an organisation and machine is utterly incapable of carrying on war under modern conditions. I have never," he continued, "heard any explanation, if a Cabinet can

show that supervision over our preparations for war that the country expects of it, why a Cabinet of twenty-two, or any one of them, never found out the cause or the reasons of our want of ammunition." Perhaps the question of munitions was not quite so simple and elementary as Sir Edward Carson made it out to be. The Government is very largely dependent on its military advisers, and there is no evidence that the Government ever turned a deaf ear to their requests. It was easy in November to realise the importance of a boundless supply of munitions; it was less easy at the beginning of the year, and even when the need was seen there was necessarily a great gap between seeing the need and supplying it. On the whole, thanks in great measure to the energy with which

Mr. Lloyd George took up the problem of munitions, and to the speeches in which he forced home on the mind of the country, by the rhetorical arts of which he was a master, the tremendous national importance of munitions as the indispensable conditions of victory, this country, though behind the Germans, was not greatly behind our Allies.

Sir Edward Carson went on to give the Gallipoli expedition as an example of the incompetence of a Cabinet to carry on a war. He described the expedition to the Dardanelles as "a millstone hung round our necks":—

"It is all very well to tell us, as the Prime Minister told us, as a general proposition that the Cabinet have very often to determine on questions exclusive of naval and military considerations. I do not know how far the right

hon. gentleman would push that proposition. Does he mean that if he had not a reasonable chance of success he would still undertake operations like those of the Dardanelles for reasons outside military and naval ones? If that is so, I think it is a vice of Cabinet Government. I do not believe that the country would be justified in entering upon an expedition which has cost us some 100,000 men in casualties and suffering which baffles description, unless they had assurances from their naval and military advisers that they were likely to carry their expedition to a successful conclusion. Was there ever such an illustration of the miscalculation which can arise under our present system of instituting these operations as what has happened in the story of the Dardanelles?

"First you had the miscalculation as regards their



Lord Kitchener, followed by Sir William Robertson, leaving his hotel in Paris for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Central News.

naval expedition. Then you had the miscalculation as regards the landing of troops, where you lost in casualties 40,000 men and had an entirely insufficient force to enable you to go on. Then you had later another miscalculation when you sent out an inadequate force for an extension of the operations at Suvla Bay, where you had another 40,000 casualties, and your expedition was not advanced a single mile towards a successful conclusion.

"From that day when this disaster occurred-a disaster, in my opinion, the most vital in the war-to this, under your Cabinet system, you have never been able to make up your minds. And you have not now made your minds whether you ought or are able to proceed with this operation, or whether you ought boldly to withdraw your men and save the suffering and loss that goes on from day to day with absolutely no hope of any result.

"I have no experience of a Cabinet in peace times. A Cabinet in peace times is a microcosm of this House, as this House is of the country, and I dare say it is the very best form of government that could probably be desired for ascertaining what is best in the interests of the majority of the people, and, very often, as a debating society for discussing how best you can keep your party together and by what methods you can obtain most support in the But I country. absolutely deny that any of these considerations come in times of Spasmodic meetings of Cabinets and discursive debates are absolutely fruitless in carrying on a war.

"What is wanted in carrying on a war is a small number-and the smaller the better competent men, sitting not once a week but from day to day,

with the best expert advisers they can get, and working out the problems that arise in the course of the war from day to day.

"You want the best Military Staff you can get. And as far as I could see when I went to the Cabinet and up till very recently there was no Staff at all-at least I never saw their productions. It is quite true that in the last few weeks I was there there was a Staff which furnished us with certain information, but in my opinion the Staff should not be a scratch Staff; the Staff should be the very ablest men you could get, to keep your Cabinet advised as to all the means that were necessary for carrying out the operations that you, as a matter of policy, had determined upon from time to time.


"What happened when the war broke out? Whatever M 3**-VOL. IV.


Military Staff they had at the War Office—and I am told some of them were very experienced Generals-went off to carry on the war on the Continent, so the Staff was depleted. I feel bound to say that so long as that system, which I believe has been greatly accountable for all the various miscalculations that have happened since the war broke out, continues I do not believe that you are turning the new material and forces to the best advantage in the interests of the country.'


Sir Edward Carson went on to give the story of our dealings with Servia as a further example of the Cabinet's failure to conduct the war with efficiency.

THE GOVERNMENT'S DEFENCE.

The charges made by Sir Edward Carson certainly cannot be accepted as they stand. The view taken in







General Joffre in London.

[Photopress.

of the Government's policy, or rather lack of policy, in Servia, Mr. Asquith urged that our problem was much more difficult than that of Germany, that whereas she had no scruples in giving away the property of our Allies in bribes we had, and further, that while Allies of Germany were mere cyphers and appanages for German purposes the Entente Powers were equal members of their alliance. "The Allies on every important step have naturally and necessarily to be taken into consultation, and with the best goodwill in the world, and with the most genuine common purpose, there must be differences of angle and point of view." This last admission pointed to a very real weakness in the organisation of the Allied forces for victory, and it must be accounted as the best of the results of criticism that in the month after Sir Edward Carson's speech active steps were taken to secure better co-ordination of Allied strategy.

ALLIED CONFERENCES.

There had, of course, been consultations before this between the military representatives of the Allies, but clearly what was needed was consultation ahead of events, and not after the crisis had arisen. Only a permanent Council could guarantee co-ordinated strategy and prompt decision. In November a beginning was made, and on December 6th the first meeting of the War Council of the Allies was held in Paris. It was presided over by

General Joffre, and was attended by General Gilinski (ex-Chief of the Russian General Staff), General Porro(Deputy-Chief of the Italian General Staff), and Colonel Stefanovitch, representing Servia. Great Britain and Belgium were also represented. A second War Council was held on the following day at the French Headquarters, at which Colonel Sir Archibald Murray (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) and Sir John French represented this country. A third Council followed on the next day. These were purely Military Councils, and were quite distinct from the meetings of members of the British and French Governments, which became more and more frequent. The chief business of these early War Councils



The first meeting of the new Air Board: Sir Paul Hervey (Permanent Secretary) and Commander Groves (Under-Secretary) arriving.

[Topical Press.]

was to prepare plans of co-operation between the Allies for ratification by their respective Governments. Occasionally these plans were discussed at larger councils between representatives of the British and French Governments. One such council was held at Calais early in December, at which the Premiers of the two countries, with their Ministers of War and of the Navy, attended, and no doubt discussed the programme of work for the Military Councils. On January 19th M. Briand, the French Premier, visited London, with many of his Ministers, and held a conference in Downing Street. Nor were these meetings confined to the British and French Governments. Later in November an important Military

Mission arrived in London from Petrograd. General Cadorna also visited General Joffre, and Mr. Asquith went to Italy. In February it was announced that there was to be a War Council of the Allies in permanent session in Paris. On March 27th and 28th there met at Paris a historic Conference, at which all the Allies were represented—France, Britain, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Japan, and Servia. The meeting was in the salon of the French Foreign Office in the Quai d'Orsay, in the same room in which the Conference of Paris was held in 1856 after the Crimean War. Four tables were placed in the centre of the room, with seats for twenty-eight delegates. At the head table sat five French delegates, M. Bourgeois at the left and General Joffre at the right end, and between

them General Roques, M. Briand, and Admiral Decaze. At the left table were M. Thomas (French Minister of Munitions) and M. Cambon; then the three Belgian representatives, M. de Broqueville, Baron Beyens, and M. Vielemans; and then the British representatives, Mr. Asquith, Sir F. Bertie, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Lloyd George, and Lord Kitchener. At the bottom table were Sir William Robertson, the new Chief of the Imperial General Staff, next to Lord Kitchener, and then in order from left to right the four Italian delegates, Signor Salandra, Signor Tittoni, Baron Sonnino, and General Cadorna. And at the right-hand table were General Castelnau (next to General Joffre), then four Servian representatives, then two Russian representa-

tives, General Gilinski and M. Isvolski, and M. Matsui (the Japanese Ambassador), and finally, next to General Cadorna, another Italian representative, General Dall' Olio. The morning sitting was given over entirely to the joint military plans. These had all been drawn up at the War Councils, and the business of the Conference was an almost wholly formal one of ratification. The later sittings were given to discussion of the political settlement after the war, and to drafting the broad outlines of an agreement on economic measures to be adopted by the Allies after the war. The elaboration of this agreement was left over to an Economic Conference, which met in the following month.

These meetings were not the only improvements in our organisation for war which followed the agitation in the autumn of 1915—an agitation which was not confined to England, but also had its counterpart in France. Great changes were made at the British War Office, which, however, are best set forth when the narrative comes to deal with the work of Lord Kitchener. Mr. Asquith also made certain small concessions to the critics who had attacked the Cabinet for its unwieldiness, but he held very jealously to the principle that the Cabinet as a whole must be responsible for the great decisions of policy, and he refused to believe that there was any numerical specific against either want of foresight or want of good luck:—

" I do not think any Prime Minister has ever carried to a greater degree than I have the delegation of work which under normal conditions is done by the Cabinet as a whole to Committees and small bodies. I believe that from first to last since the beginning of the war we have had something like fifty different Committees and advisory bodies formed out of the Cabinet, sometimes with material added from outside to which special departments of activity, brought into prominence or urgency by the needs of the war, have been relegated, subject of course to ultimate Cabinet responsibility.

"In particular
we have had
since a very early
period of the war
a body fluctuating in numbers
from time to
time, and which
has varied in
name—sometimes
we have called
it a War Council,
sometimes a War

Committee, and sometimes by other designations—to which either general questions of State or questions of strategy in particular areas have been reserved with the consent of the Cabinet. I have come to the conclusion, after now some fifteen months' experience, that it is desirable to maintain that system, but to limit still further the number of the bodies to whom what I may call the strategic conduct of the war shall be from time to time relegated.

"I think, and my colleagues agree with me, that that Committee, or by whatever name it may be called, should be a body of not less than three and perhaps not more than five in number, but with this important proviso, that, whether it be three or five, it should, of course, have

power to summon to its deliberations and to its assistance particular Ministers concerned with particular departments whose special knowledge is needed or is desirable for the determination of each issue as it arises. I think, further, and this is rather a delicate question, that the relations between any such body and the Cabinet as a whole should be of an elastic kind, but at the same time it should be understood that the Cabinet as a body is ultimately responsible for the great decisions of policy. Without that you might do away with Cabinet government altogether. The Cabinet should not only be kept constantly informed of the decisions and actions of the Committee, but on all questions which involve a change or a new departure in policy the Cabinet should be consulted before decisive action is taken. I am sure that it is only on these lines that you can successfully conduct a war like this.

Lord Curzon (President of the Air Board) and Lord Northcliffe going to the first meeting. $[Topical\ Press.]$

"I entirely agree with those who say that it is very undesirable, and leads to delay and even confusion, that decisions which have to be taken often at very short notice should not become effective before they are referred to the Cabinet as a whole. That is perfectly true, and I think Committee as I have indicated ought to be elected, with powers to take such decisions and act upon them. On the other hand, I very am jealous of the maintenance of collective Cabinet responsibility for changes and large departures, new and I think in practice it will be found practicable to work the two things together, and that is what we propose to do, and I hope before many days are over to announce to the House, because I think the House ought to be told of the members who are to compose the Committee, whatever its size."

The measure of success that was achieved by critics,

even in the absence of a regular opposition, is also a measure of what was lost by the formation of the Coalition. For all criticism laboured under very great difficulties. Though the Government could not stifle the expression of opinion which is criticism, it could deprive that criticism of half its persuasiveness by suppressing the publication of the facts on which it was based. All honour to those who refused to be merely easy-going where the reputation and the very existence of the country were at stake, and tried to the best of their ability to induce the country to face facts which could not be openly stated except in innuendo.



Mr. Lloyd George speaking at the meeting in Conway, at which he replied to his critics. $[Central\ News.]$



Mr. Gibson Bowles (Independent candidate) addressing an open-air meeting during the Market Harborough election. [L.N.A.



A demonstration by Glasgow women in favour of the prohibition of alcohol during the war. $[Newspaper\ Illustrations.]$

CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS.

But it was not the general conduct of the higher strategy of the war alone that was attacked. There was also much criticism of the work of Government departments. To some of that criticism reference will be made later when we come to estimate the services of Lord Kitchener to the country. Grievous mistakes were made by this departmental criticism, but in spite of them its general effect was good, and in the public interest. For the chief quality that this war asked for from our rulers was imagination. Our past history had nothing to show that offered any sort of parallel to it. Traditionwhen the plunge had once been taken—so far from being a help, was a drawback to a realisation of the nature of its problems. All through our history we had never had a war to which every member of the country, man and woman, was a party. Even the great war with Napoleon was, after all, so far as the military and naval operations went, the affair of a comparatively small class in the country. It increased the price of food, but it did not greatly affect the everyday life of the people in other ways. But this war imposed on everyone the duty of personal service in one form or another. It may be doubted whether even those countries with whom universal military service had long been an institution quite realised before the war how much it implied. How much harder was it for a country like Great Britain to realise, which not only had never recognised the obligation of service as a citizen's duty, but had made a virtue of being the one country in Europe which by reason of its island position had no need to do so, and regarded war as a condition that affected the State and a few classes rather than the ordinary individual citizen. It was not easy for statesmen suddenly translated to a new and unfamiliar world to adapt themselves and the nation to the new conditions. It was a time when the gift of imagination became not merely the highest but the one indispensable quality of statesmanship. Few there will be at any time who can develop this gift and place it at the disposal of the country, thereby atoning for many errors of judgment and administrative lapses.

Nearly every department of State came in for severe criticism. The Foreign Office was attacked for its failures, especially in Balkan and Turkish politics; the Home Office for its treatment of alien enemies, which was held to be too lenient; the Admiralty, jointly with the Foreign Office and the Law Officers, for what was regarded as the excessive tenderness of the law of contraband to neutrals and the mildness with which the blockade of Germany was conducted in the early months. Much of the criticism was ill-informed, and some of it ill-conditioned, but in the end the Government often came round to the view of its critics. The truth was that the people instinctively jumped at the real implications of the war, and sometimes because of their very ignorance of precedent far sooner than a Government Department, weighted as it was with a burden of precedent, could do.

THE AIR SERVICES.

No attacks were fiercer than those on the Government's conduct of the air services, and with reason, for its mistaken neglect of airships had broken down our immunity

from invasion, and led to deplorable loss of life. So strong was the feeling aroused that after the winter of 1914-15 it almost seemed for a time as though it was a positive disadvantage to have the support of the regular party organisations. The victory of Mr. Pemberton Billing in the East Herts. by-election in March, 1914, over a candidate who had the active support of both party organisations was one of the most remarkable facts in the whole of our electoral history, and it was nearly repeated in Wimbledon in the following month by Mr. Kennedy Jones. Nor was the neglect of airships the Government's only mistake in its administration of these services. We had started the war with the advantage in heavier-than-air machines, but from time to time we lost it, and our inventive ability, or the Government's utilisation of it, failed to keep pace with that of the enemy. The appearance of the Fokker at the beginning of 1916 made it for a time almost the rule for British airmen to be worsted in their encounters with the enemy, and the excuse of Mr. Tennant that the Fokker was incapable of long flights only made matters worse, for it showed that the Germans had awakened to the need of specialisation in the types of aircraft earlier than we, and if ever the British offensive in the West, to which people by this time were locking forward to in the spring, was to be a success it was necessary that we should be masters of the air over the German lines as well as over our own. Mr. Pemberton Billing, who, however, soon lost the ear of the House, declared that many of our machines were so bad that to send men up in them was little short of murder :--

"When negligence was due to official folly coupled with ignorance it became criminal negligence, and when the

death of men ensued the line between such official folly and murder was purely a matter for a man's conscience."

At the beginning of April a Judicial Committee was appointed to examine into Mr. Billing's charges. A more careful and persuasive critic was Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, who advocated the formation of an Air Board, under a responsible Minister, to take over the control of the air services, both naval and military. He made much of the evils of the dual control. A Committee was appointed to "co-ordinate" the work of the two departments, and Lord Derby and Lord Montagu were appointed to it as the two civilian members. They resigned because they were powerless to effect anything. Faced with a renewal of criticism, the Government agreed to the formation of a Joint Board, of which Lord Curzon was to be chairman. In a speech explaining the powers of the New Board, Lord Curzon made it clear that he would have preferred an Air Ministry, and that he believed that this solution would have to be adopted later. Mr. Churchill had said that the future of the new Board would be either one of harmless impotence or a continuation of first-class rows. Lord Curzon, however, hoped for better results. new Board was charged with the duty of thinking out and formulating a policy and making recommendations to the War Committee of the Cabinet. Montagu continued his advocacy of an Air Ministry. He held that the air service would before long become even more important to this country than the army and navy, and his moderate and reasoned advocacy did much both to awaken and to guide public opinion.



Anzac soldiers at an exhibition of sketches done in Gallipoli,

[L.N.A.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE ARTS IN WAR TIME.

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR—VISITORS FROM ABROAD—PAINTERS AND PAINTING—LETTERS AND THE WAR—THE CARTOONISTS—MUSIC IN WAR TIME.

THE laws, according to the old tag, are silent amid the clash of arms, and the war has discovered a fair amount of support for a shortsighted view that the arts ought to follow their example. But it is not a view which has produced much practical effect. The unfortunate closing of certain of the State art galleries and museums at the beginning of 1916, in order to save a very doubtful £40,000 a year out of a war bill which was then about five millions a day, is the biggest triumph which the view achieved; and it was a somewhat costly one for the reputation of the Government, for the many opponents of the proposal had everything on their side except the ability to persuade the authorities to reconsider a decision which rejoiced nobody except our enemies. But, however open to persuasion the Government might be on more vital and important points, on this they were adamant, and the most curious "economy" of the whole war was duly enforced in the face of all protest and criticism. Still, it is very arguable that, even with this depressing decision thrown in, on a strict balance our national galleries profited by the war. After all, it was the war that opened them. August, 1914, had found the public

barred out because of the lawless activities of the militant suffragists. But when Ulster and the militants and all minor domestic feuds had been overwhelmed by the arrival of the Great War, and a general amnesty had been granted to suffragists under sentence, there was no longer any need to search the visitor to an art gallery or museum for a concealed hatchet, and the doors were opened once more. True, the menace of the suffragette's hatchet was later replaced by the menace of the Zeppelin's bomb, but it was some time before it was thought advisable to remove many of our famous masterpieces to places of greater security in cellars and strong rooms.

Out of the very nature of things most of the arts tend to be anything but silent in time of war. The lot of many of those who practised them for a livelihood was extremely unfortunate in the early months of the struggle, when apparent silence was forced upon them by an inability to find a market for their wares. But it was not possible for arts of all kinds to avoid reflecting the tremendous turmoil into which the soul of man had been thrown by the war, and with poetry particularly the danger was not so much of silence as of a little uproar of good intentions which, with a few exceptions, had failed to justify



"Somewhere in France": A picture by Sergeant E. Handley Read, shown at the exhibition of work by members of the Artists' Rifles.

[Central News.]



Another picture, by Lance-Corporal Lee Hankey, from the Artists' Rifles' Exhibition.

[L.N.A.

themselves. The war inevitably coloured all the artistic outlook, even where it had not provided the message with which the artists were busy. And so far from art dwelling in a peaceful, secluded world of its own, it was plausibly argued that it had foreshadowed the war even before it arrived, and that Futurism, Cubism, and all the other "isms" that had recently puzzled or infuriated the orthodox, were symptoms of the same lawless unrest which had now turned Europe into a battlefield—an ingenious theory which certainly found support in the famous manifesto of the Futurists, and the way in which the revolting Italian artists flung themselves into the movement for securing Italy's intervention in the war.

EMILE VERHAE-REN'S VISIT.

The war also had the effect of quickening the public appreciation of the art of other countries -or, at least, of our Allies. The overrunning of Belgium drove many Belgian artists into England, and the names at any rate of such painters as Emile Claus, Albert Baertsoen, and Victor Rousseau, and of writers like Verhaeren and Cammaerts, became far more widely known than could have been the case in more peaceful times. The work of the Belgian artists in England found its way into the art exhibitions and into the newspapers, and some representative examples both of painting and literature were ultimately collected in "A Book of Belgium's Gratitude," published at the beginning of 1916. The biggest figure among

the Belgians who came over to us was the poet Emile Verhaeren. His was, indeed, a European reputation of some long standing—his first work had been published more than thirty years ago—but in spite of the fact that he had visited this country before the war his writings were nothing like so generally known here as those of his compatriot, Maeterlinck. But with his visit to England as an exile from the stricken country of an Ally came a very whole-hearted reparation for earlier neglect, and many English dabblers in Continental literature to whom Verhaeren had been little more than a name began to enquire for the text of his works. His was a genius which offered many contrasts to that of Maeterlinck. With more accuracy than Herrick he

might have claimed. "I sing of times trans-shifting," for he was essentially the vigorous interpreter of contemporary life, with its gaunt factories and dockyards, and its black, insatiable towns creeping out over the green country. There was plenty of stimulus to so modern an outlook to be found in this country, and after a flying visit, in the autumn of 1914, to the industrial North—which he found bound in one of its traditional fogs—the distinguished visitor could remark with truth, "I felt I was at home in Belgium, between Mons and Charleroi." It was a compliment with a critical flavour about it, for it needs the enthusiasm of a Verhaeren to discover inspiration in the scenery either of industrial Belgium

or industrial England. But Verhaeren is not so much of a modern as to have no eyes for the more natural inspirations of England, as is indicated by his tribute. "I think the most beautiful clouds in the world adorn the English skies," and the discerning comments which he made on the way those skies had been rendered by great English painters.



Mr. Augustus John's much-discussed "Red Cross Sale" portrait of Mr. Lloyd George.

M. MESTROVIC'S SERVIAN SCULPTURE.

The war was the means of securing a general introduction to the British public for an even more striking figure in European art than Verhaeren. Ivan Mestrovic the Servian sculptor, was still in his early thirties, and, therefore, a younger man than the Belgian poet, but his reputation was already among the greatest of

contemporary ones. The exhibition of his work, which was held in the early summer of 1915 at the South Kensington Museum, was one of the most important events in the English artistic world during the whole war. It was a war exhibition in the most real and fundamental sense of the term, for the sculpture shown at it was a direct revelation of the ideas behind one—and a very important—aspect of the struggle. Above all things, Mestrovic was the tremendously powerful interpreter of the soul of his own people and of its aspirations. All the fierce vigour of the Southern Slav races found artistic expression in the massive strength of his sculpture. Much of it was the direct expression of national hopes and ideals. To be erected some day,

it was intended, on the Plain of Kossovo—where the old Servs and their Allies had formed the outpost of Christian Europe in more than one bloody and disastrous battle against the invading Turks—Mestrovic and the group of Servo-Croat artists who worked with him had designed the monumental Temple of Kossovo as the proof and memorial of their persistent nationality, and of the old Servian Empire whose example and traditions four centuries of Turkish oppression had not been able to destroy. The model of this temple, and the statuary which was to be part of it, had been exhibited at the International Exhibition in Rome in 1912, and there the genius of its creator had received European recognition—nowhere, it may be added, more warmly than among the

critics of Austria-Hungary! The exhibition in London was representative of all sides of the Servian sculptor's art, including the temple and its heroic statuary: and again the war provided a larger and keener interest for it than could have been secured in peaceful times. The war was a declared one on behalf of smaller nationalities; and here was one of them vindicating a side of its national life with a direct strength and message which the largest of its neighbours might envy. Fortunately, perhaps, for the peace of mind of English spectators, the overwhelming and exile of the people from whom this message had gone forth was yet to come.

One of the artistic invaders which the war brought to us was a permanent one, in the shape of

an extraordinarily handsome gift from the veteran French sculptor artist, M. Rodin. His ties with this country, had always, of course, been strong and affectionate, and the age of the war was still to be reckoned in weeks when, as proof of those ties and of the new ones which had been created by "the great gallantry of the British soldiers fighting in France," the French artist presented eighteen pieces of statuary, all by his own hand, to the Victoria and Albert Museum. The most interesting of the gifts was a replica of the "Age of Bronze," which had been the occasion of a great pother of criticism at the Paris Salon almost thirty

years ago, and the whole collection was representative of the various stages in the development of the great sculptor's art. Another indication of the artistic entente with our nearest Allies was the exhibition, held in London, of naval and military paintings, of which French and Belgian works were a great part. A large portion of the collection consisted of paintings loaned from the State Galleries of France—some of them a hundred years old, and a reminder of the days when France had been the bogyman of Europe—and the fact that they could be trusted to make a safe journey across the Channel is one of the minor tributes to the small menace of the German submarine campaign against our communications with the Continent.



M. Mestrovic.

[E. O. Hoppé.

"RED CROSS" PORTRAITS.

After the first month or two of the war the promoters of the customary English exhibitions began to be a little more confident of the possibilities of making a success of them. The first Winter Exhibition at the Royal Academy was replaced by one which was frankly an attempt to make an all-round best of a rather bad job. It was an exhibition of the works of British artists, with a fund to be formed from the sale of them and divided in equal portions between the Red Cross Society, the Artists' General Benevolent Institution, and the artists whose work had been sold-so that the prospective purchaser had a full charitable incentive towards generosity. The first Academy of the war showed

no signs of lack of activity in the artistic world. The number of paintings sent in was almost as great as in normal years. Inevitably a number of them had been inspired by the war. The deep impression which the tragedy of Belgium had made upon the mind of the country is reflected in the fact that it was the direct inspiration of two of the really notable pictures of the war—Mr. Clausen's "Renaissance," in the 1915 Academy, and Mr. Brangwyn's "Mater Dolorosa Belgica," in the Academy of the following year.

Art collectors and connoisseurs found a way of making

their hobby "do its bit" in the Red Cross Sale at Christies'—an artistic jumble sale on behalf of Red Cross funds, at which the most extraordinarily varied donations in the way of works of art, antiques, and curiosities, were put up for patriotic auction. The sale of 1915 secured over £48,000 for the Red Cross; and apart from this, the most interesting point about it was the intriguing offer of blank canvasses by well-known portrait painters, with an undertaking that the maker of the highest bid should have the right to nominate the portrait that should be painted on them. Mr. Sargent was induced to depart from his intention to paint no more portraits, and his offer to execute one on behalf of the Red Cross was at once taken up by

Sir Hugh Lane in a handsome bid of f10,000. This large lift to the total proceeds of the sale received tragic emphasis only a few days later by the news that Sir Hugh Lane had been drowned on the Lusitania, and British art thereby robbed of a most generous and distinguished patron. Mr. Augustus John's canvas for a halflength portrait was the occasion for one of the most debated paintings of the year. It was secured by Sir James Murray for 210 guineas, and the purchaser had the happy thought of nominating Mr. Lloyd George as the subject. It promised, therefore, one eminent and original Welshman's view of another, and the result was awaited with interest. arrived in a portrait which was a very personal interpretation of the biggest figure in the domestic

in the domestic politics of the war, and painted with a tempestuous strength not at all inappropriate to the characteristic qualities of the sitter. It had little dealing with the mannerisms of conventional portraiture; and there were many political admirers of Mr. Lloyd George who displayed no great admiration for this view of him.


WRITERS AND THE WAR.

It is when one comes to letters that one finds art most directly active in the war, though few English writers found themselves in a position to exercise an influence as decisive as that of d'Annunzio, who might fairly claim, by his pro-war speeches, to have done a very real amount towards bringing Italy to declare war

on Austria. But literary England, besides producing a tremendous amount of writing bearing on the war, took a very imposing first-hand share in waging it. The list of writers who within the first year of the struggle were serving in the naval or military forces, or with the Red Cross organisations, would be a long one. Mr. John Masefield was on hospital work in France; Mr. Hugh Walpole with the Russian Red Cross; Mr. Compton Mackenzie was at the Dardanelles, together with Rupert Brooke; Mr. A. E. W. Mason's name was among the holders of commissions in the Manchester Regiment and Mr. Barry Pain's in the Naval Air Service—to mention one or two of the better-known writers. And, of course, the Artists' Rifles at a very

early date in the war had a high compliment paid it by Sir John French, when he withdrew it from the trenches in France and turned it en masse into an Officers' Training But these Corps. are activities of the citizen rather than of the artist playing his own part; and the record of Literature's more professional share in the war must be sought for among the publishers' announcements and in the newspaper files.

It will be found there in overpowering abundance. The opening of the war threw the publishers into something approaching panic, though their anxiety, judged by the comparatively small reduction in the number of books annually published, seems to have been rather unjustified. And whatever class of publishing






M. Mestrovic's "Annunciation." [E. O. Hoppé.

scandal; and denunciations of Germany, and all manner of books on arms and warfare, tumbled after one another in a fine flood of excitement and instruction. Later, when the first great offensive of the publishers had begun to subside, there was good, notable work published in actual descriptions of various aspects of the great war by literary men who had taken part in it.

Of the big names in contemporary English letters it is not easy to think of one who did not turn his pen towards the war. Mr. Hilaire Belloc, who had already been adding to his several-sided reputation by work as a military historian, jumped at once into great prominence as a weekly expounder of the strategy of the various

battle fronts in a manner to be readily understanded of the people, and for a time at least achieved a fame beyond any of his fellow publicists on the war. The rapid creation of these authorities out of what up to now had been mere men of letters was one of the most interesting developments of these stirring times. Arnold Bennett forsook the "Five Towns" and took to the exposition of the war at home and abroad, laying down the law with the best of them. Mr. G. K. Chesterton cut (intellectual) capers round the intolerable Prussian, bestowing on him all the paradox and verbal ingenuity which he had once directed against teetotalers and false doctrine. Mr. Bernard Shaw, out, as ever, to flabbergast the bourgeois, did it with uncomfortable



"The Revolt of Servia," by Mestrovic.

[E. O. Hoppé.

success in a famous pamphlet wherein the British cause was defended by what looked uncommonly like the best Prussian arguments. Mr. H. G. Wells had his full and wholly patriotic say on the war in correspondence columns and elsewhere. Mr. Kipling wrote of the new armies in training and of "France at War," from a personal observation of both; Mr. Galsworthy addressed his own countrymen and the neutral world, often through the American magazines, on British aims and ideals in the war. And mention should also be made of the more or less official labours undertaken by literary men, such as Mr. Kipling's writing up of the adventurous work done by the British submarines,

Professor Gilbert Murray's mission of friendship to Scandinavia, or Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's messages as war correspondent at the Italian front.

RUPERT BROOKE AND WAR POETRY.

A reference has already been made to the poetry of the war. It was turned out in astonishing volume, but the bulk of it has little claim to be remembered, and more than one well-known name added nothing to its reputation by an adventure into this tempting but hazardous region of war art. Perhaps the war was too near at hand, and the emotions stirred by it too strong, for poetry of permanent appeal; certainly the temptation to let anything go, and trust to the flood tide of patriotic

feeling among its readers to carry it to success, seemed far too often irresistible.

But the war could serve as the direct inspiration of absolute poetry, and the name of one poet, standing out far above the rest, proves it. Rupert Brooke had written fine, sensitive poetry long before August, 1914, but it fell to him, in the five exquisite soldier sonnets which he wrote after the outbreak of war, to leave preserved in a rich, lyrical casket the very heart of young England taking up the challenge of arms. It was the challenge which, as Mr. Kipling had sung (in a poem which is also to be counted as one of the genuine contributions of poetry to the struggle), had "sickened earth of old"; but though the world is rightly appalled at the

sound of it, for the individual, and above all for the young and generous spirited, it brings a magnificent appeal. To hold the lives of others cheaply is a hideous thing; but to hold one's own life cheaply for the sake of an idea is the highest triumph of the human spirit, and the support of all conscience and honour. It is the joyous personal acceptance of this test which rings through Brooke's five sonnets, and, calling straight to the soul of man, gives them a value beyond that of any temporary appeal, even of the highest patriotism.

"Now God be thanked, Who matched us with His hour, And caught our youth, and wakened us from sleeping,"

was the spirit in which the poet replied to the call, and

the lovely poems on those who had laid down their lives at its bidding reveal the same thankfulness still unshaken. Brooke's spirit leapt to the test like a flame, and there is a profound personal interest in comparing the doubts and bitterness- of many of his earlier poems with the swift strength and certainty which the spiritual armour of war brought to him. Maybe this armour, too, would in time have failed its restless champion, who, in his first published poems, had given such a bitter sequel to the loves of Menelaus and Helen. But Brooke was far too sure a poet not to know that, if Life will not dwell upon the heights which it reaches in happier moments, the poetry that truly enshrines them lives there for ever, be later moods what they will. Brooke's poetry was, alas, destined


to reflect no more moods beyond those with which the war began. He joined the naval forces in September, 1914, served with the illfated Antwerp Expedition a month later, and sailed with the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in February of the following year. In the Ægean he fell sick, and at the end of April was gathered to the host of "the rich dead" whose everlasting peace and honour he had celebrated in two of his finest poems. Brooke's age was only twentyseven, and his death must be regarded as one of the greatest losses which the war brought to English letters.

THE WAR

The other art that took the greatest share in the war and its ideas was that of the cartoonist. The

cartoon is essentially a weapon, and war is the keenest of all stones for putting an edge on it. It is also the swiftest, most-readily seized indication of the thoughts running through the mind of a people, and in war time the outlook of the nations is more anxiously studied than at any other period. In this country we do not usually expect of our cartoonists the fierceness which is characteristic of Continental work, but the war produced some English examples of satire at its most ruthless. Mr. Will Dyson flogged "Kultur" with all the monstrous strength which he had once devoted to the "Fat Man" of Capitalism—and thereby put himself in the way of all sorts of praise from newspapers and critics who would have had little

sympathy with his earlier campaign, or, for that matter, with his later and equally vigorous one against the conscription movement. And in a series of delicate drawings, which were, perhaps, less cartoons than decorative designs, Mr. Edmund Sullivan expressed a detestation of Prussia in which anger and disgust could hardly have been heightened. For other examples of the savage indignation of the cartoonist the English papers borrowed freely and with effect from abroad. L'Asino, Pasquino, and Numero, of Italy; Le Rire and Paris papers publishing the work of such famous practitioners as Steinlen and Forain; the Dutch journals, and, indeed, the whole of the satirical Press of Europe, were ransacked for telling indictments of Germany or support for



"The Widow," by Mestrovic.

[E. O. Hoppé.


the Allied cause. One Italian paper declared that the cartoonists of Italy had been worth a machine-gun division to the Allied cause, and the Germans seem to have shared this opinion when they took the trouble, through their Embassy in Rome, to prosecute Galantara, one of the artists whose bitterly anti-German work was a great feature of L'Asino. The prosecution was received with joy by the artist and paper, who promptly made it the occasion for another stinging cartoon against Germany. An opportunity for seeing many of the originals of these striking cartoons was provided by a comprehensive exhibition of the work of the Italian artists held in London towards the end of the second year of the

THE WORK OF M. RAEMAEKERS.

But the biggest find among the European cartoonists was Louis Raemaekers, the Dutch artist. If the work of the Italian cartoonists was worth a division to the Allies, Raemaekers' cartoons were the equal of several army corps. They were first published in the Amsterdam Telegraaf, and from the very beginning of the war fought German ideals and denounced German outrages with a passionate indignation which was all the more effective because it came from a neutral country. There were even personal grounds which would have justified the assumption that Raemaekers' sympathies would have



"The Slandered Animals: And they call us the wild beasts!" by Galantara. [Central News.



"German Kultur and Miss Cavell," by Corbella. [Central News. [Two drawings from the exhibition held in London of war pictures and cartoons by Italian artists.]

inclined in favour of the Germans. He was the son of a German mother, knew Germany well, and spoke German with greater ease than either English or French. Yet his work displayed the most vigorous horror of Germany's share in the war, and the very warmest friendship for the Allied cause. In addition to the satire and pathos of the ideas, it was work of the highest artistic ability. He had been connected with the *Telegraaf* about six years at the outbreak of war, and before that had been a landscape and portrait painter of some reputation. Rodin's comment, on seeing some of his war cartoons for the first time, was that each one was the study for a picture.

The *Telegraaf* war cartoons very soon began to be noticed and reproduced in the European Press beyond Holland, and after a year of the war M. Raemaekers' reputation in England and France was beyond challenge. In this country his cartoons became as well known as the recruiting posters. France presented him with the Cross of the Legion of Honour. On a first visit to London he was received by the Prime Minister, and was everywhere greeted with enthusiasm. Even Germany admitted to her cost the high artistic value of his work and its terrible political force. The Cologne Gazette rhetorically threatened a settling with Holland after the war, when for "each Dutch calumny, each cartoon of Raemaekers," payment would be exacted with interest. He was charged in the Dutch courts with endangering the neutrality of his country-the counterpart to the German prosecution of L'Asino, and once again with an acquittal. Against this intellectual offensive Germany was helpless. The work and fame of the Dutch artist represented the biggest individual share that the arts of Europe had taken in

GERMAN MUSIC IN ENGLAND.

Music, the most social and the most international of the arts, suffers most from the disabilities of war time. It is some compensation that it is also the most inspiriting of the arts, and does most to maintain courage and lighten the depression and sorrow of war. The utility and acceptability of music in war time, and the gratitude of the public for it, were soon and amply proved by many an enthusiastic scene in our concert halls and theatres, while the occasions when the public feeling seemed unresponsive to music were rare. We were at war with one of the most musical peoples in the world, and the one whose music strikes the most deeply into the English heart, and we, alone of all the Allied nations, continued frequently and regularly to perform German music during the war. There was a semi-commercial banishment of contemporary German music which was felt but little, as our national liking for German music had never kept fully up to date. Even the most informed part of the public really missed no other composer but Richard Strauss, and his exultant and aggressive style, which before the war had many opponents, was quickly made an æsthetic as well as a political ground for the public suppression of his music. If the great German masters of the past suffered at all the change did not do more than reduce their popularity into a more due proportion to that of the leading composers of the Allied nations. To the professional English musician, who had in most cases spent the bulk of his life in the study and practice of German music, the war came not only as a blow to longcherished ideals and sentiments, but also as a challenge to an intellectual independence in his art, too long foregone. Never since Elizabethan days had English music

been a plant robust enough to stand by its own strength. The French liveliness and pomposity of the Restoration period were never quite digested. Handel overwhelmed all our writers with an idiom which they could not sustain; and a quaintly florid vocal idiom as killing to individuality, expressed oftenest in the broken form of the glee, was an unfortunate appropriation from the grand symphonic style of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven. Later, we had echoed only the weaker strains of the German romantic composers, which curiously mingle with Italian fripperies to adorn the banal sentiment of our ballad operas; while latterly our most serious composers had copied the sterile rigidity of Brahms, and had been as disputatious as the most Philistine German against the Wagnerian and post-Wagnerian developments of musical harmony. A free and self-reliant English note had been sounded first in Elgar, with his now famous "Enigma" Variationsthe first English work to have a real orchestral idiom or an original romantic spirit-and his cantata "The Dream of Gerontius," whose success was the signal to our young composers to trust no longer to foreign fashions or traditions, but to follow their own bent and realise their individuality.

THE NEW ENGLISH SCHOOL.

From this time onward, during the last fifteen years before the war, there was a period of adventurous, and somewhat experimental, musical composition in England. It was helped greatly by the growing popularity of orchestral music, due to the influence of Tschaikowsky and Wagner. The total result was a mass of music, mostly original in thought and idea, somewhat cold in expression even where it aimed at sensuous feeling or exotic colour, of irregular and frequently imperfect technique, and somewhat deficient in the musical sense, but marvellously promising in comparison with past achievements. Possibly its chief defects were due to the fact that our English composers still lacked a full musical experience. English people have never completely overcome their distrust of a profession so precarious, and dislike of a calling emotionally so irreticent, as that of music. We have made it almost a part of good breeding to give place to the Continental performer, and our musicians have almost shrunk from public experience and activity in their art.

For many a decade we had marvelled at the growing powers of the German conductor, forgetting the exhaustive musical experience which explained them. In confining our musical culture and life for a time to purely English sources of musical performance the war does our English musicians a real service, and many a musical reputation is already made which but for the war would, through lack of opportunity, have been lost or too tardily won for a full musical career. During the war for the first time in our musical history it was possible to see a youth of English birth conducting a magnificent orchestra as his daily vocation. A whole school of young conductors rose rapidly, proving that even in this most purely interpretative sphere of the musician's art the Englishman was not the Philistine he has been rated, nor a whit behind his fellows on the Continent in natural gifts of interpretation.

SIR THOMAS BEECHAM'S PART.

As much because of our political ideas and methods as from any consideration with regard to music itself, our public bodies remained aloof from music, in absolute contrast with the elaborate governmental and municipal

organisation of music which is made so great a virtue by our enemies. Before the war had long continued the paltry grants officially made towards the furtherance of musical education were in the leading cases ostentatiously withdrawn, almost as a symbolic offering to the spirit of frugality and thrift. The view that the voice of music should be kept low for the period of the war did not, however, find a general acceptance. The Covent Garden opera was the most notable case in which a complete abeyance of activity was resolved upon, but in this case, as in others, music soon seemed to be almost a gainer by the friends that it lost. If lethargic spirits fell away it made the way only the more clear for its ready and ardent champions. Foremost among them was Sir Thomas Beecham, whose knighthood bestowed

in the second winter of the war, on his return from conducting a festival of music of the Allied nations in Rome, and an exposition of it in other Italian cities, set the seal of Royal approval on his openly avowed policy of making the development of English and Allied music almost a part of the war itself. He was swift to see in the war the very opportunity for establishing our English musical life in its every aspect on a more organised and self-reliant basis. He had never been at all a nationalist in music, in any narrowing sense. He had, in fact, done more than anyone in recently preceding years to make English appreciation even of German music modern in its sympathy. But by brilliant and extensive seasons of Russian opera and ballet

he had also awakened a broader and more balanced knowledge of European music before the war began, and the onset of the war quickened rather than retarded the impulse given. He began by showing a more generous concern for the maintenance of our older musical institutions than could have been anticipated from his previous activities. The Hallé Society in Manchester, and the many musical organisations connected with it in the north, were enabled by his generous help, advice, and skill to continue, and even greatly to develop, their activity. The still older Philharmonic Society in London also received new life from his energy, and in Birmingham, at his second visit with the Hallé orchestra, it was resolved to found a fullyendowed orchestra and series of orchestral concerts. He gave, in conjunction with Mr. Emil Mlynarski, the Polish

composer and conductor, an all-British festival of music in London during May, 1915, at which several important works were heard for the first time, and many little known works of merit received further recognition. Far from abandoning opera, in the autumn he with great judgment founded a strong company, which included many of our finest and most youthful singers, and after nine months continued performances in London and Manchester of operas which include many of the most ambitious and least-known works of every great school, the success of the undertaking, which had been pronounced from the first, still increased, and the establishment of opera in English on the most complete scale, with playing, singing, suitable text, action, and stage settings equally considered, had been shown to be practicable, and became, indeed,

Sir Thomas Beecham.

[Dover Street Studios.

assured in all the leading cities. In connection with this undertaking Mr. Eugene Goossens, junior, and Mr. Julius Harrison, established their reputation as conductors, and two striking examples of comic opera were introduced in "The Critic," by Sir Villiers Stanford, and "The Boatswain's Mate." by Dr. Ethel Smyth. The last opera was published by Messrs. Forsyth Brothers, instead of, as was previously arranged, in Germany, and the edition did much credit to our English publisher. But our music publishers on the whole did little to wrest the preponderance of musical publication from the great German firms, whose shadow still rested over musipublication in cal London. Neither did the tariff nor, later, the prohibition put upon the importation of musical instruments

immediately result in the production of an ideal English pianoforte.

Of our composers, only Sir Edward Elgar appeared freely inspired by the war itself. His music had always had its military aspects, and these features were greatly strengthened in his music composed during the war. First, in a melodramatic setting of the poem "Chantons Belges," by Emile Cammaerts, and later in a solemn setting of two poems, "To Women" and "For the Fallen," by Laurence Binyon, he showed unmistakably that national struggles and feelings may be made to yield a noble musical inspiration.

A movement started under a powerful Committee for Music in War Time seemed a little uncertain as to its aims in regard to music and the musical profession, but maintained itself in being, and proved welcome to the soldiers in camp, field, and hospital, where it provided them with musical and other entertainment of such kinds as were most acceptable and desired. The war did not prove remarkable either for the revival or the production of popular melodies. Two songs, "It's a long way to Tipperary" and "Keep the home fires burning," seemed to strike in oblique ways the needs of the time, and were chiefly associated with

Abroad, the deaths of Scriabine, Reger, and the Spanish composer Granados, who was drowned as a direct result of the war, were the chief musical events. The early deaths of the Russian, Scriabine, and the German, Reger, closed the two greatest avenues of harmonic knowledge and invention which the musical world possessed.



Signor d'Annunzio delivering a speech in Rome just before Italy's intervention, urging a break with the [Newspaper Illustrations.

A RETROSPECT.

HIS volume has covered a period of transition. The deep depression of the last volume, which told the story of the Russian defeats in the summer of 1915, of the British failures in Gallipoli, and of the breakdown of the Allied offensive in the West, has passed, and has been succeeded by a more sober view of the war and more rational hopes. But these hopes, in the period covered by this volume, are still far from fulfilment, and seem to rest more on faith than on any positive achievement. For the most part we are still engaged during this period in writing off past failures and in meeting the claims that they make upon us. On the whole our losses are less serious than at one time seemed probable. Lord Kitchener, when the Germans seemed at the height of their successes in Russia, declared that they "had shot their bolt," and what was at the time a bold prophecy was justified. The German advance was stayed, and the advent of winter gave the Russians an opportunity to raise fresh forces and to reorganise their equipment. Already, by the turn of the year, the Russians were in a position to begin an attack on the Austrians, though not to carry it to success. In Asia, however, they not only recovered the territory they had evacuated when the Germans drove them from Warsaw, but they began a bold offensive against Turkey. Persia was cleared of the enemy; Erzerum, the fortress of Turkey in the Highlands, was captured; and the greater part of Armenia was freed from its oppressors.

This vigour on the part of a nation which had suffered the heaviest defeats of the war was in marked contrast to our own policy in Turkey. In the early autumn of last year this country had three fronts in the East. Its left wing was in Gallipoli, its centre in Egypt, its right wing in Mesopotamia. Our Gallipoli campaign had suffered a grave defeat at Suvla Bay, but the Turks were in equally bad case, and the mere presence of our army there, threatening as it did the capital of European Turkey and the bridgehead between Europe and Asia, was a grave blow to the prestige of the Turkish arms. Our acquiescence in the defeats of August changed everything. Bulgaria, impressed by the Russian defeats, and convinced that we were powerless against Turkey, threw in her lot with the Central Powers, and our Ally, Servia, succumbed to a joint attack by the Central Powers and their new Ally, Bulgaria. Russia could do nothing to help her, France had few troops to spare, Great Britainhaving completely misread the political situation in the Balkans—was profoundly sceptical of the value of any assistance that we might be able to offer Servia from Salonika. In the end we occupied Salonika, but our action had the effect of antagonising the Court and military party in Greece, and was powerless to assist Servia. Two more of the small nations whose rights we were defending in the war, first Servia and then Montenegro, went under, and presently, although it was by no means obvious what use we should be able to make of Salonika, we evacuated Gallipoli in order

to satisfy the demands of our new base. This was the moment of our greatest depression in the war. Nor was our failure in European Turkey compensated by any success elsewhere. On our centre, in Egypt, a large army was accumulated, and remained almost completely inactive, engaged in the passive defence of the Suez Canal, which was at no time menaced very seriously. On our right, in Mesopotamia, we were active to the point of rashness. We attempted to reach Bagdad with insufficient forces, and a campaign which had opened well suffered a serious check just as the Russian campaign against the Turkish Highlands was gathering strength. Our attacks undoubtedly contributed to the Russian successes in the north, but so far as our own record in Turkey was concerned it was one of unbroken failure.

The causes were not merely or even so much military as political. The one Power which had a clearly determined policy in regard to Turkey was Russia. For her, indeed, the war was first and foremost a Balkans War; that is, a war for the succession to Turkey. Her championing of the cause of Servia was not due wholly to sentimental sympathy with her cousin Slavs. She recognised that Servia mattered to the Central Powers because she was the bridge between them and Turkey, and on her submission depended all their hopes of empire in the East. Because she was interested in defeating German designs on Turkey, Russia was also interested in maintaining the independence of Servia. Even when her own territory was invaded, Russia never for a moment forgot that the real subject of the war was the future of Turkey; and her campaign in Armenia, with the enemy still in Warsaw and in front of Riga, showed with unmistakable clearness the political thoughts that were in her mind. As the action of Roumania, Bulgaria, and of the Government of Greece showed, opinion was very much divided among the neutral States as to whether it was more in their interest that Germany or Russia should have the hegemony of South-Eastern Europe. England might have resolved these doubts in favour of the Entente Powers had she taken early and decisive action in defence of Servia, or given more serious attention to the Gallipoli campaign. As it was, she hesitated between the two policies that were open to her, attempted to combine both, and for the time being failed in both. One was the military policy, appropriate to the greatest of naval Powers, of a peninsular" campaign which might have carried her to Constantinople and given her control of the bridges between Europe and Asia. The other was the Continental policy of defeating Germany in France. It is just to add that as between these two policies she was hardly free to choose, for she was under obligations to France which, as might have been foreseen, were not consistent with the maintenance of her military system, but could not honourably be shirked. Still a sounder interpretation of the military situation in France at the beginning of 1915 would have enabled her to take far

more effectual action against Turkey than she in fact did. Had she realised that it was impossible to take decisive action against Germany in France in 1915 she might have employed the interval of waiting to much better purpose than she did, and that without in any way prejudicing her chances of future success in France.

But there were other reasons for the failures of the autumn. Whereas the war as between the Central Powers and Russia was a struggle between two Imperial ambitions in the East, for the Western Powers it was in the main a struggle on behalf of certain principles of international justice. Between the Russian and the Western view there was no real inconsistency, but their perspective was somewhat different, and the Allies, each pursuing its own share of the common policy in its own way, had no common plan of campaign, no single strategic vision. The adhesion of Italy increased the confusion of military purpose, for not only had she no sympathy with the Slavs, but at some points (as has been described in the chapter on Montenegro) her ambitions on the eastern shores of the Adriatic clashed with theirs. Germany was in an excellent position to make the most of these divided purposes. She was so much the dominant Ally that she was free from the notorious disabilities of a coalition in war which hampered the Entente Powers. Moreover, her geographical position gave her the great military advantage of "interior lines." She could throw her weight east or west as circumstances required. The Central Alliance consisted of many Powers, but the only voice that mattered was that of Germany, whereas each member of the opposing Alliance saw the war from a different angle of vision, and had its own views of the strategy that was appropriate to the attainment of the common end. Here lay the chief causes of our failure, and the motive of the Allied Conference in Paris to avoid the confusion which had done so much injury in the past, and to concert a common strategy of mutual support. How these plans worked out will be told in the next volume.

It was still doubtful in the winter of 1915-16 whether Germany would face east or west, whether she would continue her campaigns against Russia, or whether she would revert to her earlier strategy of concentration against France. But the attacks on Verdun, of which this volume has described the beginning, cleared up the doubts. She made up her mind to gain possession of the Meuse Heights, in the hope of defeating the co-operation between the British and the French. She thought that the loss of these heights would so weaken the French defence that the Britihs army would have to extend its lines, and all danger of a serious Allied offensive on the West would be removed. Her hope doubtless was to carry Verdun soon enough to be in time to force a settlement with Russia before the winter; but even if it took longer, the time she thought would be well spent, for if only she could be relieved of the fear of attack from

the West she had no doubt of her ability to settle with Russia. On the other hand, the Allies hoped by artful combination of their attacks so to wear down the German's man-power that some point in her lines would be fatally weakened. Such were the hopes on either side which emerged in the spring of 1916. Both sides were confident of success, for the Allies had recovered from the depression of the previous autumn; and though the Germans had suffered bitter disillusionments, nothing had yet happened to convince their General Staff that they would have to acknowledge defeat. Only now, even more than before, they felt that time was all-important to them. Germany might be in no danger of actual starvation owing to the increased stringency of the blockade, but the thousand and one inconveniences and hardships that it inflicted on the people took the bloom off all victories on land. A lean and hungry victory did not accord with the temper of modern Germany, or with her theories of war.

The war would have been lost twice over by now but for the British command of the sea. No defence of the Low Countries would have availed if the German fleet had been able to land troops on the French Channel coasts in rear of the defending armies. It would be as though the Gap of Belfort had stood open and defenceless. Nor could France or Russia have financed the war if the sea had been closed, and but for the fresh supplies of munitions from England, America, and Japan, the Russian armies would never have recovered from their defeats, and by this time would have been a defenceless mob. It is the more necessary to acknowledge the immeasurable debt that the Allies owed to the British navy, because its published annals at this time are so meagre and so lacking in decisive incident. The old professional seaservice was our greatest contribution to the war, but the army, because of its size, its ubiquity, and its enormous costliness, direct and indirect, almost shut the fleet out of the popular mind.

In this period the Continental ideas of war, so different from those which were traditional in England, gained a complete and almost unquestioned ascendancy. Compulsory service was adopted by an overwhelming majority in Parliament, and without any serious opposition in the country. More remarkable still, it was adopted almost without discussion either of the principle or of its practical necessity or value. Its necessity was taken to be selfevident, its value was left to be proved, and the only discussions of this which is perhaps the most tremendous revolution in our history, at any rate if measured by its effect on the every-day life of the people, turned on questions of its detailed application. The fact was that the tremendous success of the voluntary recruiting paved the way for its abandonment. So many people had enlisted voluntarily that the enlistment of the rest by compulsion presented itself to the popular mind rather as a measure of justice to the volunteers.

Appendices.

A.—THE EVACUATION OF GALLIPOLI.

The following is the despatch of Sir Charles Munro describing the evacuation of Gallipoli and the reasons for it, and is dated from the Headquarters of the First Army, France, March 6th:-

On the 20th October, in London, I received your Lordship's instructions to proceed as soon as possible to the Near East, and take over the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. My duty on arrival was in broad outline:—

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. My duty on arrival was in broad outline:—

(a) To report on the military situation on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

(b) To express an opinion whether on purely military grounds the Peninsula should be evacuated, or another attempt made to carry it.

(c) The number of troops that would be required (1) to carry the Peninsula, (2) to keep the Straits open, and (3) to take Constantinople.

The impressions I gathered are summarised very shortly as follows:—

The positions occupied by our troops presented a military situation unique in history. The mere fringe of the coastline had been secured. The beaches and piers upon which they depended for all requirements in personnel and material were exposed to registered and observed artillery fire. Our entrenchments were dominated almost throughout by the Turks. The possible artillery positions were insufficient and defective. The force, in short, held a line possessing every possible military defect. The position was without depth, the communications were insecure and dependent on the weather. No means existed for the concealment and deployment of fresh troops destined for the offensive—whilst the Turks enjoyed full powers of observation, abundant artillery positions, and they had been given the time to supplement the natural advantages which the position presented by all the devices at the disposal of the field engineer.

The State Of the Troops.

THE STATE OF THE TROOPS.

Another material factor came prominently

Another material factor came prominently before me. The troops on the Peninsula had suffered much from various causes.

(a) It was not in the first place possible to withdraw them from the shell-swept area as is done when necessary in France, for every corner on the Peninsula is exposed to heatile for

for every corner on the Peninsula is exposed to hostile fire.

(b) They were much enervated from the diseases which are endemic in that part of Europe in the summer.

(c) In consequence of the losses which they had suffered in earlier battles, there was a very grave dearth of officers competent to take command of men.

(d) In order to maintain the numbers needed to hold the front, the Territorial Divisions had been augmented by the attachment of Yeomanry and Mounted Brigades. Makeshifts of this nature very obviously did not tend to create efficiency.

NOTHING TO GAIN BY STAYING.

Other arguments, irrefutable in their conclusions, convinced me that a complete evacuation was the only wise course to

pursue.

(a) It was obvious that the Turks could hold us in front with a small force and prosecute their designs on Bagdad or Egypt,

(b) An advance from the positions we

(b) An advance from the positions we held could not be regarded as a reasonable military operation to expect.
(c) Even had we been able to make an advance in the Peninsula, our position would not have been ameliorated to any marked degree, and an advance on Constantinople was quite out of the question.

(d) Since we could not hope to achieve any purpose by remaining on the Peninsula, the appalling cost to the nation involved in consequence of embarking on an overseas

in consequence of embarking on an overseas expedition with no base available for the rapid transit of stores, supplies, and personnel make it urgent that we should divert the troops locked up on the Peninsula to a more useful theatre.

Since, therefore, I could see no military advantage in our continued occupation of positions on the Peninsula, I telegraphed to your Lordship that in my opinion the evacuation of the Peninsula should be taken in hand.

in hand.

I received approval that the two forces the Mediterranean should be designated as follows:

(a) The original Mediterranean Expedi-(a) The original Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, which comprised the forces operating on the Gallipoli Peninsula and those employed at Mudros and Imbros as the "Dardanelles Army," under Lieutenant-General Sir W. Birdwood, K.C.B., &c., with headquarters at Imbros.

(b) The troops destined for Salonika as the "Salonika Army," under Lieutenant-General Sir B. Mahon, K.C.B., with head-

quarters at Salonika.

SALONIKA ARMY.

SAI,ONIKA ARMY.

Early in October the Tenth Division, under Lieutenant-General Sir B. Mahon, K.C.B., was transferred from Suvla to Salonika, and fully concentrated there. The dislocation of units caused by the landing on the Peninsula, and the subsequent heavy fighting which occurred, prevented this division being despatched intact. The organisation of the infantry and the Royal Engineers was not disturbed, but the other services had to be improvised from other divisions as found most accessible.

The arrival of the Tenth Division had been

The arrival of the Tenth Division had been preceded by two French Divisions, under General Sarrail, whose force was subsequently augmented by another division. These three divisions were then moved into These three divisions were then moved into Servia under the understanding arranged between the Allied Governments, which was to the effect that the French forces were to protect the railway between Krivolak and Veles, and to ensure communication with the Servian army, whilst the British were to maintain the position from Salonika to Krivolak, and to support the French right. If communication with the Servian army could not be opened and maintained, the Allied forces were to be withdrawn.

The task of moving troops into Servia and maintaining them there presented many difficulties. No road exists from Salonika to Doiran; a few miles of road then obtains, which is followed within a few miles by a track only suitable for pack transport. Sir B. Mahon had therefore to readjust his transport to a pack scale, and was dependent on a railway of uncertain carrying power to convey back his guns and all wheeled traffic in case of a withdrawal, and to supply his troops whilst in Servia.

Very soon afterwards reinforcements commenced to arrive. The disembarkation of

troops whilst in Servia.

Very soon afterwards reinforcements commenced to arrive. The disembarkation of these new divisions was an operation which taxed the powers of organisation and resources of the staff at Salonika to the highest degree possible, and it speaks highly for their capacity that they were able to shelter and feed the troops as they arrived.

During November and the early part of December the Tenth Division was holding its position in Servia, and the disembarka-

tion of other divisions was proceeding with difficulty.

THE WITHDRAWAL.

The Withdrawal.

It had been evident for some time that the power of resistance of the Servian armies was broken, and that the Allied Forces could afford them no material assistance. It was also clear from all information received that the position of our troops was becoming daily more precarious owing to a large German-Bulgarian concentration in the Strumnitza Valley. I, therefore, again pressed General Sarrail to proceed with his withdrawal from the positions he was holding. The British Division operating as it was, as the pivot upon which the withdrawal was effected, was compelled to hold its ground until the French left was brought back.

Before our withdrawal was completed the Tenth Division was heavily attacked on the 6th, 7th, and 8th December by superior Bulgarian forces. The troops had suffered considerably from the cold in the highlands of Macedonia, and in the circumstances conducted themselves very creditably in being able to extricate themselves from a difficult position with no great losses. The account of this action was reported by wire to you by General Mahon on the 11th December; no further reference is, therefore, necessary to this incident.

Meanwhile, the operation of disembarkation at Salonika was being carried out with all possible speed, and the Greek authorities, through their representative from Athens, Colonel Pallis, were informed by me that we intended to proceed to the defensive line selected. This intimation was received in good part by the Greek generals. They commenced to withdraw their troops further to the east, where they did not hamper our plans, and they showed a disposition to meet our demands in a reasonable and friendly spirit.

Whilst dealing with the events above enumerated, I desire to give special prominence to the difficulties to which General Sir B. Mahon was exposed from the time of his landing at Salonika, and the ability which he displayed in overcoming them. [General Monro dwells on the extraordinary difficulties of transport, supply, &c., and trusts that "full It had been evident for some time that

THE DARDANELLES ARMY.

On my arrival in the Mediterranean of hy arrival in the Mediterranean theatre a gratifying decline in the high rate of sickness which had prevailed in the force during the summer months had become apparent. The wastage due to this cause still, however, remained very high.

On the 21st November the Peninsula was visited by a storm, said to be nearly unpre-

wood, commanding the Dardanelles army to prepare a scheme to this end, in order that all details should be ready in case of

This problem with which we were con-fronted was the withdrawal of an army of

This problem with which we were confronted was the withdrawal of an army of a considerable size from positions in no cases more than 300 yards from the enemy's trenches, and its embarkation on open beaches, every part of which were within effective range of Turkish guns, and from which in winds from the south or south-west the withdrawal of troops was not possible.

According to text-book principles, and the lessons to be gathered from history, it seemed essential that this operation of evacuation should be immediately preceded by a combined naval and military feint in the vicinity of the Peninsula, with a view to distracting the attention of the Turks from our intention. When endeavouring to work out into concrete fact how such principles could be applied to the situation of our forces, I came to the conclusion that our chances of success were infinitely more probable if we made no departure of any kind from the normal life which we were following both on sea and on land. A feint which did not fully fulfil its purpose would have been worse than useless.

ANZAC AND SUVI.A EVACUATION

On the 8th December, consequent on your Lordship's orders. I directed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to Omeer Commanding Dardanelles Army to proceed with the Evacuation of Suvla and Anzac at once. Rapidity of action was imperative, having in view the unsettled weather which might be expected in the Ægean. The success of our operations was entirely dependent on weather conditions. . . Lieutenant-General Birday and Taxacadad on require of his orders. wood proceeded on receipt of his orders with the skill and promptitude which is characteristic of all that he undertakes. with the skill and promptitude which is characteristic of all that he undertakes, and after consultation with Rear-Admiral Wemyss it was decided, provided the weather was propitious, to complete the evacuation on the night of the 19th-20th December.

Throughout the period 10th to 18th December the withdrawal proceeded under the most auspicious conditions, and the morning of the 18th December found the positions both at Anzac and Suvla reduced to the numbers determined, while the evacuation of guns, animals, stores, and supplies had continued most satisfactorily.

THE GUNS AND SUPPLIES LEFT.

The successful final withdrawal during

The successful final withdrawal during the night of December 19-20 is then briefly described, but with little or no indication of how it was done. General Munro adds:—At Anzac, four 18-pounder guns, two 5-inch howitzers, one 4.7 naval gun, one anti-aircraft, and two 3-pounder Hotchkiss guns were left, but they were destroyed before the troops finally embarked. In addition, 56 mules, a certain number of carts, mostly stripped of their wheels, and some supplies, which were set on fire, were also abandoned. At Suvla, every gun, vehicle, and animal was embarked, and all that remained was a small stock of supplies, which were burnt.

THE POINT OF THE PENINSULA.

The Point of the Peninsula.

Early in December orders had been issued for the withdrawal of the French troops on Helles, other than their artillery. On the 21st December the number of the French garrison doing duty on the Peninsula was reduced to 4,000 men. These it was hoped to relieve early in January, but before doing so it was necessary to give some respite from trench work to the Forty-second Division, which was badly in need of a rest. My intention, therefore, was first to relieve Division, which was badly in need of a rest. My intention, therefore, was first to relieve the Forty-second Division by the Eighty-eighth Brigade, then to bring up the Thirteenth Division, which was resting at Imbros, since the evacuation of Suvla, in place of the Twenty-ninth Division, and finally to bring up the Eleventh Division in relief of the French. Helles would then be held by the Fifty-second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Divisions, with the Royal Naval Division and the Forty-second Division in reserve on adjacent islands. reserve on adjacent islands.

On 28th December your Lordship's tele-

gram ordering the evacuation of Helles was received, whereupon, in view of the possi-

bility of bad weather intervening, I instructed the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army to complete the operation as rapidly as possible. He was reminded that every effort conditional on not exposing the personnel to undue risk should be made to save all 60-pounder and 18-pounder guns, 6 inch and 4.5 howitzers, with their ammunition and other accessiving such as o inch and 4.5 howitzers, with their ammunition and other accessories, such as mules and A.T. carts, limbered waggons, &c. In addition, I expressed my wish that the final evacuation should be completed in one night, and that the troops should withdraw direct from the front trenches to the beaches, and not occupy any intermediate position unless seriously molested.

IDEA OF A FEINT DISCARDED.

At a meeting which was attended by the Vice-Admiral and the General Officer Commanding Dardanelles Army I explained the course which I thought we should adopt to again deceive the Turks as to our intentions. The situation on the Peninsula had not materially changed owing to our withdrawal from Suvla and Anzac, except that there was a marked increased activity in aerial reconnaissance over our positions and the islands of Mudron and Turk. aerial reconnaissance over our positions and the islands of Mudros and Imbros, and that hostile patrolling of our trenches was more frequent and daring. The most apparent factor was that the number of heavy guns on the European and Asiatic shores had been considerably augmented, and that these guns were more liberally supplied with German ammunition, the result of which was that our beaches were continuously shelled, especially from the Asiatic shore.

I gave it as my opinion that in my judg-ment I did not regard a feint as an operation offering any prospect of success. Time, the uncertainty of weather conditions in the Ægean, the absence of a suitable locality, and the withdrawal of small craft from the and the withdrawal of small craft from the main issue for such an operation were some of the reasons which influenced me in the decision at which I arrived. With the concurrence of the Vice-Admiral, therefore, it was decided the navy should do their utmost to pursue a course of retaliation against the Turkish batteries, but to refrain from any unusually aggressive attitude should the Turkish guns remain quiescent.

SIR W. BIRDWOOD'S PLANS.

General Sir W. Birdwood had, in anticipation of being ordered to evacuate Helles.

pation of being ordered to evacuate Helles, made such complete and far-seeing arrangements that he was able to proceed without delay to the issue of the comprehensive orders which the consummation of such a delicate operation in war requires.

He primarily arranged with General Brulard, who commanded the French forces on the Peninsula, that in order to escape the disadvantages of divided command in the final stage the French infantry should be relieved as early as possible, but that their artillery should pass under the orders the final stage the French infantry should be relieved as early as possible, but that their artillery should pass under the orders of the General Officer Commanding Eighth Corps, and be withdrawn concurrently with the British guns at the opportune moment.

On the 30th December, in consequence of the instructions I had received from the Chief of the General Staff to hand over my command at Alexandria to Lieutenants.

command at Alexandria to Lieutenant-General Sir A. Murray, who, it was stated, was to leave England on the 28th December, was to leave England on the Zoth December, I broke up my headquarters at Mudros and proceeded with a small staff, comprising representatives of the General Staff, the Quartermaster-General and Adjutant-General branches, on H.M.S. Cornwallis to Alexandria

In the meantime the evacuation, following the same system as was practised at Suvla and Anzac, proceeded without delay. The French infantry remaining on the Peninsula were relieved on the night of the 1st-2nd January, and were embarked by the French navy on the following nights. Progress, however, was slower than had been hoped, owing to delays caused by accident and the weather. One of our largest horse ships was sunk by a French battleship, whereby the withdrawal was considerably retarded, and at the same time strong winds sprang up which interfered materially with work on the beaches. The character of the weather now setting in offered so little hope of a calm period of any duration, that General In the meantime the evacuation, following

Sir W. Birdwood arranged with Admiral Sir J. de Robeck for the assistance of some J. de Robeck for the assistance of some destroyers in order to accelerate the progress of re-embarkation. They then determined to fix the final stage of the evacuation for the 8th January, or for the first fine night after that date.

KEEPING UP THE OFFENSIVE.

Meanwhile, the Eighth Corps had maintained the offensive spirit in bombing and minor operations with which they had established the moral superiority they enjoyed over the enemy. On the 20th December the Fifty-second Division completed the excellent work which they had

enjoyed over the enemy. On the 20th December the Fifty-second Division completed the excellent work which they had been carrying out for so long by capturing a considerable portion of the Turkish trenches, and by successfully holding these in the face of repeated counter-attacks. The shelling of our trenches and beaches, however, increased in frequency and intensity, and the average daily casualties continued to increase.

The method of evacuation adopted by Lieutenant-General Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B., commanding Eighth Corps, followed in general outline that which had proved successful in the northern zone. As the removal of the whole of the heavy guns capable of replying to the enemy's artillery would have indicated our intentions to the enemy, it was decided to retain, but eventually destroy, one 6-inch British gun and six French heavy guns of old pattern which it would be impossible to remove on the last night. General Brulard himself suggested the destruction of these French guns.

THE EMBARKATION DEFENCES.

The first step taken as regards the with-drawal of the troops was the formation of a strong embarkation staff and the preparation of positions covering the landings, in which small garrisons could maintain themselves against attack for a short time should

selves against attack for a short time should the enemy become aware of our intention and follow up the movement.

Major-General the Hon. H. A. Lawrence, commanding the Fifty-second Division, was selected to take charge of all embarkation operations. At the same time the services of various staff officers were placed at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding Eighth Corps, and they rendered very valuable assistance.

The General Officer Commanding Thir-

The General Officer Commanding Thirteenth Division selected and prepared a position covering Gully Beach. Other lines position covering Guny Beach. Other lines were selected and entrenched, covering the remainder of the beaches from the sea north of Seddil-Bahr to "X" Beach inclusive. Garrisons were detailed for these defences, those at Gully Beach being under the General Officer Commanding Thirteenth Division, and those covering the remainder of the beaches being placed under the command of a selected officer, whose head-quarters were established at an early date, together with those of the General Officer Commanding Embarkation, at Corps Head-

As the withdrawing troops passed within the line of these defences they came under the orders of the General Officer Commanding Embarkation, which were conveyed to them by his staff officers at each

In addition to these beach defences four In addition to these beach detences rour lines of defence were arranged, three being already in existence and strongly wired. The fourth was a line of posts extending from De Tott's Battery on the east to the position covering Gully Beach on the west.

The time fixed for the last parties to leave the front trouches was 11-15 p.m., in order

the time fixed for the last parties to leave the front trenches was 11-45 p.m., in order to permit the majority of the troops being already embarked before the front line was vacated. It was calculated that it would take between two and three hours for them to reach the beaches, at the conclusion of which time the craft to embark them would be ready.

The naval arrangements for embarkation

were placed in the hands of Captain C. M. Staveley, R.N., assisted by a staff of naval officers at each place of embarkation.

A TURKISH "FIZZI,E."

On the 7th January the enemy developed heavy artillery fire on the trenches held by

the Thirteenth Division, while the Asiatic guns shelled those occupied by the Royal Naval Division. The bombardment, which was reported to be the heaviest experienced was reported to be the neaviest experienced until 5 p.m., and was intensive between 3 p.m. and 3-30. Considerable damage was done to our parapets and communication trenches, and telephone communications were interrupted. At 3-30 p.m. two Turkish mines were sprung near Fusilier Bluff, and the Turkish trenches were seen to be full of men, whom their officers appeared be full of men, whom their officers appeared to be urging to the assault. No attack, however, was developed, except against Fusilier Bluff, where a half-hearted assault was quickly repulsed.

Our shortage of artillery at this time was amply compensated for by the support received from fire of the supporting squadron under Captain D. L. Dent, R.N. Our casualties amounted to two officers and fifty-six other ranks killed, and four officers and 102 other ranks wounded.

IN THREE TRIPS.

The 8th of January was a bright, calm day, with a light breeze from the south. There was every indication of the continuance of favourable conditions, and, in the opinion of the meteorological officer, no important change was to be expected for at least twenty-four hours. The Turkish artillery were unusually inactive. All preparations for the execution of the final stage

were complete.

The embarkation was fixed at such an hour that the troops detailed for the first trip might be able to leave their positions after dark. The second trip was timed so that at least a greater portion of the troops for this trip would, if all went well, be embarked before the final parties had left the front trenches. The numbers to be embarked at the first trip were fixed by the maximum that could be carried by the craft available, those of the second trip being reduced in order to provide for the possibility of casualties occurring amongst the craft required to carry them.

The numbers for the third trip consisted only of the parties left to hold front trenches to the last, together with the garrisons of the beach defences, the naval and military beach personnel, and such R.E. personnel as might be required to effect the necessary repairs to any piers or harbour works that might be damaged.

RISING WIND AND A SUBMARINE.

About 7 p.m. the breeze freshened con-lerably from the south-west, the most unfavourable quarter, but the first trip, timed for 8 p.m., was despatched without difficulty. The wind, however, continued difficulty. The wind, however, continued to rise until, by 11 p.m., the connecting pier between the hulks and the shore at "W" beach was washed away by heavy seas, and further embarkation into destroyers from these hulks became impracticable. In spite of these difficulties the second trips, which commenced at 11-30 p.m., were carried out well up to time, and the embarkation of guns continued uninterruptedly.

Early in the evening reports had been received from the right flank that a hostile submarine was believed to be moving down the Straits, and about midnight H.M.S. Prince George, which had embarked 2,000 men, and was sailing for Mudros, reported she was struck by a torpedo which failed to explode. The indications of the presence of a submarine added considerably to the anxiety for the safety of the troop carriers and made it necessary for the Vice-Admiral to modify the arrangements made for the subsequent bombardment of the evacuated

positions.

At 1-50 a.m. Gully Beach reported that the embarkation at that beach was complete, and that the lighters were about to push off, but at 2-10 a.m. a telephone message was received that one of the lighters was aground and could not be refloated. The N.T.O. at once took all possible steps to have another lighter sent in to Gully Beach, and this was as a matter of fact done within an hour, but in the meantime, at 2-30 a.m., it was decided to move the 100 men who had been relanded from the grounded lighter to "W" Beach and emFrom 2-40 a.m. the steadily increasing swell caused the N.T.O. the greatest anxiety as to the possibility of embarking the remainder of the troops if their arrival was much deferred.

BURNING STORES AND EXPLOSIONS AWAKE THE ENEMY.

At 3-30 a.m. the evacuation was complete, and abandoned heaps of stores and supplies were successfully set on fire by time fuses after the last man had embarked Two magazines of ammunition and explosives were also successfully blown up at 4 These conflagrations were apparently the first intimation received by the Turks that we had withdrawn. Red lights were immediately discharged from the enemy's trenches, and heavy artillery fire opened on our trenches and beaches. This shelling was maintained until about 6-30 a.m.

Apart from four unserviceable fifteen-pounders which had been destroyed earlier in the month, ten worn-out fifteen-pounders, one six-inch Mark VII. gun, and six old heavy French guns, all of which were pre-viously blown up, were left on the Peninsula. In addition to the above, 508 animals, most of which were destroyed, and a number of vehicles and considerable quantities of stores, material, and supplies, all of which were destroyed by burning, had to be abandoned.

It would have been possible, of course, by entending the period during which the process of evacuation proceeded to have educed the quantity of stores and material that was left behind on the Peninsula, but not to the degree that may seem apparent at first sight. Our chances of enjoying a continuity of fine weather in the Ægean were very slender in the month of January; it was indeed a contingency that had to be reckoned with that we might very probably be visited by a spell of bad weather which would cut us off completely from the Peninsula for a fortnight, or perhaps for even longer.

Supplies, ammunition, and material to a certain degree had therefore to be left to the last moment for fear of the isolation of the garrison at any moment when the evacuation might be in progress.

SKILL OF COMMANDERS AND STAFF.

The entire evacuation of the Peninsula had now been completed. It demanded for its successful realisation two important military essentials, viz., good luck and skilled disciplined organisation, and they were both forthcoming to a marked degree at the hour needed. Our luck was in the ascendant by the marvellous spell of calm weather which prevailed. But we were able to turn to the fullest advantage these

accidents of fortune.
Lieutenant-General Sir W. Birdwood and his Corps Commanders elaborated and prepared the orders in reference to the evacuation with a skill, competence, and courage which could not have been surpassed, and we had a further stroke of good fortune in being associated with Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck, K.C.B., Vice-Admiral Wemys and a body of naval officers whose work remained throughout this anxious period at that standard of accuracy and professional ability which is beyond the power of criticism or cavil.

The Line of Communication Staff, both naval and military, represented respectively by Lieutenant-General E. A. Altham, C.B., C.M.G., Commodore M. S. FitzMaurice, R.N., principal naval transport officer, and Captain H. V. Simpson, R.N., superintending transport officer, contributed to the supers of the apparation by their nutrition the success of the operation by their untiring zeal and conspicuous ability.

The members of the Headquarters Staff showed themselves, without exception, to be officers with whom it was a privilege to be associated; their competence, zeal, and devotion to duty were uniform and unbroken.

A PICTURE OF THE SUPPLY DIFFICULTIES.

Before concluding this inadequate account the events which happened during my tenure of command of the forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, I desire to give a brief explanation of the work which was

carried out on the line of communications, and to place on record my appreciation of the admirable work rendered by the officers responsible for this important service.

Ön the Dardanelles Peninsula it may be said that the whole of the machinery by which the text-books contemplate the maintenance and supply of an army was non-existent. The zone commanded by the enemy's guns extended not only to the landing-places on the Peninsula, but even over the sea in the vicinity. The beaches were the advanced depôts

and refilling points at which the services of supply had to be carried out under artillery The landing of stores, as well as of troops, was only possible under cover of darkness.

The sea, the ships, lighters, and tugs took, in fact, the place of railways and roads, with their railway trains, mechanical transport, &c., but with this difference, that the use of the latter is subject only to the intervention of the enemy, while that of the former was dependent on the weather.

Between the beaches and the base at Alexandria, 800 miles to the south, the line of communications had but two harbours, Kephalos Bay on the island of Imbros, fifteen miles roughly from the beaches, and Mudros Bay at a distance of 60 miles. In neither were there any piers, breakwaters, wharves, or storehouses of any description before the advent of the troops. On the shores of these two bays there were no roads of any military value, or buildings fit for military usage. The water supply at these islands was, until developed, totally inadequate for our needs.

THE SUBMARINE DANGER.

These difficulties were accentuated by the advent of submarines in the Ægean Sea, on account of which the Vice-Admiral deemed it necessary to prohibit any transport or store ship exceeding 1,500 tons proceeding north of Mudros, and although this rule was relaxed in the case of supply ships proceeding within the netted area of Suvla, it necessitated the transhipment of practically all reinforcements, stores, and supplies other than those for Suvla—into small ships in Mudros Harbour.
At Suvla and Anzac disembarkation could

only be effected by lighters and tugs. for all personnel and material there was at least one transhipment, and for the greater portion of both two transhipments

Yet, notwithstanding the difficulties which have been set forth above, the army was well maintained in equipment and ammunition. It was well fed, it received its full supply of winter clothing at the beginning of December. The evacuation of the sick and wounded was carried out with the minimum of inconvenience, and the provision of hospital accommodation for them on the Dardanelles line of communica-tion and elsewhere in the Mediterranean met all requirements

The officers responsible were fortunate in being associated in their onerous and anxious task with a most competent and highly-trained Naval Staff. The members of the two staffs worked throughout in perfect harmony and cordiality, and it was owing to their joint efforts that the require-ments of the troops were so well responded

APPENDIX B.

The following are the changes in the Income Tax made during the passage of the Finance Bill through Committee

On uncarned income the rate of 3s. in the pound is extended from incomes up to £300 to those up to £500. A reduction of od, is also made in the rates on incomes up to £1,500. Where a person's whole income does not exceed £500, and consists entirely of dividends on which tax has been deducted at source, half-yearly repayments of the excess deduction, instead of yearly ones, will be made. A concession in the same spirit is also made to some others, and a further reduction in rates is given to officers whose income exceeds £300 a year but is not more than £1,500.

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